Probing the Boundaries
Innovative Dialogue

Understanding Violence: Contexts and Portrayals

Edited by

Marika Guggisberg and David Weir

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Understanding Violence

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The Hostility and Violence Hub
'Violence and the Contexts of Hostility'

Understanding Violence:
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Understanding Violence

Marika Guggisberg and David Weir

1.   Introduction

Since the very dawn of time earthly existence has been inexorably attended by the threat of violence. Our distant nomadic ancestors endured the destructive wrath of intermittently unleashed elemental forces well before the commencement of civilisation. Yet the destruction wrought by fire, wind, water and earth, though it has remained spectacular in its scope and scale throughout the development of increasingly complex forms of human cohesion, is now secondary to the violence to which these forms have given rise.

Within the social realm, violence is used in many different contexts, inflicting harm upon individuals, communities, cultures and physical environments.[1] Indeed, violence appears to be omnipresent, underlying a host of individual, institutional and social practices in contemporary society.

Violence takes many forms, some of them overt, and some less obvious. The use of 'reasonable' physical force under certain circumstances and within certain culturally defined norms has long been deemed appropriate by those empowered both to define those norms and to apply the force.[2] However, what constitutes 'reasonable' force in one culture may not necessarily apply in another. Moreover, within any one culture, the question of when it is, or is not, permissible to use force, is dependent upon subjectivities that may be born of a variety of social, political, ideological and religious influences. Similarly, subjective understandings of what constitutes 'appropriate' behaviour in a particular situation inevitably lead to other, less overt forms of violence, which almost invariably tend to be constituted by some form of interference with the autonomy of individuals and/or communities.

Questions then arise: when is violence deemed appropriate and reasonable and when does its use pose a problem for individuals, communities, and the environment?

Violent acts and the variety of different forms of violence, its causes, consequences and developmental patterns have only recently come under the gaze of academia.[3] Since then, these categories have formed the grounds for many different theoretical frameworks. More recently, the focus of attention has also been upon investigating opportunities to prevent the occurrence of violence.

Given its global reach and multifarious expressions, the subject of violence invites study from a variety of perspectives and locations. An

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interdisciplinary approach to collecting and analysing information on violence yields broader patterns of its occurrence, thereby allowing more insightful conceptualisations of its nature.

Violence perpetrated against individuals, communities, and the environment is all too often condoned and reinforced by individuals in positions of power along with power structures, either implicitly or explicitly. Whether violence is embedded in racial, national or interpersonal disputes, or is enacted through representations in art, literature, or the media, its investigation from the perspectives of different disciplines provides opportunities to challenge myths and stereotypes held by scholars, professionals in the field and the public. Violence prevention must challenge the different contexts of violence, which is a goal we believe is achievable.

Expanding the knowledge-base on violence and its prevention proceeds from a diverse set of papers that were presented at the 7th Probing the Boundaries - *Violence in the Context of Hostility* conference in Budapest, Hungary from 5 - 7 May 2008. This eBook provides a 'snapshot' of some of the papers as they were presented at the conference, which offered a platform for scholars from all over the world and multiple disciplines to consider both existing and potential problems and prevention efforts. It is our contention that from this convergence of scholarly thought upon the potential harmfulness of violence in all of its embodiments, both explicit and implicit, a better understanding of the many different forms and patterns of violence may be gained. This, we argue, may have implications for prevention and intervention efforts.

From the vantage points of their respective disciplines, the authors represented in this eBook interrogated the logics of state-sanctioned violence, teased out translucent filaments of covertly exercised violence, and questioned the social and economic mechanisms by which violence is constructed and maintained. The articles presented here highlight some ongoing efforts to counter violence in its many forms. In doing so, they emphasise the need for communication between different disciplines on a global rather than a local level. From these articles it becomes evident that intervention and prevention efforts should be informed by evidence from different geographic locations and multiple disciplines, implying that interdisciplinary and international cooperation are key elements for developing strategies to combat violence in its various occurrences.

2.   Overview of this eBook
In Chapter 1, "Deconstructing Representations of Violence in Art, Literature, and the Media," authors examine both representations of violence and violent representations that appear in cultural texts. Their analyses reveal how cultural producers may infix broader cultural attitudes within forms such as literature, film, the visual arts and the news media. Some authors pierce

the opacity of such representations to reveal how public opinion may be simultaneously reflected and shaped by these culturally encoded messages, which may be revealing of, and designed to maintain prejudices based on gender and/or ethnicity. Others tease out threads of meaning woven through the fabric of cultural attitudes to violence, analysing the complex relationship between a society's attitudes towards violence and its reception of portrayals of violence.

First, Gabrielle Murray, in "Post 9/11 and Screen Violence" examines claims from within the public domain and critical literature of a causal link between the heightened visibility of actual violence in the post-9/11 period - due to the intense media coverage of the 9/11 attacks and their aftermath - and representations of explicit violence in the cinema. Pointing to the 'speculative' nature of claims of a naturalisation of screen violence as a 'media effect,' Murray interrogates a number of assertions made within the screen violence debate, finally concluding that this debate might in itself be of secondary importance to that which it may serve to obscure: objective analysis of 'symbolic' and 'systemic' violence.

In her essay "Arabs and Muslims in Hollywood: Breaking Down the Siege," Kenza Oumlil also examines screen representations of violence, here drawing the focus in upon a single film. Through a textual analysis of the script of the highly successful Hollywood thriller *The Seige*, Oumlil problematises the film's construction of Arab and Muslim identity. Repeated characterisations of Arabs and Muslims as terrorists are seen to implicate *The Seige* as a tool of Orientalist discourse that casts Arabs and Muslims as charmingly 'exotic' yet ultimately dangerous 'others.' More than merely providing entertainment for its targeted Western audiences, the film is shown to serve a 'demonising' function that justifies ongoing Western violence to Arabs and Muslims in Afghanistan and Iraq.

In "Nostalgic Violence? Neo-Victorian (Re-)Visions of Historical Conflict," Marie-Luise Kohlke explores 19th century violence and conflict as depicted in the emergent sub-genre of what she calls 'the neo-Victorian trauma novel.' Making reference to Julian Rathbone's *The Mutiny* as an exemplar of the form, Kohlke poses the question: why, in an age that is replete with endlessly propagated mass mediated images of violence and suffering, does the neo-Victorian trauma novel attract such avid readerships? In attempting to answer this question she gives consideration to a number of arguments, discussing the role that history and nostalgia play in our perception of violence. The author concludes by suggesting that the nostalgic trauma novel can facilitate readings of history that are nuanced with honest recognition of the brutality and violence that has preceded us, and that such knowledge may equip us more readily for dealing with violence.

Next, Mine Gencel Bek and Abdülrezak Altun report on a study that problematises the representation of domestic violence in the Turkish media.

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In "Media, Women and Domestic Violence in Turkey," the authors point to the persistence of high levels of domestic violence in Turkey - despite recent efforts of government and non-government organisations to counter its occurrence. They partly attribute these high levels to engrained attitudes within Turkish society - attitudes that the print media help shape and maintain through representations of domestic violence. Reporting on their content analysis of major Turkish newspapers, the authors identify a range of factors that can be seen to feed misogynist attitudes in Turkey.

In "Racist Violence Attacks on Foreigners, Mass-Media and Fear of Crime," Hakan Arikan extends the focus on the media's shaping of attitudes to enquire into the possible construction of fearfulness through particular modes of reporting crime. He questions the media's role in creating perceptions that do not necessarily reflect reality by studying the relationship between actual criminal victimisation and fear of crime in the racially diverse European Union. Arikan argues that although the media can be identified as consistently emphasising crimes of physical violence, the attribution of these crimes to racist motives may be overstated in some cases, or understated in others. He concludes that responsible, accurate reporting of crime is essential to the cultivation of realistic levels of caution against crime in citizens.

Continuing with the topic of media representation of violence, in "Symbolic and Discursive Violence in Media Representations of Aboriginal Missing and Murdered Women," Yasmin Jiwani examines Canadian press coverage of missing and murdered Aboriginal women. Drawing upon seven years of records as reported in Canadian newspaper *The Daily Mail*, she brings to light the discursive and symbolic violence that mediates representations of Aboriginal women. Jiwani traces the historical roots of colonialist constructions of Aboriginal women as prostitutes, then shows how these constructions are used to form 'templates' through which contemporary Aboriginal women may be cast as inherently violent, drug-prone, inassimilable 'others'.

Mª Dolores Villaverde Solar and Elena Alfaya Lamas shift the focus away from the media and onto fine art. In "Different Violence and Intimidation Representations Against Women in Arts from the 16th to the 20th Centuries," they critically analyse a number of paintings and sculptures from the sixteenth century to the present, revealing their misogynist subtexts. Examining both religious and secular topics, the authors highlight iconic visual depictions of women - as prostitutes, as victims of rape and as objects of male desire, and show how these representations either tacitly or explicitly denigrate women.

In "Representations of Violence in Contemporary South African Fiction," Zuzana Luckay examines the violent legacy of South Africa's apartheid policy. Through her analysis of Damon Galgut's novel *The Good Doctor*, Luckay points to the ambiguities and over-simplified binarisms of

apartheid, a system that endured for decades by precluding the possibility of relativising the complex mechanisms and relationships that exist in a multi-ethnic society.

In Chapter 2, "Ethnic-based Violence," authors deal with past and present hostilities that have arisen through differences in ethnicity. Ethnic-based conflicts are notoriously intractable; here, their depth and complexity is revealed and explained in the context of both their historical and ideological roots, and contemporary political configurations.

First, Daniel Meier considers the forces that sustain enmity between Israel and the Lebanese organisation, Hisbullah. In "The Intimacy of Enmity: the Hizbullah-Israel Relation," Meier proposes an interdependency between the two actors in the Middle East; the identity of each being, in part, constituted by its enmity toward the other. By tracing the beginnings of the conflict and its subsequent development, he shows how each actor, in a sense, 'is dependent upon the other.'

In "The Struggle for Survival and Security in the Middle East: An Ethnological Observation of Public Discourse in Israel," Aide Esu reflects on the construction of public discourse in relation to military security. Drawing upon field work conducted on a security-centred travel tour in Israel, she reveals the symbolic and discursive strategies by which the tour operators enunciate a national identity for Israel - as a state 'struggling for survival and security' in its region.

Next, Rasim Özgür Dönmez and Pınar Enneli trace the shifting shapes of the PKK (Kurdistan Workers Party) in Turkey in "The Changing Logic of Political Violence: The Case of the PKK in Turkey after the Invasion of Iraq - Violence for Violence's Sake." The authors note that the PKK's aim of forming a Kurdish state was pursued with the use of violence but enjoyed strong grassroots support across Turkey, due partly to the state's repression of Kurds. They show how this support was lost, due to national and international political conditions and ruptures within the organisation. This dislocation from original goals sees the PKK moving from what may subjectively be called 'political violence,' which pursues a goal of emancipation and autonomy for a people, into 'terrorism,' aimed at the mere survival of the organisation.

Roland Clark then exposes the power of the printed word to create communities, in "Printing a Pogrom: Violence and Print Communities in the Case of Captain Keller." Through an examination of historical documents, the author relates the story of a 1927 outbreak of violence by ultra-nationalist students against Jews in northern Romania. In doing so, he observes how representations of the violence in newspaper reports, police memoranda and diplomatic documents served to galvanise anti-Semitic communities of violence, hastening their transformation into a viable social movement.

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Chapter 3, "Subliminal Violence," presents four essays that bring to light forms of violence which operate tacitly: either behind regulatory functions of the state, or, as in "Preventing 'Ideal' Communication by Linguistic Violence," within language. The latter paper, by Gabriela Scripnic, Alina Ganea and Anca Gâţă, introduces the concept of 'linguistic violence,' which may operate overtly through the use of words that are inherently violent, or covertly through strategies that frame communications in discursive settings that will cause them to be received as hurtful or offensive. The authors analyse how linguistic violence functions by proposing a general model of 'ideal' communication, against which they appraise linguistic data collected from a television talk show broadcast on the Romanian National TV Channel.

In the next essay, "The Promise of Violence: Closed Circuit Television and the Contemporary Construction of Governmentality," Jeff Heydon interrogates the motives behind the increasingly pervasive practice of surveillance. Using Foucault's notion of governmentality and Weber's claim of the state's monopoly on the use of violence, he argues that CCTV - touted by governments and municipalities as a method of crime (and thus, violence) prevention - is actually a component of the exercise of violence over a population.

Then, in "Domesticating' Violence in Interwar Romania," Corina Pălăşan traces the medicalisation of the field of criminology. In Europe at the beginning of the 20th century, she argues, new models of scientific reasoning were adapted to European criminology, which resulted in the medical concepts of 'isolation,' 'prevention' and 'eradication' entering penal codifications. Tracing these developments in interwar Romania as a case study, Pălăşan depicts the features and intellectual sources of violence as 'disease'.

Finally, in "'Resurrecting' the Self: Atomising the Individual via Solitary Confinement," Siyaves Azeri takes as his starting point an extreme form of solitary confinement practiced by the Islamic regime of Iran, known as 'resurrection'. He questions the goals of 'resurrection' by analysing it within the broader context of isolation techniques applied to the incarcerated. The isolated prisoner, the author claims, is not rehabilitated, as proponents of the practice maintain, but rendered an irrevocable 'other' by the atomising of the self.

In Chapter 4, "Victims of Violence," authors draw attention to the recipients of various forms of violence. Individually, these essays direct spotlights onto different contemporary sites of violence across the globe. Collectively, they acknowledge the ongoing primary and secondary effects of violence, which may be felt by individuals, families, communities and even societies over generations.

Beginning this chapter, Cassandra Clifford examines the use of rape as a tool of war. In her essay, "Rape as a Weapon of War: The Long Term Effects on Victims and Society," she considers the powerful 'ripple' effect of rape in the war context, showing how the offence casts a web of suffering that spreads far beyond the individual victims, ensnaring families, communities, and eventually, entire cultures in trauma and dysfunction for up to several generations. Even perpetrators are seen to be sometimes caught up in this web, spreading further suffering after returning home from war. The author concludes by proposing recommendations for ending the practice, all of which must begin with a redressing of the stereotypes that sustain the gender inequalities that allow and excuse the practice of rape as a weapon of war.

Next, Marika Guggisberg presents preliminary findings of an Australian study examining relationship violence and associations with risk behaviour. In "Mental Health and Substance Use Problems: the 'Invisible' Scars of Intimate Partner Violence Victimisation," the author examines complex interactions of female victimisation by a current or former intimate partner with women's use of alcohol and other drugs, which have been found to increase the risk of further victimisation. Guggisberg presents two case studies illustrating the effects of alcohol and other drug use in the context of intimate partner violence. Given the complexity of the relationships between women's victimisation and their psychological and behavioural responses, the author hopes the study, upon completion, will contribute to further collaborative efforts across social, health, and criminal justice areas in assisting abused women and their children.

In "How Does Mothers' Sexual Abuse Trauma Beget Trauma in Daughters? The Constellation of Mother Complex," Neringa Grigutytė examines the repetition of experiences of sexual abuse over generations. Her work, grounded in C. G. Jung's analytical psychology theory, acknowledges both a deep predisposition for the experience of sexual abuse, and the higher likelihood of women with 'negative mother complex' experiencing such abuse. Against this theoretical background the author analyses the processes underlying the 'cycle of victimisation' over generations that has been documented in the empirical literature.

Jane Welsh then highlights the phenomenon of acid attacks in "Powerful, Educated and Immune from Justice: Contemporary Cambodian *Vitrioleuses*." The author examines the occurrence of this form of violence in Cambodia, where it is largely an offence committed against women, by women. She brings to light the cultural and societal processes that tend to ascribe culpability to victims, thereby indirectly granting perpetrators impunity. These processes are underpinned by issues of power, gender imbalance, inequality, corruption and traditional beliefs.

In "The Land of Oz: Youth Gangs and Child Soldiers," Melissa Zisler examines the recruitment and abduction of children to serve in gangs and paramilitary operations around the world. In seeking understandings of how and why children join or are abducted to serve in these violent collectives, the author first analyses the commonalities between gangs and child soldiers. She then examines the societal frameworks within which children may be attracted to, or forcibly inducted into, such groups.

Completing the volume, Chapter 5, "Attempts at Countering Violence," brings to light some specific efforts to counter violence. The authors, writing on efforts that emanate from such diverse sites as politics, literature, music and non-government organisations, both reflect upon and celebrate small yet significant expressions of resistance to power that is made manifest through its application of repressive violent force.

First, David Weir introduces a relatively new form of musical anti-war protest in "Mashing Power: Musical Imaginings of the Unimaginable." The author, as a practitioner of political mashup - which musically recontextualises the recorded speech of politicians - traces the form's evolution before theoretically framing his own mashup creations within Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri's concepts of 'Empire' and the 'Multitude'. He positions his musical works as counter-hegemonic examples of agency within the complex and violence-legitimating milieu of global capitalism; employing non-violent themes, home studio production and non-pecuniary internet distribution he argues that the works envision and invoke alternative paradigms of cultural production and consumption.

Then, in "Günter Grass - His Commitment Against Violence," Cornelia Caseau highlights the untiring efforts of Günter Grass, winner of the Nobel Prize for literature in 1999, to oppose violence. The author catalogues the many instances in which Grass, throughout his long career, spoke out, wrote and acted in ways that espoused peace, protected and defended the rights of the marginalised, and fought against the violence of injustice and poverty.

In "The Rhetoric of Violence in African Literature," Oumar Diop takes as his starting point Foucault's concepts of rhetorical violence, which see violence as a set of political, ideological, cultural, and discursive strategies employed by dominant powers. The author reveals how the writings of Alex Laguma and Sony Labou Tansi present a counter-discourse to the violence constructed in the socio-political arena. He shows how the two authors - one through the graphic portrayal of 'otherising' strategies, the other by using satire and ridicule - undermine the power and authenticity of imposed repressive rule.

Finally, in "The Role of NGOs in Promoting Children's Participation in Domestic Violence Prevention," Monica Denomy reports on the organisation *Plan International*, whose children- and youth-focused work

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on domestic violence prevention and awareness-raising has brought to light valuable knowledge concerning the vulnerability of children to violence in Latin America. She cites recommendations that have emerged from the project, primary among them being that the involvement of children and youth in conducting community training activities for adults helps to build awareness about the problem of domestic violence, while supporting increased communication and respect between adults and children.

3.   Acknowledgements
We express our gratitude to all authors of this volume and their willingness to cooperate in the process of editing. Without exception, all papers are original versions and constitute valuable contributions to the body of knowledge.
Further, we are grateful to Nancy Billias, Alejandro Cervantes-Carson and Rob Fisher from Interdisciplinary.Net for their support. Without them this publication would not have been realised.

February, 2009

Notes

[1] M Perez, 'Understanding Violence', US Department of Peace, The Peace Alliance, viewed 15 February 2009,
<http://www.thepeacealliance.org/content/view/583/656>.
[2] D Ross, *Violent Democracy*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2004, p. 1.
[3] E Kandel Englander, *Understanding Violence*, Lawrence Erlbaum, Mahwah, NJ, 2006, p. 2.

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Section 1

**Deconstructing Representations of Violence
in Art, Literature, and the Media**

Post-9/11 and Screen Violence

Gabrielle Murray

Abstract
An overriding perception exists in the public domain and critical literature that there is a direct link between increased visual knowledge of violence and torture in the world with an escalation of representations of explicit violence in the cinema. Since the early gangster films of the 1930s, debates have raged about the possible effects on audiences of watching violence on the screen. As in the 1960s, a similar logic of 'effect' is currently used to argue that there is a direct linkage between an historical period - post 9/11 - and the escalation in explicit violence on our screens. David Slocum argues that the interpretation of film violence as a 'media effect' has become naturalised in the critical discourse and legitimated through funding and policy, yet most discussion of the nature of the relations between social and cinematic violence remain 'circumstantial' and 'speculative.' The paper will analyse critical and public reactions to social violence, specifically images of Abu Ghraib post9/11, garnered from our televisions and the internet, in the context of screen violence debates.

Key Words: Abu Ghraib, cinema, media effects, post-9/11, screen violence, torture, torture porn.

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There is enormous unease in Western society about the effects on audiences of being exposed to screen violence. In this paper I will examine the perception in the public domain and critical literature that there is a direct link between increased visual knowledge of violence and torture in the world with an escalation of representations of explicit violence in the cinema. While public attitudes toward violent imagery are largely historically determined, the nature of the actual relation between social violence and screen violence remains speculative. In this paper I will tease out the debate that links increased public knowledge of images of actual torture, increased representation of explicit violence in fictional, popular Western films, and audiences' desires to experience these graphic representations. Ultimately, this project will analyse critical and public reactions to social violence, specifically images of Abu Ghraib post 9/11 garnered from our televisions and the internet, in the context of screen violence debates.

The film critic David Edelstein's review 'Now Playing at Your Local Multiplex: Torture Porn', appeared in the 6th February 2006 issue of *New York Magazine*. Edelstein, commenting on the surge in extreme,

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prolonged graphic torture, abduction, rape and dismemberment in films such
as *The Devil's Rejects*,[1] *Saw*,[2] *Wolf Creek*,[3] and *Hostel*,[4] dubbed the
phenomenon "torture porn."[5] The label has stuck. The box-office success of
films like the *Saw* and *Hostel* series stunned many critics; most seemed
bewildered by young audiences' thirst for such graphic fare. Edelstein's
uneasy review suggests:

> Fear supplants empathy and makes us all potential torturers,
> doesn't it? Post-9/11, we've engaged in a national debate
> about the morality of torture, fuelled by horrifying pictures
> of manifestly decent men and women … enacting brutal
> scenarios of domination at Abu Ghraib.[6]

Similarly, the director Eli Roth, promoting the release of his 2007 film *Hostel
11* has stated, in relation to the popularity of this increase in screen violence,
that teenagers who were nine or ten when 9/11 happened are now sixteen or
seventeen. Roth states, they have "grown up being told you are going to get
blown-up. Terror Alert Orange … They want something to scream at"[7] that
is as shocking as the events of their lives. An interesting observation
considering that, reacting to a backlash against its apocalyptic underbelly, the
American entertainment industry post 9/11 has also displayed a tendency to
cosset its audiences.

    In his 'Introduction' to *Film and Television After 9/11*, Wheeler
Winston Dixon outlines Hollywood's initial reaction to the terrorist attack.
Film sequences containing images of the World Trade Center were edited out
of films in post-production, while 'family' films were rushing into release.[8]
Studios also frantically reshuffled release dates. As Jonathan Markovitz
notes, a film like *Collateral Damage*,[9] which concerned a terrorist threat in
downtown Los Angeles, had its release date moved from 2001 to 2002,
whereas *Black Hawk Down*,[10] which dealt with the U.S. intervention in
Somalia, had its release date pushed forward to 2001.[11]

    The images of U.S. and U.K. military personnel torturing prisoners
at Abu Ghraib were initially brought to the public's attention by a *60
Minutes 11* news report on 28th April 2004, and an article by Seymour M.
Hersh in *The New Yorker Magazine*, posted online on the 30th April 2004
and published in the 10th May issue. Edelstein's suggestion that these media
releases of documentary images helped feed the escalation of uninhibited
images of torture, degradation and mutilation in fiction film is echoed in
most reviews and commentaries on the phenomenon.[12] Furthermore, most
discussion argues that increasingly graphic scenes are appearing in a broader
range of mainstream and art-house releases, from the protracted beating,
lashing, and scourging of Jesus in Mel Gibson's *The Passion of Christ*,
released in 2004, through to James Bond's most recent offering, *Casino*

Royale,[13] in which the latest Bond, Daniel Craig, tied to a seatless chair, had his genitals whipped. A more recent example is the 2008 release of Gregory Hoblit's R-rated thriller *Untraceable*, which involves the hunt for a serial killer who posts live videos of his victims being tortured on the internet. The more people who log on to the 'untraceable' website, the more quickly and violently the victims die.

Prior to this growth in explicit productions, the horror genre had been in one of its cyclic declines. The overblown reflexivity of films like the *Scream* series[14] and *Scary Movie*[15] resulted in a comic trend in the horror genre, to the point where it seemed to have lost its edge. It no longer scared its audience. Since 2003, the success of horror films such as Ronny Yu's *Freddy vs Jason*[16] and Marcus Nispel's remake of *The Texas Chainsaw Massacre*[17] began an escalation in the production of these explicit films. The industry reasoning for this increased production is straightforward: in a period of mounting pressures due to diverse markets, new technologies and platforms, these films have proven to be financially successful. *Hostel* was produced for under $5 million, yet it grossed close to $50 million in the U.S. and around $80 million world wide.[18] These films are cheap to make, partly because they do not need expensive locations or sets; they are formulated on special effects rather than featuring stars who command huge salaries. Furthermore, the American industry, responding to the increasing popularity of extreme Asian cinema with audiences and directors, has exploited this influence by using Asian directors, remaking films and increasing the explicitness of its own product.

The suggested relation between our increased visual knowledge of violence and torture in the 'real' world with the escalation of representations of explicit violence in the commercial and creative medium of cinema can seem glib. After being exposed to images of real torture, why would audiences then want to see films in which representations of dramatised torture are enacted in intimate detail and for protracted periods of time?

The easy linkage of national events and cinematic representation has a long history. J David Slocum argues that there is an overriding perception that an upsurge in 'film violence' occurred in relation to the social upheaval of 'the Sixties.' The 1960s in America are seen as a period of extreme unrest and the familiar argument is that the increased carnage in films arose out of, and in response to, the 'increased carnage' in society. As Slocum claims, 'film violence' has become a trope closely associated with that of 'the Sixties.' While Slocum agrees with J Hoberman that "public attitudes toward violent imagery are historically determined,"[19] he argues that the naturalisation that occurs through the development of such tropes has obscured further debate. Moreover, much of the discussion remains "circumstantial and speculative."[20]

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The primary theoretical model supporting this interpretation is 'media effects,' which developed from behavioural science and communications studies interested in the "instrumentality of media."[21] For the cinema the question becomes: what are the behavioural 'effects' of viewing violent films? Most of us, when we think about the media effects model, are focussed on the audience. Does the viewing of violent film by an audience have a discernible effect? While most of us agree that there is a 'vulnerable' spectator who may be inspired by film violence to act, most of us also concede that this is a rare engagement. What the cinema is really good at, and one of the main reasons we continue to participate with its content, is that it affects us - it makes us *feel*. Slocum's argument draws attention to the way in which this discourse both underpins and restricts many of the debates about film violence. He argues that the interpretation of film violence as an 'effect' has become naturalised in the critical discourse and legitimated through funding and policy. This naturalisation has had two distinct effects: it limits our perception of violence in the cinema to 'blood and guts'; and it results in the insistence on a critical consideration of the moral stance of the film.[22] But as Slocum observes, violence can also be about power and its relations. Questions of morality restrict our analysis, while the linkage of 'the Sixties' to 'film violence' atomises a historical moment with an aesthetic and thematic effect.[23] We need only look back to the films of the 1950s to assess the problems with this simple equation.

Currently, a similar logic of 'effect' is used to argue that there is a direct linkage between a current historical moment - post 9/11 - and the escalation in explicit violence on our screens. Filmmakers, living in a society of increasing uncertainty, war and torture, respond by exploring this reality on film. This is often the case. Over 250 documentary and feature films have been made on the bloody break-up of Yugoslavia in the 1990s and the ignition of ethnic violence with new successor states claiming their territories.[24] Filmmakers choose to make films that have a strong social commentary or which are specifically political. The act of making these kinds of films and the process of viewing them for an audience can be homeopathic. But in the case of increased representations of explicit violence in contemporary fictional film, is this direct correlation so clear?

In simple terms, fictional cinema is a cultural object which is creative. It might exist, react to and reflect upon events in the world, but what it does best is create imaginary worlds. Like all art forms, it is also capable of insightful social commentary. As a commercial product it must respond to the mood of changing milieus to maintain audience interest and survive economically. And, it must also adjust to changing screen and viewing experiences.

An obvious anecdote to the linear 'effects' argument is the relatively low crime rate in Japan, where tolerance of explicit violence and sex in the

cinema and other media is extremely high. I cannot help but also think here of the influential nature of the Italian post-war film movement, Neorealism. Although having a powerful legacy, it could be argued that this social realist style had difficulty maintaining an audience largely because people who had lived through the war wanted fantasy - sunshine, happiness and romance - on their cinema screens, not the hardships of their daily lives.

Shortly after the release of the Abu Ghraib images, Susan Sontag in the *New York Times* resoundingly condemned the refusal by the Bush administration to call the actions that took place at Abu Ghraib "torture."[25] The shock voiced by the Bush Administration in relation to the photos and their circulation, argued Sontag, undermines and elides the fact that the true horror lies in the actions - the real thing. Noam Chomsky's collection of interviews entitled *9-11* is obviously worth noting here too in relation to the definition and use of torture. He repeatedly states that Western powers could never abide by their own official definitions of the term, in their codes or military manuals. To do so would be to reveal the U.S. as a "leading terrorist state, as are its clients."[26] Here, Australia is an obvious example of one of those 'clients.'

Commenting on the overwhelming power of images in our world, Sontag says that the "Western memory museum is now mostly a visual one."[27] Due to new technologies such as mobile phones and digital cameras, each soldier records a 'visual' memory of his or her war experience. Military forces can no longer easily censor the circulation of information from their ranks. Now soldiers have become amateur 'war photojournalists.' Enabled through digital cameras, they record "their war, their fun, their observations of what they find picturesque, their atrocities."[28] They swap images among themselves and e-mail them around the globe. In fact, at the time of their release, Donald Rumsfeld acknowledged that there are many more images, and videos too - images and film we were not allowed to see. However, since 2006, most of these images and films have been made available on *Salon.com*, where there is an archive of 279 photos and 19 videos of Abu Ghraib abuse. This information was first gathered by the criminal Investigation Command CID, and included their timeline of events. *Salon.com* acquired the material through a military source.[29]

Drawing attention to the explicit nature of these images, Sontag claims torture is predominately of a sexual nature. Further compounding the sexual component of these images is the fact that when circulated, they were interspersed with images of soldiers having sex with each other. Historically, torture is frequently based on "rape and pain being inflicted on the genitals."[30] Truly disturbing is the way in which the label 'pornography' appropriately fits the actual images of victims of torture at Abu Ghraib. These covert images taken in the secret of night; images of illegal acts inflicted upon human beings - shared among a cohort; for reasons of power

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and reasons of pleasure; illicit images that were never supposed to reach broad public sight - these are the images that truly fit the label 'torture porn.'

Non-profit organisations like Amnesty International work tirelessly to draw our attention to incidences of torture throughout the world, yet many of us take little notice of their efforts. The images of torture from Abu Ghraib - shocking in their stark bleakness - effectively focused attention on the morality of torture in the public realm. In a review of the 'torture porn' trend, Lynden Barber has written: "While asking us politely not to mention the T-word, the US has admitted to the use at its Cuban detention centre of techniques including near-drowning, extremes of heat and cold, and 24 hour lighting."[31] But why would this revelation result in the popularity of 'torture porn' fiction films that animate experiences of torture, mutilation, dismemberment, castration and cannibalism, especially when you can see the real thing on 'shockumentaries' or internet sites?[32] Edelstein's query, "Fear supplants empathy and makes us all potential torturers, doesn't it?"[33] is a crucial one for discussion in relation to government and military use of torture and society's acquiescence, but it does little to explain the perceived phenomenon of 'torture porn.'

Most of us think of torture as the infliction of excruciating pain as a means of extortion to elicit a confession of 'secret information.' It is clear that what happened at Abu Ghraib is torture, but the meanings and purpose of torture are more complicated than its appearances. Elaine Scarry asserts that torture is a primary physical act of inflicting pain, with the "primary verbal act, the interrogation."[34] In spite of this, she argues that the overt aim of the interrogation to elicit information is a ruse. Ultimately, torture is a process whereby recognition of weaponry as agency enables the denial of the victim's pain and its translation into the assertion of the power of the torturer's regime. Telling, for my discussion of the phenomenon of 'torture porn', is the way in which torture is structured as an event - the playing out of a monstrous drama. I'd like to quote Scarry here at length:

> Torture is a process which not only converts but announces the conversion of every conceivable aspect of the event and the environment into an agent of pain. It is not accidental that in the torturer's idiom the room in which the brutality occurs was called the 'production room' in the Philippines, the 'cinema room' in South Vietnam, and the 'blue lit stage' in Chile: built on these repeated acts of display and having as its purpose the production of a fantastic illusion of power, torture is a grotesque piece of compensatory drama.[35]

Although interrogation is a feature in both war and thriller genres, films that fit within the 'torture porn' trend never represent it. Instead, these films bring us face-to-face with what is routinely denied in the process of military, State, and Government sanctioned 'torture': the event is reduced to a cruel, clear dynamic of power relations. The victim's power is stolen through his or her imprisonment. Then the victim's agency is annihilated by the process of torture; through not just the infliction of excruciating pain, but also its anticipation and duration. In these films there is no attempt to suggest a legitimation for the torturer's actions. They clearly display the fact that the torturer's pleasure is his or her absolute power over the victim, the events and the situation. This sadistic pleasure is intimately bound to the torturer's omnipotent and omniscient power. Yet, there must be a survivor - the 'final girl' (in *Hostel* it's a final boy), who Carol Clover identifies in *Men, Women and Chainsaws* as empowering because she escapes to live another day, or even returns to kill the 'monster.'[36] Someone has to escape to allow the audience to surface and the series to continue. Having now seen many of these films, the only element that seems consistent is their staging of the performance of the torture, the maiming, and the dismemberment.

It is difficult to ascertain why audiences - specifically those under the age of 25 years - have flocked to see these films. When Roth argues that young audiences want "something to scream at"[37] that is as shocking as the events of their lives, it almost sounds like an argument in support of a catharsis. However, I do not think there is any literal relationship between these films and contemporary political events. But that is not to say that young audiences who feel disengaged, anxious and hopeless do not seek out these films. I think they do, but for the same reasons they have always sought out alternative and explicit films. My sense is that these audiences want to feel intensity and fear; fear that brings one into the moment, back to the body, to the senses, allows this.

However, to conclude, I think we need to take heed of Slavoj Žižek's argument in his recent book *Violence: Six Sideways Reflections*. Žižek argues that we need to stand back from the "fascinating lure of … directly visible 'subjective' violence."[38] Just as Sontag claims that the hysteria over the images of Abu Ghraib becomes a kind of smoke screen for the 'true horror,' which 'lies in the real thing,' the critical debate around 'torture porn' also functions as a 'ruse.' It draws our attention away from thinking about the 'real thing'; it places blame on a surrogate object, and it fails to develop a thoughtful, objective analysis of 'symbolic' and 'systemic' violence.

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Notes

1 R Zombie, (dir.) *The Devil's Rejects*, 2005.

2 J Wan, (dir.) *Saw*, 2004.

3 G McClean, (dir.) *Wolf Creek*, 2005.

4 E Roth, (dir.) *Hostel*, 2005.

5 D Edelstein, 'Now Playing at Your Local Multiplex, Torture Porn: Why has America Gone Nuts for Blood, Guts and Sadism?', *New York Magazine*, 6 February 2006, viewed 19 August 2007, <http://nymag.com/search/search/>.

6 ibid.

7 E Roth, 'Interview with Eli Roth', *At the Movies on the ABC TV*, 6 June 2007, viewed 20 August 2007,
<http://www.abc.net.au/atthemovies/txt/s1941380.htm>.

8 W W Dixon (ed), *Film and Television After 9/11*, Southern Illinois University Press, Carbondale, 2004, p. 3.

9 A Davis, (dir.) *Collateral Damage*, 2002.

10 R Scott, (dir.) *Blackhawk Down*, 2002.

11 J Markovitz, 'Reel Terror Post 9/11', in *Film and Television After 9/11*, W W Dixon (ed), Southern Illinois University Press, Carbondale, 2004, pp. 201-205.

12 For example, see: L Barber, 'Atrocity Entertainment: Filmmakers are turning up the Volume on Human Degradation', *The Weekend Australian*, 14-15 April 2007, p. 25; R Douthat, 'Punch the Director!', *National* Review, Vol. 59, no. 12, July 2007,
<http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m1282/is_12_59/ai_n27286427/pg_2?tag=artBody;col1>, p. 54; D Gordon, 'Horror Show; Scary Movies are Multiplying Faster than Ever, and getting increasingly Sadistic. Why are Audiences so Hungry for Blood? Pull up a Chair. Just be Careful which One', *Newsweek*, 3 April 2006, p. 60; H Liden and D Rimanelli, 'Regarding the Torture of Dudes', *Artforum International Magazine*, Vol. 44, no. 10, Summer 2006, pp. 85-86; K Newman, 'Torture Garden', *Sight and Sound*, Vol. 16, no. 6, June 2006, 28-31.

13 M Campbell, (dir.) *Casino Royale*, 2004.

14 W Craven, (dir.) *Scream 1*, 1996; *Scream 2*, 2000.

15 K I Wayans, (dir.) *Scary Movie*, 2000.

16 R Yu, (dir.) *Freddie vs Jason*, 2003.

17 M Nispel, (dir.) *The Texas Chainsaw Massacre*, 2003.

18 *IMDB The Internet Movie Database*, viewed 19 September 2008, <http://www.imdb.com/IMDB>.

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[19] J D Slocum, 'The "Film Violence" Trope: New Hollywood, "the Sixties" and the Politics of History', in *New Hollywood Violence*, S J Schneider (ed), Manchester University Press, Manchester, 2004, p. 17.

[20] ibid., p. 17.

[21] ibid., p. 23.

[22] ibid., p. 24.

[23] ibid., p. 23.

[24] D Iordanova, 'Introduction', in *The Celluloid Tinderbox: Yugoslav Screen Reflections of a Turbulent Decade*, A J Horton (ed), Central Europe Review, Shropshire, 2002, p. 6.

[25] S Sontag, 'Regarding the Torture of Others', *The New York Times*, 23 May 2004, viewed 15 September 2007, <http://www.nytimes.com/2004/05/23/magazine/23PRISONS.html>.

[26] N Chomsky, *9-11*, New York, Seven Stories Press, 2001, p. 16.

[27] Sontag, p. 1.

[28] ibid., p. 2.

[29] See J Walsh (ed), 'The Abu Ghraib Files', *Salon.com*, viewed 25 April 2008, <http://www.salon.com/news/abu_ghraib/2006/03/14/introduction/>. Also see J Lesage, 'Links: Abu Ghraib and Images of Abuse and Torture', *Jump Cut: A Review of Contemporary Media*, Vol. 47, 2005, viewed 10 August 2007, <http://ejumpcut.org/archive/jc47.2005/links.html>.

[30] Sontag, op. cit., p. 2.

[31] Barber, op. cit., p. 25.

[32] For further discussion see, M Brotman, 'The Fascination of the Abomination', in *Film and Television After 9/11*, W. W. Dixon (ed), Southern Illinois University Press, Carbondale, 2004, pp. 163-177.

[33] Edelstein, 2006, op. cit.

[34] E Scarry, *The Body in Pain: The Making and the Unmaking of the World*, Oxford University Press, New York, 1985, p. 28.

[35] ibid. The structuring of torture around cinematic, dramatic practices and technical language is an important area for research; however, it is not possible to address this issue in the context of this paper.

[36] For further discussion see C Clover, *Men, Women and Chain Saws: Gender in the Modern Horror Film*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1992.

[37] Roth, 2007, op. cit.

[38] S Žižek, *Violence: Six Sideways Reflections*, Profile Books, London, 2008, p. 1.

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Arabs and Muslims in Hollywood:
Breaking Down *The Siege*

Kenza Oumlil

Abstract
This paper examines representations of Arabs and Muslims in the film *The Siege* (1998) and investigates representations of violence in a media text that was widely circulated prior to September 11, 2001. Relying on an analysis of the script of the film, this study is based on a textual analysis of the movie *The Siege*. The relevance of this research lies in the connections between media representations and public identity as these are mediated through popular culture, and especially popular media texts. The media play a major role in disseminating information and what is presented has real consequences (e.g., it constructs the identities of 'Others'). Studying previous representations sheds light on current ones by providing the history of how certain identities evolve over time and are context-bound. A high-profile action thriller set in the present, *The Siege* stars Denzel Washington as FBI special agent Hubbard, whose anti-terrorist task force needs to bring to justice Arab terrorists responsible for bombings in New York City. I chose to focus on this film because although it was a huge hit at the box office, it also created considerable controversy and anger. The *Council on American-Islamic Relations* (CAIR), the *American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee* (ADC), and other Arab and Muslim organisations conducted press conferences, contesting the film's stereotypes and negative portrayals of their communities.

Key Words: Arab, construction, Hollywood, identity, Islam, Muslim, representation, Terrorism, *The Siege*.

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1.   Synopsis of *The Siege*
After the capture by the U.S. military of a Muslim religious leader, the FBI and the CIA (represented by agent Elise Kraft, whose true name is later revealed to be Sharon Bridger) team up to seize the organisation responsible for the terror in New York City. The wave of terrorist attacks leads the President of the U.S. to declare martial law. The U.S. government sends the army, headed by General Deveraux, into the streets of New York. The Army heads to Brooklyn, where most of the Arab population in New York City resides, and puts Arabs in internment camps, including FBI agent

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Frank Haddad's son. After the main terrorist, Samir Najdi, played by Samir Bouajila, prays, he attempts to bomb peaceful American demonstrators. CIA agent Sharon Bridger tries to stop him; Samir kills her. Agent Hubbard shoots Samir dead and arrests General Deveraux for failure to adhere to the law and to civil rights, for torturing and killing Tarik Husseini, an Arab-American citizen.

Groups such as ADC and CAIR have protested representations of Arabs and Muslims in *The Siege*. At the film opening on 6 November 1998, Arabs and Muslims in the United States objected to the film's negative stereotypes in front of movie theatres in the United States.[1] Wilkins and Downing highlighted that "many analyses confirm these negative and limited discourses of Arabs and Muslims in U.S. entertainment programs (Ghareeb, 1983; Kamalipour, 1995; Shaheen, 1984, 1997, 2000) and in the U.S. news media (Kamalipour, 1995; Suleiman, 1988; Wolsfeld, 1997)."[2]

2.   Method

The study relied on using sentences as the unit of analysis to deconstruct the text. First, I transcribed all references made by: (a) Non-Arabs/Non-Muslims, (b) references made by Arabs/Muslims, and (c) references made by the news. I created the news category to avoid speculating about the identity of the voices of reporters who were commenting on the events in the movie. Most likely, these voices belonged to Non-Arabs and Non-Muslims, but for the sake of validity, I created a separate category for them. I created three categories to compare and contrast how Arabs and Muslims define themselves with how others define them in the film.

Second, I identified the positive, negative, and other references to each of the three categories. Positive references marked Arabs and Muslims by affirmation, approval, or acceptance. I considered references that expressed a refusal or negation of Arabs and Muslims as negative. I have placed units associating Arabs/Muslims with violence, hate, crime, or oppression, for example, in the negative category. I have used the 'other' category for references that did not display obvious positive or negative representations of Arabs and Muslims.

3.   Discussion

In its entirety the film *The Siege* contained 622 Arab and Muslim references. Non-Arabs and Non-Muslims issued most of the references (457), the majority of which had a negative connotation (336). Non-Arabs/Non-Muslims referred positively to Arabs/Muslims 65 times and in a 'neutral' manner 56 times. Arabs/Muslims issued 121 references about themselves: 45 positive, 41 negative, and 35 'other.' The news category included a total of

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44 references about Arabs/Muslims: 34 negative, six positive, and four 'other' references.

This study found that overall, Arabs and Muslims were projected negatively, as the majority of the references about them were negative (411/622). This study also found that in seventy-three percent of cases Arab and Muslim references were made by Non-Arabs/Non-Muslims (457/622).

Non-Arabs/Non-Muslims constructed the identities of Arabs/Muslims, speaking for them, and defining who they are. Non-Arabs/Non-Muslims made comments such as: "I'm afraid they're gonna blow the bus," "his brother blew up a movie theatre in Tel Aviv," "these people bomb," "they're ready to die," "all day long they watch TV," "it's not gonna stop these criminals," and "they're attacking our way of life."

A. Non-Arab/Non-Muslim Voices

Drawn to an imaginary, orientalised Middle East, CIA Agent Sharon Bridger feeds the Western fascination for the mysterious and exotic East as it can be seen in the following examples: "My first boyfriend was Palestinian," "My father used to say Palestinians seduce you with their suffering," "they're [Palestinians] these incredibly warm, hospitable people living in this horrible place," and "I love Lebanese men." However, the East is not only constructed as attractive, but also as dangerous and backward. Karim describes how the exotic East simultaneously evokes attraction and revulsion, fascination and terror.[3] Whereas Sharon nostalgically reminisces about how "growing up there [in Beirut] was like paradise, like an exotic Paris," a subsequent scene alludes to women's oppression in the Middle East. Sexist language is put in Samir's mouth: "the only ones who didn't spend time in Israeli jails were women like you."

Sharon Bridger is also presented as the expert on the Middle East, as the incarnation of the 'objective outsider.' At her first encounter with Frank Haddad, Sharon exposes his origins by simply taking a look at him: "Shuf mountains, right? Shiite or Sunni?" Frank confirms her knowledge of the Arab region as he replies: "Wow. You're really good. She's really good." Fanon speaks about how objectivity always works against the colonised.[4] In *The Siege*, instead of hearing from indigenous voices, it is a Westerner who sheds light onto the characteristics of the regions, often in an essentialised manner. Drawing on the stereotypical clichés of Middle-Easterners, Sharon tells the story of Arab terrorist "pros" who have "a warrant from god": "from the age of 12, they've been dodging people like you, people better than you." These references signal to a Muslim holy war against infidels, often referred to as 'jihad' in the West. The label 'jihad' becomes a signifier for 'fundamentalist and terrorist Islam.' However, some Muslims define it rather differently: as a spiritual struggle. For example, Yasin said in a speech delivered at Harvard University's 2002 commencement exercises:

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> The word for struggle in Arabic, in the language of my faith, is *jihad*. It is a word that has been corrupted and misinterpreted, both by those who do and do not claim to be Muslims, and we saw last fall, to our great national and personal loss, the results of this corruption. *Jihad*, in its truest and purest form, the form to which all Muslims aspire, is the determination to do right, to do justice even against your own interests. It is an individual struggle for personal moral behaviour. Especially today, it is a struggle that exists on many levels: self-purification and awareness, public service and social justice. On a global scale, it is a struggle involving people of all ages, colors, and creeds, for control of the Big decisions: not only who controls what piece of land, but more importantly who gets medicine, who can eat.[5]

The signification of 'jihadist' has become naturalised in the West, to the point of its virtually exclusive use in reference to Muslims who allegedly wage a war against infidels. Interestingly, the language of a Muslim war against Christians and Jews is also present in President Bush's rhetoric:

> The terrorists practice a fringe form of Islamic extremism that has been rejected by Muslim scholars and the vast majority of Muslim clerics - a fringe movement that perverts the peaceful teachings of Islam. The terrorists' directive commands them to kill Christians and Jews, to kill all Americans, and to make no distinction among military and civilians, including women and children.[6]

Agent Bridger's 'knowledge' of the region allows her to make recommendations such as the following: "they're [the terrorists] not here to negotiate. They were waiting for the cameras. They want everybody watching. Kill them now." Whereas she plays the role of the expert, the narrative of the film will show that, in fact, Sharon fails to understand the region, thus enabling the construction of the irrational and illogical East that cannot be reasonably understood.[7] General Deveraux describes her as a "woman who will never understand the Middle East." At the end of the movie, Samir kills her because she considered him an ally and was unable to see him as a threat and as a terrorist. This particular ending of the plot also introduces the idea that Arabs and Muslims cannot be trusted. One should always keep in mind the possibility that they might strike against the West.

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B. Arab and Muslim Voices

First, it is worth noting that translation from Arabic to English was not systematically provided when Arab characters spoke. Stam and Spence remind us that the "absence of the language of the colonized is also symptomatic of colonialist attitudes."[8] One may conclude that what the Arab characters said in those episodes was irrelevant, and therefore unworthy of translation.

Second, Arabs and Muslims in the film appear to have internalised the racism targeted at them as they display characteristics of mentally colonised subordinates. It is through the voice of Arab-American FBI agent Frank Haddad that the viewers learn that Samir Najdi, who teaches Arab studies at Brooklyn College, sponsored Ali Waziri, one of the bombers of Bus 87, with a student visa. Frank further informs the viewers that Samir's brother "blew up a movie theatre in Tel Aviv" and thus announces the terrorist threat that Arabs and Muslims represent. He warns Anthony Hubbard that while he is gathering intelligence, Samir is "getting visas for bombers." The accusation of terrorism emanates from Frank, who says: "you sponsored Ali Waziri's visa; you spent two years in Israeli jails during the intifada."

Similarly, Samir confesses the story of his terrorist brother by revealing that life in the Palestinians camps was "like dying." He relates how a sheikh told his brother that "to die for Allah is beautiful," that his parents will be taken care of and that "... he'll live in paradise with 70 virgins." This Arab/Muslim story-telling episode classically ends when his brother "straps ten sticks of dynamite to his chest." The construction of Palestinians as terrorists and the absence of representations of Israeli terrorism can be traced to the fact that the U.S. is Israel's strongest military and financial supporter.[9]

Finally, the cooperation of the Arab community in the 'fight against terror' in the film supports the construction of terrorism as an Arab and Muslim phenomenon. FBI agent Hubbard announces this support at the beginning of the movie: "I just got off the phone with the leaders of the Arab community. We have their complete support and cooperation. They want these criminals brought to justice as badly as we do." Furthermore, the leader of the Arab Anti-Defamation League presents a reminder of the support of the Arab community in this statement: "I represent the Arab Anti-Defamation League. Whatever injustices my people may be suffering at this very moment, we will continue to show our commitment to this country." It is noticeable how the suffering of the Arab community is hypothetical as shown by the use of the modal auxiliary verb 'may,' and that patriotism takes precedence over civil and human rights. Agent Hubbard, representing the FBI and thus the establishment, rewards the position of the Arab Anti-Defamation League in his statement: "I appreciate that. Thank you, sir." Towards the end of the film, agent Frank Haddad presents another reassurance of cooperation,

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which also legitimises the ill-treatment of Arabs and Muslims. After his son is imprisoned in an internment camp for the sole reason of being of Arab and Muslim descent, Haddad throws his FBI badge as he tells Hubbard: "tell them I am not their sand nigger anymore." Surprisingly, a visit from Hubbard convinces him to rejoin the FBI and to postpone liberating his son. Hubbard's decisive words were: "When this is over, I promise you, we'll get your boy back."

C. The News

Not only do reporters comment, throughout the movie, on the bombings in New York City, but politicians also provide their input. The events in the film are powerfully constructed as reality. One reporter relates that: "the worst terrorist bombings for the last five years in the United States took place earlier today." President Clinton decides that "the cowards who committed this murderous act must not go unpunished" and summarises the events: "the explosions appear to be the act of terrorists. I'm outraged by the terrorist act." Viewers are thus disposed to think of the events as factual, and of the 'Muslim/Arab threat' as real. This encourages the dissemination and reproduction of hate speech and hate crimes against Arabs and Muslims.

4.   Conclusion

In *The Siege*, the framing of terrorism excludes establishment violence and equates Arabs and Muslims with terrorism. Hall argues that what is missing is just as important as what is represented.[10] In the film, the U.S. government is not constructed as terrorising the Arab and Muslim populations in Brooklyn. Rather, terrorism is limited to violence from below.

Whereas allusions to the charms of the Middle East reveal the exoticism of the East, Arabs and Muslims appear as threatening and fanatical beings. In the first part of the movie, Samir is Sharon's lover. However, he becomes the last terrorist cell when he attempts to bomb a march of peaceful protesters and kills her. This positions Arab professors in the U.S. as violent sponsors of terror. In contrast, the acceptable Arab is he who works for the FBI and prioritises 'serving his country' over his son's freedom. Leaders of the Arab community in the U.S. also support the argument that security takes precedence over rights in their willingness to sacrifice their freedoms in the name of their 'commitment to their country.'

Thus, *The Siege* participates in Orientalist discourse, which is the Western discourse which concerns itself with the Orient. Orientalism relies on Western 'positional superiority.' The West constructs its sense of identity through a comparison with the Orient.[11]

Previous studies that have examined the construction of Arab and Muslim identities have shown that Arab and Muslim representations are negative and limited.[12] They have also documented the history of these

constructions, which precede the September 11, 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. These analyses demonstrate that Islamophobia and anti-Arab sentiments in the Western media preceded September 11, 2001. Historically, different ethnic groups have been vilified because they presented a threat.[13] After the 'red menace' of communism, today Islam represents the 'green menace.' These representations are not only vehicles for entertainment; they participate in a wide-reaching discourse that dehumanises Arabs and Muslims. Categorising them as threatening 'others' justifies violence targeted at them, such as the war on Afghanistan, the war on Iraq, and the targeting of Arab and Muslim communities in the U.S., evident in legislation such as the U.S.A. Patriot Act, which particularly frames them as suspects of terror.[14] The material, emotional, and psychological reactions and responses of these communities continue to require attention.

Notes

[1] J Shaheen, *Reel Bad Arabs: How Hollywood Vilifies a People*, Interlink Books, Northampton, MA, 2001, p. 431.

[2] K Wilkins and J Downing, 'Mediating Terrorism: Text and Protest in Interpretations of *The Siege'. Critical Studies in Media Communication*, Vol. 19, 2002, pp. 419-437, p. 421.

[3] K Karim, *Islamic Peril: Media and Global Violence*, Black Rose Publications, Montreal, 2003, p. 63.

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[5] Z Yasin, 'Of Faith and Citizenship'. *The Harvard Arab Alumni Association Quarterly Newsletter*, Vol. 1, July 2002, p. 6, viewed 18 April 2008, <http://www.harvardarabalumni.org/HAAA_Newsletter_Volume_I_Issue_2_Summer_2002.pdf>.

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Nostalgic Violence?
Neo-Victorian (Re-)Visions of Historical Conflict

Marie-Luise Kohlke

Abstract
The exploration of 19th century violence and conflict constitutes an important emergent sub-genre of the neo-Victorian novel. This paper examines the contemporary fascination with historical violence and trauma in the comparatively distant past, focusing on Julian Rathbone's *The Mutiny* (2007). Why, in the face of much more recent cataclysms and current 'real-time' war, terrorism, and counter-terrorist brutality, do writers opt to resurrect the 'ghosts' of hostilities? Can one speak of nostalgic violence, and if so, what purposes, political or otherwise, might nostalgia serve?

Key Words: Bodies, conflict, historical fiction, Julian Rathbone, nostalgia, the Indian Mutiny, the neo-Victorian novel, trauma, violence.

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1. Neo-Victorian Trauma and the Ethics of Representation

In a time rife with aggravated inter-cultural conflict and ethnocidal terror, compounded by developed nations' often brutal counter-terrorist measures, the ever-present spectre of violence invites artistic as well as political and philosophical responses. Yet literary engagements with violence are not just focused on current and recent histories, 'real-time' violence, its antecedents and possible causes; they also revisit scenes of atrocity in an ever more distant and receding past. The nineteenth century constitutes a particular locus of such evocations of historical violence, focalised by the proliferating neo-Victorian novel, which typically re-imagines the nineteenth century - in Britain and elsewhere - from latter-day perspectives, with texts either set wholly or in part in the earlier period, or else evinces an overriding preoccupation with the period's socio-cultural legacies.

I want to focus on a particular sub-genre of this kind of historical fiction, which I will call the 'neo-Victorian trauma novel,' that includes such well-known prize-winning exemplars as Toni Morrison's *Beloved*, Beryl Bainbridge's *Master Georgie*, and Matthew Kneale's *English Passengers*.[1] The traumas explored by neo-Victorian writers range from the social to the inter-cultural, encompassing nineteenth century violent crime and the exploitations of the sex-trade, the institutionalised brutality of penitentiaries and asylums, epidemics and famines, the horrors of slavery and imperialist colonisation, massacres and genocide, civil and international wars. This paper concerns itself with the latter kinds of violent encounters between different

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peoples, races, and/or nations. Specifically, I focus on Julian Rathbone's *The Mutiny*, first published in 2007, which deals with the Indian Mutiny or Sepoy Uprising of 1857, sometimes also referred to as the Great Rebellion or India's First War of Independence, and its retaliatory aftermath.[2]

In using the terminology 'neo-Victorian trauma novel,' I am conscious of the dangers of using trauma rather loosely and generically, as well as aesthetically and possibly ahistorically. Allen Feldman warns of the term's "general lack of specificity" when "deployed as a description and as a diagnostic tool, and viewed as a pathogen - trauma is both an object and a method of analysis," with readers rarely informed of "what theory of trauma is being deployed when it is invoked"[3] - medical, psychoanalytical, somatic, linguistic, or therapeutic. My use of 'trauma' admittedly mixes theoretical approaches, referring, on one hand, to out-of-the ordinary, extreme experiences of bodily woundings, and, on the other, to scenes of inter-societal conflict in which such violence occurs, scenes that thereafter haunt cultural memory through commemoration, re-enactment, and obsessive working-through of the past, artistic and otherwise. Finally, I employ 'trauma' to designate a wider cultural trend of constructing history and historical knowledge as a genealogy of human violence and suffering.

What are we to make of the current obsession with representations of violence displaced onto historical contexts beyond living memory? Especially when, now separated from our own time by more than a century, that past exists only as an "incurable past"[4] beyond the possibility of intervention, justice, or retribution? What does it mean to bear such second-hand witness to posthumous horrors, which, for most readers at least, are unlikely to carry any individual resonance in terms of immediate family connections or essential national identifications? Descriptions of British reprisals against the Indian mutineers, for instance, are unlikely to evoke any feelings of historical guilt or national responsibility in today's British adults remotely comparable to the perceived German accountability for much more recent and more extensively - above all visually - documented Nazi crimes against humanity. Commemoration inevitably alters in kind once the survivor generations pass away, loosening connections and identifications between the living and the sufferings of those dead and gone.

With atrocities reported on real-time television and 24-hour news coverage of global conflict hotspots, images of violence and its attendant suffering become incessant, instantaneous and, in a sense, more readily forgettable because immediately substitutable. To some extent, the image evacuates the concentrated effort involved in bearing witness. Trauma narratives may counteract this trend through their readers' more extended empathic involvement with the characters they read about, providing a different entry point into the experience of violence - vicarious rather than virtual. Accordingly, this paper explores the neo-Victorian trauma novel's

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strategic effects on readers confronted with the violation and destruction of living bodies, which cannot simply be read "at leisure."[5]

Of course the neo-Victorian writer/reader's second-hand re-imagining, as opposed to first-hand experience, or the elicitation thereof from eyewitnesses actually present at events, accentuates ethical problems regarding authenticity and spectacle, involved not only in representing violence but representing the past more generally. As Harold Pinter remarked: "The past is what you remember, imagine you remember, convince yourself you remember, or pretend to remember."[6] By its very nature as fiction, the neo-Victorian trauma novel does not make a claim to historical veracity on par with testimony or documentary record, though it will usually draw closely on historical sources and witness accounts. (At the end of *The Mutiny*, for instance, Rathbone lists Victorian historical accounts of the uprising, official dispatches, and private letters, diaries, and memoirs among his background sources, some of which are incorporated directly into the novel in edited or amalgamated form.[7]) Borrowing Pinter's terms, the neo-Victorian novel tries to make us *imagine or pretend to remember*, projecting ourselves as witnesses into scenes of simulated brutality, which we can experience *as if* they happened to us or someone we knew personally. In a sense, we become time-travelling tourists in often exoticised landscapes of violence. What does it mean that we should wish to do so?

2.   Nostalgia, Violence, and Empire
        The neo-Victorian trauma novel raises the spectre of a perverse nostalgia, a sort of retrospective yearning not for imagined certainties of the past but for the past's crises of violent extremity. In the age of depersonalised super-technological warfare, often conducted at great distance, nineteenth century hostilities, many of them involving hand-to-hand combat, may paradoxically appear more 'real,' more immediate, even heroic. By seeming to collapse the distance between spectator and event, depictions of historical violence hold out the promise of a more authentic kind of knowledge of conflict. Yet in spite of such 'direct' engagement, the temporal gap between then and now ensures the reader a place of physical and psychological security vis-à-vis the events (though not wholly uncompromised, as I will show). Inherently voyeuristic and consumerist, the reader's position may facilitate apathetic indifference and recoil as easily as empathy and greater understanding. As Susan Sontag warns, "No 'we' should be taken for granted when the subject is looking at other people's pain."[8]

        Rathbone dramatises the ethical ambiguities of the onlooker's position in a scene where the British spy, Lt Bruce Farquhar, arriving in disguise at the Palace of Jhansi, witnesses the brutal killings of two fellow Britons, who had hoped to arrange safe conduct from the city for themselves and their families. One man, whom Farquhar vaguely knows, has his throat

cut; the other is shot at close range, the bullet taking off most of his head, an event marked with the laconic comment: "The likeness to a clumsily topped soft-boiled egg was unavoidable."[9] Though unquoted, this appears to be Farquhar's response, through whose eyes we witness the slaughter as co-spectators: "Lieutenant Bruce Farquhar was forced to look on although every cell of his body that was that of a soldier rebelled. He maintained a look of Olympian disinterest and headed for the palace gate."[10] Farquhar seems to embody what Sontag calls "the satisfaction of being able to look … without flinching" and the simultaneous "pleasure of flinching."[11] The next day, he again adopts the same compromised position of witness-spectator, who does/can do nothing, as the remaining British population of Jhansi is summarily butchered before his eyes.

Such reader-encounters with neo-Victorian violence may prove cathartic in the most complacent sense. They reassure readers that they live in more civilised times and societies, where such outrages would not be tolerated or likely to occur. The progress supposedly made since 'then' conveniently takes the edge off violence here and now. Perceived similarities between real-time violence and historical atrocities are attributed to other people's regression to a state of barbarism; other-time conflates with elsewhere. As David Lowenthal puts it, "nostalgia expresses longings for times that are safely, rather than sadly, beyond recall."[12]

In Rathbone's *The Mutiny*, these dangers of nostalgia are symbolically embodied in the automaton of Sultan Tipu's tiger, which the lawyer Azimullah Khan, who helps ferment the uprising, sees at the East India House on a visit to London. Khan discovers "a large lacquered tiger crouching full length over a prostrate redcoat, mauling the poor soldier's throat…. An automaton taken from the rebel Tipoo Sahib's palace some sixty years earlier,"[13] complete with mechanical roar. Historical violence as exoticised archaic spectacle of awful otherness is safely domesticated and contained by temporal distance, its removal from original contexts, and its exhibition for aesthetic consumption. Nostalgia clearly shapes the formation of Britain's and the East India Company's glorified mythification of history, with Tipu's Tiger standing in for a bygone era of primitive cruelty heroically vanquished, and hence for British mastery over history per se. The might of Tipu Sultan, also known as the "Tiger of Mysore," in actual fact a highly civilised ruler, French ally, and successful threat over nearly two decades to the expansion of British rule in India, is reduced to a harmless figure of fun. Economically driven British aggression is glossed as the triumph over the barbarous native, who would feed decent Englishmen to tigers.

The implication of much neo-Victorian violence in politics of empire raises the problem of its potential promotion of a reactionary form of cultural memory, with historical excesses misrepresented or justified as beneficial progress and the enlightenment of 'lesser' races. Such hearkening

back to a talismanic glorious age of British world dominance risks transfiguring the perpetrators of colonialism's brutalities into *victims* of ungrateful barbarous natives, obdurately resisting the modernisation and democratisation of their corrupt and depraved societies. This risk becomes especially pronounced when, as part of a deliberate strategy of even-handedness,[14] Rathbone levies indirect critique of native schisms in comparison to the implied unity of the English nation, its common purpose and identity only reaffirmed by extremis.[15] During the slaughter at Jhansi, the commanding officer Captain Skene valiantly cries out to his attackers: "It is idle … for you to hope that by destroying a handful of her men you will denude England of all her bold sons."[16] When the Custom Officer's son begs in Hindi to be spared, Skene's ten-year-old son, having witnessed his father's death, admonishes the other boy, "Die like an Englishman."[17]

Yet such a reading also constitutes an oversimplified version of the workings of nostalgia in neo-Victorian literature. As Malcolm Chase and Christopher Shaw argue, nostalgia is "not a one-dimensional concept with clean-cut edges."[18] More commonly, neo-Victorian nostalgia displays an ironic and subversive edge. Early on in *The Mutiny*, Sophie Hardcastle, wife of a Company lawyer newly arrived in India, muses with pride:

> Here she was, thousands of miles away, surrounded by an alien people, contributing just a little to the history that had brought this rightness, this news, this perfection of understanding, this civilisation and love of God to a benighted land, torn with religious dissension as it had been, chaotic, anarchic. It was a noble calling, a noble company she was part of. Earth's proud empires might indeed pass away, like those of Alexander, Rome and the Mughals, but this one, being the empire of God as well as Queen Victoria, would not.[19]

The reader's hindsight that the British Empire too has passed away undermines the pride in Britain's one-time power and its 'noble' aims of world improvement, exposing them as self-deluding fictions. Sophie herself admits as much when, shortly after, she questions the cost of British achievements. Reading the inscriptions on the headstones in the English cemetery, Sophie finds the dates of soldiers' deaths "clustered round those of the many small wars in the north-west" and realises that many more would have died but been "buried, or burnt, where they fell." Above all, the sheer number of commemorated dead women and children fills her with dread: "Let's face it, she said to herself, is a Christian Empire, on which the sun does not set, worth all this…?"[20] Through Sophie, Rathbone both echoes the

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reader's modern distrust of violent imperialist expansionism and foreshadows
the indiscriminate slaughter of innocent civilians in the uprising to come.

The highlighted convergences of nostalgia and nationalism evoke an
uncanny resonance with current military campaigns of the U.S. and its
NATO allies in Afghanistan and Iraq, with outrage at the Taliban's brutal
suppression of women, for instance, replacing the Victorians' condemnation
of the practice of suttee to help justify interventions of force. The refusal of
the pragmatic Colonel Sir Charles Blackstock to buy into the myth of a
nineteenth century version of today's humanitarian aid and development has
a similar effect: "We are here to create and maintain a society where profits
may be made. Any other reason anyone likes to offer is claptrap."[21] The
distant past is suddenly not so different from the here and now.
Paradoxically, nostalgia can function both as a narrative screen and a
narrative unmasking of the workings of violence past and present. By indirect
means, it can engage with current horrific events that are still too raw to be
fully processed.

3.   Nostalgia versus Horror

In line with the uprising's gathering momentum, Rathbone's
descriptions of violence escalate, self-consciously aiming to shock with their
ghastliness. Much as do newspapers, the novel repeatedly plays to reader
sympathies by focusing on especially horrific violations of innocent women
and children. In Meerut, a pregnant Englishwoman is dragged from her
hiding place by the town butcher, who

> pinned her head to the floor, drew the knife and neatly, just
> as he did with pigs, slit her throat, opening the jugular vein.
> He held her down as the blood spurted, then gushed out,
> over the decking, until the thrashing of her limbs faded to a
> last nervous twitching; then he tore open her nightdress
> from her neck to her knees and, again using almost surgical
> skill, dissected out from her womb the still living foetus of
> a tiny girl, cut the umbilical chord and placed the baby on
> its dead mother's breast.[22]

The representation is deliberately visceral, literally opening the traumatised
body up to view. No sentimentalising sepia-tone of nostalgia interposes to
diffuse the horror of the scene. The animalistic imagery and the assailant's
profession in the literal butchery trade combine to routinise the violence and
underline the victim's dehumanisation in a perverse pietà.

A little later Rathbone further undermines the reader's precarious
position as sympathetic voyeur by implicating him/her in the act of murder
itself. After enumerating the slaughter among British civilians and military

personnel at Delhi, in spite of promised protection by the king, the narrator reflects on the nature of killing, offering an anatomical dissection of violence:

> It is not easy to smash a heavy blade into the angle of collarbone and neck. There may even be a moment when one feels the jarring sensation communicated by blade and hilt to *your* hand, to draw back, soften the blow, allow the blade to do little more than splinter the clavicle. But to press on without diminishing the force at all, into sternum and scapula, lungs and arteries, to see the blood well up and spill and hear the scream of *your* victim for as long as he can heave the air from his sliced lungs - none of that is easy, not unless *you* are trained to it, disciplined to do it, the way cavalry troopers are.[23]

Rathbone's adept manipulation of the reader into adopting the perpetrators' perspective, together with the assault on the reader's sensibilities, breaks the privileged nostalgic and nationalistic identification with white British victims, which might otherwise justify British retaliation.

Rathbone takes an egalitarian antiphonal approach towards violence, representing British and Indian inhumanity with the same unmitigated harshness. At Benares, Lt Col. James Neill orders the summary executions of every native male found, including a group of young boys "[m]arching about …with the flag of rebellion," "just having a lark."[24] The British sink to the very state of primitivism that the imperialist project claims to transcend; they themselves become Tipu's Tiger, compromising their status as civilised. In the final massacre at Cawnpore, Rathbone's narrator makes the same point by explicating Tatya Tope's order to the guard to kill the women and children or face being "blown from the guns before dusk" - "He was referring to a form of execution common under the Mughals, and occasionally used by the British, of tying condemned men over the muzzles of large guns charged with powder only and blowing them to pieces."[25] A similar effect is achieved by the constructions of implicit parallels between scenes of British and Indian atrocity. After the first Cawnpore massacre, survivors are stripped of their valuables, their captors "ripping from their necks any lockets or whatever that remained, tearing off earrings often with the flesh of the ear lobes too."[26] After the British retake Delhi, Major William Raikes Hodson stages an impromptu execution of the arrested princes, then orders a subaltern to collect the men's rings and other jewellery.[27] Likewise, following the Cawnpore massacres, the British bayonet native women and children at the palace of Lucknow, showing little restraint.[28]

For the British, the wholesale slaughter of innocents at Cawnpore turned the suppression of the mutiny into a holy "crusade."[29] A large part of

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the civilians had already been butchered on 27 June at the river, during an evacuation agreed upon by the Indians, who opened fire on the overladen boats until "the water boiled with blood."[30] On 15 July, as British relief forces approach the city, the final massacre begins, with Rathbone employing some of the most overtly sensationalist imagery of the novel:

> [The Indians] were there to kill, nothing else, and they cut [the women and children] down, severing heads and limbs, gashing torsos, necks, shoulders, breasts and waists with great sweeps of their heavy curved swords. The amount of blood was appalling, spouting, gushing, pouring over everybody, everything. The noise too was hellish: screams of pain, grunts of rage, terrible anguish cut off with gasping, bubbling sobs, the clang of metal when a blade hit a doorway or pillar. What made it yet more awful was the density of the crowd - one hundred and ninety-seven victims, of whom one hundred and twenty-four were children or babies, crushed into less than five hundred square feet. There was nowhere to go, no hiding place, no way out.[31]

Yet this is also one of the *least* successful representations of violence in the novel, with its almost parodic attempt at immediacy via proliferating present particles and its rendering of suffering as anonymous, until the narrative turns to the brutal deaths of Sophie's friend, Catherine Dixon, and her children. The next morning, the bodies, together with three surviving injured women and three young boys, are indiscriminately cast into a disused well.

Although this apotheosis of violence does not have an Indian equivalent of suffering in *The Mutiny*, Rathbone's restrained two-sentence summary of British reprisals actually has much more impact:

> Those who were deemed to have played leading roles were forced to eat pork and beef before being hanged. The Bibigarh murderers were made to lick up at least a square foot each of blood on the floor of the building before they too were hanged on a large banyan tree nearby.[32]

This uneven technique cannot simply be dismissed as a privileging of British suffering, not least because the victims' degradation resonates hauntingly with the 2003-2004 ritual humiliations of Abu Ghraib prisoners. John Taylor persuasively argues that within the British media, foreign corpses are widely represented *en masse*, while Western bodies are considerably shrouded or vanish altogether from sight. In places far from British shores, "the dead or

dying body becomes a sign of excessive reality in nightmarish worlds"[33] - that is, *other* worlds over there. Rathbone is not constrained by such niceties, depicting Indian and white bodies equally graphically; if anything he depicts white bodies in greater gruesome detail. Hence, if the native body is a sign of a nightmarish uncivil Indian society, that society is no longer opposed to our own, as the white body reciprocally proves a sign of Britain's own 'heart of darkness.' There is little to choose between 'them' and 'us' in terms of the capacity for atrocity. At the same time, *The Mutiny* refuses to sanitise modern warfare by conveniently 'disappearing' bodies and rendering dirty death invisible. Rathbone repositions the body - whether coloured or white - squarely centre stage.

4.   Conclusion: And after Witnessing, What?

The main intended effects of nostalgia in neo-Victorian trauma novels, like Rathbone's *The Mutiny*, are neither the idealisation or "falsification of the past,"[34] nor the palliative "glossing over [of] the past's iniquities and indignities,"[35] but rather the reverse - the exposure of such dubious practices and the recognition of historical outrages *as* outrages.[36] Nostalgia does not prettify violence but exposes its vicious and uncontrollable spiralling out of control, in the process affording possibilities for fashioning strategies of resistance.

Yet as Dianne Sadoff and John Kucich ask of "postmodern historicity," might neo-Victorian trauma fiction also be "lost in the prison house of marketable images?"[37] Nostalgic violence participates in our society's prevalent commodification, circulation, and consumption of trauma via self-help groups, confessional literature, talk shows, therapists' careers, government policies on mental health, and counselling services for disaster survivors as part and parcel of humanitarian aid. Violent trauma, like sex, sells novels as well as newspapers and much else besides. In Sontag's words: "It seems that the appetite for pictures [and texts] showing bodies in pain is as keen, almost, as the desire for ones that show bodies naked."[38] The evolution of the neo-Victorian trauma novel belongs to the wider contemporary phenomena of the universalisation of trauma as a dominant mode of experiencing and making sense of reality. History is read not as progress but pathological repetition, as a protracted trauma or series of traumas; and in a veritable trauma culture, competing rights claims and political identities are predicated on, and articulated through, suffering and persecution, *through the subjection to actual or potential violence*. Commenting on the "historical visualization" of violence and "institutional cultures of witnessing," Alan Feldman notes that "[t]he human rights narrative arrives pre-encoded as a conduit into history - through its relay of the invisible or the unthinkable, through mourning, through the ordeal of its very enunciation and inscription."[39] The neo-Victorian trauma novel

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performs this productive dialogic "ordeal" of enunciation and inscription to facilitate a more nuanced historical consciousness, which can usefully re-contextualise later conflicts and hostilities. It imposes what Lowenthal describes as the "ordered clarity contrasting with the chaos and imprecision of our own times,"[40] the outcomes of which are still unknown, and the complex legacies of which, in terms of anger, guilt, and hatred, may "vitiate all but a novelist's attempts to portray the truth."[41]

It would be too ambitious to propose that neo-Victorian trauma fiction alone might somehow counteract the glut of images of atrocity saturating "our culture of spectatorship"[42] and the resultant shrivelling of human sympathies and neutralisation of the moral imagination envisaged by Sontag. Yet the novel by its very nature facilitates a prolonged personal engagement with individual characters, giving anonymous suffering back its human face, rekindling recognition, obligation, and moral response.[43] Hence fiction could stimulate a more intense, ethical awareness, potentially reinvigorating capacities for response and (re-)action against the violence we are called upon to witness in the here and now. Admittedly, there is always an attendant risk of "[m]aking suffering loom larger, by globalizing it" - or, in this case, historicising it - to the point of overwhelming readers' capacities for caring, making the represented suffering appear "too vast, too irrevocable, too epic to be much changed by any local political intervention."[44] Such an abdication, however, would simply leave the field wide open to further violence, enshrining it at the heart of society, if we haven't already done so. Unless we find ways of translating our outrage, compassion, and empathy into action beyond our reading experience, it may be that the neo-Victorian trauma novel will simply wind up Tipu's Tiger once more.

Notes

[1] *Master Georgie* won a 1999 Commonwealth Writers Prize (as well as being short-listed for the 1998 Booker Prize), *Beloved* won the 1988 Pulitzer Prize, and *English Passengers* won the 2000 Whitbread Book of the Year (as well as also being short-listed for the Booker).
[2] Inter- and intra-cultural hostilities related to the British Empire feature prominently in the neo-Victorian trauma novel, including the Rebellions of 1837 in Canada; Aboriginal wars against Australian colonists; the Opium Wars; the Anglo-Irish conflict, the Boar War, and the Anglo-Afghan wars. The sub-genre as a whole, however, ranges widely across geographical and national contexts in its literary exploration of historical violence, with numerous novels centring on North American settler-explorer and Native American confrontations; the U.S. Civil War; European exploits in Africa; the Russo-Turkish and Crimean Wars; trade conflicts between the West and

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Japan; U.S. wars with Spain and Mexico; and other nineteenth century interventions by developed nations in South America.

[3] A Feldman, 'Memory Theatres, Virtual Witnessing, and the Trauma-Aesthetic', *Biography*, Vol. 27, no. 1, Winter 2004, pp. 163-202, p. 184.

[4] S Sontag, *Regarding the Pain of Others*, Penguin, London, 2004, p. 83.

[5] J Taylor, *Body Horror: Photojournalism, Catastrophe and War*, Manchester University Press, Manchester & New York, 1998, p. 36. Taylor here discusses Stephen Greenblatt's view that both history and literature "turn bodily agony into inscriptions to be read at leisure" but that "factual accounts place a greater moral burden on readers than fictive descriptions, no matter how graphic they are," a conclusion I would contest; ibid., p. 36, drawing on S Greenblatt, *Learning to Curse: Essays in Early Modern Culture*, Routledge Chapman and Hall, New York, 1990, pp. 12-15.

[6] H Pinter, quoted in T P Adler, 'Pinter's Night: A Stroll down Memory Lane', *Modern Drama*, Vol. 17, 1979, pp. 461-465, p. 462. Quoted in D Lowenthal, *The Past is a Foreign Country*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2006, p. 193.

[7] J Rathbone, *The Mutiny: A Novel*, Little, Brown, London, 2007, pp. 440-441.

[8] Sontag, op. cit., p. 6.

[9] Rathbone, op. cit., p. 219.

[10] ibid.

[11] Sontag, op. cit., p. 37.

[12] D Lowenthal, 'Nostalgia tells it like it wasn't', in *The Imagined Past: History and Nostalgia*, M Chase and C Shaw (eds), Manchester University Press, Manchester & New York, 1989, pp. 18-46, p. 28.

[13] Rathbone, op. cit., pp. 62 and 63. The automaton is now part of the collections of the Victoria and Albert Museum, London; see the V&A homepage, viewed 30 April 2008,
<http://www.vam.ac.uk/collections/asia/object_stories/Tippoo's_tiger/index.html>.

[14] See Rathbone's 'Notes and Reflections', ibid., pp. 437-439, especially p. 438.

[15] At one point Khan muses on the impediments to a successful uprising, namely lack of a "belief in ourselves as a people" and the absence of a charismatic leader to unify the disparate factions and religions of his country, more intent on fighting amongst themselves. "What about India, Mother India? [….] No such…thing…exists. [….] we lack all cohesion except dislike and often hatred for our current rulers." ibid., p. 81, un-bracketed ellipses in the original.

[16] ibid., p. 231.

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[17] ibid., p. 232.

[18] M Chase and C Shaw (eds), 'The dimensions of nostalgia' [Introduction], in *The Imagined Past: History and Nostalgia*, Manchester University Press, Manchester & New York, 1989, pp. 1-17, p. 2.

[19] Rathbone, op. cit., p. 20.

[20] ibid., p. 23, original ellipses.

[21] ibid., p. 51. Nevertheless Sir Charles too engages in nostalgia - for the early days of the Company in India, where discipline was better and decency and fairness prevailed in the treatment of the natives; ibid., p. 53.

[22] ibid., p. 153.

[23] ibid., p. 165, emphasis added.

[24] ibid., p. 215.

[25] ibid., p. 314.

[26] ibid., p. 299.

[27] ibid., p. 345.

[28] ibid., p. 387.

[29] ibid., p. 318.

[30] ibid., p. 297.

[31] ibid., p. 315.

[32] ibid., p. 317.

[33] Taylor, op. cit., p. 130.

[34] Chase and Shaw, op. cit., p. 1.

[35] Lowenthal, 'Nostalgia tells it like it wasn't', op. cit., pp. 21-22.

[36] This is not meant to imply that Rathbone remains oblivious to nostalgia's temptations of creative revisionism and fabrication within national histories. For instance, he draws attention to the subsequent exaltation of victim-perpetrators to the status of 'star' victims, national heroes or martyrs; see Rathbone, op. cit., p. 122 on the figure of Mungal Pandy, p. 317 on the "Martyrs of Cawnpore," and pp. 426-427 on the Rhani of Jhansi.

[37] D F Sadoff and J Kucich (eds), 'Introduction: Histories of the Present', in *Victorian Afterlife: Postmodern Culture Rewrites the Nineteenth Century*, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis & London, 2000, pp. ix-xxx, p. xxv.

[38] Sontag, op. cit., p. 36.

[39] Feldman, op. cit., p. 164. Although Feldman discusses biographical artefacts, I believe his views apply to literary ones also.

[40] Lowenthal, 'Nostalgia tells it like it wasn't', op. cit., p. 30.

[41] Rathbone, op. cit., p. 347.

[42] Sontag, op. cit., p. 94.

[43] As Sontag suggests, a "narrative seems likely to be more effective than an image" in mobilising practical opposition to violence, partly because "it is a

question of the length of time one is obliged to look, to feel" and, to some extent at least, to identify; ibid., p. 110.

[44] ibid., p. 70.

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Media, Women and Domestic Violence in Turkey

Mine Gencel Bek and *Abdülrezak Altun*

Abstract
This study is a part of a project supported by the European Union, the United Nations Population Fund and the Women Directorate in Turkey. It aims to show how domestic violence is reported in the mainstream Turkish newspapers. This presentation will focus mainly on the findings of a content analysis of the news. Turkish newspapers have increased their levels of awareness and responsibility, especially by supporting some social projects against domestic violence (mainly honour killings). However this study shows that even so, there are still many problems in the representation of domestic violence in the Turkish media. This presentation will discuss the results on the basis of the following dimensions:

- Distribution of the news according to pages (This can show the importance attributed to the issue. In fact, Turkish newspapers consider domestic violence as a 'page 3 issue'; that is, a private, police-crime matter).
- Visualisation of domestic violence (How the victims are portrayed is indicative of rising sensationalism in the Turkish press).
- Types of violence represented (physical, sexual, psychological, and economic: the news tends to focus on physical violence while ignoring other forms. Among the physical violence stories, murder stories make up a majority. Women who are not killed are not reported on much).
- Legitimisation and naturalisation of violence (How do reports build empathy with killers and try to understand them?).
- Sources and actors of news (The analysis of who speaks about the issue, in fact, broadly determines the content)

We will also discuss more discursive elements on the representation of violence in the news and try to show the problems in this representation by analysing the verbal choices. Also, we will question whether the news contextualises domestic violence as a political problem, and in an attempt to guide or help readers.

Key Words: Domestic violence, news content, news discourse, news media, representation, Turkish newspapers, Turkish women, women.

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In earlier studies, we analysed the media content in Turkey regarding the representation of gender. These studies showed that the media conceived women either as angels (mother, housewife) or as sexual objects. Even professional women can hardly escape being represented through their 'feminity' (the woman politician who loves cooking; the beautiful lecturer, the business women who is a good mother).[1] This study we will talk about today is different from the earlier work,[2] included the production dimension and conducted a series of in-depth interviews with journalists. Today, we will be mainly talking about the findings on the news. However, the whole project also considers women's TV programmes and serials.[3]

There have been many regulations, policy changes and a big change in the official understanding on the position of women in Turkey in recent years. Feminists organised marches against beating in 1987. Women shelters were established in 1990. Lawyers organised to lobby for legal changes. The state - with legal changes, action plans and institutionalisation; NGOs - by sharing international experience (i.e. CEDAW); and the private sector - with social responsibility projects, all worked together to prevent domestic violence and to protect and support victims. This was explained in detail throughout the conferences on Domestic Violence organised by the Women Directorate in Turkey in 2007 and 2008.

Even though official policies are organised to stop or reduce domestic violence, it still continues. Still, one in three women continues to experience domestic violence. It is not only common in rural areas and among uneducated people, but can be seen in all countries, all ages, classes and professions.[4] Why is this so? We believe that the greatest obstacle to changing these patterns of violence lies in the mentalities of citizens. Thus, the media has a great role in this process. Therefore, analysing how the media conceives the issue is important.

This study aims to analyse how the Turkish press represents domestic violence directed at women, by applying content and discourse analysis of the news published in the main newspapers of the media groups: Hürriyet, Posta, Sabah and Zaman.[5]

The main findings were as follows:

News items on domestic violence are mainly crime stories (78.5%). Only 5.9% of the news is about politics. Another finding parallel with this is the focus on actors (those who speak in the news): they are mainly 'ordinary citizens' (78.3). While NGOs are referred to 35 times in the news (2.5%), references to celebrities are double that; 74 times (5.3%). This shows the increasing tabloidising tendency of Turkish media. The sources of the news are the police, ordinary citizens and the judiciary.

Domestic violence can hardly find a place on the first page (only 13.3 %); the issue is covered mainly on the third page (30.7 %). This would seem to indicate that the Turkish media does not attribute enough importance

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to domestic violence issues to allocate space to their coverage on the first page.

Domestic violence news is highly visualised. Photographs of victims appear more than those of attackers.

The newspapers tend to report stories of physical violence more than others (86%). Among physical violence stories, murder events constitute the majority. While the news reports sexual violence, these reports are made up mainly of rape stories. Psychological violence is reported less than the first two. The least reported news is that which centres on economic violence. Even though it is common, economic violence is not considered newsworthy.

The news analysed in the study was mainly concerned with more visible results of domestic violence: physical damage (159 news items) rather than psychological damage (34 items).

An analysis of the ways in which both victims and perpetrators were described in newspapers revealed problematic patterns in choices of adjectives. For example, the newspapers used expressions such as: 'ruthless', 'maniac', 'mentally ill' and 'depressed' for men who used violence against women. This is problematic, because these adjectives may serve to indirectly excuse violence. Furthermore, they can hide the political nature of violence and reduce it to some psychological deviance or illness. The adjectives used for victims, such as 'poor', 'fateless' or 'pitiful, can also similarly contribute to hide the social and political roots of violence. In fact, the expressions, 'domestic violence' or 'violence against women' are used only five times in the news. In their declarations, journalists (six times) and other actors (17 times) often used expressions that called into question the life styles and moral values of victims (terms such as 'immoral' and 'sinful'). Thus, not only is domestic violence de-politicised, but also women are accused and held responsible.[6] It was interesting to see these representations, especially in the news on 'honour killings' (murders in the name of 'honour'). The state opposes 'honour killings' and is doing a great deal to prevent them. The press claims to oppose these killings, and in fact, there are many reports which express this opposition. However, there are still reports which give disproportionate representation to the perspectives of perpetrators over those of victims, often giving print space to perpetrators' expressed rationales for their acts, sometimes even in headlines. Such was the case in the news on the death of Güldünya. In the court, the killer listed reasons why his sentence should be reduced due to 'provocation'. The news, by foregrounding these reasons, appeared to almost justify the killing.[7] In another case, in which a convicted killer thanked the court for reducing his punishment, the media coverage included this headline: 'Who would not thank?'[8] The press should be very careful in conveying these accounts, which can serve to build empathy with the killer, rather than with the victim.

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What are the other problematic areas of the news? The news analysed in the study sensationalises, and sometimes even reports in a comic way that fails to problematise violence. Here are some examples of news headlines that demonstrate these tendencies:

> "Hello, I shot my daughter and am waiting for you at home."[9]
> "I am tired, you continue beating."[10]
> "10 years sentence to rape of mother-in-law with detergent."[11]
> "Stabbed his wife who went to her neighbour to take a spinach pie recipe."[12]
> "A prisoner who beat his wife will pay his sentence by living with his wife."[13]

The study revealed that stories about sexual violence can sometimes constitute a pornographic narrative by privileging the rapist's account without reservation. For example: "Rape punishment to breaking up."[14] This headline accompanied a news report of a man who found his ex-fiance making love with another man. He raped her, and then distributed her naked photos on the internet. One (relatively, more tabloid) newspaper even printed these 'revenge' photos in the news. In this way, the newspaper perpetrated even further violence against the victim.

In conclusion, what can be said about the situation of the Turkish media? There are some social projects, such as that of the biggest newspaper, *Hürriyet*, 'End Domestic Violence Against Women', which changed the representation in a positive, sensitive way. However, they do not make a radical change; there are still many news sources who continue to represent domestic violence in the same way we criticised here.

Currently, the industry standard *Media and Diversity Guidelines*,[15] to which we contributed as the authors of this presentation, is an important initiative since it allocates a title specifically on violence towards women and children. Producing guidelines are important, but they can be meaningful only if they are applied; if they are used in training programmes by committed editors. It is possible to make some relatively minor positive changes as a result of these initiatives. However, for more positive transformation of the media industry in Turkey, more radical questioning of its operation is needed (such as fierce competition, ratings, lack of organisation, lack of a trade union, and less women in managerial positions).

We are not saying that the media is the only entity responsible for violence. And violence will not stop even if the media changes its attitude. However, we argue that the media is one of the most important tools in

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reproducing and legitimising violence. Why shouldn't we struggle to reverse this situation?

Notes

[1] M Gencel Bek, 'Medyada Cinsiyetçilik ve İletişim Politikası', *İletişim*, Vol. 10, 2001, pp. 214-216; M Binark, M Gencel Bek, *Eleştirel Medya Okuryazarlığı, Kuramsal Tartışmalar ve Uygulamalar*, Kalkedon, İstanbul, 2007, pp. 149-171.

[2] A Aziz, E Köker, A Altun, M Gencel, and N Tutal, *Medya Şiddet ve Kadın,* T. C. Başbakanlık Kadının Statüsü ve Sorunları Genel Müdürlüğü Yayınları, Ankara, 1994.

[3] For another study which analyses different television genres, see N B Çelik (ed) *Televizyon, Kadın ve Şiddet*, KİV, Ankara, 2000.

[4] For further information see A Altınay and Y Arat, *Türkiye'de Kadına Yönelik Şiddet*, İstanbul, 2008.

[5] The newspapers mentioned comprise more than half of the total circulation in Turkey during one year. The analysis included papers published from 1 September 2006 to 31 August 2007.

[6] Marian Meyers takes into account the detrimental impact of this representation in her book titled *News Coverage of Violence Against Women: Engendering Blame*, Sage, London, 1997.

[7] 'Güldünya aile şerefini lekeledi savunması', *Zaman*, 10 November 2006, p. 14.

[8] Neşet Karadağ, 'Kim Teşekkür Etmez ki?', *Posta*, 5 November 2006, p. 5

[9] Murat Karaman, 'Alo kızımı vurdum evde sizi bekliyorum', *Sabah*, 12 April 2007, p. 3.

[10] 'Ben yoruldum damat biraz sen döv', *Sabah*, 16 May 2007, pp. 1 and 6.

[11] Oya Armutçu, 'Kaynanaya deterjanlı tecavüze 10 yıl hapis', *Hürriyet*, 23 March 2007, p. 5.

[12] 'Ispanaklı börek tarifine giden eşini bıçakladı', *Hürriyet*, 19 December 2006, p. 3.

[13] Mehmet Barlas, 'Karısını döven mahkum, cezasını eşinin yanında çekecek', *Zaman*, 5 July 2007, p. 3.

[14] Teslime Tosun, 'Terk edilmeye tecavüz davası', *Hürriyet*, 25 August 2007, p. 7.

[15] Turkish Journalists Association and British Council, *Media And Diversity Guidelines*, Ankara, 2007.

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Racist Violence Attacks on Foreigners, Mass-Media and Fear of Crime

Hakan Arıkan

Abstract
Racist violence perpetuated against foreigners, immigrants and even citizens is reported to constitute one of the most rapidly growing forms of hate-crimes in the world. More and more, people rely on the information they get from media sources about almost everything, including racist violent crime. The more violent and scandalous the hate crime, the more likely it is to make the news media. The main thesis statement of this study states that the media's continual and intense presentation of such criminal acts has contributed to the 'fear of crime' (an anticipation of victimisation, not the actual victimisation) in societies. This study will look at the ways in which the media portray such crimes and how their portrayals possibly affect the fear of citizens. News media, movies and television shows inflame the fear of crime in people by depicting both real incidents of such crimes and fictionally created crime cases. However, whether this fact has an effect, especially in relation to fear of crime, remains ambiguous. Thus, this study will include some theoretical and case study elaborations, both on the dynamics of racist violence against foreigners and on the assumed relations between media depictions of such violent cases and the fear of crime in citizens in the modern European Union societies. A social constructivist approach will be employed to analyse the sociological aspects of such hate crimes by specifically focusing on the possible impacts of the media re-framings of such cases on the fear of crime of viewers-audiences.

Key Words: European Union, fear of crime, hate crimes, immigrants, mass media, racism, violence.

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1. Introduction

This study takes as its specific focus the relationship between actual criminal victimisation and fear of crime. It is assumed that estimates of the risk of criminal victimisation are substantially exaggerated relative to observed victimisation rates.[1] In this paper, I seek to explain these inaccuracies by focusing on the social contexts in which fear of crime emerges. In particular, I argue that the influence of actual racist violent attacks on immigrants and their framings in the media serve as key predictors of fear of crime in the European Union (EU). This study provides an

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overview of the research on the mass media and its effects on perceptions of racism and personal fear of crime. Thus, I examine the modifiers of the relationships between media and fear.

The relationship between fear of crime and mass media is unclear. To put the dilemma in simple terms: do people fear crime because a lot of crime is being shown on television or does television just provide footage about crimes because people fear crime and want to see what's going on? The complex nature of crime could allow the media to exploit social naivety, covering crime not only selectively, but also distorting the everyday world of crime. According to Ferraro, some say the media contribute to the climate of fear that is created, because the actual frequency of victimisation is a tiny fraction of potential crime.[2] With crime accounting for up to 25 per cent of news coverage, the quality and angle of the coverage becomes an issue. The media displays violent crime disproportionately to its actual occurrence, whilst neglecting minor crimes. The profiles of offenders in the media are distorted, causing misunderstanding of criminal offending.

Several sociological studies have identified several instances where social and cultural contexts shape perceptions of risk.[3] Fear of crime in individuals can be regarded as a perception of risk of victimisation. There may be various social and cultural factors that influence the emergence of fear of crime in individuals. Many of these factors are summarised in the 'social amplification of risk' framework, developed by Kasperson and colleagues.[4] The social amplification of risk summarises the multiple levels at which risk-relevant public events - such as violent racist attacks on foreigners or immigrants in Europe - are amplified or attenuated in the public understanding. Amplification (or attenuation) of risk messages can occur both at the point at which messages are sent (e.g. the media, politicians, police or non-governmental organisations) and points at which messages are received (e.g. citizens and immigrants).

The mass media can downplay or intensify a message by providing little or extensive coverage to an event or story. Individuals can also amplify or attenuate signals by attaching social values and meanings to the information which give it greater or lesser significance. The social amplification perspective thus provides a framework for understanding the range of factors that may increase or decrease perceptions of the importance of events related to a risk. Rather than accepting a simple model of risk and response, this perspective encourages us to consider the social and cultural context in which risks become highlighted or downplayed.[5]

2.   Racism and Media Coverage

Hate crimes can be defined as acts of discrimination, harassment or violence against individuals based on their gender, race, religion, ethnicity, language, sexual orientation, or disability. Violence perpetuated against

foreigners, immigrants and minorities is reported to constitute one of the most rapidly growing forms of hate-crimes in Europe.

Today, even though there are no accurate statistics on the number of 'hate-motivated crimes' committed each year, based on the official statistics it can be rightfully claimed that such crimes - especially ethnic and religious racism - are on the rise in the world, including in the European Union. Moreover, several EU crime surveys indicate that around 20 percent of all crimes against ethnic minorities and immigrants were actually racially motivated.[6]

Most racist attacks are generally classed as neo-Nazi or far-right-wing violence and are widely related to the increasing economic problems in the EU by the European media. Another popular explanation behind the rise of racist violence in Europe has been the 'incompatible' social, cultural, religious differences between 'real Europeans' and 'foreigners.' In contrast, victim immigrants' native countries or minority-owned media have a tendency to illustrate these crimes as acts of historical and socio-cultural biases and discrimination towards non-Europeans and non-Christians in Europe.

Some European media also tend to portray some proven racist attacks as individual hate crimes rather than as organised racist acts. They tend to characterise the crimes as the acts of sociopathic youths, often influenced by unemployment, hardships, bewilderment, or nostalgia for old-fashioned ideals. To some other media, these violent attacks are not unrelated, isolated atrocities; they are directed by right-wing extremists. Ferraro claims that the tactics and strategies used, together with the geographic distribution of such aggressive actions, prove that attacks against foreigners are planned and financed by a centralised entity in order to attain maximum effect in terms of visibility, fear and confusion.[7]

Media framing on racism cases can be influenced by a given media's ideological stance. For instance, right-wing, left-wing, or liberal media, and international or national media sources may frame or reframe the same case quite differently. For example, the left-wing and liberal media accounts of the riots that spread across France in the fall of 2005 and again in November 2007 laid the blame squarely on a racist society that has marginalised the children and grandchildren of North African immigrants. In contrast, some right-wing media had blamed the 'ghetto' immigrants' resistance to integration into the mainstream French society. It was not just racism.

The xenophobic discourses and activities of organised hate groups, racist organisations and political parties often get more media attention and thus fuel the fear among some immigrants and minorities (e.g., Neo-Nazi activities). However, anti-racist demonstrations usually get relatively less

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coverage, unless they turn into huge non-violent mass protests or violent public riots.

If we look at the overall news coverage on racism we see overwhelming representation of the cases of physically violent attacks and some racist discrimination cases against immigrants and minorities. Less dramatic or non-physical harassment cases are often undermined in the media. Serial killings, multiple deaths or injuries, arson attacks on the house or business places, child and woman victims, as might be expected, get more media attention and create more panic in the society.

It must be noted that not all cases against immigrants or minorities can be regarded as racially motivated. However, racially motivated cases usually get more media and public attention. Most daily violence attacks stay unnoticed or unreported by both the police and the media, thus minimising the effects of fear of crime in a given society. On the other hand, overrepresentation of racist attacks in the media can have negative effects on fear of crime.

3.   Fear of Crime and the Role of the Mass-Media

Fear, in this paper, is defined as an anticipation of victimisation, rather than fear of an actual victimisation. This type of fear relates to how vulnerable a person feels. It is an "emotional reaction characterised by a sense of danger and anxiety produced by the threat of physical harm ... elicited by perceived cues in the environment that relate to some aspect of crime."[8]

There are three ways to study fear of crime: cognitive, affective and behavioral. Some researchers study the cognitive side of fear of crime which means trying to assess the size of the crime problem according to respondents. The second way to look at fear of crime is to make a distinction between fear, worries and concern, which is the affective side of fear of crime. This makes it possible to take into account the altruistic side of the fear (others might become a victim of crime). A third way to study fear of crime is to ask people whether they ever avoid certain areas, protect certain objects or take preventive measures. This way, measuring fear of crime can become a relatively straightforward thing, because the questions asked tap into actual behavior and 'objective' facts, such as the amount of money spent on a burglar-alarm or extra locks.[9]

Fear of crime has both positive and negative effects on people. When the fear of crime is proportionate to reality, people are aware of the risks associated with various personal violence offences. This level of fear or concern can encourage good personal safety habits and increased home and property security, thereby minimising the risks of becoming a victim. When the fear of crime becomes disproportionate to the reality, the positive effects may swiftly be replaced with a string of devastating effects on a person's

lifestyle and quality of life. These effects can include: restriction of lifestyle, paranoia, decreased confidence, increase in financial costs and so on.[10]

People get their information about crime from a number of sources, but one major source for information is the media. The media are a powerful way of getting messages across to citizens, since up to 95% of people use the media as a prime source of all types of information.[11]

Many studies have looked at the ways in which the media portray crime and how their portrayals affect levels of fear. It has been found that "the media tend to disproportionately represent violent accounts of crime." The media cover events which are "intense, exciting, arousing, or extreme."[12]

Interest in crime news has increased greatly in recent years. Today, over half of the stories deal with violent crimes, and half of these violent crimes deal with murder.[13] This is very disproportionate, considering the fact that violent crimes constitute only approximately 10% of all crimes reported in Europe, and murders constitute around 1% of all reported incidents. For example, a study conducted in Scotland found that 6.5% of the news reported in newspapers involved crime, and 46% of this was violent and sexual crime, even though only 2.4% of reported crimes were actually violent or sexual.[14] The same pattern was found in Birmingham, England. Smith found that while personal crimes constituted 5.4% of officially recorded crimes, they occupied 72.7% of press reports.[15] This pattern of the media disproportionately portraying crime can be found in numerous other places. The media all over the world have a fixation on the topic of crime, especially violent and sexual crime. This leads people to believe that there is more crime than there actually is, and believing that a great amount of crime exists in society leads people to be fearful.

Knowing that the media report mainly sensational crimes, research has moved on to look at whether media reports have any effect on citizens' perceptions. Results of studies that have examined the effects have been diverse. Some studies report that those who read newspapers which report a great deal of sensational crime have more fear.[16] On the other hand, some others state that newspaper coverage of crime lessens peoples' fear of crime, for when people read about the crime in other towns and cities, or even in other neighborhoods, it makes them feel "safe by comparison."[17] However, other studies suggested that the more local TV news a person watched, the higher their reported fear of crime was.[18]

There are a number of factors that must be considered when examining the effects of the media on fear of crime, including: sensationalism, randomness, proportion of the news devoted to the incident, location, and whether harm is done.[19] All of these factors play a role in determining the level of fear that results from the media portrayal of the crime. The media are capable of contacting many people, but whether this contact has an effect, especially in relation to crime, remains ambiguous.

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Several studies have shown that demographic characteristics, media exposure, perceived risk to crime, and victimisation are associated with a person's perception of crime. Also, a person's perception of crime often does not coincide with the actual crime rate. Studies also show that many demographic features affect perceptions of crime, both negatively and positively. Concerning the impact of age on perceptions of crime, research has varied results. Some research shows that older people tend to have less fear of crime when compared to younger people.[20] Conversely, other research states the opposite; older adults report greater fear of crime.[21] People who are more affluent and belong to a higher social class have less fear of crime.[22] In addition, women report a higher fear of crime than men.[23] When considering race, minorities (particularly African immigrants) fear crime more than whites.[24] And, lastly, viewing local television news relates to a heightened fear of crime.[25] This heightened fear of crime may result from the fact that most news sources use crime, particularly violent crime, for major news stories, and, because of this, media reports contain more violence than the 'real' world.[26] According to the literature, results vary as to whether older or younger adults fear crime more.[27] Some other studies also support the similar claims that social class also has an effect on a person's fear of crime. The literature stated that people who were of higher socioeconomic status reported lower fear of crime.[28]

The literature suggested that people who felt they were at a greater risk of crime also reported a high fear of crime.[29] Prior victimisation can have a negative effect on a person's fear of crime.[30] The literature agreed that people's perceptions of crime occurrence are greater than the actual occurrence of crime.[31] The majority of criminal activity covered in the media is often about violence, murder and rape, therefore leading people to believe that these crimes occur much more often than they really do. And media coverage tends to not hype up the 'lesser' crimes, which lead the public to believe they occur much less than they do.[32] There have been a few studies on minorities and their fear of crime in Europe. Some studies showed that immigrants and people from minority groups have a higher fear of crime than the rest of the population.[33] If a person perceives his/her neighborhood as dangerous, he/she is more likely to feel at risk of crime, and a higher perceived vulnerability to, or risk of, crime increases one's fear of crime.[34] When considering crime victimisation, results from research have shown that previous victimisation will be a key predictor of fear of crime.[35] And ordinarily, it is found that the greater the victimisation, the greater the fear of crime.[36]

Certain factors have been shown to increase a person's fear of crime. Yet researchers have found that people's perceptions of crime are greater than the actual occurrence of crime. In fact, the perception of gun deaths by participants in one study was 6 - 10% higher than the actual gun deaths.[37]

Despite a general decrease in crime rates, surveys suggest that people still feel that crime in their area increases over time. A possible explanation for this is what Felson calls the "dramatic fallacy."[38] Dramatic fallacy refers to perceptions of crime being higher than crime rates due to the influence of media and police. Studies have found that the public believes that violent crimes dominate when in actuality crimes such as burglary, robbery, and drug-related crimes are far more common.[39]

However, perhaps there are more effects than those, such as the social context. Since actual crime rates are fully known, individuals rely on other social or contextual factors associated with crime for additional information in forming their estimates of risk; such as signs of disorder, incivilities, and demographic characteristics of a local area.[40] Considering that many immigrants in Europe live in ghettos or in less secure areas of the cities, they may feel more fear of crime than the people who live in better off and more secure areas.

In sum, the previous studies have focused on the cues individuals draw upon to interpret risks of criminal victimisation. Victimisation presents an interesting case from the perspective of risk formation: crime occurs on a regular basis; people thus have reason to think about the risks of crime in their daily lives. Likewise, information about the frequency and severity of crime in a local area is available to non-specialists, through personal experience and observation, crime reports, and other sources of information. Individuals thus have access to a wide range of information and direct experiences against which to calibrate their perceptions of crime. In their everyday assessments, then, how accurately do individuals perceive the risk that they will become the victim of crime? What social cues do individuals use in forming these risk estimates, and to what consequences? It is these questions that need to be answered in future studies.

4.   Conclusion

Exaggerated or understated fear of crime, and its association with violence against minority or immigrant groups, can thus create a self-fulfilling prophesy, whereby reactions to the fear of crime may produce larger and more visible impacts on the general population. Thus, both cases may reinforce individuals' perceptions about the occurrence of violent crimes against foreigners and its association with racism, especially among immigrant or minority groups.[41] Biases in judgment and claims-making activities cannot be just matters of personal concern. They can themselves support deeply rooted racial stereotypes, contributing to the persistent gap between the native and immigrant people in the European Union.

Overestimating or underestimating criminal victimisation and its association with racism are decisions with a social and a political cost. Certain immigrant or minority groups (i.e., non-Christians, non-Whites, gays

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and lesbians) usually perceive higher risks of victimisation than others, beyond any actual association between racism and crime. Even in the cases of actual violent attacks against such groups, non-minority observers (i.e., citizens, media, politicians and police) are most likely to perceive less risks of crime. Some of these people and the media may even tend to perceive such attacks as mere criminal acts with no racist motives. Some immigrants, their representing organisations and the media from immigrants' own countries may easily associate such crimes with European racism. In particular, most European media prefer to underestimate the racist motives behind such attacks and fear of crime in the immigrant society (e.g., the ongoing arson attacks on immigrants in Germany since 1991).

Such facts provide some signs of the racialisation of fear of crime. The mental connection of race and crime against immigrants and minorities appears to be suitably powerful as to override most other possible factors in the socio-cultural environment that may be linked to risks of victimisation. The media framings of such incidents may vary a lot, thus they influence the public opinion in both ways: intensifying or easing fear of crime in the society.

No matter how media portrays such incidents, individual biases still play a significant role in their perceptions and claims-making. The only thing that remains unquestionable is the existence of fear of crime among so called high-risk immigrants such as non-Christian and non-white immigrants. In particular, Blacks, Asians, Muslims, Jews and gypsies always feel more vulnerable and insecure in regards to such hate crimes and violent attacks than other immigrants or minority groups. Historically, these five major groups have been usually perceived as the 'other' or even 'outcast' by the white Europeans.

These partly prejudice-related and partly factual differences in risk perceptions about racism and fear of crime may cause serious social polarisation in a given society. Although it is difficult to identify a direct association, the results are consistent with the influence of widespread cultural stereotypes associating immigrants with crime, as well as to distortions in media coverage, which tends to exaggerate the amount of violent crime and the degree to which violent crime is committed by racist people or organisations. Regardless of the source of the bias, an amplification of fear of crime is a personal process which is only partially influenced by the media framings. A further analysis of the influence of the media amplification of such violent incidents on public opinion may provide some sociological knowledge in assessing the fear of crime.

Everyone seems to have a different opinion when it comes to crime; however, those opinions tend to be influenced by similar factors. The results from previous studies consistently agree that gender, age, race/ethnicity, social class, media exposure, perceived risk, and prior victimisation are all

associated with one's perception of crime. Although the results vary from sample to sample as to what the strongest predictor is, most find that the public's view of crime does not often coincide with the real rates of crime. In fact, it seems that fear of crime rises as crime rates drop.[42] Researchers try to explain this through looking at external forces influencing a person's perception of crime. The final result is that the public's view of crime is influenced by many psychological and social factors. Individuals, therefore, often make errors in judging risk and uncertainty, but many errors tend to be systematic and predictable.[43]

It is evident that this specific social problem of crime has been repackaged by the media. The media draws public attention to this visible, already existing problem. Violent racist attacks in particular have made a shocking impact and have attracted public attention. The media often uses techniques of 'drama' by emphasising real situations; for instance, there are "bad racist people against innocent, vulnerable foreigners."[44] Murders, arson attacks on homes and businesses, gang beatings, rapes, attacks on religious temples and schools, women and children victims are often presented in dramatic stories to increase newspaper sales and TV ratings. The links between past and present similar crime cases are usually established to suggest a clear, dangerous trend. In some European mass media, even proven or suspected deadly racist incidents are given brief coverage, or they are presented as if they are non-racially motivated murder cases, without showing any links with other similar incidents. Another big danger lies in the various forms of denials. Although discrimination is often covered in the press, it is usually represented as incidental; racism is denied in many ways. Racism is usually located elsewhere; temporally, in the past, politically, in the far-right (racist parties), and socially, at the bottom (poor inner cities, skinheads, etc). Everyday forms of cultural racism, or ethnicism, are at most characterised as intolerance of xenophobia, which may even be blamed on the victim.[45]

In conclusion, mass media must act more responsibly by neither downplaying nor exaggerating violent incidents in general, and racist acts against minorities and immigrants in particular. By doing so, the gap between host country natives and their immigrants and minorities can possibly be bridged and thus the level of fear of crime can possibly be minimised. Some socio-cultural and political measures stimulating cultural tolerance must be taken into account to ease the fear of crime. However, promoting governmental or non-governmental programs like these do not make headlines, as do racist killings and outbreaks of violence.

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Symbolic and Discursive Violence in Media Representations of Aboriginal Missing and Murdered Women

Yasmin Jiwani

Abstract
To date, Canada is one of four nations that have refused to ratify the UN Declaration of Rights of Indigenous peoples. Yet an Amnesty International Report reveals that over 500 Aboriginal women in Canada have gone missing over the last two decades. More recently, Robert W. Pickton, a serial killer, has been alleged to have murdered at twenty-six of the women missing from Vancouver's Downtown Eastside, many of whom were Aboriginal. This presentation draws on examples culled from seven years (2000 to 2007) of press coverage in Canada's daily newspaper of record, *The Globe and Mail*, to illustrate how symbolic and discursive violence was used to mediate representations of the missing and murdered Aboriginal women. I pay particular attention to historical constructions of Aboriginal women as prostitutes and discuss the legacies of colonialism that have systematically violated their rights and entitlement to land. Drawing from this historical backdrop, I examine how the national press coverage repositions Aboriginal women as criminals, victims of sexual crimes, militant rebels and as inassimilable others. I underscore themes of culpability that were invoked in these accounts to make sense of these women's lives and realities, thereby pre-empting notions of societal responsibility or intervention. I conclude with an examination of how these representations have enabled the Canadian state to maintain its position of limited involvement in alleviating the conditions of Aboriginal women 'over here' all the while attempting to rescue women 'over there' in Afghanistan or elsewhere.

Key Words: Aboriginal women, Canada, colonisation, press representations, racism, sex trade, victimhood, violence.

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1.   Introduction: Situating the News

In telling the stories of the nation, the news performs the role of the bard, disseminating myths that offer the nation a sense of an imagined community.[1] Which stories are told and how they are told becomes a crucial matter when we begin to examine the tangible consequences of actions taken on the basis of the perceptions that are being amplified by the news media. News, at both the national and local levels, thus constructs a symbolic universe - a

"socially constructed reality"[2] that affirms national identity and the latter's relations *with* and location *in* the world at large.

It is the language and representation of 'common sense' that makes news discourse worthy of study in terms of how it situates different groups and how that location is then used to define the boundaries of nationhood. Using everyday language and conversational modes, "the media 'colonise' that 'taken-for-granted' world in which conversation achieves coherence and order."[3] In so doing, they naturalise social inequalities and legitimise the status quo. However, this is not a monolithic process. Rather, a hierarchy of voices exists within the news media, with some voices more privileged than others, and some ways of understanding events more intelligible than others.

Nevertheless, news stories achieve a resonance that makes them appear intelligible; offering the most apposite analysis and highlighting the most suitable solution. Such coherence is accomplished through the framing of stories in a way that 'makes sense.' Robert Entman suggests that framing news involves:

> *selecting and highlighting some facets of events or issues, and making connections among them so as to promote a particular interpretation, evaluation, and/or solution.*[4] (Italics in the original)

An event can be contested through counter-frames but the interpretation offered by a dominant frame often seems more intelligible because it resonates with common sense. That 'common sense,' as Stuart Hall has noted, is steeped in the wellspring of historically sedimented knowledge. It is "at one and the same time, 'spontaneous,' ideological and unconscious." Hall succinctly argues, "[y]ou cannot learn, through common sense, *how things are*: you can only discover *where they fit* into the existing scheme of things."[5]

Even prior to September 11, 2001, the image of the burqa-clad Afghan woman captured the Western public imagination as an iconic symbol of oppression under the Taliban more specifically, and Islamic rule more generally. In contrast, images of Aboriginal women have not captured the same kind of resonance. However, more recently, and in light of the widely publicised trial of Robert W. Pickton - a serial killer convicted of the murders of numerous 'missing' women, many of whom were Aboriginal - the image of Aboriginal women as victims of violence has resurfaced. In this paper I examine representations of Aboriginal women that have circulated in the Canadian national daily, *The Globe and Mail*, in an effort to decipher why these women have not been constructed in a similar manner - as victims deserving of societal attention and intervention.

2.   Representations of Aboriginal Women

The legacy of Aboriginal representations in the Canadian context dates back to early French and English colonisation. Early representations were thus intimately tied to the process of colonisation and varied across the country in terms of colonial settlement and contestation over land. What is noteworthy is that these representations changed when it became strategically necessary to discredit Aboriginal claims to land and nationhood, and to annihilate native identity and traditions either through law, genocide or assimilation.[6] White women's presence was used as a marker to outline the boundaries between indigenous and settler peoples, and to exemplify the latter's moral and cultural standards of acceptability.

In popular culture, representations of Aboriginal women have oscillated between Indian princesses and "lascivious squaws."[7] Rayna Green argues that in the early stages of Anglo-native relations, the Indian woman was symbolised as powerful and dangerous. However, in the later stages of empire, when the colonies began to secede, she was represented as younger, tamer and more American. Green posits that a Pocahontas perplex riddles the American popular imagination, marked by an intolerable split between the 'good' Indian woman and her more negative sister. The 'good' Indian woman "rescues and helps white men."[8] She heals the sick and aids those in trouble. If she falls in love with a white man who she cannot marry or who leaves her, she is granted the dignity of suicide. Her sister, the 'squaw,' stands in stark contrast: "She does what white men want for money or lust."[9] Janet Acoose contends that such images were strategic as they legitimised and furthered imperial interests and the specific agendas of Christian missionaries, fur traders and explorers. Within this context, the squaw represents the 'primitive' woman relegated to servicing the sexual needs of white settlers, whereas the princess represents the 'good' and 'rescue-able' Aboriginal woman who could be tamed through Christian conversion and domestication.[10]

In speaking to the conditions of colonial contact in Canada between Aboriginal women and white men in Victoria, B.C., Barman observes that Aboriginal women were considered racially inferior and sexually licentious. As she puts it, "[n]ewcomer men did not want to need Aboriginal women, but if they were prostitutes it was possible to use and abuse them with impunity."[11] This association with prostitution was also underlined by the kinds of relationships that the North West Mounted Police (NWMP) and government officials had with Aboriginal women. In her insightful examination of 'capture' narratives in the early days of empire in the Canadian west, Sarah Carter notes that many Aboriginal women turned to prostitution out of economic necessity, and when faced with food rationing by federally appointed Indian agents.[12] Brownlie offers similar evidence pointing to how Indian agents would label Aboriginal women as prostitutes if they didn't comply with their demands or succumb to their authority.[13]   Thus, the association of Aboriginal women with prostitution has

long been an entrenched feature of the Canadian moral economy and widely distributed through popular culture. Sherene Razack notes:

> [N]ewspaper records of the nineteenth century indicate that there was a conflation of Aboriginal woman and prostitute and an accompanying belief that when they encountered violence, Aboriginal women simply got what they deserved. Police seldom intervened, even when the victims' cries could be clearly heard.[14]

It is the connection between this devalued status and culpability that ultimately marks Aboriginal women as less deserving or unworthy victims. How then are these signs of culpability and devaluation evident in contemporary Canadian press coverage?

3.   Aboriginal Women in *The Globe and Mail*

A search of *The Globe and Mail* archives (using the Factiva database) from January 1, 2000 to September 7, 2007 resulted in over two hundred articles that reference the word Aboriginal and/or native woman/women. Excluding letters to the editor, descriptions of television shows, book reviews and films that mentioned Aboriginal women only in passing, narrowed the search to 190 articles. I also excluded most of the articles dealing with the recent trial of Robert W. Pickton, except in those instances where women's Aboriginal identities were salient. The remaining articles included some obituaries, opinion pieces, editorials and special issue articles.

The articles clustered around the following themes: violence against Aboriginal women, dissension in Aboriginal communities between the women and band leaders, Aboriginal women asking (read demanding) for funding or protesting government decisions, custody cases involving Aboriginal children, Aboriginal women's vulnerable health status and high fertility rates, and the benevolence of various levels of government in responding to Aboriginal issues. Sprinkled in between were stories dealing with Aboriginal women and education and Aboriginal women achievers - those who had succeeded or been the first lawyers, judges, radio broadcasters, athletes, etc. While all of these thematic clusters worked in concert to inform particular understandings of Aboriginal women's lives and realities, it is the issue of violence that becomes particularly pronounced, bleeding into all other depictions of Aboriginal women.

Jenny Kitzinger comments that key events previously reported in the media become reference points, enabling journalists to use preceding frames as templates. She notes that:

> templates serve as rhetorical shorthand, helping journalists and audiences to make sense of fresh news stories. They are

instrumental in shaping narratives around particular social
problems, guiding public discussion not only about the past,
but also the present and the future.[15]

Based on the predominance of stories linking Aboriginal women and
violence, it can be argued that the violence template underpins much of the
coverage about Aboriginal women. However, how that violence is understood is
constrained and limited by the template itself, which, I would argue, is
historically entrenched. Thus, prostitution, alcohol and drug abuse, along with
inept mothering, form the dominant frames through which the violence is
defined.

4.   Erasing Structural Violence

Broadly, the issue of violence against Aboriginal women can be
conceptualised as spanning two intersecting and interlocking areas: intimate and
structural forms of violence. Structural violence, a term I borrow from Johan
Galtung, can be defined as that violence "manifested in the denial of basic
material needs (poverty), human rights (repression) and 'higher needs'
(alienation)."[16] Throughout the examined newspaper articles representations of
structural violence differed if it stemmed from government actions and inactions
as opposed to the violence directed at women within reserves by Aboriginal
leadership. In the latter case, representations tended to underscore the patriarchal
authority of Aboriginal men, though in a few cases there were counter-frames
that contested this interpretation.

With respect to structural violence, Aboriginal women are largely
portrayed as abject victims of poverty, their lives marked by alcohol and drug
addictions, homelessness, high infant mortality and morbidity rates, greater
incidence of HIV, Hepatitis infections and gynaecological cancers. In effect, they
were represented as one of the most hopeless segments of society. Numerous
stories entrenched this image of Aboriginal women as poverty-stricken, drug-
addicted victims of violence. Statistics were constantly referenced to underscore
this reality as evident in the stories ranging from the publication of Amnesty
International's report on violence against Aboriginal Women (*Stolen Sisters*), to
Statistics Canada's various news releases, to the advocacy initiatives of the
Native Association of Aboriginal Women (NWAC) and other groups. A
quintessential example of this kind of reportage can be seen in the following
news story:

> Aboriginal people are 2½ times as likely to report being the
> victims of violent crime than the general population, Statistics
> Canada said yesterday. And aboriginal women are three times
> as likely to report being victims of spousal violence, the federal

agency says in a groundbreaking report relating ethnicity to crime victimization rates.[17]

There is a constant theme in these stories, entrenching the victim status of Aboriginal women, but in a way that suggests a causal link between intimate and structural forms of violence wherein these women were constructed as culpable for their victimisation. As well, many stories imply that Aboriginal peoples have an essentialised proclivity to violence. This was especially the case in stories concerning crime. Once again, statistics were used to anchor such a frame and interestingly, because of the hard and defined nature of numbers (their exactness and concreteness) combined with the legitimacy of the government agencies or academics releasing these reports, there is a heightened aura of objectivity that surrounds them.

The association with criminality and culpability works in conjunction with other stories focusing on Aboriginal peoples' failure to uplift themselves. The inclusion of stories celebrating Aboriginal women's achievements work to communicate an impression of those rare individuals who have transcended the disadvantages of Aboriginal heritage. The implication being that, as per neo-liberal logic, if one tries hard enough, one can surely succeed. However, that such is not likely to occur, except in a few rare cases, is reflective of a kind of racial exceptionalism which Paul Silverstein defines as

> a process by which certain 'successful' members of minority groups (often sports stars, musicians, and intellectuals) escape from a generalized racial discourse and symbolize a possible harmonious future. These individuals are positioned as ideal-types giving rise to sentiments of comparison and implying the conditions of acceptance.[18]

Within this corpus of news stories there appeared to be a singular concern with Aboriginal people as either a vanishing race or Aboriginal women as being extremely fecund. References to Aboriginal women as being fecund breeders resonate with colonially entrenched stereotypes of the colonised as more animal-like, having less control and - through their excessive numbers - constituting a potentially threatening and invasive force. Thus, not only are Aboriginal peoples portrayed as criminals and as victims of crimes (perpetuated by their own people against them), but they are also depicted as inept, prone to addictions, and as lacking responsibility or accountability. However, these stories decontextualise the very sources contributing to this structural violence. As Robert Harding argues in his study of the press coverage of four 'flashpoints' of Aboriginal history in British Columbia,

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> [b]y unhinging the present from the past in its coverage of
> contemporary aboriginal issues, the news media perpetuate
> damaging stereotypes of aboriginal people and create a
> supportive environment for state structures and practices that
> reproduce material and social inequality between aboriginal and
> non-aboriginal people.[19]

While a few stories did attribute current conditions to an historical
legacy, many of these were framed within the mantle of paternalism and
inscribed an 'us' versus 'them' binary.[20] The question "what are 'we' doing to
'help' Aboriginal women?" is then answered by other news reports which focus
on the actions of various levels of government. Thus, the benevolence of the
state comes through in various stories detailing the funding of monies for
Aboriginal initiatives, the naming of a park in memory of an Aboriginal woman,
the allocation of a scholarship honouring an Aboriginal victim of violence and
injustice, as well as the implementation of employment equity laws and legal
decisions favouring Aboriginal women.

This theme of benevolence also came through in the various obituaries
that referenced Aboriginal people. Here, the deceased were often recognised in
terms of their participation in organisations working for Aboriginal women's
causes. In general, Aboriginal heritage is a constant theme in these obituaries,
where the stories tell of grandmothers who were Aboriginal country wives or that
the deceased lived during a time when there was considerable 'intermingling'
with native women, suggesting that otherwise these men would not have taken
Aboriginal wives.

5.   Victimised Women & Patriarchal Criminals - Intimate Violence

Throughout the period examined, several other themes were recurrent.
One of these concerned the construction of Aboriginal women as drug-addicted
prostitutes and inept mothers. There were numerous stories that focused on the
missing Aboriginal women, but always describing them as fitting a particular
profile - that of the drug-addicted prostitute. Similarly, stories about custody and
access continually reiterated a construction of Aboriginal women as inept, drunk,
addicted, mothers who did not seem to be capable of maternal feeling.

The consistent mention of Aboriginal women as 'drug-addicted
prostitutes' comes through most clearly in the stories concerning violence
perpetrated by white men. In all of these instances, the men are identified and
described in detail with respect to their backgrounds and their actions. Yet, in
each one of these cases (with the exception of Bishop O'Connor), the young
women involved were constantly referenced as drug-addicted sex workers.
Reiterating the identities of Aboriginal women victims of violence as fitting this
profile makes them seem responsible for the violence they experience. It is a
discursive strategy of blaming the victim.

The focus on individual white men as singular perpetrators of sexual violence against Aboriginal women abstracts them from the larger historical patterns of sexual violence as an inherent part of the conquest of Aboriginal peoples.[21] It also removes the focus from the larger societal patterns of gendered violence such that these men become signified as aberrant and pathological individuals.[22] For non-Aboriginal women, such stories reinforce the notion of danger from strangers while reinforcing middle-class standards of morality regarding how women should dress and act, and the areas they should not frequent.

While there were only three stories that referenced violence committed by Aboriginal men against Aboriginal women, they reinforced the representation of Aboriginal men as patriarchal, violent, and inherently criminal. However, what sealed this representation were the numerous stories about nepotism and corruption among Aboriginal leaders in native communities. At the same time, press accounts continued to stress that the leadership was opposed to any progressive gender equality measures that the government sought to impose. In contrast, white politicians were often portrayed in a way that made them appear more benevolent, compassionate and concerned about Aboriginal women.

Notwithstanding the above, there were a number of stories that emphasised the agency of Aboriginal women. However, in most instances, that agency translated as 'militancy' - in that Aboriginal women were positioned as 'demanding' rather than having legitimate claims. On a more positive note, agency was also demonstrated in terms of how they transcended structural limitations to attain positions of power and knowledge, as in being the first lawyer, the first athlete, the first radio host, etc. Most of the time, however, agency translated negatively into culpability - as taking actions that wilfully destroyed their lives and those of their families. In that sense, Aboriginal women appeared as 'fallen women.'

6.   Conclusion

In their study of mugging as a moral panic involving black males in Britain, Hall *et al* observe that labels "not only place and identify those events, they assign events to a context. Thereafter the use of the label is likely to mobilise this whole referential context, with all its associated meanings and connotations."[23] Labels such as 'drug-addicts,' 'alcoholics,' and 'prostitutes' then carry enormous semiotic weight freighting the iconic image of Aboriginal women as both hopeless and helpless.

The template upon which stories about Aboriginal women were fashioned tended to emphasise their culpability. The alcohol-drug-addicted-inept-mother-prostitute who was simultaneously a demanding, abject victim did not render Aboriginal women's representations deserving of the same kind of sympathy, empathy, and unswerving public commitment as called forth by their Afghan counterparts. Thus, whereas the Taliban were seen as imposing their

particular interpretation of Islam on helpless Afghan women, Aboriginal women are seen as complicit in the violence enacted on their bodies and psyches.

Yet, there is another element to this discursive economy. By focusing on issues 'out there,' the media can overlook the issues 'over here' and thereby obfuscate, if not evacuate, the issue of our complicity in upholding the 'existing scheme of things.'

Notes

[1] J Lule, 'Myth and Terror on the Editorial Page: The New York Times Responds to September 11, 2001'. *Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly*, 2002, Vol. 79, no. 2, pp. 275-293.

[2] P Dalhgren, 'TV News and the Suppression of Reflexivity', *Urban Life*, Vol. 9, no. 2, 1980, pp. 201-16.

[3] J Hartley, *Understanding News*, Methuen, London and New York, 1982, p. 98.

[4] R M Entman, 'Cascading Activation: Contesting the White House's Frame after 9/11', *Political Communication*, 2003, Vol. 20, no. 4, p. 417.

[5] S Hall, 'Culture, the Media and the 'Ideological Effect'', in *Mass Communication and Society*, J. Curran, M. Gurevitch & J. Woollacott (eds), E. Arnold in association with the Open University Press, London, 1979, pp. 325-326.

[6] C Harris, 'How Did Colonialism Dispossess? Comments from an Edge of Empire', *Annals of the Association of American Geographers,* 2004, Vol. 94, no. 1, pp. 165-82.

[7] T A Portman and R D Herring, 'Debunking the Pocahontas Paradox: The Need for a Humanistic Perspective', *Journal of Humanistic Counselling and Development*, 2001, Vol. 40, no. 2, p. 189.

[8] R Green, 'The Pocahontas Perplex, the Image of Indian Women in American Culture', in *Native American Voices, a Reader*, S. Lobo & S. Talbot (eds), Prentice Hall, Upper Saddle River, NJ, 2001, p. 206.

[9] ibid., p. 208.

[10] J Acoose, *Iskwewak - Kah' Ki Yaw Ni Wahkomakanak, Neither Indian Princesses nor Easy Squaws*, Women's Press, Toronto, 1995.

[11] J Barman, 'Aboriginal Women on the Streets of Victoria: Rethinking Transgressive Sexuality During the Colonial Encounter', in *Contact Zones: Aboriginal & Settler Women in Canada's Colonial Past*, K. Pickles & M. Rutherdale (eds), UBC Press, Vancouver, 2005, pp. 205-27, p. 208.

[12] S Carter, *Capturing Women, The Manipulation of Cultural Imagery in Canada's Prairie West*, McGill Queens, Montreal, 1997, p. 5.

[13] R J Brownlie, 'Intimate Surveillance: Indian Affairs, Colonization, and the Regulation of Aboriginal Women's Sexuality', in *Contact Zones: Aboriginal and*

Settler Women in Canada's Colonial Past, K. Pickles & M. Rutherdale (eds), UBC Press, Vancouver, 2005, pp. 160-78.

[14] S H Razack, 'Gendered Racial Violence and Spatialized Justice', in *Race, Space, and the Law: Unmapping a White Settler Society*, S. H. Razack (ed), Between the Lines, Toronto, 2002, pp. 121-56, p. 130.

[15] J Kitzinger, 'Media Templates: Patterns of Association and the (Re)Construction of Meaning over Time', *Media, Culture & Society*, 2000, Vol. 22, no. 1, pp. 61-84, p. 61.

[16] J Galtung, quoted in K. Karim, *Islamic Peril*, Black Rose Books, Montreal, Quebec, 2000, p. 20.

[17] J Sallot, 'Likelihood of assault on natives called high', *The Globe and Mail*, August 9, 2001, A5.

[18] P A Silverstein, 'Sporting Faith: Islam, Soccer, and the French Nation-State', *Social Text*, 2000, Vol. 18, no. 4, pp. 25-53, p. 42.

[19] R Harding, 'Historical Representations of Aboriginal People in the Canadian News Media', *Discourse & Society*, 2006, Vol. 17, no. 2, pp. 205-35, p. 206.

[20] T A van Dijk, *Elite Discourse and Racism*, Sage, California, 1993.

[21] A Smith, *Conquest, Sexual Violence and American Indian Genocide*, South End Press, Cambridge, MA, 2005.

[22] See N Berns, 'Degendering the Problem and Gendering the Blame: Political Discourse on Women and Violence', *Gender & Society*, 2001, Vol. 15, no. 2, pp. 262-81; M. Consalvo, 'The Monsters Next Door: Media Constructions of Boys and Masculinity', *Feminist Media Studies*, 2003, Vol. 3, no. 1, pp. 27-45.

[23] S Hall, C Critcher, T Jefferson and B Roberts, *Policing the Crisis: Mugging, the State, Law and Order,* MacMillan Press, London, 1978, p. 19.

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Representations of Intimidation of and Violence against Women in Art from the 16th - 20th Centuries

Dolores Villaverde Solar & Elena Alfaya Lamas

Abstract
Currently, nearly every day one can read in the newspapers or hear on the radio about women being murdered at the hands of husbands and boyfriends. Unfortunately, these events are becoming commonplace, and not only are we witnessing the violence of husbands against their wives, or boyfriends against their girlfriends, but also misogynist violence at work by means of mobbing, sexual harassment from bosses and other colleagues, or even rape. We listen to all this, we read about it and we watch it with all its harshness in every mass media. But has denigration towards women ever been analysed in the fine arts? This is not spoken of when dealing with the topic of a picture or a sculpture. This is, however, a topic present in the arts from antiquity, so it should be analysed. Some topics in the arts have always been considered worthy of study in order to understand the history of the different artistic styles: their treatment of sacred events, portraits, landscape, or mythology. Among those topics labelled as important we find history, and inside history we find battle pictures and war scenes that represent the irrationality of war and violence, such as Picasso´s *Guernica* or Goya´s *May 3 Shootings*. But other works denigrate and undervalue women, and these works are sometimes insufficiently observed. Didn't the Greeks, sculpting the *korai*, show their misogyny when hiding each and every feature showing beauty or anatomy as compared to the elegant *kuroi*? In this paper we will go through different artistic styles and observe when the artist was either an accomplice to or an informer of women´s ill-treatment and abuse; of the way in which the topics of rape, prostitution, and sexual harassment were treated, and the image of the so-called 'femme fatale.'

Key Words: Art, misogyny, violence, woman.

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1. Introduction

Misogyny is defined as hatred towards women.[1] From this perspective women are believed to be inferior to men and guilty of bringing evil to the world. This idea was easily accepted in antiquity. Actually, we can see it throughout the arts. Let us focus our attention first on Greek statuary of both male and female figures. The Greeks sought perfection in sculpture, and, notwithstanding this, misogyny is revealed in their *korai*,[2] hiding any beauty

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or anatomical features, as contrasted with the Apollinian *kuroi*. The young men are always shown naked, and walking - in spite of the rigidity and hieratic attitude characteristic of this period. These sculptures of men show chest and muscle characteristics, as contrasted with cylindrical and 'tough' women sculptures. We find an example of this in the Samos Hera.[3]

Misogyny in the arts is also present in contemporary pieces.[4] Arts in the period of the French Revolution portray women as mothers, as secondary figures. Although they participated actively in that conflict, in the fine arts women are excluded from organisations, political parties and so on. One picture that especially caught our eyes is *Horatio´s Oath* by the neoclassical French painter J. L. David (1748-1825). The Arts Ministry commissioned the picture in the Louis XVI period. It has always been interpreted as a paradigm of moral and patriotic values in which men are portrayed as brave and strong, whereas women just weep and moan. The picture focuses on a brother´s oath before leaving to fight in war so as to save his country. David separates the men from the women and we clearly see the different corporeal expressions of each. The men´s hands are closely joined together, signifying fidelity. The values of patriotism and nationalism are represented by men who, when forced to choose between defending their country or their family, choose their country. Women are represented crying and moaning. This difference is also remarkable because of the clearly defined and angular lines that represent men. The women are curved and wave-shaped. They symbolise governance by the emotions, and weakness, while the men represent honesty and righteousness. The only joining point between men and women are children, who leave their mothers to learn from their fathers.[5] It is unquestionable that this picture is painted by and for men. The depictions of women are implicitly disparaging to all women in general.

We will now go through a series of paintings and sculptures from 1500 to 1900 that serve our goal: proving that, by means of iconography, topic or composition, women are ill-treated by men artists. They are involved in reporting and showing this ill-treatment as normal, or even in vindicating it or exculpating it, as it happens in some cases related mainly to women prostitutes. We will group these paintings and sculptures into two categories, according to their religious or secular topics.

2.   Sacred Topics

The Bible is an important documentation of violence against women. This book presents approximately three hundred women, some of them with no name, or referred to simply by their relation to a man, such as the Pharaoh´s daughter, or Mark's mother. At first there might seem to be only two women in the Bible, representing the evil and the good: Eve and Mary. However, there are many more women, for example, the Queen of

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Saba, Esther, Ruth, and Judith. Also, the role played by martyrs and saint women deserves our close attention.

There is no scope to examine all the Biblical women portrayed in art, so we will go through just a few. *Susanna and the Old Men* was painted by Tintoretto and also by the female painter Artemisa Gentileschi some years later.

For Tintoretto, Susan does not seem to be a myth. He directs us to young women's hygiene in *Susanna in the Bath*;[6] he directs the observer to the young woman's decency and modesty, at the same time that two men observe her, seemingly admiring her nude body. This topic closely follows the Old Testament one. In this case, sexual harassment and violence is under-represented by the two old men watching Susan´s nudity for their own pleasure.

Although the same topic is presented by Artemisa Gentileschi (1593-1652/3), she paints it in a radically different way. We must mention that she is perhaps the only woman painter who received recognition in her period, the Baroque. Important characteristics of her paintings are her choice of topics and a particular iconography. She liked painting in which women figured prominently, and particularly those taken from the Bible, in or from mythology, such as Susan, Esther, and Judith.

In Artemisa´s painting of Susanna, the two old men, the judges, are not hidden, and the young woman is not placidly leaving the bath. The picture is focused on Susanna´s suffering and she is the one who hides frightened because she is being harassed. We see a terrified woman. She has to choose between being raped or suffering public derision.

Salome is one of the most well-known wicked women in the Bible. She is iconographically always represented either as a seducer or a prostitute; notwithstanding this, she was actually a princess. It was Gustave Moreau who perhaps best represented her in his picture, *The Apparition.*[7]

Princess Salome received the decapitated head of John the Baptist after dancing for King Herod. In the painting, John's head is floating in the air, bleeding; it is an apparition reminding Salome of what she did, while she appears to express regret. The whole picture appears unreal and fantastic. Salome is nearly naked, wearing only some diaphanous garments and a crown. Her attitude, composure, physical appearance and clothes are not very different from the ones shown by men in literature, history or cinema. Let us, for instance, remember Matahari or Bella Otero,[8] both of whom suggest an image of a beautiful and captivating bad woman.

We should also mention Delilah, who makes Samson lose his strength. Let us here pay attention to Rubens, who paints Samson sleeping in Delilah´s arms.[9] She, knowing that his strength comes from his hair, calls a barber to cut it. We must emphasise that Samson is shown nearly as a big boy in the hands of an indifferent erotic woman.[10]

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Lucas Cranach the Elder painted *Saint Catalina's Martyrdom* in 1508. He does not paint her in the martyrdom she suffered, ordered by Emperor Majencio and represented by a wheel of knives, but rather in the moment in which she is going to be killed - at the hands of a single man, with his sword. Her face does not show pain or regret for not having accepted to marry Emperor Majencio.

This is the typical Christian image, proving that divine love is superior to earthly love, that God helps those who call on him, and that only faith can save people. But, what we have here is violence against a woman; the princess, the smart, young and beautiful woman who must die because she does not want to marry the man to whom she has been promised. Cranach over-painted the genital organs of the executioner and the horseman in golden armour. Both of them symbolise danger and temptation for *all* women, as well as the cause of Saint Catalina's death.

Sebastiano de Piombo's (16th century) painting *Saint Agueda's Martyrdom* depicts a terrifying moment for this woman: two men are twisting her nipples with two big pliers, while three men look on. This is one of the harshest and most insulting representations of violence against women. Besides the picture, her legend is a clear example of 'machist' violence - both show what happens to a woman who rejects a man: she is sent to a brothel as a punishment, and in this we see that women's prostitution is considered bad, sinful and dishonourable for a woman (but not for those men who go to the brothel).

3.   Secular Topics

It is not only religious topics that show ill-treatment of women, but also secular topics, for instance, Bernini's *Apollo and Daphne*. The Italian artist was commissioned by Cardinal Borghese to sculpt a representation of Apollo and Daphne. The subject had been represented in painting before, but not so frequently in sculpture. Bernini (1598-1680) chose the moment in which Apollo thinks that he has reached Daphne, and she begins to turn into a tree. Meanwhile, Apollo seems to understand that something is wrong. Daphne's face shows that she prefers to turn into a tree rather than submit to the god's harassment. Her half-open mouth seems to shout and her eyes show terror.

Sexual harassment is also shown in Poussin's *Abduction of the Sabine Women*[11] and Bernini's *The Abduction of Proserpine*. The kidnapping of the Sabine Women forms part of Rome´s foundation myth. Its founder, Romulus, invited the Sabine people to a celebration in order to kidnap their women. It has been transmitted in the arts and literature as a noble goal, that of reproduction, but it actually meant horror for women.

Pluto and Proserpine is a white marble carving by Bernini. It represents the god Pluto just after his kidnapping of the woman, who tries to

run away. The god emerges victorious; the young woman - pictured trying to shout - is an image of fear, representing again, a victim of men.

Let us now focus on *Leda and the Swan*, a myth represented by many painters and sculptors. The god Zeus raped Leda by means of tricks, pretending to be pursued by an eagle. After the rape she gave birth to Castor, Helen, Pollux, and so on. The common depiction of rape in the history of art is not a graphic representation, but rather an embrace or other socially approved visual metaphor for sexual interaction. This is the case with Leonardo da Vinci, Corregio or Gericault.

This is not exactly what Paul Gauguin did, however. In his painting *The End of Virginity* we see a young woman with a flower in her hand and a box beside her. In fact, she is Juliette Net, the young woman whom the painter impregnated before leaving for Tahiti. There are many symbols in this painting, including the fading flower, symbolising the end of virginity, and the fox, indicating perversity. Juliette crosses her feet, as though to protect her violated sexual organs.

Several Spanish painters also represented sexual aggression. Let us consider for instance the 19th century representations of El Cid's daughters, Doña Elvira and Doña Sol. They are represented nearly naked and tied to a tree in the middle of a forest. After being raped they are abandoned, tied to a tree. The rapists are their own husbands, the Earls of Carrion.

Women's prostitution is not a typical subject in painting and sculpture, since it goes against social norms of propriety and decency. Notwithstanding this, Titian (1477-1576) paints Danaë not as a goddess, but as a naked prostitute. Golden rain stands here for coins.

Toward the end of the 19th century, Manet (1832-1883) paints *Oyimpia,* which is a modern representation of Titian's *Venus de Urbino*. However, Manet changes both the aspect and symbology of the original. He shows a perfect and white woman, who at the same time is both ordinary and treacherous.

Manet's *Oyimpia* was the cause of a scandal, both because of the topics - female nudity and prostitution - and also because of the style: he eschewed the self-conscious decency of classical paintings and represented a self-confident woman, cold, with an aggressive and intense look. This was interpreted as a threat to the public order and a provocation to men.[12]

One of the paintings showing more violence against women is *The Death of Sardanapalo* by Delacroix. It represents a bloody orgy in which an impassive man, Sardanapalo, king of Babylon, after being defeated, decides to put to fire everything that gave pleasure to him in life, including women. We do not need to say that this picture is obviously misogynistic. Delacroix is said to have enjoyed painting dead women. He is said to have had personal problems with women.[13]

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We may analyse Jean-Honoré Fragonard's (1732-1806) picture, *The Jolly Fate of the Swing*, his most famous painting. The topic seems to be a frivolous one: a young woman swung by a man and another one looking at the scene. However, the painter focuses all of the light on the woman so that we feel her attractiveness. The naked foot, or the elegant high heel shoe in the air are excellent erotic symbols.

Finally, Cezanne's *The Three Bathers* shows the voyeur hidden in the forest.[14] That is why women are frightened and try to cover their naked bodies. This turns an apparently non-dramatic picture into a dramatic one.

To conclude, we will summarise our observations as follows: 1) The vast majority of artists who have achieved social recognition are men, who most of the time are also misogynists; 2) It is much more common to see aggression against women than against men in art, above all in secular art. However, we may not forget the martyrdom of women saints as cases of 'machist' violence; 3) What all these pieces of art have in common is not the topic, author or style, but misogyny, premeditation and the false superiority of men.

We might continue to analyse artworks and the result would always be the same: in the arts, women suffer either physically or morally, and men, but for those depicted in battle pictures, are exonerated.

Notes

[1] B Anderson, and J Zinsser, *Historia de las mujeres,* Crítica, Barcelona, 2007, p. 73.

[2] Korai and kuroi are the terms used to talk about Greek sculptures of young women and men.

[3] It was made in marble in Samos in about 550 before Christ. Currently, the head is missing.

[4] The term 'contemporary arts' covers the period between 1750 to date. This coincides with the beginning of the Modern era.

[5] P Mayayo, *Historias de mujeres, historias del arte,* Ensayos de arte Cátedra, Madrid, 2003, p. 153.

[6] Both Tintoretto's *Susanna in the Bath* and Gentileschi's *Susanna and the Old Men* are based on the Old Testament.

[7] Paris, 1826-1898.

[8] It was said of her: "Talent is not everything. She has something equally valuable: fire. In her eyes, in her hair, and above all sensuality in every movement of hers." C Posadas, *La Bella Otero*, Planeta, Barcelona, 2001, p. 90.

[9] Peter Paul Rubens was born in Siegen in 1577. He died in Amberes in 1640.

[10] Judges 16: 19-20.

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[11] French painter, born in the Normandy in 1594, died in Rome in 1665.
[12] M Molins, *Manet*, Taschen, Madrid, 2005, p. 57.
[13] R M Hagen and R Hagen, *Los secretos de las obras de arte*, Taschen, Colonia, 2005, p. 565.
[14] Aix en Provence, 1839-1905.

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Representations of Violence in Contemporary South African Fiction

Zuzana Luckay

Abstract
Certain social structures are inherently violent. Apartheid, by definition, promoted 'apart'ness, created disjunctions and affirmed social gaps. As such, it fuelled power struggles, which are the breeding ground of antagonism and hostility. After more than a decade, the ghosts of apartheid still loom over Southern Africa. But the degree to which they are responsible for the high crime rate, which often includes callous violence, remains a question. Apartheid, as one of the most recent examples of attempts at social engineering (not new to humanity, e.g. the Third Reich) was a system which did not allow for the maintenance of dignity; in other words a system in which it was impossible to 'be good' - to put it bluntly. The reasons for this vary between peoples of particular groups, colours or tongues. There *were* perceived senses of honour during apartheid, but they were, rather, manifestations of struggles for power on the one hand, as opposed to an asymmetric and often futile yearning for recognition by 'the others'. This created social tensions, mistrust, fear and guilt, which have been triggering and perpetuating violations on various levels. So even if it stands to reason that there is no dignity in violence, often the opposite is claimed because perceptions of worth and dignity vary as much as do perceptions of what constitutes violence itself, and justifications for it. In this paper I examine the various roles violence - as a result of various perceived humiliations and threats - plays in people's lives in South Africa today, as well as in light of the social gaps and rifts created by apartheid. I study the representations of the different forms of violence in Damon Galgut's novel, *The Good Doctor* with the objective of showing how unjust social circumstances skew one's perceptions in making moral ethical choices.

Key Words: Apartheid, binary oppositions, dignity, fear, homelands, hope, identity, political ideology, violence.

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Certain social structures are inherently violent. Apartheid in South Africa was a political system which, by definition, promoted separateness, created disjunctions, and affirmed and exacerbated social gaps. As such, it fuelled power struggles, which are the breeding ground of antagonism and hostility. And, although official segregation is no longer enforced, the

shadows that it left - cultural, economic and social gaps, mistrust, feelings of anger, resentment and guilt - continue to haunt this land.

In this paper I will talk about the mechanisms behind the social engineering of apartheid; the ambiguity of political ideology, which by its dichotomous nature generates breaks in the integrity of identity, and as such induces and perpetuates violence. I will do so via Damon Galgut's novel *The Good Doctor*, and social and political analyses of the times. Neither of these offer solutions, but they trigger thoughts about the need for understanding social and political mechanisms; the need for a deconstructive approach to realities and the importance of the acknowledgement of the various co-existing truths.

The Good Doctor, like any other novel, should not be reduced to politics. It is a story of a few people who, for different reasons, happen to be in one place at the same time. An interesting interpretative parallel is found in the psyches of the characters, portrayed against the backdrop of political and social circumstances.

The story takes place in the borderland of South Africa. Medical Doctor Frank Eloff becomes (somewhat reluctantly) the friend and room-mate of Laurence Waters, a freshly graduated medical doctor, who arrives at the hospital to do his community service.[1]

The location of the town in the novel is not specified. And indeed, it need not be; it is a former homeland and that is what defines it. Frank Eloff explains to Laurence Waters: "a few years ago there was a line on a map, somewhere around where we're sitting now. On one side was the homeland where everything was a token imitation. On the other side was the white dream …."[2] The spaces in the novel bear testimony to a system which divided (people, space, etc …) according to its own ideas and ideals. Based on the Population Registration Act of 1950, the entire population of South Africa was classified by the western concepts of 'race' and 'ethnicity' into White, Coloured, Indian/Asiatic and Native (later Bantu or African). These categories determined political, economic and social rights as well as educational opportunities.

When the two main protagonists of the novel are talking about the homeland, Laurence (the younger doctor) claims that it is all politics, which he is not interested in, but Frank reminds him that "Everything is politics […] The moment you put two people in a room together politics enters."[3] As much as Laurence tries to ignore politics, it is precisely the reason why he is where he is at that moment. Homelands were purely political constructs.

The absurdity of this deliberate construction of space exemplifies the absurdity of the system of apartheid. In the history of humanity we have witnessed many examples of social engineering on a mass scale (e.g., the Third Reich, communism in central-eastern Europe), the 'grand plan' of apartheid being one of the latest. Its underlying political ideology is the

making of a handful of people, which if propelled in the 'right' direction can be sustained for long periods relatively successfully, regardless of the amoral and immoral nature of its social ethics. In 1948 the South African National Party's 'apartheid' slogan was "a huge success" and according to political scientist Anthony Butler, "its power lay in its very ambiguity."[4]

A *good quality* ambiguity occurs when a point, regardless of its validity, can be persuasively presented in opposing terms, while both terms support the initial point, making it valid in any case. If the point is ideological (that is, based on ideas and sets of beliefs), and is also ambiguous, it constitutes a potentially powerful tool. South African political scientists Willem Van Vuuren and Ian Liebenbergs explain that:

> Ideology, as the logic of domination, has typically proclaimed a single dogmatic truth or core myth; but it has presented these basic myths in dichotomous terms so that the ideologies constituted a mythic antithesis of absolute positive and absolute negative elements, which *precluded* more complex alternative interpretations of reality.[5] [my emphasis]

Reduction to simple binarisms *excludes* the possibility of relativising and, therefore, proper assessment of the situation. Historian Karl Dietrich Bracher argues that the ideology in power politics is "a tendency towards extreme simplification of complex realities,"[6] which is at the same time divided into dichotomies of good and evil, right and wrong, friend and foe.

The political illusions in South Africa were structured around a myth of white supremacy and inherent racial and ethnic difference, the 'logic' of which led to segregation and the so-called 'separate development,' which the white minority was to provide and control. Despite its simplicity, the inner logic of these claims was convincing enough to sustain the system for decades. Those who were not *with* were *against*. The myth of the enemy is created alongside these poles. According to Van Vuuren and Liebenberg, the psychology of the National Party mythology involved the exploitation of the two most powerful forces of human motivation, namely fear and hope.[7]

Fear and hope are indisputably amongst the strongest emotions in our individual and social lives. A sense of belonging gives us reassurance, countering fear. It also gives us hope that we are not alone. We identify with certain characteristics of a group, the 'us', as opposed to the other group, the 'them.' This is part of the process of identity creation, while 'the enemy' is always the opposite of 'me' or 'us.' From then on, we strive to comply with the characteristics of the group we associate with in order to maintain a sense

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of safety and belonging. Our 'urge to belong' is used and abused by some political ideologies.

Peter du Preez, a professor of applied ethics and political psychology at the University of Cape Town, does not think that the choice of identity as a central theme in politics is an arbitrary choice. He claims that "the identity of a group makes political action possible."[8] Du Preez explains that "identity is not maintained in isolation. Identities exist in systems of relations" that he calls "identity frames - which maintain each other."[9]

We all have various social roles. The identities, some of which are arbitrary while some are inherent, are on another level, so to speak; they overarch the social roles and we negotiate them constantly (I will for the purposes of this paper leave out the psychological self-perceptions and focus on the social psychological aspects). However I do want to make clear that the interchangeable use of 'self' and 'identity' is misleading. The person as a system of identities is the broadest concept, which encompasses various identities that are not necessarily equal.

Du Preez explains that locutions such as 'the role of a woman' (or 'the role of the African') are usually attempts to pre-empt the implications of womanhood (or Africanness) for a particular purpose. Du Preez says,

> [T]hey are, when they are not specific, attempts to absorb categories of persons to particular roles; to make these roles of such importance that anyone of the designated category who fails to perform them can be made to feel guilty or ashamed.[10]

Guilt and shame humiliate and undermine one's sense of integrity (and challenge the maintenance of dignity, which is another issue I won't address here). The meeting points of the various identities within us are precisely what are used against us in 'power games.' They can be used against us because they are presented to us in oppositions; in mutually exclusive binarisms. Therefore a constant deconstructive approach is needed in order to bear in mind - despite the traps - that identities and roles are neither mutually exclusive nor constant categories. This deconstructive approach is the very opposite of what politicians or, for example, religious leaders, want us to do. It is easier to control and manipulate people when they are pulled into identity traps.

In *The Good Doctor* Frank Eloff recalls his time in the army. He describes it as follows: "History had sent me up to the Angolan border for two years."[11] From there he was sent up to a small bush camp for three months.

The camp was being used for a lot of intense activity; patrols were going out constantly, looking for enemy patrols to annihilate. For the first time I was treating people who were fighting in a real war. I saw things there I had never seen before. Wounds made by grenades and bullets and land mines; the deliberate damage that people wilfully inflict on each other.[12]

This is where Frank meets Commandant Moller, the officer in charge of the whole camp. Most people were afraid of him and tried to avoid him. "He had a reputation that spread far beyond his physical presence - for a blind and holy devotion for his job. His job was killing enemy soldiers, and it was for this reason only that the camp existed."[13] Frank and another doctor were there to "patch up the people who did the killing, so that they could go out and do it again."[14]

One night, Frank is called to come and look at a man who is being interrogated. The black man, naked, is lying on the floor, splattered with blood, barely breathing. Frank is asked to examine him and assure the soldiers that he is not faking it. The question is, of course, absurd. Commandant Moller asks Frank's expert opinion on how much more questioning the man can take before he dies. Frank thinks: "[T]hese questions are insane, they are the measuring-points of an inverted world, doctors are here to heal and repair, not assist in this calculated demolition of nerves and flesh."[15] But he has to comply, and says that the man "won't die yet."[16] By the following day, when the mind's natural instinct to retain sanity has started working, he has repressed his moral and ethical imperatives, saying to himself: *"It would have made no difference. You didn't have a choice. You only answered the questions."*[17] Had he tried to save the man who was being beaten to death he would not have become a hero. Heroes are constructed for political reasons, just as enemies are. In this case Frank would have become an enemy too. He would have been flipped onto the wrong side of the morality duality and he would also probably have been killed.

The situation Frank was in was an identity trap on various levels. As a doctor he was ethically - and morally - bound to save the life, yet he knew that it would only postpone the man's death for a few hours, so that the soldiers might torture more 'answers' out of him. Frank was not allowed to *save* him, he had to keep him alive for the necessary purposes; as a human, that man did not count. Frank could do nothing to save him.

However, life brings Frank to meet Moller ten years later.[18] Moller came to be stationed at this former homeland town to guard the (national) border, as a commander of a group of soldiers, this time "black and white together, some of them the enemy he'd been trying to kill"[19] a decade earlier. Frank is still scared of him. But by now he realises that it was

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> something else in him, something deeper than his face, that
> scared [Frank]. He was drawn in on a hard, tiny centre of
> himself, in the way of people who live in devotion to a
> single idea. In a monk this can be beautiful, but in him it
> was not.[20]

Moller is a soldier: his job is to exterminate the enemy and protect the people from the enemy; he is devoted to that idea alone. The fact that enemies change with the political situation does not seem to matter to him. This blind devotion is what Frank finds puzzling. Moller is a very polite man, Frank has no doubt that "he used the same level tones with the people he'd tortured and killed. There was nothing personal in it for him."[21]

The political ideology of apartheid kept the myth of the 'enemy as a threat' alive; it nurtured fear, hatred and violence towards the enemy. Moller's self-righteous attitude is justified by a moral high ground; he is doing his job well, he takes pride in it. For him, violence is a necessity, while Frank's position as a doctor goes head on *against* violence; his job is to save lives.

Blind devotion is potentially harmful, even if it is to a seemingly 'good' cause. Frank detects this in Laurence and Zanele, the American woman (Laurence's supposed girlfriend), who after having rediscovered her African origins, changes her name from Linda, wears colourful western African attire and goes on a mission; first to Sudan (where she meets Laurence), and then on to Lesotho, where she is now working.[22] Frank thinks: "She and Laurence were the same kind of person: blindly and naively believing in their own power to change things. It was simple, this belief, and the simplicity was strong and foolish."[23] Their zealous approach could be compared to Moller's blind devotion.

Laurence and Zanele are portrayed as 'do-gooders', a certain type that arouses skepticism in many, particularly in association with Africa. Africa is very inviting for those who want to 'do good.' Choose a remote, poor, rough, sunburnt place, 'do good' and than go home feeling cleansed, some sins repented. Linda/Zanele argues with Frank that despite the odds "[A]nything is better than nothing."[24] It is true that help is needed and should not be dismissed as useless, yet Frank Eloff's words perhaps also express a truth: "past a certain point, anything is exactly the same as nothing."[25]

Towards the end of the novel Frank eventually gathers courage to remind Moller of their meeting over ten years ago, but Moller does not even remember it.[26] What was a life-changing trauma for one meant nothing out of the ordinary for the other. Frank made what he calls a "little confession, but [Moller] could not give [Frank] absolution."[27] Moller would not ease Frank's sense of guilt.

It is comforting to think of Moller as a moral monster; a deviant psychopath. But there are too many Mollers around. Indeed, all of us have Mollers in us. One evening, as Frank returns back to his room in the hospital he finds Laurence asleep in his bed. He thinks:

> ... his face seemed even younger than it was. Not young enough to be innocent, but soft and pale and vulnerable to violence. And the violence was in me: from nowhere it occurred to me how simple it would be to break a sleeping head like this. One hard, heavy blow with the right object and it would be done. Because he was the enemy. I saw it now. The enemy was not outside, at large, in the world; he was within the gates. While I had slept.
> Night thoughts; but nothing like this had come to me before. And it was terrible how casual, how very ordinary, the idea of murder could be. I turned away from it, and from myself, and went to bed.[28]

Blind devotion, whatever its justification or inner logic is a potential breeding ground for antagonism and violence. A deconstructive approach: a relentless questioning of the various levels and aspects of reality is necessary to prevent us from blindness; a scrutiny that is like looking through a prism, which disperses, rather than focuses light.

Absolution and forgiveness will not come from the outside for Frank Eloff; he has to learn to live with the past and the present it brought along. However absurd, we must admit that history cannot be dismissed. And South Africa is a country in transition, where people have to learn to live alongside former enemies, however unclear and unstable that category is.

There is no single 'correct' way of dealing with the past violence and humiliations. In this long period of the national party rule in South Africa, apartheid permeated all layers of society, but it affected everybody in a different way. Some do not deal with the legacies of the past but yearn for it to return, still nurturing racist beliefs, while others are guilt-ridden. But many look the past in the eye and are filled with new energies for new beginnings.

Galgut's novel does not offer a recipe for healing the social problems of post-apartheid South Africa; neither does it paint a picture of a bright new future. It triggers broader questions; questions which are not only valid for South Africa, but which should make us think about the potential dangers of political ideologies, about finding ways of dealing with the past and present realities, in order to learn to live in tolerance.

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Notes

[1] It is government policy in South African that medical doctors, after completing their studies, have to do a year of community service.

[2] D Galgut, *The Good Doctor*, Atlantic Books, London, 2003, p. 18.

[3] ibid., p. 18.

[4] A Butler, *Contemporary South Africa*, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2004, p. 16.

[5] W Van Vuuren and I Liebenberg, ''Government by illusion': the legacy and its implications', in *The Hidden Hand, Covert Operations in South Africa*, A Minnaar, I Liebenberg and C Schutte (eds), Human Sciences Research Council, Pretoria, 1994, pp. 25-43, p. 27.

[6] K D Bracher, *The Age of Ideologies,* Methuen, London, 1985, p. 5.

[7] Van Vuuren and Liebenberg, op. cit., pp. 25-43, p. 16.

[8] P Du Preez, *The Politics of Identity: Ideology and the Human Image*, Blackwell, Oxford, 1980, p. 3.

[9] ibid., p. 3.

[10] ibid., p. 6.

[11] Galgut, op. cit., p. 62.

[12] ibid., p. 62.

[13] ibid., p. 63.

[14] ibid.

[15] ibid., p. 66.

[16] ibid., pp. 64-66.

[17] ibid., pp. 66-67.

[18] ibid., p. 99.

[19] ibid.

[20] ibid., p. 183.

[21] ibid., p. 188.

[22] ibid., p. 96.

[23] ibid.

[24] ibid., p. 97.

[25] ibid.

[26] ibid., p. 203.

[27] ibid., p. 204.

[28] ibid., p. 161.

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Section 2

Ethnic-based Violence

The Intimacy of Enmity: The Hezbollah-Israel Relation

Daniel Meier

Abstract
This paper aims to focus on how violence can be created and protracted in an international context, through the example of one of the most tense situations of the Middle East crisis, the relations between Hezbollah and Israel. This deep link between the two enemies started in the wake of the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon. Questions of the genesis and the evolution of this conflict between Hezbollah and the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) will show the importance of the history and its context for an analysis of the violence and the cooperation that emerge. The understanding of this process is also linked to the analysis of perceptions of the 'other,' a sort of subjective building that leads to acting in a certain way to confront such a definition of the enemy. The spill-over that occurs along the time of confrontation is also part of the comprehensive aspect of violence and can be conceptualised through the notion of interdependency between enemies. According to Laclau's theory,[1] each of the parties in their very identity need the other to a certain degree. Finally, the behaviour on the international stage is often linked to a juncture of power that either allows or denies some actions or some deals. This dynamic and non-linear aspect will be explored through the notion of 'figuration' (from Norbert Elias) to shed light on violent actions or reactions. My main objective is to illustrate how intimate and close the relations between enemies are. In order to reach this goal, the paper focuses on concrete interactions from 1982 to the present, and suggests the defining of three periods: the context of Lebanese civil war, the 1990s post-civil war and the 'peace period' (2000-2006).

Key Words: Hezbollah, Israel, intimacy, enemies, conflict, South Lebanon, interdependency, figuration.

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1. Introduction

This paper follows an inspiration of the famous sociologist Georg Simmel, who tried to show that a conflict is not only antagonism but also a form of socialisation. His main example was the understanding between enemies to protect innocent victims, or more simply, any agreement on a framework to rule the violence.[2] This paper focuses on how violence can be created and protracted in an international context through the example of one

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of the most tense situations of the Middle East crisis, the relation between Hezbollah and Israel.

      For a long time now, South Lebanon has been a battlefront for these two actors and, occasionally, has turned into a war zone that has involved local powers like Syria, Iran, and, of course, the United States. More than describing this situation, this paper highlights the old and special link that has existed between Hezbollah and the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) since 1982, and follows its evolution in order to understand what has fuelled and strengthened it. This sort of intimacy that developed between enemies during a first period is surprising. Hezbollah behaved as if its very existence depended on the existence of Israel. After 1990 and the end of the civil war in Lebanon, a more balanced relation of interdependency saw the need for the IDF to react, to deal with and use Hezbollah in Lebanon for its own purposes. After the withdrawal in 2000, Hezbollah continued the struggle in arguing that the Shiba' Farms, still occupied, were under the sovereignty of Lebanon.[3] The Party of God (which is the literal translation of *Hezbollah*) has shown since that period how deeply its very existence depends on an Israeli occupation of a part of Lebanon, and more deeply on the simple fact of the existence of Israel. In both sides an intimacy of enmity seems to be a major factor in fuelling the violence: Israel for its own strategic and regional purposes, and Hezbollah for its own *raison d'être*.

      Laclau's theory helps in understanding this first stage of the problem:[4] the enemy's identity becomes a constitutive outside supporting the identity construction of the Self. And of course this relation is quite unusual because Hezbollah was born "with a vengeance"[5] and had risen during Israel's 1982 invasion of Lebanon with the main goal of fighting and compelling Israel to leave Lebanese soil. This kind of dependency link slowly becomes a double-bind, firstly because the only reason for Hezbollah's very existence is the elimination of Israel, and secondly because during the 1990s and after the 2000 withdrawal, the IDF's daily infringements in the Lebanese sky or military strikes in south Lebanon (as retaliatory measures) entailed the existence of Hezbollah, whose military action serves Israel's own strategic goals (legitimation of its occupation and later of its war in 2006).

      Further light can be shed on the problem through an explanation of the comparison between the two periods - before and after 2000. This changing attitude of Israel and Hezbollah is of course due to this withdrawal. But it is not enough to understand in a broader context what it means for both actors regarding the evolution of the situation in Syria, in the United States after 11 September 2001, or in the political shift that has occurred in Lebanon since 2005. Elias' notion of 'figuration' could be useful in order to see how this 2000 change redraws lines, links and (unwritten) laws.[6] This concept deals with the question of power in order to analyze changes in relations

(with Elias' famous example of the transformation of nobles in the court due to a more centralised power).

Three steps organise this paper. The first part deals with the context of 1982 when Hezbollah as an Islamic group was raised and developed with an ideology, goals and actions as testimony of its own *raison d'être*. I will also highlight the beginning of the relationship with Israel as an enemy and show how one can observe the beginning of an interdependent relation during the 1980s. The second part will show the evolution of this militia as a party during the second period of the occupation of south Lebanon (1990-2000). This was after the Taïf Agreement and the *pax syriana* over Lebanon, that underlined the deep antagonism and the routine of this permanent war of attrition that characterised this period in south Lebanon, and revealed what kind of relationship it had created. The third part will explain how things changed with the withdrawal in May 2000, and how a new 'figuration' emerged that renewed the relation between Hezbollah and Israel and allowed Israel to launch its massive attack during the summer of 2006.

2.   Hezbollah's Ideology and Action in the Context of War

The group known as Hezbollah, which first appeared publicly in 1985, is the result of a long process of mobilisation. It is the outcome of multiple groups meeting during the aggression of the 1982 Lebanon invasion. First of all, it rests on the political mobilisation of the Shiite movement of deprived (*mahrumeen*) under the lead of Imam Musa Sadr, well known under the militia name of Amal. Some of their leaders were under the effect - and the success - of the Iranian revolution (1979). As the Iranians wanted to export their Islamic revolution to Lebanon, they proposed to these leaders that they give up Amal and build a new force. They also received help from some Shiite clerics who had raised the project of a Party of God during their journey through Shiite religious towns in Iraq some years before. Of course, Israel's invasion of Lebanon is "the pre-eminent factor directly responsible for the movement's birth."[7] And the success of the Israeli army against the Palestinian Resistance, which was monopolising the battlefield in south Lebanon, provided an opportunity for the Shiite reaction, with the military deployment of 300 Pasdarans sent directly from Iran. The huge damage caused by the Israeli invasion in the south, together with the 19,000 deaths and 32,000 casualties, radicalised the Shiite population that came to Beirut and swelled the size of the 'Shiite misery belt,' a sort of repository of militant Shiites. So we can affirm that Hezbollah's initial *raison d'être* leans on the Israeli invasion of 1982 and Hezbollah's leaders had expressed their self-perception as a 'natural reaction' to this invasion.

The ideology of Hezbollah has been well known since the Memorandum published in the Lebanese newspaper *Al-Safir* in 1985. It stated three main objectives that defined the identity of Hezbollah. First, it

claims its resistance against Israeli troops in Lebanon, expressing it in a religious concept of 'defensive jihad,' which allows military action. Second, the text expresses the submission of the group to the *wilayat al-faqih* theory, Khomeini's governance theory of the guardianship of the leader jurisprudent before the return of the hidden Imam. Third, Hezbollah is more precise on its political project, viewed as an Islamic republic.[8] The clerical approval of this programme, led by the Ayatollah Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah, slowly but seriously increased support among local Shiites. The war context, and the failed State in Lebanon, started to validate the logic of resistance sustained by the use of violence.

In order to enforce or implement these objectives, Hezbollah - like many other political groups, such as Nasserists, Communists and other Leftists, and of course Amal - launched attacks against Israeli soldiers in south Lebanon. IDF troops that invaded Lebanon to destroy PLO and also to install a friendly government in Beirut were on the verge of losing the game when the 17th May 1983 Agreement of a peace treaty with Lebanon failed. After the summer of 1983 and the 'War of the Mountain',[9] the IDF started to withdraw from parts of the south, where the human cost was too heavy: "By 1984 the pace of attacks was so intense that an Israeli soldier was dying every third day."[10] In June 1985, 640 Israeli soldiers had died in south Lebanon before Israel hunkered down in the border zone of 850 sq/km. This withdrawal was seen as a major success that Hezbollah's resistance policy was able to achieve. This way of acting with Israel is also rooted in the party's commitment to fulfil its religious and legal obligation to wage war with a defensive jihad against oppressors - according to certain interpretations of passages in the Qur'an. These interpretations of defensive jihad are of course useful for Hezbollah in such a situation, allowing the party to use the Qur'an to legitimise their military acts. In fact, the Shia history of oppression and suffering and the exemplary defensive jihad waged by Imam Hussayn gave primacy to Shiite militants on religious tenets.[11] In a certain way, the politicisation that started with Musa Sadr using the Shi'a identity register to mobilise, reached with Hezbollah a more religious dimension, using the same theme but in a religious universe of meanings that makes sense to more and more Shiites.

The sacralisation of the land to liberate is the core principle for Hezbollah's attitude towards Israel. In fact, continuation of the occupation of the south border area defended by the Israel-sponsored South Lebanese Army (SLA) was a great opportunity for Hezbollah to enlarge the mobilisation of the Shiites. The main discourse was based upon the premise that the military resistance was there to protect the country against this militia, so that Israel became an enemy to fight, to stay united against, and one which allows enforcing the very identity of Hezbollah as a resistance group. Some authors highlight the militias' actions against Israel as a test of national legitimation.

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On the other side, for Israeli political and military leaders, the security zone became a sort of proof of the insecurity that reigned in Lebanon and it became an argument for continuing the occupation. In this sense, Hezbollah became part of the justification of 'being and staying there': its violence justified the maintenence of a buffer zone with the northern frontier of Israel as a major security purpose following the path of the main security argument of Lebanon's invasion of 1982: 'Peace for Galilee' as they called this operation. In the perception of the IDF, Hezbollah became a major concern and the major factor to intervene in Lebanon - like the operation launched in 1988 in the north of that occupied zone against 'Lebanese terrorists,' as they called them.[12]

Israel's perception of Hezbollah was still not precise at that time, but dealt with an 'Islamic deterrence' and the old fear of an Islamic wave surrounding Israel and threatening it constantly. Hezbollah, on its side, had in the 1980s constructed a perception of its enemy as an evil incarnate. To demonstrate that, Hezbollah specified its discourse with the atrocities committed by Israel, such as the Sabra and Chatila slaughters. And the occupation of south Lebanon was seen as underscoring the hidden Israeli objective in the region: to depopulate it of its Arab inhabitants in order to create the Holy Land (Great Israel).[13] The ideologists of Hezbollah also used to find some 'proofs' of these malevolent intentions in the Torah and cited passages that they linked with concrete cases of what had happened during the 1982 war. In this way, the brutal and well-prepared military withdrawals that led to civil strife in the Shuf Mountains in 1983 and in the East of Sidon in 1985 were explained by the Jewish religious affiliation. The main idea of this process of demonisation was to show that this enemy is preparing a plot 'to destroy us' so that one can neither trust him, nor find a reconciliation or a normalisation of relations.[14] From the beginning up to the present time, Hezbollah has built a one-way interaction with Israel - confrontation - and has locked the door to any peace agreements.

3.   The 1990s: A Step Ahead in Enmity

If, during the 1980s, Israel feared Hezbollah as an Islamic movment, in the 1990s it started to need it as a Syrian proxy militia. For its part, Hezbollah needed Israel to justify its own existence among the Shiites in the 1980s. In the 1990s, it continued to need to fight against Israel in order to build a legitimate identity of a resistance group among the Lebanese people. But at the end of the civil war in Lebanon (1989), the Taïf Agreement stated that all militias must be disarmed, which was a problem for the survival of Hezbollah as a group. A meeting between Syrian and Iranian officials in Tehran during the spring of 1990 found an agreement to leave Hezbollah armed in order to continue the 'Islamic resistance' against Israel. In the meantime, the ideological orientation of the 'God's Party' changed: from the

goal of an Islamic Republic in Lebanon to an acceptance of the multi-sectarian nature of Lebanese society, necessary for the party's participation in the electoral process.[15] If the main stake of this militia seemed to be to end Israel's occupation of south Lebanon, its ideology was, and is, fundamentally anti-Zionist. Behind the non-recognition of Israel lies the ideal to excoriate the Israeli State from Palestine in order to liberate Jerusalem.[16] In other words, the state of hostility is not due to the occupation in south Lebanon but to the very existence of the Israeli state, depicted as 'an absolute evil' (*shar al-mutlaq'*).

At the beginning of the 1990s a set of rules was drawn up to define a *modus vivendi*: an agreement to disagree. This oral agreement between enemies followed 'Operation Accountability', launched by Israel in July 1993. The agreement stated that Israel would not attack civilian targets in Lebanon and that Hezbollah would focus its actions only on the Security Zone.[17] Meanwhile, "civilians were regularly killed 'by accident' and in greater cumulative numbers than either members of the resistance, the IDF, or the SLA."[18] The weak position of the civilians in this fight has an explanation in each camp. Among Israeli military staff, Lebanese civilians are not considered as neutral individuals and their death in a military operation is considered as collateral damage, despite Israeli reflection upon military doctrine in an attempt to diminish the level of such civilian casualties and deaths.[19] On the Hezbollah side, Israeli civilians are viewed as part of the Zionist ideology who harbour expansionist designs of Zionism by their very presence within the state of Israel. Despite this legitimation of the use of violence against Israeli civilians, Hezbollah never pursued their killing, deeming Israeli civilians as neutral in its struggle with Israel for "humanitarian Islamic consideration."[20] In the meantime, Hezbollah agreed to use Katyushas attacks (that randomly target civilians living in Israel) as an invaluable 'element of force' in its endeavour to liberate south Lebanon.

The IDF and Hezbollah continued to play their 'ruled' game in south Lebanon until they both broke the rules in 1996 when Israel responded with the operation 'Grapes of Wrath.' The main goals of this offensive were to undermine popular support for Hezbollah among the Lebanese and to oblige Syria and Lebanon to react by seeking a way for peace.[21] At this level, Hezbollah appeared for Israel as an excuse to deal with Syria, as if Hezbollah's militia-men were under Syrian, or at least foreign control. At that stage, Hezbollah was not recognized for its own capabilities, as a full and responsible actor. In fact, during this operation Israeli strategy failed because of the death, intentional or not, of 106 civilians who were seeking safety in a UN compound in the small but symbolic town of Qana. This massacre inspired more hatred for the Jewish state in the Lebanese population and confirmed the discourse about the 'barbarism' of the 'Zionist entity' channelled by Hezbollah. Of course, it reinforced a common belief on the

legitimacy and necessity of Hezbollah as a deterrent force instead of cutting it from its social basis.

The intervention of US Secretary of State Warren Christopher led to a new agreement known as 'the April understanding' that was approved (but not signed) by both enemies. This paper redrew a set of rules, just as three years previously, with the same red lines: there were to be no Israeli attacks on Lebanese civilians, no Hezbollah attacks on Israeli territory and a common avoidance in launching attacks from civilian areas. But this time a monitoring group (with representatives from some international countries, plus Syria and Israel) was in charge of implementing the agreement and receiving complaints of violations. This agreement started a kind of routine in enmity: both belligerents had found a space in which to fight each other for their own interests and purposes. Both of them had a right to self-defense and, more revealing, "Israel never challenged the right of Hezbollah to attack its soldiers in Lebanon."[22] In other words, the opposing sides seem to be interdependent; each needs the other as an enemy in order to legitimate its own position as armed belligerents in a wider context of the balance of power in the Middle East peace negotiations. But reducing their relations to this broader context undermines what happens in such a long-term relation between enemies: a kind of intimacy is taking place. And no rationale will be able to explain this process that happened as an unpredictable effect of the occupation of south Lebanon by IDF troops. As many authors agreed on that question,[23] Israel had become a prisoner of its own security zone project to protect its northern border. The heightened demand for security in the north of their country, the media agitations and the political discourses around the idea that 'things cannot continue like that' in relation to the katyushas that fall, sometimes constrained the government to act in a hawkish way. And this attitude led Hezbollah to retaliate on the northern frontier with other katyushas, as was promised by Hassan Nasrallah in response to the assassination of Hezbollah's former Secretary-General Abbas Moussaoui in 1992. In return, each katyusha that reached Israeli territory seemed to justify more concretely the necessity for Israel to maintain its then so-called "in-security zone."[24]

This way of being bound to its enemy has found a neutral ground for cooperation in the occasional process of exchanging hostages, dead soldier's bodies or remains. Some periodic and indirect negotiations happened through German negotiators or UNIFIL officials. Such exchanges took place in 1996 and in 1998. However, the most famous and sensational prisoner exchange was conducted in January 2004: "in return for three bodies and one living retired lieutenant colonel who had been captured in Beirut, Israel released 23 Lebanese and 400 Palestinian prisoners."[25] During these moments, Hassan Nasrallah used to claim his 'respect' for the enemy for the concern he displays towards his civilians, prisoners and casualties of war.

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This strange cooperation between enemies led to a win-win solution that worked well for Hezbollah: if such exchanges legitimate the 'humanity' of Israel in its own eyes, they serve Hezbollah's image of wisdom and capability to obtain freedom for prisoners (Lebanese as well as Palestinians). The success of such deals encouraged both Hezbollah - to capture more soldiers, and Israelis - to do other exchanges of good value.

4. From Israeli Withdrawal to the 33-Day-War: Toward a New Figuration

The high level of casualties and deaths among Israeli soldiers led Ehud Barak, in one of his electoral campaigns, to promise the withdrawal of the IDF from south Lebanon. Negotiations with Syria failed in March 2000 in Geneva (during the Assad-Clinton Summit) so that Israel unilaterally left south Lebanon on the 22nd May and the SLA disbanded in disorder, with most of the former militia-men or collaborators taking refuge in Israel. Hezbollah declared every stronghold and town 'liberated' and pacified the volatile atmosphere of accountability and potential chaos while positioning itself on the border with its own flag (instead of the Lebanese one). This operation turned to a great success for the Party of God: this withdrawal, like the one in 1985, tended to prove in the eye of Hezbollah that its strategy of deterrence and war of attrition paid good dividends. In other words, its attitude of resistance was the right one because 'Israel only understands the logic of force,' as Hassan Nasrallah had explained some years before.[26] In the enemy relation, this unilateral withdrawal was read by many other groups in the Middle East as an acknowledgement of Israel's defeat. A strategic assessment made in Israel just after the withdrawal and in order to justify it, explained that during the 1990s, Hezbollah's growth was due partly to Syria's assistance on the one hand, and also Israel's counteraction on the other.[27] In Lebanon, it was celebrated in that sense, and so was seen as a great success for Hezbollah. In a discourse channelled some weeks later, after Nasrallah consulted his party and the Iranian leader (al-faqi) Ali Khamenei, the Secretary-General of Hezbollah stated that its struggle would not stop there because the Shiba' Farms had to be liberated and then a new file would be opened concerning Palestine and Jerusalem.[28] A new lease of life was given to Hezbollah military operations by the Lebanese government when it declared that the Israeli withdrawal was incomplete because of the Shiba' Farms. The party's *raison d'être* was clearly not over, it continued in a face-to-face tension along the Blue Line (southern border): "Harassing fire, aggressive patrolling, and heated rhetoric by both sides marked the entire period"[29] between 2000 and the 33-Day-War in the summer of 2006.

Another change marked this period, a change in the figuration that slowly took place. By 'figuration' Elias means a balance of power between two groups designed through a type of interdependency.[30] In this case, the

evolution of the relation between Israel and Hezbollah is a little bit different: it is marked by the strengthening of Hezbollah, which took confidence and won a territory. More largely, the figuration in the Middle East saw a shift with the death of Hafez el-Assad, the launch of the second Intifada and, the following year, the terrorist attack of 11 September 2001. It is important to note that this shift put Hezbollah at a global level as a terrorist group and as a major threat for the Middle East.[31] This change also impacted Hezbollah through Syria, its closer ally on the Lebanese ground, which entered a turbulent area. Because of the withdrawal of Israel, a significant part of the Lebanese population asked Syria to withdraw from Lebanon too. This tension added to the new trend of US foreign policy asking Syria to leave Lebanon (Syria Accountability Act) and drove the country to international pressure - notably Resolution 1559 of the United Nations Security Council - and to an unwanted withdrawal of Lebanon following a popular uprising after the assassination of the Former Prime Minister, Rafic el-Hariri.

From that moment, Hezbollah was weakened inside Lebanon and became a political actor almost like other Lebanese actors. It chose to enter into politics through the legislative elections of summer 2005 in order to keep control over its destiny, because it was threatened by Resolution 1559, that stated, among other things, that all militia, Lebanese or non-Lebanese, must disband.[32] Tension inherited from the past, stemming mainly from the sectarian system of power-sharing in Lebanon, led to a division of the society and political actors into two blocks: the pro-western 14th March coalition and the pro-Syrian 8th March coalition, which incorporated Hezbollah. A National Dialogue was initiated in spring 2006 but ended before the summer. The war killed any hope to restart such an intercommunal dialogue between the two coalitions.

In itself, the 33-Day-War launched by Israel with the approval of the United States had as a primary objective the erasure of the Party of God from Lebanon. This strategy was not so well prepared by the IDF, which launched a massive bombing campaign over all of the civil infrastructure in Lebanon, killing dozen of civilians with no link to the Party of God, while it was trying to undermine national support for Hezbollah. Then, facing difficulties in the ground battle, the IDF stated that this mission was to weaken the military capacities of Hezbollah to launch rockets on the northern sector of Israel.[33] Finally, following an International Resolution (1701) that was approved by all of the countries of the UN Security Council, the withdrawal of IDF troops was hailed in Lebanon as a 'divine victory' by Hezbollah over the strongest army in the Middle East. Everything had happened as if Hezbollah was well-prepared for such an Israeli invasion and war. None of the Israeli goals were achieved:

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> The military blows inflicted against Hezbollah were
> sustainable, its military wing continues to exist, its
> fighters remain in south Lebanon and it is unlikely that
> they will face a serious challenge from the Lebanese army
> nor a beefed up UN Interim Force in Lebanon
> (UNIFIL).[34]

Strengthened by this success, Hezbollah enforced a tougher strategy within the Lebanese political game, as the situation became even more tense with the legitimate rule of Fouad Siniora extricating itself from the government and starting a protracted period of civil disobedience, with strikes, sit-ins and more recently, a military coup, in order to exert pressure for negotiations on power-sharing. Its relation with Israel tended to become a struggle against a vanguard of an American plot against the Middle East. The war in Iraq and the ongoing 'War on Terror' launched by the White House in 2001 were together seen as further proof of this scenario, building the legitimacy of Hezbollah as the leading fighting group against Israel and the US in the whole region. Israel, although it underestimated the power of Hezbollah and admitted its failure during that summer war in 2006, continues to need Hezbollah as a hated example of what is called 'a terrorist group,' that justifies exceptional measures and attitudes, retaliations, strikes and prisoner exchanges.

5.   Conclusion

In the eyes of Israeli analysts, Hezbollah today represents a threat to Israel, not only because it has the potential to launch attacks on its northern border (katyushas, missiles) and even kidnap Israelis, but mainly because it jeopardises any future peace agreements between Israel and the Palestinian Authority.[35] Conversely, in Hezbollah's view, Israel is the 'Zionist entity,' unnamed because its very existence is illegitimate. Hezbollah's holy mission is to expel Israeli troops from the territory of Lebanon. The battlefield of South Lebanon was, and is still, the territory at stake. For Israel it is a desired space, one which could be expanded into a security belt, but which is now a potentially dangerous space because of Hezbollah's skills in warfare. For Hezbollah, south Lebanon is the place from which its legitimation grew because of the struggle it has had in successfully launching itself in 1982 and sustaining itself against Israel. South Lebanon is the space of the intimacy which has built up slowly over time, through violent contacts, military operations, wars, deaths and exchanges of prisoners.

In a war, such intimacy is built with a necessary relation between two enemies. This interdependency rests on each other's political and strategic agendas. More deeply, as is the case with Hezbollah, its very existence depends on the existence of its enemy, Israel. For Israel, the

intimacy is more linked on the one hand to a regional balance of power - because Hezbollah is viewed as a proxy militia of Syria and Iran - while on the other hand, Hezbollah incarnates a tactical enemy, especially on the success of the Party of God during the last 33-Day-War.

Notes

[1] This concept of 'interdependency between enemies' has been outlined in E Laclau, *New Reflections on the Revolution of Our Time*, Verso, London, 1990.

[2] G Simmel, *Sociologie, Etudes sur les formes de la socialisation*, PUF, Paris, 1992, p. 245.

[3] A Saad-Ghorayeb, *Hizbu'llah. Politics and Religion*, Pluto, London, 2002, pp. 187-188.

[4] Laclau, op. cit., p. 17.

[5] H Jaber, *Hezbollah: Born with a Vengeance*, Columbia University Press, New York, 1997, p. 14.

[6] For more details on the concept of 'figuration' see N Elias, *La société des individus*, Fayard, Paris, 1994.

[7] Saad-Ghorayeb, op. cit., p. 10.

[8] A R Norton, *Hezbollah: A Short History*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2007, pp. 35-41.

[9] For a historical account on the 'war of the Mountain' see T Petran, *The Struggle over Lebanon*, Monthly Review Press, New York, 1987.

[10] Norton, op. cit., p. 80.

[11] Saad-Ghorayeb, op. cit., pp. 123-125.

[12] N Picaudou, *La déchirure libanaise*, Editions Complexe, Bruxelles, 1989, p. 207.

[13] Saad-Ghorayeb, op. cit., p. 136.

[14] ibid., pp. 134-136.

[15] J Alagha, *The Shifts in Hezbollah's Ideology. Religious Ideology, political Ideology, and Political Program*, Amsterdam University Press, Leiden, 2006, pp. 149-155.

[16] Saad-Ghorayeb, op. cit., p. 134.

[17] D Sobelman, 'New Rules of the Game: Israel and Hizballah after the Withdrawal from Lebanon, Memorandum N° 69', Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv University Database, April 2004, viewed 15 December, 2007, <http://se1.isn.ch/serviceengine/FileContent?serviceID=47&fileid=110A0B09-FBD8-7DFB-4B5D-A2A556EB2020&lng=en>.

[18] Norton, op. cit., p. 87.

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[19] P de Crousaz, 'Israël, la doctrine du 'combat disséminé'. Vers une sur-violence sans rationalité militaire ?', *A contrario*, Vol. 5, no. 2, 2008, pp. 76-101.

[20] Saad-Ghorayeb, op. cit., p. 143.

[21] A Bishara, 'Acting Tough: Israel's Domestic Imperatives', in R Hollis and N Shehadi (eds) *Lebanon on Hold*, Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, 1996, pp. 47-51.

[22] Norton, op. cit., p. 85.

[23] Hollis and Shehadi, op. cit., pp. 37-41.

[24] Norton, op. cit., p. 87.

[25] ibid., p. 88.

[26] N Noe (ed), *Voice of Hezbollah. The Statements of Sayyad Hassan Nasrallah*, London, Verso, 2007, pp. 100-115.

[27] A Kurz, 'Hezbollah at the Crossroads', *Strategic Assessment*, Vol. 3, no. 5, 2000, pp. 1-5, viewed 3 February, 2008, <www.tau.ac.il/jcss/sa/v3n1.html>.

[28] W S Abbas, 'A stable structure on shifting sands: assessing the Hezbollah-Iran-Syria relationship', *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 62, no. 1, 2008, p. 32.

[29] Norton, op. cit., p. 80.

[30] N Elias, *Qu'est-ce que la sociologie ?* Editions de l'Aube, Paris, 1993, pp. 86-88.

[31] P Droz-Vincent, *Vertiges de la puissance. Le "moment" américain au moyen-orient*. La Découverte, Paris, 2007, p. 267.

[32] International Crisis Group, *Lebanon: managing the gathering storm*. Middle East Report N° 48, 2005,viewed 14 March 2006, <http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=2743&l=2>.

[33] For more details, see F Mermier and E Picard (eds), *Liban, une guerre de 33 jours*, La Découverte, Paris, 2007; R Leenders, A Ghazal and J Hanssen, 'The Sixth War. Israel's Invasion of Lebanon', *The MIT Electronic Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol. 6, 2006, available from http://web.mit.edu/cis/www/mitejmes/intro.htm>.

[34] N Blanford, 'Hezbollah and the IDF accepting new realities along the Blue Line', *The MIT Electronic Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol. 6, 2006, pp. 68-79.

[35] E Karmon, 'En quoi le Hezbollah est-il une menace pour l'Etat d'Israël ?', *Outre-Terre*, No. 13, 2005, pp. 391-416.

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The Struggle for Survival and Security in the Middle East:
An Ethnological Observation of Public Discourse in Israel

Aide Esu

Abstract

This paper examines the construction of public discourse: by Mossad officials, Shin Bet commanders, high ranking officials, military judges and 'war heroes' of the Israeli Defence Force. It is based on field observation on the Shurat Hadin Law Center travel tour to Israel in a self-styled "*eight day exploration of Israel's struggle for survival and security in the Middle East.*" I analyse how the position of the speakers in the military and the political hierarchy, and the places where the speeches are performed - a military museum, military bases, the Defence Ministry, Military Courthouses, military observation stations - influence, shape the discourses, and set the limits for the narration about wars, battlefields, military technology and media argumentations. The participatory approach to the study of these speeches serves to highlight the social representation and the performance of public discourse. This methodology also helps to reveal details such as body language, the variations of public speech and audience reactions. Frame analysis is particularly useful for gathering all of these dimensions of public discourse, the military-political and social construction of the conflict, the narration of the 'self' and the denial of the 'other.'

Key words: Denial, enemy, institutional denial, Middle East, military discourse, public discourse, security, war.

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1.   Introduction

In June 2007 the Shurat Hadin, a Jerusalem-based Law Center, dedicated to "tak[ing] on the perpetrators and financial supporters of Islamic terror in the courtrooms,"[1] organised a travel tour to Israel. The tour, called Ultimate Missions, was a kind of military safari, advertised as: "a once-in-a-lifetime experience: an intensive reality check concerning the threat from Islamic terror."[2]

Why did I choose to make this field research? Like many participants of the tour, I read the advertisement in a flash banner on the website of an Israeli newspaper. Surfing the website fuelled my curiosity; I started to consider the idea that this was a unique opportunity to gain access to a research field usually closed to social science; a challenge to get a different perspective on observing public discourse performed in the context

of a military environment. I decided to adopt the 'unknown observer' status, because it was a suitable solution to gain entry to a complex research setting. It gave me the opportunity to observe and highlight the social context, the stage and the backstage of public discourse, and to examine details like body language, variations in public speech and audience reactions.

Qualitative observation has, in the sociological tradition, a prevalent naturalistic essence, where the observed situation is represented with loyalty towards the actors and their social interrelations. The here-quoted transcription of the public discourse follows this approach. Some briefings were conducted in a less formal, often passionate manner, which is reflected in the vocabulary and articulation. The following quotations are faithful transcriptions, exhibiting the colloquial register, sometimes with grammatical errors due to the zealous manner in which they were uttered. This naturalistic essence gives

> (…) the advantage of drawing the observer into the phenomenological complexity of the world, where connections, correlations, and causes can be witnessed as and how they unfold. Qualitative observers are not bound, thus, by predetermined categories of measurements or response, but are free to search for concepts or categories that appear meaningful to subjects.[3]

My approach to ethnological observation draws on Goffman's premise for studying the forms of auto-representations and the ways to expose them in front of others. In fact, according to Adler& Adler there is:

> an intentionality behind the planning and execution of these performances, that they were accomplished with an eye toward people's achieving the best impression of themselves in the view of others.[4]

2.   Place/Space and Public Discourse

Frame analysis is particularly useful for gathering all dimensions of public discourse:[5] the military-political and social construction of the conflict, the narration of the 'self' and the denial of the 'other.' Let me quote a few words to point out the terms of the framework analysis view:

> definitions of a situation are built up in accordance with principles of organization which govern events - at least socials ones - and our subjective involvement in them.[6]

What do Goffman's 'principles of organization which govern events' mean in terms of case studies? These are the principles behind the formal frame of the tour. The organisers' goal was to *"experience a dynamic and intensive eight day exploration of Israel."* As they said in their introductory briefing:

> We would like to use this week to show you the security situation in Israel; to show you and introduce you to Israel's struggle for survival in a way you never knew. It's going to be a very, very busy week. I'm warning you in advance. We gonna go to military courts, to military bases. We gonna go to forward positions in the Lebanese border, in areas in Gaza - hopeful we are not going to get rockets -. We gonna hear from Mossad agents, Shin Bets officials, intelligence agents, IDF officers, chief judge of the Supreme Court. Many, many important people who will teach you first hand, what really is going on in Israel.[7]

Those eight days were engineered around two main pillars: the sites selected to visit and the speakers. Each was designed to represent a vision of Israel's *struggle for survival and security.* The presentations of sites were often strengthened with dramatisations, emphasis, denials and legitimation. The context - military bases, military museums, and military courts - influenced the speakers' performances. It was framed in the institutional ceremonies that were embedded with internal codes, constraints of what could and couldn't be pronounced in public, and constrictions imposed by status obligations, deference, security, hierarchy.

The speakers were social actors framed in history. Here we saw some clear forms of embeddings. The discourses were performed not by free subjects, but by actors on a stage, displaying the expectations created by the organisers. In order to attest the appropriate self, the war heroes had to show bravery, determination, authority, *esprit du corps*; the appropriate self of the intelligence community had to express rationality, cool-headedness and analytical capacity. The tour was a crisscrossing of Israel, a true physical and symbolic plunge into what the organisation intended with the slogan: *Israel's struggle for survival and security*. Through bus trips, walking, and talking, the tour operators informed participants of the significance of geographical places in the history of the conflict and contemporary events: Latrun, Golan Heights, Sderot, Kyriat, Shimona, etc - real signposts of memory. Each place was presented as a suggestive encounter, evoked through the history of war, archaeology and politics. The presentation was designed like a clear-cut marketing proposal.

The visitors were mainly North American Jews.[8] In the immediate hours before the tour, many of the participants exhibited palpable excitement and apprehension for the journey, which in their memory evoked sad moments, but also great redemption and self-affirmation. The organisers were committed to this emotional frame, a complicated entanglement of family stories, separations and desires for reunification.

The sequence of the stages of the tour and the attributed categorisation of the days were: the *Reality of Terrorism - the Judicial Reality - the Military Reality - the Human Reality - the Historical and Religious Reality and the Political Reality*. The categorisation indicated the intention to paint a familiar and well-rooted picture, in order for the geographical places to set the discourse on various levels.

One level comprised the expectations of the audience, consisting of preconceived ideas that were based on journalistic accounts and historical narratives. A few participants, when questioning the speakers, exhibited eloquence in Israeli military history, and demonstrated this in small talk with the tour staff and the co-participants.

The second level was the self-representation of the spatial narrations offered by the speakers. These re-evoked their vision of the official history embedded in war memories and narrations. Mark Regev, the speaker of the Foreign Minister presenting Latrun said:

> Latrun is not a place of Israeli victory but a very different place. It was the control way to Jerusalem. They failed (...). Sharon was a group commander. If you remember correctly it was a defeat. Only in 1967 we got the way to Jerusalem. Israel is far from perfect. We make mistakes. This place is a memorial to people that lost their lives. We pay very deadly.[9]

The third level of the discourse was about the sense of belonging to the land as it is represented in the discourse of the kibbutzim at Misgav Am at the Lebanon border:

> The Kibbutz was founded in 1945 while before the State of Israel by the Jews National Fund for the Jews people (…) it's our land not Palestinian land, it is not Lebanon's land, it's ours.[10]

The last level consisted of the expectations of the organisers. The tour was not a simple discovery of the country; it was an educational tour, a fabrication of new consciousness. They called our attention to the relevance of the places we visited, a significance that was explicit - not only in the choice of sites, but also in the speakers we met, and their pride at managing

to overcome the inaccessibility of some places. Accordingly, as we arrived at the armoured base in the Golan Heights the organiser emphasised the security situation:

> It was very, very hard to get into this base, because of the situation with Syria. It is very dangerous and unstable. Basically we are very, very fortunate to get into this base.[11]

3.   Institutional Ceremonies

What the organisers presented as 'exceptional meetings' constitute a classic example of what the sociology of total institutions defines as 'institutional ceremonies.' Their function is to open places that, in general, are exclusive, and present a predefined image for institutional purposes. Goffman defines this as *putting on stage* - often prepared for the visitors - a representation that is manipulated to show what the institution intends to expose. It can be directed "towards the visitors with the aim of offering them an image of their organization."[12] For these reasons the meetings can be placed in a frame of 'institutional ceremonies.' They reveal some important characteristics, and a number of new ones in respect to Goffman's definition.

There were institutional meetings in which several principles of the classical model were exhibited. First, by the giving up of formality and roles: nobody, except the personnel on active duty in the bases - in the intelligence and in the military tribunals - was in uniform. They gave e-mail addresses, spoke in a colloquial tone and did not have a belligerent approach. Second, by the softening of the authoritative attitude: General Yair Nafshi, for example, presented the female soldiers and sergeants as if they were his children. Third, by standard forms of sociality: a breakfast-buffet was awaiting our arrival, and later, lunch in the canteen. Conversely, the military places reflected formality and respect of the rules: the warning at the entrance, controls and prohibitions ('no photos' was repeated like a mantra while we were at the base). Photos were allowed only after the engines of airborne drones had been sealed off. There was a persistent focus on security measures, which were often described in great technical detail prior to the entrance.

4.   Performed Discourse

The performed discourse about security and war was a recurrent theme in the sixteen performed briefings. Since it is a very difficult task to give a resume in a few pages I will continue in a schematic form. The discourses can be summarised in two large temporal dimensions: references to the past, and discourses on the actual perspectives - the future. The war heroes introduced their briefings by turning back to the past, through

narrations of ancient history, the Israeli existence prior to the Diaspora; they mentioned their biography, telling the families *alyha* [return from the Diaspora] and the relative's military biographies. Military and personal stories were mixed: being refugees from Yemen or Germany, the life in the kibbutz, parents that left for the war, fathers and uncles who fell in battle. They told military events in a very natural form, in a way sociologists call 'the domestication of the war.' The war was narrated - not as an exceptional event, but as a routine. The dedications to the military hierarchy also implied a separation from family life, an exclusion replaced by the military life, as General Nashi spoke about:

> It's not easy to be a leader, you don't eat, you don't sleep, you don't have a family life (*very emotional*). My son was born during the attrition war.[13]

Some of the military stories were narrated with the support of recorded images: nationalistic films - one film ended with an arrangement of tanks in the shape of Israel - or slides that exposed the military strategy in the Golan Heights. These are examples of military history, probably already presented to the recruits in their training. It is the story of Merkava and his deeds. The real, passionate and personal narrations slide into military mythology, introducing the discourse of heroism and sacrifice. "*I was the leader of the battalion.*" The descriptions of the battles were filled with pathos through the introduction of nationalistic characters distinguished in combat.

Contemporary discourse was confided to the intelligence community, a noteworthy change from the defence of "our land" to the defence of "the democracy." Generally speaking, in the strategic military discourse the landscape has fixed physical connotations; the hills to be conquered or the outflanking of the enemy through a stratagem. The enemy has a concrete presence that forces the struggle for survival. This dimension is nullified in contemporary discourse because the enemy they envision has no military physiognomy, as a Mossad speaker told us:

> This is not a kind of war between two armies, like in the past that you knew exactly who your enemy is. There are no borders. Because unfortunately part of our enemies live with us. And the weapons are totally different. We don't know exactly who is our enemy. You don't know what kind of weapons they have …[14]

He painted a picture of what they called '*a brain-washed generation.*' It was the discourse of the enlargement of the conflict. It's no longer the

conflict between Israel and Palestine but between the West and the Islamic world. The physical dimension of the confrontation becomes secondary. The invisibility of the enemy makes military intervention ineffective. Instead, the dimension of *financial warfare* becomes relevant:

> What is the meaning of economic warfare against us? They want to beat us in our weak point. What is our weak point? Our weak point is the economical infrastructure.[15]

He presented a picture of the future, where attacks are aimed only to take control of the financial markets. The enemy assumes a high strategic profile: "*they know how to change the decision-making process*." It was more than a discourse on public awareness; it was strategic-informative targeting of the audience. It was underlined also by his body language, which communicated security. The discourse was a crescendo that glided towards the semantics of the war on terror. 'We are all in the same boat; Israel and the whole of the West.'

The audience's knowledge about the history of the conflict played a crucial role in the way the intelligence was performed. Indeed the speaker's eloquence and the structure of argumentation confirmed the audience's expectations about the intelligence skills. They announced a worrying perspective: the penetration of a surrounding invisible enemy, a state of total insecurity, but were also reassuring in their knowledge about the enemy organisation. He described "*the brain-washed generation*," and the social construction of a new enemy generation was explained through the functioning of the DAWA.

> What is the DAWA? It's the core activity. Since the 1967 war the radical Islamic groups build it all around the world. I don't know from where you are, but I'm sure that every place you come from in your country they have a huge infrastructure. May be you are not aware about it (…). What we call the cyber infrastructure is a system of schools, mosques, Islamic centers, charity centers, Islamic clubs, Islamic universities. We are speaking about huge infrastructure.[16]

5.   Where is the Other?

At the end of the eight-day tour the perception of the other was faint. The real geography was a silent semantics, reminding one of the Biblical origins, the occupation of the Romans and the Ottoman Empire. The Arabs are white patches, as described by Meron Benvenisti in his "Sacred

Landscape."[17] The tourist map distributed at the beginning of the tour represented a country without borders with Palestine. The speakers and the tour staff rectified the negation of the history through the sacralisation of the land; the West Bank was continuously denominated as Judea and Samaria. Along the paths we often touched on the territory of the West Bank, and we came close to the Gaza Strip. From time to time the tour guide drew attention to a minaret in the skyline, symbolising the existence of a Palestinian village. It was a constant denial. It was a design of a simplified reality. The result of accumulated denial became evident in the narration of the separation wall. The village of Kalkilia was chosen as an observation "point of one of the main terrorist's infiltration routes into Israel."[18] In his briefing, the head of the IDF Humanitarian Unit said:

> I will show you, if you don't mind, what we call the wall. You see the concrete wall, over there, this is the wall and this is the center of Kalkilia, ... Kalkilia is one of the best places to speak about the security fence. I like, if you don't mind to show you the concrete wall, build between Israel and Kalkilia.[19]

We observed the wall from a distance of 1.5 kilometres, from one of the protected roads for the settlers. During the short stop at the crossroad the IDF official took the opportunity to explain the difference between the wall and the fence:

> If we talk about a fence we are talking about 800 km of fence from Jenin to the North to Hebron to the South. Just 4% of this 800 km is a concrete wall, 8 km. You see the fence, 3-4 meters. What is important is that because everybody is coming here, I'm briefing to them. The wall. Where is the wall? It is a tiny little wall, that's it. Only a reason to build the wall is that is expansive and take a lot of time and money.[20]

This briefing showed a discrepancy between the title and the actual discourse. There was no mention of the *'humanitarian' dilemma - emergency medical vehicles, and the civil population,* as was announced in the programme. The content and the semantics in the description of the wall were very close to what Stanley Cohen calls official denial.[21] It was a public event. It was collective because it was socially accepted, and it was organised with invested resources for its reproduction. It seems to me that it was more than a denial. It became a real social framework in the sense that it "provided a background understanding for events that incorporate the will, aim, and controlling effort"[22] of a collective mind.

Notes

[1] Shurat Hadin Israel Law Center, *About Us*, Mission to Israel, 2006, http://www.israellawcenter.org/template.php?section=AU>.

[2] ibid.

[3] N K Denzin and Y Lincon, *Collecting and Interpreting Qualitative Materials*, Sage Publications, London, 1998, p. 81.

[4] P A Adler and P Adler, 'Observational Techniques', in N K Denzin and Y Lincon, *Collecting and Interpreting Qualitative Materials*, Sage Publications, London, 1998, p. 92.

[5] We refer to Goffman's definition of frame: "my phrase 'frame analysis' is a slogan to refer to the examination in these terms of the organization of experience." E Goffman *Frame Analysis: An Essay in the Organization of Experience,* Northeastern University Press, Boston, 1986, p. 10.

[6] ibid.

[7] Introductory remarks by Shurat Hadin's director Nitsana Darshan-Leitner, Sheraton Plaza Hotel Jerusalem, 11 June 2007.

[8] The group was composed of 73 people, mainly North Americans, 5 Europeans, 95% Jews.

[9] Briefing of Mark Regev, spokesman for Israel's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 'Israel's security dilemmas – democracy under fire', 12 June 2007, Latrun, Israel Defence Force Center.

[10] Briefing of a member of Misgav Am, a front line Kibbutz on the Lebanese border, 14 June 2007.

[11] Introduction to Brig. Gen. Yair Nafshi at the 7th Armoured Brigade in the Golan Heights, Syrian Border, 14 June 2007.

[12] E Goffman, *Asylum Essays on the social situation of mental patients and other inmates*, Anchor Books (Doubleday & Company, Inc.), Garden City, New York, 1961, p. 129.

[13] Y Nafshi, op. cit.

[14] Briefing by the Senior Official of the Mossad, *Tracking the Material Support and Resources of the Palestinian Terrorist Organisations*, Latrun Israel Defence Force Center, 12 June 2007.

[15] ibid.

[16] ibid.

[17] M Benvenisti, *Sacred Landscape*, University of California Press, Berkeley, 2000, p. 1.

[18] Shurat Hadin Israel Law Center, Itinerary program "The Ultimate Mission to Israel", June 2007.

[19] Briefing of Head of Humanitarian Services, *"The infiltration and detection of terrorists, explosives and smuggling, "humanitarian" dilemma -*

emergency medical vehicles, and the civil population", Kalkilia, 13 June 2007.
[20] ibid.
[21] S Cohen, *States of Denial: Knowing about Atrocities and Suffering*, Polity Press, London, 2001, p. 103.
[22] E Goffman, *Frame Analysis*, op. cit., p. 22.

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The Changing Logic of Political Violence: The Case of the PKK in Turkey after the Invasion of Iraq - Violence for Violence's Sake

Rasim Özgür Dönmez and Pınar Enneli

Abstract
Terrorism and violence are sometimes used by perpetrators to gain political ground. It is also the fact that the ways and the means of terrorism can be changed according to national and international political conditions. In this context, this paper will analyse the dynamics, logic and rationality of political violence in the case of a separatist terrorist movement, the PKK (Kurdistan Workers Party) in Turkey. It will be focused on the conditions, actions and changing styles of violence of the PKK in line with the changing conditions of the Middle East and the political environment in Turkey. By doing this, the paper will show how the international, national and regional politics are intermingled and affect the way violence is performed by a terrorist organisation. The PKK used violent actions in the 1980s and '90s to set up an independent Kurdish state. In that period, the organisation was very well disciplined. However, after its leader Abdullah Öcalan was captured, the organisation came to a point of breakdown. Some members left the organisation and formed alternative movements. The rest divided into two parts: hardliners and moderates. At the same time, the military intervention of the US in Iraq created a new political environment. The PKK found a safe haven in the Middle East and used American hostility towards Iran for its own interests. It has also aspired to set up a pan-Kurdish state beyond Turkish boundaries. As a result, considerably large numbers of Iranian and Syrian Kurds started to join the organisation and began to constitute the commander ranks. All these developments forced the PKK to change its strategies and perform different sorts of violence, not only against civilians and Turkish military in rural areas, but also against civilians in cities.

Key Words: Ethnic terrorism, Iraq's invasion, Kurdish nationalism, organisations, PKK, political violence, security, terrorist organisations, Turkey.

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1.   Introduction

In the context of ethnic politics, terrorism and political violence are two concepts whose meanings are both subjective and identical. Violence may be perceived as political by one side, to attribute a positive connotation

to the action, even while it is perceived as 'terrorism' by others. In respect to this dual meaning of the concepts, our study aims to analyse the dynamics, logic and rationality of political violence by the PKK, a separatist terror organisation that re-arose after the US invasion of Iraq. Our argument is, that although, after the US invasion of Iraq, the PKK found a safe haven in northern Iraq from which to escalate the level of its violence in Turkey, the organisation has been gradually losing its grassroots support in Turkey. This is partly because of the stance of the ruling party, AKP (Justice and the Development Party) in regard to the 'Kurdish Problem' and in part because of Turkey's process of Europeanisation. Political violence can be defined as a collective attack against a regime and/or operatives of a regime. According to scholarly accounts of modernisation, dramatic social, political and economic change leads to rising expectations.[1] If these expectations are not satisfied, political violence will ensue. Violence, however, is not the first or the foremost means by which to achieve the objectives of a group, since political channels might still be used to realise political objectives. Political terrorism is a derivation of political violence; it is political violence used in an effort to compromise others' bids for political power. In other words, it is a way of sending a political message by using violence. However, unlike political violence, acts of violence can gain independence from the political objectives of its ethnic group. In this respect, a terrorist group might ignore the grassroots demands from which the violence originally gained meaning in itself. In this context, the terrorist organisation will use violence for its survival, a bullying action that substitutes violence for politics and alienates the organisation - from both the mainstream society and its own grassroots. The other rationale beyond this kind of terrorism is to divide the society along ethnic lines, thus inculcating ethnic hatred and ethnic consciousness.[2]

Turkey's 'Kurdish Problem,' for some, or 'Eastern Problem,' for others, is the result of socio-economic deprivation and the State approach of not recognising Kurdish identity. The PKK was the first armed organisation to address the problem strongly in ethno-political terms and to use violence in pursuit of its aims. In other words, the organisation was the first actor in the region that diffused ethnic consciousness to the grassroots by political violence or ethnic terror. The organisation's systematic violence usually targeted state security forces and fellow Kurds who either refused to cooperate, or who took the State's side, or who wanted to voice the Kurdish problem independently from the PKK.[3] The organisation murdered women, men and children indiscriminately and targeted Kurdish left-wing organisations such as Rizgari and Kawa, killing dozens of their members. The PKK attacked the State security forces as well and clashed with civil servants to show the limits of the Turkish State's ability to protect people living in the region. For this purpose, it specifically targeted teachers, to prevent their indoctrinating children with Turkish state ideology. The main

objectives of the group are to be the sole representative of the Kurdish problem and to increase awareness of Kurdishness among the grassroots population.[4] The main approach of the PKK is to engage in a low-intensity conflict with Turkish security forces. Over time, the PKK found strong support from the Kurds living in the east of Turkey. The political violence of the group eliminated Kurds who did not contribute to the PKK; these moderate Kurds were stigmatised and marked as 'collaborators' who should be terminated.[5] The PKK reached the peak of its strength in the late 1980s and early 1990s, when Turkish security forces could hardly enter the Cudi and Gabar mountains, where the PKK created free zones.

In those days, the PKK enjoyed its power, and Őcalan (its leader) began to be perceived by many Kurds living in the eastern part of the country as the founding father of the Kurdish people. In this period, the PKK was not perceived as a terrorist organisation by a majority of people in the southeast part of Turkey, but as a political militia which carried out violence in defense of Kurdish rights against the State.[6] The State's rather harsh policies, such as banning pro-Kurdish parties like HEP and HADEP, fostered this positive image of the PKK in the region, in the absence of legal Kurdish organisations.[7] The power of the PKK attracted many recruiters to the organisation, especially from the eastern part of the country. The organisation incited the "education war," which they named "cadre education,"[8] inspired by a merging of Marxist-Leninist terminology with strong Kurdish nationalism. However, in the mid-1990s, the growth of the organisation caused the group's organisational structure to deteriorate.

Ali Kemal Ozcan explained this deterioration as follows. First, 'Cadre education' or the 'education war' lost its philosophical and moral essence, and the context of the education issue was reduced to taking revenge upon the enemy. Therefore, "the intensive philosophical, moral and spiritual education came to be converted into parroted imitations of certain terms and phrases."[9] Secondly, although the PKK alleged that it had a democratic organisational structure and the principle of loyalty to the people, to the martyrs and to the future of humanity, the leadership became the sole symbol of the organisation in practice, which the members had to obey without hesitation. This created a Soviet type of bureaucracy and divinisation of Őcalan. Thirdly, the PKK ideology held as an objective the "production of new man," which was to rise from the "cradle of civilization," reflecting the PKK's educational activities. In this process the "critique" and "self-critique" mechanism had a paramount role in "self-dissolution" and in creating a "re-humanised" man.[10]

In psycho-sociological terms, this mechanism was a stimulus mechanism to absorb individual identity within the group identity by weakening the former and strengthening the latter. However, the instrument of self-critique deteriorated into 'self-veiling' or 'self-disguising' instruments of

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bureaucratic authority wherein these cadres attributed their false actions to others. Finally, the handicaps that the PKK experienced stemmed from the loosening of the PKK's ideological patterns at the end of Iron Curtain socialism in the world.[11]

The PKK's deterioration was also fostered by intensification of the Turkish security forces' operations against the organisation during the same period. These operations, together with the Turkish State's international pressures on the US, and on Turkey's neighbouring countries - particularly Syria - for harbouring the organisation, accelerated the deterioration process. In this period, the PKK, for the first time in its history, extended its actions beyond the countryside to the cities, carrying out suicide bombings, which only showed the organisation's desperation.[12] The deterioration process ended with the capture of Őcalan in 1999 in Kenya, after which the PKK declared a unilateral ceasefire.

After the capture of Őcalan, the militants were physically and psychologically defeated, and the organisation came to the point of dissolution. The approximately 2500 militia left in the organisation were tired and had lost their belief in revolution.[13] Some members from the high cadres, such as Osman Őcalan, the brother of the organisation's leader, Nizamettin Tas, and Hikmet Fidan, left the organisation and set up their own movement, which they called Partiya Welatparezen Demokraten Kurdistan (PWD).[14]

In addition, the imprisonment of Őcalan gave AKP a chance to turn its face to the European Union in order to try to democratise and Europeanise the country, in reference to "acquis communitière."[15] The democratisation process gave some social and political rights to the Kurds in the country, such as the right to open private Kurdish language courses and to broadcast in Kurdish. The AKP also constructed strong bonds with the Kurdish elite living in the region, on the basis of the concept of Islamic brotherhood, and brought the Kurdish elite to the top cadres of the party, while providing aid to the region. However, the AKP restricted its solution of the Kurdish problem to the fostering of Islamic brotherhood and the provision of aid to the region.[16] Although these relatively positive developments made the PKK and the DTP lose its support among Kurds, these developments were not followed by other economic, social and political initiatives to create further improvements in the region, and to persuade the militia to come down from the mountains. Yavuz and Ozcan explained the situation as follows:

> Until 2005, the JDP government's policy was to "forget" the Kurdish problem or assume that there was no such problem to begin with. For the JDP leadership, the PKK was an issue exaggerated by the military. Some privately claim that the military wanted the conflict to continue in

order to "maintain their spending and role in Turkish politics."[17]

2.   The Invasion of Iraq

On 1st March 2003, the Turkish parliament decided against giving permission for the US to use its air bases and land as launching points to Iraq; by so doing, at least for some commentators, Turkey lost its political incentives for the reconstruction of Iraq. The US invasion of Iraq caused great instability in the region and gave the PKK a chance to find a free zone in northern Iraq, together with the other Kurdish organisations, the Kurdistan Democratic Party and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan. For their own purposes, both these organisations and the US let the PKK enter northern Iraq. The actors in the Middle East began to use the PKK against each other. Although the Kurdish groups were not keen on having the PKK in northern Iraq, they used its presence there as a tactic against Turkey, to prevent Turkey from interfering with the establishment of a legal Kurdistan in northern Iraq.[18] For their part, Syria and Iran promoted the PKK to attract Turkey to their side against the US, under the pretext of cooperation with Ankara against the PKK. The US also let the organisation enter this region in order to use its Iranian branch, the Party for Freedom and Life in Kurdistan (Partiya Jiyana Azadi Kurdistan) (PJAK), in opposition to the Iranian government.[19]

In this period, the PKK were located in four camps in northern Iraq: Kandil, Hakurk, Zap and Avasin.[20] These free zones gave the PKK a chance to renew itself and gain strength. The PKK changed its policies and demands, setting up different organisations in Syria, Iraq and Iran under different names in order to partake in efforts toward the political combination of these countries; it initially wanted a confederation of these countries, and then to set up a Pan-Kurdish state in the region. However, the PKK would face two unpleasant developments: first, the emergence of new actors in Turkey and, second, a power struggle inside the organisation.

In the post-Iraq invasion period, developments in Turkey led to some unpleasant situations for the PKK. Most importantly, the organisation lost its status as the sole actor in the Kurdish problem. In 2007, the AKP won most of the seats in the parliamentary elections and emerged as the first party in eastern Turkey against the pro-Kurdish independent nominees close to the PKK, who later formed a pro-Kurdish party called the Democratic Society Party (DTP). The Party of Rights and Freedom (HAKPAR) and the Participator Democratic Party (KADEP) were set up on the basis of Kurdish Islamic synthesis, which avoided armed struggle and competed in a democratic context. These parties demanded federalism for the eastern part of the country, where the majority of Kurds live. However, the biggest problem for the PKK came from young Kurds whose families had migrated from the

eastern to the western part of the country to escape the low-intensity conflict of the 1990s. Although these young people were Kurdish nationalists who disagreed with the State practices against Kurds, they were not keen on the PKK's methods, including its armed politics and its coercive mindset. These people, unlike many who were pro-Kurd in the 1990s, wanted to work within the Turkish political system, and believed in democratic struggle. Thus, the PKK had little chance to control this group of pro-Kurds.

In this period, the PKK was managed in a vague and complex way, which produced a power struggle within the organisation. Öcalan, imprisoned in Imrali Prison, lost his control over the organisation to a great extent. His imprisonment offered a peaceful solution to the Kurdish problem.[21] The PKK's military wing was controlled by Murat Karayilan, who competed for leadership with other high officials within the organisation, such as Cemil Bayik and Syrian Kurdish Fehman Huseyin. Murat Karayilan, representing the right wing of the organisation, wanted to cooperate with the US in meeting its objectives, while Bayik represented the left wing and supported anti-Americanism and cooperation with Iran, Iraq and Syria. This leadership clash sometimes resulted in armed conflict within the group; the clash for the leadership of the organisation, between Syrian Kurds and Turkish Kurds in the military wing of the PKK, resulted in bloodshed in 2008.[22]

Thus, the PKK lost its ideological base, so it enhanced its demands against the Turkish State in order to distinguish itself from other actors in the region. The organisation wanted to be the sole representative of the Kurdish problem at the negotiation table with the Turkish State, so it reduced the scale of the Kurdish problem, demanding only the release of Öcalan from prison, and the setting up of a system of federalism in Turkey.[23] Although the PKK was aware that it was almost impossible for the Turkish State to accept these demands, it still continued its violent attacks - to preserve its collective identity. These attacks have not been effective because, unlike the 1990s, the PKK can no longer find enough popular support from Kurds in the country and because Turkish security forces have been highly professionalised in their struggle against terrorism, particularly against the methods of the PKK.[24]

The PKK usually use three methods of violence. The first method is forming small groups and carrying out attacks against State security forces through remote-controlled mines. Unlike its operations in the 1990s, the organisation in recent times has not wanted to engage in direct combat with security forces. For example, on 8th April 2006, the PKK attacked a military convoy by using a remote-controlled mine in Elazig, resulting in the deaths of one soldier and one lieutenant.[25] On 23 May 2007, a military convoy was attacked by the PKK in Sirnak, and six soldiers died.[26]

The second method of violence being used by the PKK is violent attacks in the big cities, targeting civilians in order to terrorise them and force

the State to negotiate. By using this second method, the PKK pursues three aims: killing civilians, particularly in Metropolitan areas; extending its terror actions all over Turkey; and damaging public and civilian commodities. The PKK executed a suicide attack in Ulus, a crowded business and trade centre in the capital city of Ankara on 22nd May 2007, killing seven people. In a similar attack, the PKK set up a remote-controlled bomb in Diyarbakir on 8 January 2008, which resulted in six deaths and hundreds of injuries. On 16 June 2005, the PKK blew up coaches in Kusadasi, a holiday resort in the west of the country, resulting in five deaths and thirteen injured. For its part, the PKK's youth organisation, Kurdistan Freedom Hawks (TAK-Teyrebazen Azadiye Kurdistan), vandalised public coaches and cars belonging to civilians.[27] The objective of the organisation is to generate hatred in mainstream society and to divide the society along ethnic lines, like Israelis and Palestinians, or Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland.

The third method of the PKK is killing opposition members within the organisation. On 17 July 2005, one of the chief executives of the PKK, Hasan Özen, who wanted to leave the organisation, was murdered in Austria. In Diyarbakir, on 6 July 2005, the PKK killed Hikmet Fidan the former founder of the People's Democratic Party (HADEP), a legal branch of the PKK, after he split from the PKK and formed an alternative organisation called PWD with Osman Őcalan.[28]

All separatist organisations, particularly ethnically based ones, are political entities which pattern their acts of violence on their grassroots and have political objectives. After the US invasion of Iraq, the PKK enforced its objectives, but the changing political environment in Turkey had deteriorated its once strong base of support. Recently, the PKK lost its ideological and social base, while other actors in the region have become serious challengers to its self-proclaimed identity as the sole representative of the Kurds. The organisation cannot adapt itself to the new developments, so it has executed terror acts for the purpose of preserving the organisation. Thus, the actions of the PKK no longer have any political purpose and cannot pretend to go beyond terrorism for its own sake.

3.   Conclusion

From the late 1980s until the mid-1990s, the PKK was the primary and strongest organisation addressing the Kurdish problem. It raised Kurdish nationalism at a grassroots level by carrying out political violence against State security forces, civil bureaucrats and Kurds who did not cooperate with the PKK. The State's hawkish perspective reduced the Kurdish problem to one of 'terrorism,' which strengthened the positive image of the PKK in the eastern part of the country. However, the PKK's organisational deadlock, together with Turkish security forces' successful operations, almost dismantled the organisation.

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The US invasion of Iraq and the political incentives of the current Turkish government allowed the PKK to refresh itself and offered a new chance to unite Kurds in a pan-Kurdish state. However, the emergence of new actors who represented the Kurdish problem and the democratisation of the country, along with the AKP's serious Europeanisation effort, severely eroded the PKK's popular support. In addition, the capture of Őcalan resulted in leadership struggles within the organisation. The PKK downsized the legal political sphere of its legal branch, the DTP, and began to use terrorism. Thus, the organisation had no path open to it, except to carry out terrorist attacks against Turkish security forces, civilians in cities, and the opposition groups within the organisation.

Notes

[1] S Hungtington, *Political Order in Changing Socities*, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1968, pp. 39-58.

[2] A Insel, 'Terörün Amacı (The Aim of Terror)', *Radikal İki*,
14 October 2007, viewed 5 January 2008,
<http://www.radikal.com.tr\ek_haber.php?ek=2&haberno=7549>.

[3] R Ö Dönmez, 'Nationalism in Turkey: Political Violence and Identity', *Ethnopolitics*, Vol. 6, March 2007, pp. 53-54; Ö Taşpınar, *Kurdish Nationalism and Political Islam in Turkey: Kemalist Identity in Transition*, Routledge, New York and London, 2005.

[4] R Ö Dönmez, op.cit., p. 53.

[5] ibid.

[6] The high percentage of votes for pro-Kurdish parties were the evidence of this; see K Kirişçi and M G Winrow, *Kürt Sorunu, Kökeni ve Gelişimi (The Kurdish Question and Turkey: An Example of a Trans-State Ethnic Conflict)*, Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, İstanbul, 2002, pp.146-159.

[7] Ü Cizre, 'Turkey's Kurdish Problem: Borders, Identity and Hegemony', in *Right Sizing the State*, B O'Leary, I S Lustick and T Callaghy (eds), Oxford University Press, New York, 2002, p. 234.

[8] A K Özcan, 'The Vacillating PKK: Can It be Resurrected ?', *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 43, January 2007, p. 116.

[9] ibid.

[10] ibid.

[11] ibid., p. 112 and pp. 116-117.

[12] E Ergül, *Kürdistan İşci Partisi (PKK) Terör Örgütü:Etnik terörün Fikri Yapısı, Anatomisi ve Şiddet Stratejileri*, Abant İzzet Baysal University, Unpublished Masters Thesis, 2008, pp. 135-140.

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[13] Interview with a Former Militia, 'Siyaset Meydanı', *Show TV*, 24 January 2008, 23.30 pm.

[14] This organisation was brutally suppressed by the PKK. See İ Aktan, 'PKK Uzun Bir Savaşa Hazırlanıyor (The PKK is Prepared To Wage a Long War)', in *Birikim*, December 2007, pp. 20-21; E. Ergül, op. cit., pp. 185-195.

[15] The term is used in European Union Law. It means that a country willing to the EU membership should basically provide democracy, free market economy and human rights.

[16] M H Yavuz and N A Özcan, 'The Kurdish Question and Turkey's Justice and Development Party', *Middle East Policy*, Vol. 13, Spring 2006, p. 110.

[17] ibid.

[18] İ. Aktan, op. cit., pp. 22-23.

[19] *CNN Türk*, 'ABD PJAK'a Silah Veriyor İddiası (It is Alleged that the US Donates Weapons to PJAK)', 12 September 2007, viewed 8 January 2008, <http://www.cnnturk.com/DUNYA/haber_detay.asp?PID=319&haberID=390671>. See also: J Brandon, 'Iran's Kurdish Threat: PJAK', *Terrorism Monitor*, Vol. 4, June, 2006.

[20] Interview with a Former Militia, op. cit.

[21] ibid.

[22] İ Aktan, op.cit., p.18; *Tüm Gazeteler*, 'PKK'da İç Savaş Çıktı 10 Ölü (The Internal Conflict Emerged Within the PKK)',02-16-2008, viewed 15 February 2008, <http://www.tumgazeteler.com/?a=2564163>.

[23] ibid., E Mavioğlu, 'Sivil Çözüm Tartışması (The Civil Solution Debates)', *Radikal*, 02-03-2008, viewed online, 12 February 2007, <http://www.radikal.com.tr/haber.php?haberno=249028>.

[24] See R Çakır, 'PKK Hala Nasıl Etkili Olabiliyor (Why is the PKK so Effective?)', *Vatan Gazetesi*, 21 September 2006.

[25] S Öztürk, 'Hedefte Önce Komutanlar Var', *Objektif Haber*, 17th April 2006, viewed 16 January 2008, <http://www.objektifhaber.com/yeni/yazarDetay.asp?GuvenlikID=69O65O64O>.

[26] S Gazetesi, 'Hain Tuzak 6 Şehit 10 Yaralı (Malicious Trap 6 Martyrs and 10 Injured)', 24 May 2007, viewed 13 January 2008, <http://arsiv.sabah.com.tr/2007/05/24/haber,115BEFA12BBB4FDB901FF63B978CE0C0.html>.

[27] *PKK Teroru Haber Arsivi*, 'Neron Degil Tak Yapiyor (NERON does not Carry out these Actions TAK Executes Them)', viewed 2 January 2008, <http://www.ibneyiz.biz\pkk\2007\neron-degil-tak-yakiyor>.

[28] İ Bal and E Özkan, 'The Timeline of PKK Terror Organization', *Uluslarası Hukuk ve Politika*, Vol. 2, no. 8, 2006, p. 155.

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**Printing a Pogrom:
Violence and Print Communities
in the Case of Captain Keller**

Roland Clark

Abstract
Both printing and violence help create communities. Printing of reports about
violence also mutates and expands existing communities created by violent
events such as pogroms. During the 1927 annual congress of the National
Union of Christian Students of Romania (UNSCR), attendees attacked Jewish
residents and destroyed their businesses and places of worship in Cluj and
Oradea Mare. Captain Wilfred N. Keller, an American businessman and
former YMCA worker, went onto the streets to ask rioters to stop vandalising
his office. The severe beating that Keller received put him in hospital and
temporarily brought Romanian anti-Semitic violence into the international
spotlight. This paper examines how the Oradea Mare violence and the court
cases that followed were represented in the Romanian and international press.
In particular, it looks at how newspaper reports, police memoranda and
diplomatic documents surrounding the Keller case helped to draw nationalist
students into the fascist 'Legion of the Archangel Michael'.

Key Words: Codreanu, fascism, Iron Guard, Legion of the Archangel
Michael, pogrom, print community, Romania, violence.

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One thing that printing and violence have in common is that both
help create communities. Furthermore, printing reports about violence
mutates and expands existing communities created by violent events such as
pogroms. On 5-6 December 1927, large numbers of ultra-nationalist students
rioted in the northern Romanian towns of Cluj and Oradea Mare. Students
attacked Jewish residents and destroyed their businesses and places of
worship.[1] This paper examines how the Oradea Mare violence and the court
cases that followed were represented in the press. I am primarily concerned
with how fascist movements proselytised and gained adherents by first
creating communities of readers around controversial events such as
pogroms.

Anti-Semitic violence was a time-honoured custom in Romania well
before the 1920s.[2] Andrei Oişteanu has shown that anti-Semitic stereotypes
have permeated Romanian culture almost as long as written records of that
culture have existed.[3] An anti-Semitic predisposition does not automatically

guarantee violence. In the modern world, organisational networks are often a vital catalyst. Anti-Semitic organisations had established themselves in Romania with the inaugural congress of the 'Universal Anti-Israelite Alliance' in Bucharest in 1886, and they continued to grow and multiply up until the end of the Second World War.[4] One of the most influential anti-Semitic activists was A. C. Cuza, a professor in Iaşi who established the National Christian Defence League (LANC) in March 1923. This was not the first such movement that Cuza founded, but it was to be his most successful.

Student activism began independently of A. C. Cuza. The National Union of Christian Students of Romania (UNSCR) was formed in February 1925, taking the place of earlier student movements, only some of which were anti-Semitic.[5] Re-founding the student movement in 1925 was a reaction against official attempts to reign in student activism,[6] but was mostly a way of making official the well-organised student movement that had arisen out of the 1922 riots over Jewish dissections of Romanian cadavers.[7] Students living in the big cities, far away from their parental homes, constituted a large, transient population with the ability to dispose of their time and incomes largely as they saw fit. Once students - as distinct from workers or intellectuals - turned to organised anti-Semitism, the incidence of violence increased dramatically. Frequent meetings between students and LANC leaders took place during the 1920s, some of which ended in attacks on Jews or clashes with police.[8] The UNSCR and the LANC collaborated closely, even though they were officially two separate, unrelated groups.

A common pattern throughout the early 1920s was that transitory communities of violence were formed in response to real or imagined threats; they were used to serve a broad range of social issues, not just the persecution of Jews. These transitory communities became permanent when their members organised into formal associations.[9] Based on communities of violence, anti-Semitic organisations institutionalised violence in turn. They made it a normal means of communication between competing social movements, or between social movements and the state.[10]

The notion of a 'print community' as I am using it here refers to the ability of printed materials to make people feel a part of larger communities. People who read the same books, journals or newspapers can all be said to belong to the same print community. News that is relevant to most people within a circumscribed print community can be circulated through printed matter, ideas can be propagated or reinforced, and people can advertise goods, services and ideologies that are likely to be valued by other members of the community. Using the Oradea pogrom as an example, I am arguing that it was often printed material that produced imagined communities, and not vice-versa. Situational violence, riots, and court cases divided societies into communities of people who shared anti-Semitic beliefs and those who

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did not, but without printing, these communities would have been limited, local affairs. Newspapers, journals, and pamphlets spread these divisions nation-wide. Through print, local communities of violence became national print communities.

One example of the way local communities of violence can generate national print communities can be found in the pogrom that took place during the early days of December in 1927. Students were given free train travel to the congress, which may have encouraged many to travel to Oradea who had no interest in actually attending the discussions. Students used their trip across the country to vandalise train stations and to visit sympathisers in towns along the way.[11] An estimated 6000 students entered Oradea Mare for the congress, which was held in a hall with a capacity of 1500 people. The first days' discussions were well attended, perhaps because they concerned the *numerus clausus*, but following that, fewer and fewer students stayed on to discuss minor issues.[12] The rest, according to the account provided by the American Legation in Bucharest, "were running through the streets shouting, carrying long sticks which they had stolen at a market place, their pockets loaded with stones which they had picked at the edge of a river in the town, and gendarmes pursuing them everywhere."[13] According to the American account, most shops were closed, the streets were deserted, except for the rioting students who stole without payment, destroyed four synagogues, and assaulted Jews on the streets and on the trains. Students "destroyed all window displays and businesses, breaking shutters and destroying shops, right up to the most ordinary things."[14] One Jewish man recalled being beaten by students, and then chasing them into the Synagogue, begging them to stop destroying sacred objects. "These reckless [students] broke and destroyed everything that they came across," he reported. "They took cult objects with them and, dressed in prayer mantles, they began a wild dance in the courtyard."[15] Another Jewish man protected Torah scrolls with a sword in his hand.[16]

Individuals caught up in the violence were presented with a clear choice - either join the rioters, or become their enemy. The difference between students and 'Jews' was clear, in that the rioters assumed that anyone who could not demonstrate his or her Romanian-ness was a Jew and was summarily assaulted.[17] One of the injured was Captain Wilfred N. Keller, an American businessman and former YMCA worker who was part owner of the Hungarian newspaper *Minoritar Nagyvvarad*, printed in Oradea. The Romanian foreign minister, Nicolae Titulescu, reported to the American ambassador that Keller's newspaper "had been guilty of very violent attacks on the Rumanian Government and people,"[18] which may explain why it became the object of student aggression. The newspaper's official declaration with regards to the destruction stated that "not only did they destroy the four front rooms of the editors and administrators, but they [also] destroyed all of

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the objects inside,"[19] - portraits on the walls, desks, cupboards, books, telephones, and electric candles.

Exactly what *did* happen to Captain Keller is difficult to determine. A letter from his wife to the American embassy recounted that "while walking on the main street of that city [Keller] was attacked without cause and seriously injured."[20] In a later statement, "Mr. Keller admits … that he went among the students for the purpose of protesting against their vandalism and that the prefect of police endeavoured to dissuade him from taking further action."[21] The *Chicago Tribune* added to the Romanian foreign minister's report "that the American also threatened the students with the American fleet."[22] The paper also quoted another eyewitness saying that Keller was attacked while walking through the square alone, however, and that policemen stood by and did nothing while he was beaten and stabbed by a large number of students.[23] Keller eventually received $2,500 in indemnity payments from the Romanian government.[24]

Even before the congress began, police had begun special preparations for containing student violence to Oradea itself and for preventing students from leaving the trains to make more trouble on the way home.[25] Nonetheless, many went on to Cluj and other nearby towns, where they continued rioting for several more days.[26] Students travelling directly to Bucharest jumped off at various train stations on the way to destroy things or assault Jews while the train was stopped.[27] Roughly 400 students were arrested when they alighted from the trains in Bucharest. Others made it home, and were only arrested when they began trying to sell some of the objects they had stolen in Oradea.[28]

The communities of violence created at Oradea Mare relied upon the publicity provided by print for their extension across the nation. Newspapers were heavily censored in the days following the pogrom, and often appeared with large white boxes where articles about the incident should have been.[29] This practice was decried during the parliamentary debates over the riots because, as Wilhelm Filderman argued, "it lets people believe more than really happened in reality."[30] The riots were condemned by most major newspapers.[31] The university senate also quickly condemned the violence, and promised to expel anyone who was convicted of involvement in the disturbances.[32] Jewish communities commemorated the event several weeks later by burying ritual objects which had been desecrated in the pogrom.[33] Politicians, newspapers, university authorities and Jewish leaders all separated themselves from the students, excluding them from their own communities, and thus, contributing to the consolidation of circumscribed student communities instead.

The hostile reception that the Oradea Mare pogrom received in the press only served to strengthen the student movement's resolve.[34] A number of students were arrested following the riots, although only 76 students,

including some minors, and 37 others, were brought to trial.[35] The students responded by blaming the government for the disturbances. They protested against the expulsion of 380 students who had not been formally charged with crimes.[36] During one of the trials, the UNSCR President Lorin Popescu testified that the chief of police in Oradea Mare had warned them that they would be provoked by communists and that 10,000 armed factory workers had already been mobilised to attack the students. Moreover, argued Popescu, "the first student protest took place in perfect quietness, but then … the butchers Friedman and Gutman beat the students Gherghel and Disconescu. Due to the number of soldiers, students were prevented from responding to these provocations."[37] Later in 1928, Popescu led the students in a general strike to protest the uncomfortable treatment that they had received at police hands.[38] Some of the arrested students went on a hunger strike for several days before accepting their fate.[39] According to Popescu, the students had "only fulfilled their patriotic duty."[40]

The trials of the students were printed in many of the major papers. The arguments made by the defence were heard, and reprinted throughout the country, both in the nationalist press and in the mainstream newspapers. Many student testimonies read as if there had been no violence in Oradea at all. Many of them "had heard" that there were disorders, but they themselves had not seen anything. One girl, caught with pages torn from the Torah in her hand, said that she had found them on the ground. Others had seen the riots, but blamed them on "communists," or on those who "threw boiling water" on the students before any of the violence began.[41]

The extent to which the trials allowed student voices to be heard in the press can be seen in the number of witnesses brought by each side. Compared to the three witnesses provided by the prosecution for the Cluj trials, the defence called a total of thirty five.[42] This discrepancy might be explained by the fact that some prosecution witnesses were assaulted in the waiting rooms of the court house, and other prominent victims were too afraid to speak out.[43] Mr. Dunescu, the police chief in Oradea during the pogrom, testified that students had indeed been provoked, and that rocks and boiling water had been thrown on some from the Park Hotel.[44] Testimonies such as Mr. Dunescu's helped to cast doubt on the whole incident, and when they were printed and distributed in national newspapers, they helped confirm student fears of persecution and middle class suspicions of student duplicity. The printed response to the riots did just as much as the riots themselves in dividing Romania between fascists, Jews, and spectators, and consolidated the student movement ever more strongly.

Some victims were libelled in the nationalist press. The American Captain Keller was labeled "a Jew from Banat," which was clearly untrue. *Universul* claimed that Keller had walked into the student congress himself and repeatedly demanded recompense for the broken windows at his printing

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house.[45] Keller's involvement in the violence, among other things, transformed the Oradea Mare pogrom into an international incident, and gained Romania a reputation as a violent country terrorised by anti-Semitic students. Press coverage of the attack on Keller forced the U.S. government to abandon its previously ambiguous attitude towards anti-Semitism in Romania. The American ambassador to Romania, W. S. Culbertson, had reported to the U.S. Secretary of State in January 1927 that

> there have never been pogroms in Rumania or events that could be described as remotely resembling such. … Jewish students have encountered difficulties and isolated cases have occurred in which Jews have been attacked by students and rowdies to furnish amusement. Generally speaking, however, they are not molested and certainly there exists no organised persecution of Jews.[46]

Culbertson was forced to change his tune after the Oradea pogrom, despite his obvious dislike for Jews. Jewish leaders in America put pressure on the U.S. government to intervene and prevent further pogroms.[47] The tone of American relations with Romania was permanently changed by these events. For the next few years, the American press could speak of little else apart from anti-Semitism when they mentioned Romania.[48]

Hostile sentiment elsewhere also grew following the violence, showing how the divisive communities created on the streets of Oradea spread not just throughout Romania but also throughout Europe. A mass meeting of 5,000 people was held in Paris in protest against the pogrom.[49] English and Hungarian students then attempted to prevent Romanians from attending the international student congress in France in August 1928.[50] The most hostile reaction to the Oradea violence came from Hungary, however. The pogrom even created a rift with Hungarian anti-Semites, who quickly distanced themselves from the students' violence.[51] Both Hungarian journalists and politicians violently condemned the riots, using them as an example of how Romania was not protecting its minorities and therefore did not deserve the post-1918 territorial enlargement that had taken Transylvania, including Oradea Mare, away from Hungary and given it to Romania.[52] Print communities that emerged from the pogrom set Romanians against Romanians, but because of the government's inability to suppress the students, they also set Romania against the rest of the world.

The importance of the Oradea Mare pogrom and its continuation in print in the months following should, however, also be understood with reference to the internal politics of the various anti-Semitic organisations involved. The LANC had split in two during 1927, giving birth to the Legion of the Archangel Michael, and leaving the UNSCR in confusion and disarray.

At the time of the UNSCR conference in December 1927, Corneliu Zelea Codreanu, the leader of the fascist Legion, was not the confident leader of anti-Semitic students that most historians have assumed him to be. Instead, it was Cuza that the students invited as a guest of honor at their conference.[53] As the first major meeting of nationalist students since the Cuza-Codreanu split, the Oradea conference occupies a central place in the story of the Legion's rise to prominence as the voice of nationalist students.[54] Despite his celebrity, Codreanu did not have a majority following amongst nationalist students prior to the conference.

At the time of the December Congress, the UNSCR was undergoing political turmoil of its own. Uncertainty about its political future had begun to cause some members to vacillate about their commitment to the movement.[55] Others were fed up with inactivity, and assured their leaders that "any decision that leads to immediate action, even violence, I accept completely."[56] The UNSCR had been closely affiliated with the LANC in the past, so the Cuza-Codreanu split in May left the student movement quite disoriented. Government and university repression after the Oradea pogrom forced the student movement to seek an alternative organisational structure which would remove them from under the control of university administrators. The two obvious choices open to them were Cuza's LANC and Codreanu's Iron Guard. Their choice of the latter, despite Cuza's attendance at the conference, and his advocacy on their behalf in the courts, can probably be attributed to two related considerations. First, the tight communal bonds formed amongst students during the riots meant that whichever direction they went, the students would move *en masse*. Second, the strong identity that the students had won *as students* was something that they wanted to maintain, and joining Cuza's movement would mean surrendering a large part of this identity. After six months of battling with the government to remain solvent, the UNSCR amalgamated with the Legion in September 1928, although anti-Semitic student organisation continued under the name of the Christian Students League for several years to come.[57]

Having broken away from Cuza's LANC, Codreanu and his followers desperately needed to gain adherents, and the student movement was their natural 'fishing hole.' They failed to convince UNSCR leaders to recreate the student movement within the Legion in August 1927, and so the process of drawing students into the Guard was a slower one.[58] It involved remaining as close as possible to the student movement, participating in their riots and pogroms, and taking advantage of government persecution to convince the students of the need for them to join a broader-based anti-Semitic organisation such as the Iron Guard. The process of translating local communities of violence into a viable social movement through the use of print was central to Legionary recruitment methods and is what made their rapid early growth possible.

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Notes

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[1] In a long tradition occasioned by scholarly usage of emic terms when describing twentieth-century ethnicities, I shall henceforth use the words 'Jew' and 'Romanian' in the same way as they are used in my - consistently racist - sources. I in no way wish to endorse these usages of the terms but know of no alternative that retains the embodying meaning that these terms had to contemporaries.

[2] A good history of nineteenth century Romanian anti-Semitism can be found in V Neumann, 'Repere culturale ale antisemitismului din România în secolul al XIX-lea', in *Ideea care ucide: Dimensiunile ideologiei legionare*. A. Florian, C. Petculescu, V. Neumann, and R. Florian, (eds), Editura Noua Alternativă, Bucharest, 1994, pp. 35-54.

[3] A Oişteanu, *Imaginea evreului în cultura româna*, 2nd Ed, Humanitas, Bucharest, 2001.

[4] ibid., pp. 18ff.

[5] *Statutele Uniunii Naţionale a Stuenţilor din România*, 24 March 1925. Fond: Ministry of the Interior – Diverse, No: 1925, Vol. 8, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, Reel #135.

[6] Undated Letter, Ion Fotiade to the 'President,' Aghireşti, near Cluj. MI-D 1925/8, USHMM #135.

[7] I Livezeanu, *Cultural Politics in Greater Romania: Regionalism, Nation Building, and Ethnic Struggle, 1918-1930*, Cornell University Press, London, 1995, pp. 268ff; 'Excesele de la Cluj', *Aurora*, 2 December, 1922; 'Acţiunea studenţilor naţionaliştii', *Lumea*, 9 December 1922; both articles reprinted in *Totalitarismul de dreapta în România: Origini, manifestări, evoluţie 1919-1927*, I. Scurtu, C. Beldiman, N. Tampa, T. Tănase, C. Troncotă, and P. D. Bordeiu (eds), Vol. 1, Institutul Naţional pentru Studiul Totalitarismului, Bucharest, 1996, pp. 258-261.

[8] Anonymous, 'Iar agitaţii studenţeşti'. *Adevărul*, 29 March 1927.

[9] My notion of 'communities of violence' is taken from D Nirenberg, *Communities of Violence: Persecution of Minorities in the Middle Ages*, Princeton University Press, 1998, pp. 180 and 218.

[10] A Heinen, *Legiunea "Arhanghelul Mihail": Mişcarea socială şi organizaţie politică*, 2nd Edition, translated by Cornelia and Delia Eşianu, Humanitas, Bucharest, 2006, p. 114.

[11] Police report, Adjud to Bucharest, 4 December 1927; Telegram from the chief of police in Comăneşti to Bucharest, 5 December 1927; both reprinted in Scurtu, *Totalitarismul*, Vol. 2, pp. 91-92, p. 95.

[12] Police report, 8 December 1927; reprinted in ibid., pp. 98-100.

[13] American Legation, 'A Bird's-eye View of the Students' Congress, the Riots, and the Effects', Bucharest, Despatch No. 510, Enclosure No. 3, records of the Department of State relating to Internal Affairs of Romania, 1910-1944, United States National Archives, College Park, MA, MII98, Roll #7.

[14] Police report, 8 December 1927; reprinted in Scurtu, *Totalitarismul*, Vol. 2, pp. 98-100.

[15] M Magrini, quoted in T. Mózes, *Evreii din Oradea*, translated by L. Borcea, Editura Hasefer, Bucharest, 1997, p. 142.

[16] ibid., p. 142.

[17] ibid., p. 141.

[18] Telegram, W S Culbertson to the U.S. Secretary of State, Bucharest, 20 December 1927, Despatch No. 511, reprinted in *Foreign Relations of the United States* (*FRUS*), U.S. Department of State, Vol. 3, pp. 643-646.

[19] Mózes, op. cit., p. 143.

[20] Letter, Culbertson to Titulescu, 9 December 1927, in *FRUS*, Vol. 3, p. 642.

[21] Telegram, Culbertson to the Secretary of State, 20 December, 1927, in *FRUS*, Vol. 3, p. 646.

[22] Anonymous, 'Roumania Claims Captain Keller Provoked Attack'. *Chicago Tribune*, 13 December 1927.

[23] ibid.

[24] Anonymous, 'Gets Rumanian Indemnity', *New York Times*, 19 February 1928, p. 30.

[25] Telegram, Voinescu, Director General of State Security, to the Minister of the Interior, 1 December 1927; Fond: Ministry of the Interior – Diverse, No: 1922, Vol. 1/2, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, Reel #132. cf., Telephone note of Eugen Cristescu, Director of State Security, 8 December 1927, reprinted in Scurtu, *Totalitarismul*, Vol. 2, pp. 96-97.

[26] Police report, 8 December 1927, reprinted in ibid., pp. 98-100.

[27] Telegram, Vintilă Ionescu, police inspector general, to Bucharest, 9 December 1927; Report of the Tribunal at Bacă to the Procurer General in Iaşi, 10 December, 1927; both reprinted in Scurtu, *Totalitarismul*, Vol. 2, pp. 118-119 and 123-124.

[28] Anonymous, 'La Cluj s'au găsit două suluri sfinte funrate din templele dela Oradia', *Adevărul*, January 28 1928; 'Consiliul de război din Cluj judecă un process pentru două 'tore'', *Adevărul*, 11 February 1928.

[29] Mózes, op. cit., p. 140.

[30] Stenograph of the Parliamentary debate over the Oradea incidents, 8 December 1927, reprinted in Scurtu, *Totalitarismul*, Vol. 2, pp. 100-101.

[31] N Iorga, 'Reacţiunea', *Neamul românesc*, reprinted in ibid., p. 132.

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[32] Communication of the Senate of the University of Bucharest, 21 December 1927, reprinted in ibid., pp. 138-139.

[33] Police report, 3 January 1928, reprinted in ibid., p. 141.

[34] Anonymous, 'Au reînceput mişcările studenţeşti', *Cuvântul*, 22 February 1928.

[35] Anonymous, 'Consiliul de miniştri discută dezordinile studenţeşti', *Adevărul*, 9 December 1927; Anonymous, 'Condamnarea studenţilor devastatori din Iaşi', *Adevărul*, 28 January 1928.

[36] General Council of the National Union of Christian Students of Romania (UNSCR), 'Comunicat', Undated. Fond: Ministry of the Interior – Diverse, No: 1925, Vol. 8, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, Reel #135.

[37] Anonymous, 'Procesul studenţilor la Cluj', *Cuvântul*, 3 March 1928.

[38] Anonymous, 'Studentimea va declara greva generală', *Cuvântul*, 13 December 1927.

[39] Anonymous, 'Scrisoarea studenţilor închişi la Cluj', *Cuvântul*, 25 January 1928.

[40] Anonymous, 'Die Groβwardeiner Helden vor Gericht', *Völkische Zeitung*, 24 December 1927, p. 3.

[41] Anonymous, 'Procesul studenţilor din Captiala', *Universul*, 24 December 1927.

[42] Anonymous, 'Procesul studenţilor arestaţi la Cluj', *Cuvântul*, 4-5 February 1928.

[43] Anonymous, 'Procesul studenţilor din Cluj', *Lupta*, 2 March 1928.

[44] ibid.

[45] Anonymous, 'Procesul turburărilor studenţeşti dela Oradea', *Universul*, 5 March 1928.

[46] Telegram, Culbertson to the Secretary of State, 10 January 1927, in *FRUS*, op. cit., p. 638.

[47] Telegram, Secretary of State to Culbertson, 29 December 1927, in *FRUS*, op. cit., p. 819.

[48] Anonymous, 'Differ on Hostility to Jews in Rumania', *New York Times*, 14 July 1928, p. 17; Anonymous, 'Anti-Jewish Riots Recur in Rumania', *New York Times*, 22 May 1930, p. 8; Anonymous, 'Anti-Semitic Attacks Renewed in Rumania', *New York Times*, 8 August 1930, p. 23.

[49] Anonymous, 'Rally Against Rumania', *New York Times*, 1 February 1928, p. 29.

[50] Anonymous, 'Sutdenţii români vor fi excluşi dela congresul internaţional?', *Lupta*, 5 August 1928.

[51] Anonymous, 'Die Trümmerstätte in Groβwardein', *Völkische Zeitung*, 8 December 1927 p. 3; Anonymous,'Rassişti unguri şi deavastările din Ardeal',

Dimineaţa, undated clipping in Fond: Ministry of the Interior – Diverse, No: 1924, Vol. 1, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, Reel #135.

[52] 'Marea agitaţie din Ungaria din cause exceselor din Oradea', undated clipping in Fond: Ministry of the Interior – Diverse, No: 1924, Vol. 1, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, Reel #135.

[53] American Legation, op. cit.

[54] There had been two small congresses in August, at one of which Codreanu was present, but this was attended only by "former students, especially former leaders of the student movement", Anonymous, 'Congrese studenţeşti', _Universul_, 9 August 1927. The other was apparently restricted to discussing the cultural and social aspects of the student movement; see Anonymous, 'Congresul studenţilor olteni', _Universul_, 9 August 1927.

[55] Letter, George Rotaru (Circle Secretary) to the UNSCR President, 18 March 1927, Anvers. Fond: Ministry of the Interior – Diverse, No: 1925, Vol. 8, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, Reel #135.

[56] Undated Letter, G Mucichescu (Vice President of the Student Center, Bucharest) to his "dear comrades," clearly addressed to a governing body. Fond: Ministry of the Interior - Diverse, No: 1925, Vol. 8, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, Reel #135.

[57] Anonymous, 'Students are Defiant', _New York Times_, 16 September 1928, p. 55; Anonymous, 'Rumania to Guard Anti-Semites' Trial', _New York Times_, 6 August 1930, p. 10.

[58] UNSCR congress, 'Moţiune', 4 August 1927, Fond: Ministry of the Interior - Diverse, No: 1925, Vol. 8, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, Reel #135.

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Section 3

Subliminal Violence

Preventing 'Ideal' Communication by Linguistic Violence

Gabriela Scripnic, Alina Ganea, Anca Gâţă

Abstract

This paper approaches violence from a linguistic perspective, suggesting a possible analytical model of non-rational discourse in which an appeal to violence is a constant technique intended to exert influence on the public or the opponents' standpoints. The approach is framed in our more general model of collaborative dialogue and ideal communication, which we see as being: 1) rational; 2) relevant, based on the Communication Principle; 3) polite; 4) evidential (there is evidence of the information and/or knowledge sources). The main lines of inquiry are directed, in this particular context, towards conclusions which should answer the following questions: A) which types of speech acts (presumably expressives) are characteristic of the two discourse instances, being/becoming violent? B) what is the discursive connection between evidentiality and violent language; is there any relationship between violence and traces of information source marking in discourse? C) how is violence used as a strategic manoeuvre in order to defend a standpoint and/or resist the opponents' standpoints? D) how do fallacies structure violent discourse?

Key Words: Discourse fallacies, evidentiality, ideal communication, linguistic politeness, linguistic violence, non-rational discourse, strategic manoeuvring.

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Language itself is inseparable from power, and language can facilitate the most violent exercise of power against somebody.[1] Envisaging a model of linguistic violence, as compared to the model of 'ideal' communication that has as a starting point Habermas' theory on Ideal speech situation, a rather sociological concept,[2] we attempt to identify a linguistic model of Ideal Communication (IC), integrating elements from the discourse analysis area.

According to Habermas, any language should have, as its universal goal, the IC issued from a series of idealised speech conditions.[3] Being unconstrained by the lack of time, of discourse openness or of knowledge, the participants within an idealised speech situation are believed to achieve a rational consensus, *i.e.* "a meaningful level of communicative rationality": "the ideal speech situation is a critical standard by which the actually achieved consensus can be questioned and also legitimated."[4]

Our linguistic model of IC overarches four validity claims: rationality, relevance, politeness and evidentiality, according to which the participants are expected to reach a rational consensus while keeping within the chosen topic area, using politeness markers and disclosing their source of knowledge.

Linguistic violence can be defined as "covert institutional violence - assuming language is an institution and that its harm is more psychological than physical."[5] We can consequently assume at least three possible interpretations for the concept of linguistic violence: 1) violence can be located in *language*, at the lexico-semantic level, which, very simplistically, means that there are words that are inherently violent, which hurt or offend; 2) violence can be built up in *discourse*, through discourse techniques and strategies, which means that it can be: a) intentional, or b) unintentional, and also that a particular discourse structure can be perceived by its addressee or by a hearer as offending/hurting or not; 3) violence can be identified both in language and in discourse.

In our opinion, 'ideal' communication is rational, that is why it should be necessarily *non-violent* in all the possible interpretations. In building up our model, it is necessary to identify linguistic markers and/or indicators of violence which may be ranged at the lexico-semantic and pragmatic/communicative levels, respectively. We are distinguishing between markers and indicators in the following way: *markers* are a characteristic of the linguistic system (any particular language may have such markers in its vocabulary, also known in everyday language as *violent* or *fear-oriented words*, such as *killer*, *blast*, *explode*: "I encourage all of us, including myself, to *think* before we use such words that depict fear, violence, hatred and words used in terrorism."[6] Linguistic *indicators* of violence may fall into two categories: 1) at the level of the language system, some verbal forms - such as the imperative mood, and the vocative case, in languages whose grammatical description admits vocative as a case and if we admit that the imperative is a language mood and not a discourse mood; 2) at the level of discourse, by use of some lexical units in particular contexts, by specific determination, by means of adjectives or adverbs.

The linguist C. Kerbrat-Orecchioni has described lexical units as marked at the level of subjectivity,[7] being prone to become indicators of violence in particular situations: *You are as fat as a whale!*

Since, in our view, the 'ideal' communication is relevant, *violent communication* is assumingly *irrelevant*, meaning that the addressee is deliberately and aggressively not provided the required information so as to identify intended or useful meaning. Intended meaning in such cases can be different from what is perceived by the addressee as communicated to him. As stated above, lack of relevance can be perceived as purposeful and should be translated into intended non relevant communication, or it can be

perceived as involuntary, and as such translated into unintended non relevant communication. Yet, in both cases, we may have to deal with various degrees of aggressiveness as perceived by the addressee, since communication is in some way prevented and his/her face threatened.

As Grice points out in his Cooperative Principles, participants need to understand each other efficiently and rationally.[8] In doing so, they have to speak honestly and clearly, keeping within the chosen topic and without supplying information that the interlocutor is already aware of. However, according to Levinson, "the view may describe a philosopher's paradise, but no one actually speaks like that the whole time."[9]

In our view, theorising about fallacies has to start from a general and coherent perspective on reasonable argumentative discourse that provides a common rationale to the study of the fallacies. In the pragma-dialectical theory of argumentation developed by van Eemeren & Grootendorst,[10] such a perspective is offered by means of the ideal model of a critical discussion that specifies the stages and the types of speech acts that are instrumental in resolving a difference of opinion. In the various argumentative activity types that can be discerned in argumentative practice, it is generally not the arguers' sole aim to conduct the discussion in a way that is considered reasonable, but also to achieve the outcome that suits them best. In their efforts to reconcile the simultaneous pursuit of a dialectical and a rhetorical aim, the arguers make use of strategic manoeuvring directed at diminishing the potential tension between these two aims.

If a party allows its commitment to a critical exchange of argumentative moves to be overruled by the aim of persuading the opponent, the strategic manoeuvring derails. Because derailments of strategic manoeuvring always involve violating a rule for critical discussion, they are on a par with the wrong moves in argumentative discourses designated as fallacies.

Degrees of politeness are also a matter of approaching a particular subject or a communicative situation more or less violently. Politeness strategies usually serve ethos and allow the speaker to reach rhetorical goals.[11]

Since politeness is a main feature of IC, it means that the language used should be changed according to the hearer,[12] in order to mitigate the effects of certain face-threatening acts towards another.[13] In everyday talk, face-threatening acts are either desired or inevitable, politeness strategies being meant to save the hearer's status. Therefore, violent language is to be associated with impoliteness, understood as "a socio-linguistic transgression of some norms or sets of norms within a given community of practice."[14]

Impoliteness usually triggers social conflict and disharmony between participants and cannot be envisaged outside the linguistic violence framework.[15] When facing a face-threatening act, the addressee may choose,

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on the one hand, to respond to it by denying the participant's standpoint (while adopting a defensive/offensive position) or by accepting it, revealing his/her submission. On the other hand, the interlocutor has the alternative not to respond to the offending situation, which equals a withdrawal from the particular exchange.

In our opinion, the absence of explicit reference as to the source of information/knowledge may be perceived as more or less violent, since it offends the hearer. This may prevent him/her from getting the correct picture of a situation or of an event, and could be used in a manipulating way, since the speaker may not be aware of the omission, or able to infer the missing elements.

According to the way the source of information is marked in discourse, we may deal with direct evidentiality (when the speaker himself/herself has visually or auditorily witnessed the action) or with indirect evidentiality (when the speaker has not been a personal witness to the action). In the latter situation, the information in the statement may be either inferred (when the speaker deduces the action) or reported/quoted (when somebody else is the provider of information, in which case the polyphonic characteristic of the discourse becomes manifest). These two categories represent different degrees of commitment to the truth of the action: indirect evidentials show that the speaker is not as committed to the truth of what he is saying as when direct evidentials are used.

Mentioning the knowledge source is important in communication, as it points out the speaker's assessment of the reliability of the information:[16] *John seems to be sick* vs *I saw that John was sick*. The examples illustrate degrees in the speaker's commitment regarding the information transmitted via his/her utterance.[17] Consequently, the lack of evidentials may be perceived as violent since the hearer is not provided with all the linguistic elements necessary for him/her to build a full picture of the topic developed.

In order to analyse how linguistic violence functions in terms of rationality, relevance, politeness and evidentiality, relevant linguistic data have been collected from a television talk show broadcast on the Romanian National TV Channel, *Între bine şi rău* (*Between good and evil*).[18] Since this talk show usually engenders confrontational discourse, choosing it as an illustration for our study is motivated by the desire to approach linguistic violence as manifested both in language and discourse.

Taking into consideration the National Audio and Visual Commission regulation that all TV products are subjected to, linguistic violence is presumably expected to be scarce at the lexico-semantic level through the use of violent words. However, much emphasis is laid on less overt means of expressing violence, i.e., violence disclosed by the pragmatic/communicative level (lack of relevance/discourse fallacies,

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impoliteness/negative speech acts, evidentiality) in the participants' discourse.

The talk show starting point is: *the Gipsies' problems in Romania or the problems that Romanians have with the Gipsies in Romania*. The analysis reveals that, though under the form of a polite debate on a social topic, there can be perceived a model of linguistic violence meant to annihilate the opponents' opinion.

The very first question asked by the talk show host (*How do you want to be called: Roma or Gipsies?*) puts forward a two-sided situation: the members of this ethnic minority prefer to be addressed by one denomination while rejecting the other one. The latter is in some way 'offending,' though not always explicitly stated. Following Jay's view on "offending events"[19] as triggering impoliteness, the question above functions as an offending situation recaller since the latter designation reminds the participants of the everlasting conflictual status. The participants' roles are assigned from the very beginning of the argumentative discussion: the protagonists (minority representatives) defend their standpoint (they are to be called Roma), while the antagonists (Romanian ethnic representatives) advance doubts, criticisms, and objections.

Fallacies such as *argumentum ad hominem* constitute violations of the critical discussion rules and are meant to prevent the resolution of the difference of opinion. These fallacies occur when the parties prevent each other from putting forward standpoints, or when they cast doubt on standpoints.[20]

During the discussion, both parties choose to restrict the opponent's freedom of action in different ways. Through the first answer (*We must be called only the way we want and we want to be called by the word 'Rom'*), the protagonist aims at fallaciously limiting the opponent's intervention in the discussion using a discursive move destined to restrict the freedom of speech of the other party. This can be easily equated to the *fallacy of the straw man*,[21] and to a violation of the freedom rule of the critical discussion. In a different view, this could be seen as establishing the starting points of a discussion, and in no way restricting the freedom of the other party. From this point of view, the two parties should share the following standpoint: Gipsies should be referred to only as *Roma* people.

The *argumentum ad hominem* is also made use of in the antagonist's reply: *but it makes no sense in imposing it on us,* which equals an indirect discreditation of the protagonist's standpoint by questioning its credibility. The protagonist's reply keeps within the same field of drawing limits to the opponent's intervention: *and maybe he doesn't know that Roma aren't called like this only in Romania, but all over the world*, is an argumentum *ad hominem* that questions the other party's expertise. In order to fight back against the advanced standpoint, the antagonist resorts to an attack directed

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towards an absent third instance, whose attitude comes to contradict his own opinion. This intervention (*Still it has become a sort of political correctness, I heard people, serious people, endowed with intelligence, say that: Somebody is Gipsy and then they quickly take back their words as if they had made a mistake: Sorry, Rom. That's stupid.*) respects all the three steps of the *ad hominem* fallacy: A makes claim X (*people take back the word gipsy if they should use it*), B makes an attack on A (*smart people* are expected to behave intelligently - inference); therefore, A's claim is false (*that's stupid*).

Falling within the 'lack of relevance' framework, the fallacies identified seem to be used as an attempt to persuade people using non-logical means. Failing to provide logical reasons to sustain the opinion, the lack of relevance results in a form of voluntary aggressiveness, since the hearer's freedom of speech is hindered and his face threatened.

At the discursive structure level, violence might be envisaged as a compositional strategy, where the proponent deploys an aggressive control over discourse by deliberately attempting to reorient it towards an argumentatively more favourable position. Though aware that his position is rationally inconsistent with the standpoint advanced by the opponent, he dissimulates a cooperative position, displaying, in fact, a resistant attitude towards the opponent's view and aborting any principle of critical discussion based on rationality.

> LM: "Sirs, I'd like to ask you a question: *how do you want to be called: Roma or Gipsies?*"
> VI: "We must be called only *the way we want* and *we want to be called by the word 'Rom'*. Because we are Roma and you are gagii." (Note: *gagii* is the plural of the word used in the Romani language to refer to Romanians).

Though openly asserting a standpoint, i.e., the choice within a designation paradigm (with important pejorative connotative differences between the two terms proposed), the opponent eludes a direct answer and attempts an indirect, biased one, aiming at imposing themselves as a nation with a genuine identity that deserves being called as they wish to. It is, therefore, not a matter of how to be called, but to be called as they want to, namely *Roma*. The aggressiveness of the first answer results from the use of modality (*must* and *want*) associated with the occurrence of the first person pronoun, used emphatically in Romanian; this is not necessary, except for the sake of underlining the strong involvement of the subject. Having the intuition of the subtle topic change and, especially, of the further social and political implications of the Roma's claims, GP defends the offensive in linguistic terms, removing the rather taboo matter of the Roma minority's rights in Romania in the neutral, designational area. Thus, he reargues the

initial standpoint in terms of rightful designation in the officially national Romanian language, i.e., 'Gipsy,' by openly using emotionally (since ethically) charged keywords, such as *rights* and *impose,* and introducing an instantial opposition: *us* vs *they.*

> GP: "The word Roma refers to the idea of person or human being in the Gipsy language. *We refer to no people, no nation by using the word from their language. For instance, Dutch people call themselves Niderlenden* [sic; Bataafs, Hollands, Nederlends are correct], *but we call them Dutch, Frenchmen call themselves Français, but we call them French, so Gipsies can definitely use the word Rom in their conversations, in their publications or in their TV shows, but it makes no sense in imposing it on us* because hundreds of millions of people all over the world *make a quick connection between Roma and Romania* as the ending ania is, of course, …"

Although displaying an apparently balanced tone, GP reveals, nonetheless, his major concern about the matter: that is, the danger of reducing and assimilating the Romanian nation to Roma (given the formal, linguistic resemblance), which represents a clear rejection of a minority which is understood to be treated as though tolerated on the Romanian territory. The pejorative phrase *It makes no sense* becomes a lexical marker of linguistic violence, reinforcing the power of the speaker's argument by suggesting that any element of the opponents' argument is futile. Aggressiveness is at its peak, with the two parties finally revealing their positions. The next question serves to support GP's position, questioning the legality of calling the minority *Gipsies.* The idea of legally stipulated sanctions is an obvious attack on the Roma's claims since they see themselves deprived of institutional instruments sustaining their claims.

> LM: "But it's not *illegal* to call you *Gipsies*, is it?"
> The answer shows the defensive mild position, proof of a temporarily admitted defeat:
> VI: "It's a recommendation."

In his second intervention, GP quotes the words of notorious people while advancing a verbal behaviour he totally disagrees with. His disagreement, obvious when saying "this is stupid" is somehow announced by other phrases such as: "*a sort of* political correctness." The linguist may detect here a case of indirect violent language: the statement *this is stupid* primarily refers to the attitude adopted by a third instance, but indirectly

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expresses the speaker's attitude towards the opinion previously mentioned during the discussion. It also constitutes an indirect speech act, i.e., an insult directed to those personalities via a questioning of their intelligence.

Further on, interlocutors attempt to take over meta-communicational control:

> FC: "May I ..."
> LM: "Yes"
> And then, aiming at clarifying the matter of the discussion
> and negotiating the upper position in interaction:
> LM: "Let's take turns when talking. We are having this problem."

Violence can take overt forms and interlocutors openly express their disagreement or inconsistencies without making any effort to avoid or repair conversational offences:

> GP: "It has nothing to do with that. Neither an ethnic minority nor a people can force another people to accept a language."

In our opinion, the concept of linguistic violence should not be limited to the sole lexico-semantic level, obvious through the use of non-rational words or phrases. Linguistic violence is a far more overarching phenomenon which includes: face-threatening acts, limitation of the freedom of speech, impoliteness and lack of evidentiality. The study of a real discussion, through the instrumental model of the critical discussion developed in Argumentation Theory by the pragma-dialectical approach, allows the following observations: 1) a usual linguistic means to express a hostile attitude towards an interlocutor is a negative expressive speech act whose illocutionary force can range from restrained blame or reproach, to the more aggressive, mockery, insults or swearing. Indirect acts, though apparently less inflictive, are also recurrent under the form of irony/sarcasm; 2) within the same framework of a hostile attitude, the fallacies of relevance (strawman and *ad hominem*) represent another form of aggressiveness meant to annihilate the opponent's standpoint by limiting his freedom of speech, or by questioning his authority and/or personal expertise in the given field; 3) since strategic maneuvering should be directed at reducing the tension between participants' efforts to solve a difference of opinion through both dialectical moves and rhetorical procedures, violence would constitute an obstacle, limiting or diminishing the use of those verbal activities governed by institutionalised conventions; 4) linguistic violence seems to function as a common non-dialectical/non-rational means of defending a standpoint.

Notes

[1] W C Gay, 'Language', in *Genocide and Crimes Against Humanity*, D L Shelton (ed), 2005, eNotes.com, 2006, <http://www.enotes.com/genocide-encyclopedia/language>.

[2] J Habermas, *The Theory of Communicative Action,* Volume 1, *Reason and the Rationalization of Society,* Beacon Press, Boston, 1984, p. 86 (originally published in German in 1981).

[3] ibid., p. 177.

[4] ibid., p. 180.

[5] W C Gay, 'Linguistic Violence', in *Institutional Violence*, R Litke and D Curtin (eds), Rodopi, Amsterdam, 1999, pp. 13-35, p. 13.

[6] S Nichols, 'Why are violent and fear-oriented words so popular in on-line advertising?', 2002, *'elf Expressions Ezine*, viewed 10 April 2008, <http://elfexpressionsezine.com/ archive2-17.html>.

[7] C Kerbrat-Orecchioni, *L'Énonciation. De la Subjectivité dans le langage,* Armand Colin, Paris, 1980, p. 72.

[8] P Grice, 'Logique et conversation', in *Communications*, no. 30, 1979, pp. 57-72.

[9] S Levinson, *Pragmatics,* Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1989, p. 102.

[10] F H van Eemeren and R Grootendorst*, A Systematic Theory of Argumentation. The pragma-dialectical Approach*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2004, pp. 59-62.

[11] P Brown and S Levinson, *Politeness: Some Universals in Language Usage*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1987, p. 245.

[12] ibid., p. 17.

[13] E Goffman, 'On Facework: An Analysis of Ritual Elements in Social Interaction', in *Logique et conversation, Communications*, P Grice (ed), Vol. 30, 1967 (1979), pp. 57-72.

[14] S Mills, *Gender and Politeness,* Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2005, p. 264.

[15] J Culpeper, D Bousfield and A Wichmann, 'Impoliteness Revisited: With Special Reference to Dynamic and Prosodic Aspects'. *Journal of Pragmatics*, Vol. 35**,** 2003, p 1545.

[16] P Dendale and L Tasmowski, 'Introduction: Evidentiality and Related Notions', *Journal of Pragmatics*, 33, 2001, p. 341.

[17] ibid.

[18] *Between good and evil* (Talkshow, 11 March 2008). Talkshow topic: *Gipsies in Romania or Romanians' Problems with Gipsies in Romania.* Guests: Nicolae Păun, president of the Roma Party; George Pruteanu, professor, PhD in Philology, translator, literary critic, essayist; Vasile

Ionescu, president of the Roma Association (Roma who manufacture cauldrons); Florin Tănase Cioabă, king, standing for the traditional part of the Roma Ethnic Group; Host: Liviu Mihaiu. (the entire text corpus is available on the following websites: <http://www.discorps.ugal.ro/Project SMADEM/SmademCorpora.htm>; < http://www.inter-disciplinary.net/ptb/hhv/ vcce/vch7/s11.html>).

[19] T Jay, *Cursing in America: A Psycholinguistic Study of Dirty Language in the Courts, in the Movies, in the Schoolyards and on the Streets*, John Benjamins, Philadelphia, 1992, p. 98.

[20] F H van Eemeren, P Houtlosser and F Snoeck Henkemans, *Argumentation in Practice*, John Benjamins Publishing House, Amsterdam, 2005, p. 110.

[21] The straw man fallacy is based on an argumentative move where the arguer is attempting to refute his opponent's position, and in the context is required to do so, but instead he attacks a position - the 'straw man' - not held by his opponent.

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The Promise of Violence: Closed Circuit Television and the Contemporary Construction of Governmentality

Jeff Heydon

Abstract
As surveillance becomes an issue of primary concern to theorists working in the Social Sciences and the Humanities, a great deal of attention is paid to the programmes that are being implemented in order to expand the capability for surveillance and to understand how the process of surveillance actually works. This paper addresses the unspoken element in the expansion of government surveillance of populations: namely that the purpose of watching is the justified direction of violence against the population. The argument will necessarily include an analysis of Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) as an element of the Foucauldian principle/process of governmentality. Additionally, a re-evaluation of Max Weber's assertion that the state maintains a monopoly on the use of violence as a condition to legitimacy would appear to be in order. At first glance, and in light of the process applications of the CCTV camera, it would appear instead that the state maintains a monopoly on the determination of legitimacy in the use of violence. It is hoped that the analysis will situate one of the more pervasive (at least from a UK perspective) forms of popular surveillance as a component of the exercise of violence over a population rather than a method of prevention. This paper outlines the way in which violence against the individual is a necessary component of the process of governing and that the demonstration of legitimacy in that use of violence is a condition of the stability of a government. CCTV operates as a mode of communication across time and through different elements of the surveillance process. What becomes evident, however, is that the ethereal capture of the visual carried out by this camera is made manifest in the direct physical action of a government against 'legitimate' offenders amongst its own citizenry.

Key Words: Closed Circuit Television, government, governmentality, power, punishment, surveillance, television, violence.

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The major purpose of the process of contemporary governing is the establishment of control.[1] The enabling force of control is information. The method through which information is gathered, regardless of permission, is called surveillance. The major component behind surveillance is the monitoring of *changes*.

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My concerns have more to do with how technology operates as a component of the process of governing - essentially with the monitoring of these changes.[2] To begin with, previous modes of surveillance indicated a degree of blindness on the part of the system that would prosecute deviance. Whatever the affront to the state may be, the relay of information would come about as an extension of an original statement on the part of an individual. A police officer or first-hand witness to an event would indicate the specifics of an event to authorities. That personal testimonial would then become the framework for a process of prosecution. As a procedural necessity, this human element to the event would become an intractable component of the framework of the process of governing. What Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) has done is semiotically remove that human variable from the process of prosecution and replaced it with a static media presentation. We now have a record - a dormant visual memory that may be animated at the beck and call of the prosecutorial apparatus - that is supposedly inscrutable and must be taken as absolute in its integrity. The camera never lies.[3] Through a semiotic shift - the introduction of the camera and the removal of the individual interpreting events from the physical proximity of the events themselves - this problem of individual comprehension has supposedly been removed from the equation.

The problem that goes along with this is that there is no mention of the process of interpretation. The mechanism by which we navigate the visual world is comprised almost entirely of pre-conditioned notions regarding how the world works. The fundamental realisation that comes through in a critical analysis of CCTV is that the supposed sterility that goes along with this type of surveillance is pure illusion. The legacy of secret police systems and the kind of back-stabbing stupidity that emerged during the Red Scare in the United States in the 1950s is something that has a personal face - acquaintances ratting on acquaintances. What the camera actually accomplishes is that this face is removed from the view of the subject. Our accuser is the person who would initially view the signal and set the gears of the prosecutorial process in action. The fact that we are never invited to picture the human form that has viewed the signal, recognised what they determined to be an act of deviance, and set the punitive machine in motion is the reflective element of this problem - it seems as though the apparatus has done all of the work.

This prevalence of the metaphysical symbol 'government' over the physical reality of the individual is nothing new, of course. The history of penalty is littered with visual and textual overtures that were vested in removing the image of the individual from the process of punishment.[4] The hood worn by the executioner and the uniforms worn by police officers are both semiotic methods of stripping the individuality from the form and

embodying the disembodied state - the process of governing requires the clothing of dominance with blank bodies; empty forms.

What is curious is this movement from a point of mobile signification to one that is stable. It does, in a very real way, indicate a movement toward the colonising of space on the part of a power structure. The camera is obviously fixed and the representation is one of permanence - the camera is always operating and will always remain in this one area. Previously, detection was contingent on the presence of human representatives. The camera has allowed the state to become part of the physical reality of the area under surveillance.

As such, the use of the camera suggests a desire on the part of the state to be omnipresent and omniscient. This development does have its semiotic value. This notion of a fixed visual presence in any physical space gives the impression of extending the state's vigilance over its territory. What we're left with here is the assertion that the state, through the production of images for the purpose of reflexive reliability and active surveillance, has expanded itself or increased its own presence across the physical and the metaphysical realms. In short, it has both physically and semiotically grown over the territorial landscape.

The contingency that validates this relationship between the image and the purpose to which it is supposed to be used is based on a notion of reliability. McLuhan postulated that, with the advent of electronic media, the human moved the central nervous system outside of the body[5] - that the immediacy that is electronic media shifted the human understanding of what takes place outside of the limits of the body to a notion of total connectivity. This indicates two significant elements in the process of CCTV surveillance. First, the process of government now has a visceral connection to deviant behaviour. It is almost as though the state can touch the abhorrent act and it need only trust its own senses in order to assure itself of the justification of its punishment. Second, the impression of the deviant act is altered according to this new proximity. There is an immediacy that comes along with this new relationship to the surveilled world and one that adjusts perception of the way in which the urban landscape operates. The very movement of bodies is now something that is monitored via state surveillance and the minutiae is just as present as the deviant event. In other words, the increase in input also means an increase in the amount of irrelevant information.

The next step should be to work from that out to a notion of what this means in the process of governing. As I've mentioned above, the primary point to surveillance is the recognition and tracking of *changes* in the visual spectrum. The camera is set up in a given position because it is understood that events will take place there that will be of interest to the government. As vapid as that sounds, the residual effect of this action is that the relationship between the citizen and the government has changed fundamentally - we are

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all now at the introductory point of the perception system that is the process of control. As we move away from a system that is entirely dependant on the reliability of other people's perceptions, the visceral connection that develops as a result of electronic media creates the perception that we are somehow past this.

'The camera never lies' is a deeply problematic component of the contemporary media landscape. A great deal of work has already been done on the ease with which one can alter digital images or how unreliable visual identification of offenders can be under disparate circumstances. The fundamental problem with this assertion is the notion that the image captured by the camera is immune to the tint of interpretation. When we're dealing with something as socially contingent as CCTV, the importance of the way in which the image is interpreted and used by the dominant power structure is crucial. Bias is always an issue when it comes to the application of information.

Data is nebulous - unfixed. It is the process of interpretation that morphs data into the social property that is known as information. Our relationship with data is generally one of being removed; of perspective. We read books, speak to one and other and reflect on those transmissions subsequent to the act. McLuhan complicated this process immeasurably by postulating that the extension of the body outside of its traditional physical form is the invariable result of electronic media.[6] Television shifts the eyes, the limbs and the skin outside of the body.

Well, if this movement into the electronic realm is physically disruptive, the viewer of CCTV represents a shift in the process of surveillance for at least two reasons: first, that the necessary act of interpretation has been shifted from the transmission of data across successive lines of operatives to a more centralised organism. Second - and possibly following from the first - is the fact that, with the disappearance of this notion of interpretation, the determination of the meaning of the signal, or even the direction of suspicion as result of the reception of a signal, has taken on a deeper veneer of validity. The camera has added a sense of legitimacy and impartiality to what is normally assumed to be a deeply subjective process.

What needs to be developed along with this notion of 'shift' is this notion of 'representation,' or the belief that the image appearing on screen is a direct and legitimate representation of a reality that has taken place within the scope of the camera. This notion was worked over fairly well by Jean Baudrillard and resulted in his theory of *Integral Reality*.[7] *Integral Reality* ultimately asserts that as a result of the precession of simulacra[8] there is no longer a true original and, as such, everything is real. As the process of governing is a matter of the interpretation of circumstances and the establishment of control over a population, this interpretation is dependant on

the continual and operative interpretation of the signification as though it were the reality. The concern here would be the way in which this image - this flattening of the notion of human migration through contemporary structures - is interpreted by those who surveil the image in the first place. The stability of the properties of the image is relatively static; the camera will operate from a fixed position and, normally, not move. As such, the landscape of the image is benign - known to the observer and of very little interest, apart from how its properties may influence the movement or interaction of the subjects on the other side of the lens. The subjects, on the other hand, are the purpose behind the surveillance. The image on the screen is, necessarily, a representation. In a navigational sense, it is in fact a reality in and of itself once it is interpreted by the observer.

The observer is concerned with flux - with the appearance of recognisable patterns on the blank canvas that is the static transmission of the CCTV camera. The goal is to identify behaviour that sits outside of the designated limits determined by the power structure that implemented the surveillance in the first place. The question that sticks in my mind is how exactly this works when the casual interpretation of the CCTV image would be interpreted after the observer had become *comfortable* with the setting the image supposedly depicted.

Foucault referred to the process of governing as the 'conduct of conduct.'[9] The purpose of surveillance is to direct this conduct, or at least to influence it via reactive actions to supposedly deviant behaviour and through the implication of an ever-present governmental attention to even the most benign actions.

What precursors this notion of violence is the inevitable outcome of a system that requires televised information in the process of maintaining order. This information cannot be ordered in the same sense that all activity conducted by a population cannot be fully directed. We are dealing with an implicitly paradoxical position from the outset. The camera, as the deliverer of information, from the outward perspective appears to the citizen as though it were the embodiment of the promise of violence and inaccessibility of the state. To the security officer - be they police officer or private security guard - the image depicted on screen is one of flow, one of seemingly natural events that carry objects from one end of the screen to the other. The image is dehumanised as a consequence of the medium that delivers it. The concern of the observer is the determination of events out of a visual flow.

CCTV is about affront; it is about the introduction of an element into a static presentation that will disrupt the stability of that presentation - it is offensive. All surveillance is obsessed with the offensive, of course, but the crucial thing to emphasise here is the realisation that the very presence of an unpredictable element in the CCTV image is a violence committed on the tranquillity of that still image. The designation of certain activities that may

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be used against an offensive entity captured in the signal is really just a technicality.

The purpose, then, becomes to manage this visual flow according to a system of expectations. It would be a gross misstatement to assert that the notion of the individual disappears under this type of scrutiny. Essentially, the only moment of real individuality for any citizen in relation to their state is when they are being tried for a crime against that state - but there is something deeper about the dehumanisation that takes place between the lens of the CCTV camera and the surveillance screen in the booth. With respect to Baudrillard's notion of *Integral Reality*, this notion that the 'real' no longer exists is justifiable in a sense. The notion that all signifiers are themselves real has a direct effect on the notion of physical stability. CCTV is, in essence, the de-physicalisation of the human form for the purpose of efficiency when gathering data about the population. The purpose of the gathering of that data is the justification of violence inflicted on that population by the state. So, ultimately, what emerges as the prominent result would be the creation of the abstract for the purpose of punishing the physical. What becomes problematic is this notion of specificity when we're confronted with the contingency of *Integral Reality*. The reduction of everything to a system of signifiers is a consequence of the glut of signification that characterises the contemporary urban landscape. The reduction of the life-world flow of people from one point to another to a controlled dynamic, indicated by the two-dimensional image on a television screen, says as much about our relationship with media as it does about the process of governing.

That said, there is an intractable element of violence tied in with this practice. The positioning of the camera is a manner of perceptual colonialism. The conversion of the human into a two-dimensional element is a matter of spatial and physical subjugation. The reintroduction of the physical human into the equation - essentially, because it is the only effective target for violence - legitimates the use of the camera via the production of a conduit between the two-dimensional reality of the CCTV image and the three-dimensional reality of the human form.

Pushing aside the obvious rhetorical reasons to avoid making this distinction, let us, for the moment, admit that the citizen under the guise of state control is essentially a desirable site of control - an object. The conversion of the object into a *superobject* - one that functions across multiple texts and across spatial and temporal lines - is an element of the process of electronic governing. The key thing to remember here is the denial of autonomy. In effect, the individual does not have access to governorship over their own physical presence with relation to the state. The fragmenting of the presence of the individual is a managerial tactic, and one that amounts to pre-emptive violence. It is something that allows the individual to be

managed by the state as a site of violence while perpetuating this notion of the individual as object.

This shift between the individual as understood as a component of the life world, to a text that is rooted in the process of the exercise of power, is the basis behind the entire notion of surveillance. Where does this leave us when it comes to an understanding of the place of violence? The 'text' of the individual or, the *superobject*, is the site of action of the process of government. The myriad ways in which we can understand the governmental interaction in the daily life of the citizen, or of the individual, is via this conversion of the person into a text. The dehumanisation, or the de-complication, of the individual is merely the onset of the essential violence of governing.

So, then, the implementation of CCTV represents a traceable advancement in the procedure of government violence; in the same way that the most effective violence is generally figurative, and that figurative violence is the most efficient modicum of control. If Weber was correct in his assertion that the stability of a government is rooted in its ability to either legitimise or condemn the use of violence in a polity,[10] the tools that bring about that legitimation are of central importance to such a stability. The position that this paper has taken is that the introduction of CCTV not only alters the degree of certainty that the state can proclaim in the prosecution of deviance, as well as the scope of that possible certainty; we are now functioning in a condition of the absolute. The determination of guilt is now supported not by our acceptance of the legitimacy of the functioning of the system, but by our acceptance of the infallibility of the electronic components that permit that system to function. That this new synthetic ocular is something that should be treated with extreme caution is a notion that conflicts with the very properties of the medium itself.

Notes

[1] C Gordon, 'Governmental Rationality: An Introduction', in *The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality*, G Burchell, (ed), University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1991, pp. 1-53, p. 35.

[2] M Dean, *Governmentality*, Sage, London, 1999, p. 31.

[3] A good overview of the questions that come up around surveillance and the state comes out of David Lyon's *The Electronic Eye: The Rise of Surveillance Society*, Polity Press, Oxford, 1994.

[4] The number of instances where this would come up in the source text are simply too numerous to mention here. Suffice it to say that the definitive text on the history of penality and the applicability of the idea of visibility to the

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process of punishment is still Michel Foucault's *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*, Penguin, London, 1977.
[5] M McLuhan, *Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man*, Routledge: New York, 2001, pp. 47-48.
[6] ibid., pp. 47-48.
[7] J Baudrillard and C Turner, *The Intelligence of Evil Or the Lucidity Pact (Talking Images)*, Berg Publishers Ltd, Oxford, 2005, p. 17.
[8] J Baudrillard, *Simulacra and Simulation*, University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, 1994, pp. 5-6.
[9] Gordon, op. cit., p. 2.
[10] C Shearing, 'Reflection on the Refusal to Acknowledge Private Governments', in *Democracy, Society and the Governance of Security*, Jennifer Wood and Benoît Dupont, (eds), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 2006, pp. 11 – 51, p. 21.

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'Domesticating' Violence in Interwar Romania

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Abstract
Having in mind the importance that penal codifications hold in the configuration of any social project, tracing the influences of medicalisation in the field of criminology appears as a very provoking case. At the turn of the century a new model of causal explanation and scientific reasoning gained more and more adepts and practical influence in the domain of Western European criminology. What I called the model of *violence as 'disease'* gives to those in charge the opportunity to 'domesticate' violence. Its conditions of appearance and manifestation are discussed within the epistemological paradigm offered by clinical medicine with its specific vocabulary. One of the practical consequences is that of taking specific measures in order to eradicate, prevent and isolate the violence, by analogy with the measures taken in case of epidemics. The paper depicts the features of *violence as 'disease,'* establishing as well its intellectual sources. As a case study, the 'peripheral' case of interwar Romania is proposed. By questioning, through means of discourse-analysis, the institutional framework of the medical model of violence, in terms of both language and practices, the case-study follows the echoes of this paradigm in the interwar Romanian penal system.

Key Words: Criminology, diagnostic, influence, knowledge, medicine, positivism, prevention, prophylaxis, surveillance, treatment.

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1.   Working Hypothesis

The present paper deals with the manner in which the quest for scientific and causal explanations of 'violence' and 'criminality' determined the appearance of a 'medical model of violence' - a medical paradigm of reasoning, explaining and dealing with violence, which emerged within the domain of penal sciences in Western Europe at the turn of the last century. The case-study aims to illustrate the influence this medical model exercised on interwar Romanian penal sciences. First, I will try to outline a model of the characteristics of 'criminal behaviour' seen as disease.[1] This ideal-type will allow evaluation of the implications of the arguments of Romanian penal specialists, and identification of the measures specific to this new paradigm, as they were codified in legislation and put in practice. By means of discourse analysis I will grasp the echoes of this paradigm, both at the level of the language used - through following the recurrence of some specifically

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medical terms: 'diagnostic,' 'aetiology,' 'treatment,' 'prophylaxis' - as well as of the analogies between disease/patient and crime/criminal and of a specifically medical model of analysis.

The modernisation of Western societies presupposes a complex process of rationalisation of social interactions, a process that touches upon and engages countless aspects and domains of the constitution of modern social spaces. This process of rationalisation led to the advent of the 'normalization societies' in the late 19th century Western world. The 'medicalisation' of society, more specifically, the imposition of a modern medical paradigm upon the perception and regularisation of the social dynamics through the dissemination of a medical consciousness in society, represents a fundamental aspect of the process of rationalisation of society and of configuration of 'normalisation societies.' Following Michel Foucault's interpretation, I believe that the medical paradigm is the one that makes possible the evolution towards normalisation societies.[2] By 'medicalisation of society' I understand, along the lines contoured by Foucault in *The Birth of the Clinic*, the insinuation - beginning with the end of the 18th century - of a

> generalized medical consciousness, diffuse in time and
> space, open and mobile, bound to each individual existence,
> but also to the collective life of the nation, always on guard
> in what regards this indefinite domain where evil displays,
> under its diverse aspects, its immense massive force.[3]

A *medical model of violence and criminality* comprises the following elements:
1. The crime is seen as being the acute form of a latent disease, whose aetiology of a psychic, physiologic, or emotional nature may be established and observed by the 'regard of the specialist' that examines the 'personality of the criminal.'
2. The criminological diagnostic is given individually, varying from case to case, as does the disease, but its establishment is made possible only by reference to a statistical collection of data, gathered through the agency of the different institutions of surveillance: schools, prisons, juvenile halls, churches and medical cabinets.
3. The different institutes of detention (asylums, penitentiaries, juvenile halls) have an essential function of research: the accumulation of information regarding their inmates, information that, when statistically processed, will be able to furnish ever more detailed knowledge in light of the establishment of the criminological diagnostic.
4. Function of the gathered data and of the criminological diagnostic; the specialist may estimate the 'degree of peril' that the respective

delinquent presents for society, anticipating on its future behaviour. As a consequence, he will recommend the 'treatment' to be followed by the respective offender.

5. Correspondingly, the institutions that to that point had a repressive role will also become institutions of treatment of the delinquent/patient, in light of his social re-integration: prisons become penitentiaries, and are complemented by specific institutions where the treatment is continued in order to achieve healing. As a consequence, the internal configuration of the respective institutions is changed so as to allow the treatment and cure, in a way that is reminiscent of the specialisation and hygienisation of hospitals. Where the cure appears to be impossible, the delinquent/patient will be kept away from society, in virtue of the danger that he/she represents for it, following the model of the psychiatric asylum and of the hospitals for contagious diseases.

6. The final decision in determining the treatment to be followed in the case of each delinquent still pertains to the magistrate, but he/she has to take into account the medical advice, that, on the basis of the criminological diagnostic, may anticipate the ulterior evolution of the delinquent.

2.   Intellectual Sources and Institutional Developments of 'Criminality as Disease' in Europe

Starting with the second half of the 19th century, two main paradigms can be identified in the penal field indicating the advent of a society of normalisation and of bio-power - a type of power that sets itself the task of taking care of the 'life' of a given population, preventing the initiation of possible dangers that may threaten it. On the one hand were the developments of the positivist school of penal law, and on the other, those of the Italian constitutionalist school of medicine, with its German developments. The research and ideas professed within the two currents of ideas are well known to Romanian penal specialists - lawyers, jurists, doctors and psychologists - as demonstrated by the numerous articles from Romanian specialised publications dedicated to the problems debated by these schools, and to autochthonous studies that put into practice the theories elaborated by these schools in their attempts to contribute to the contemporary scientific debate. In what follows, I will present the most significant affirmations - from the perspective of the present study - of the respective schools, as they were presented by Romanian penal specialists in the inter-war period.

In sketching the reception of the ideas professed by the Italian positivist school of penal law in inter-war Romania, I appealed particularly to two of the numerous articles published in the *Penal Magazine*,[4] and dedicated to Italian positivism: *The Influence of Italian Positivism on the Current Penal Codification* by Professor Jean Rădulescu, and *The Origins of*

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Criminality by Dr. Jean Moruzi,[5] a lawyer, and a member of the Law Department of the University of Bucharest.[6]

The most important personalities of this school are Cesare Lombroso, Rafaele Garofalo and Enrico Ferri. [7] Applying the experimental method to the "moral and juridical matter," Lombroso reaches the conclusion that "crime is a natural fact, produced by the conditions of the organism against which the fight must be carried on rather by preventive means in the purpose of social defence."[8] He thus establishes relationships between congenital anomalies and crime, between epilepsy and crime, and so sets the bases of criminal anthropology and psychology.[9] As a result,

> the criminal must be *cured with the diagnostic* of the physical and ethical conditions in which he lived, *with a complex of medical, anthropological, and psychiatric research*, all aiming at rebuilding him a conscience capable of normal re-adaptation in society. [my emphases][10]

Ferri confers significant importance to the individual anthropological factors of the delinquent: the organic constitution, the psychological constitution, and the personal characteristics of the delinquent, as well as the social factors that the author considers as being extremely important in the advent of delinquency.[11] Ferri also proposes a classification of criminals according to the diagnostic of the criminal personality, the psycho-somatic examination of which must be completed with studies of determining causes of the criminal deed. Partly ingeminating Lombroso's typology, Ferri proposes five types of criminals: the natural born criminal , the mad criminal, the occasional criminal, the habitual criminal and the involuntary criminal.[12] Having at his disposal these classifications, the judge has the possibility of taking the social defence measures that are most adequate to the specific personality of the criminal. For Ferri, prevention acquires capital importance in the fight against criminality. Ferri's principles for the reform of penal legislation are the following: the criminal constitutes the main preoccupation of penal justice; the classification of delinquents; the mechanism of the crime's circumstances tends towards the enquiry of the state of danger posed by the offender.[13]

The *innovations of the positivist school in the field of penal law*,[14] as they are seen by Romanian penal specialists, were the following:
1. "The fight against crime must be replaced by a fight against the criminal, and moral responsibility must be replaced by legal responsibility."[15]
2. Sanctions were given as a function of the degree of danger the delinquent was perceived to represent to society. Special importance was conferred to the actions of crime prevention, ascertaining the efficiency of the preventive method when applied especially to infantile criminality. The adoption of

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safety measures represented the most important accomplishment, from the practical point of view, of carrying out preventive actions. Thus,

> the action of prevention of crime has as its main purpose the protection of society against the dangerous state of the criminal, in order to make him undergo *medical treatment* in order to sanction or eliminate him… The criterion for the application of these measures is the degree of danger the offender poses […] that implies an anthropological criterion, because *it depends on the tendency, the temperament, the physical-psychological individual structure*. [my emphases][16]

3. More types of criminals were proposed, thus allowing the individualisation of sanctions, which became adaptable to the specific nature of the criminal.

We are able to observe the elements that allowed the identification of the clinical model in this trend of penal studies. The centring of the penal system on 'the personality of the criminal' renders the study of this personality necessary, and in this study the model of clinical medicine will be applied. We are then dealing with the modality in which the criminal-society relationship is discussed, in terms of the potential danger that the criminal represents for society. This discussion is carried on in similar terms to those employed in the debate on 'population' and on the potential dangers that threaten it and that can be prevented through careful surveillance. Under the positivist influence, "justice can no longer be a luxury product - work of chance - but an article of prime necessity - *a laboratory product*." [my emphasis][17]

The importance conferred by the Italian positivist school on the offender, around whom the penal system is centred, prefigured the emergence of a corpus of knowledge referring to the personality of the criminal. Thus, "an intimate knowledge of the entire personality is being asked, in order to be able to ameliorate all its anomalies that life and heredity may create."[18] The work of the constitutionalist Italian school of medicine, exemplifies the intense research activity that was taking place in the epoch.[19] The results of this work were made known in the Romanian academic circles by Dr. Gheorghiu Marinescu.[20]

The practical desiderata of this school pertain to the accomplishment of the 'individual prophylaxis,' because

> by applying to *each individual previously studied*, from the somatic and psychological point of view all of the means of modern therapy, the maximum of happiness may be

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> reached within the limits permitted by *the laws of heredity,*
> *which dominate man's constitution.* [my emphases][21]

In the German space, this new approach found illustrious representatives. Dr. Ernst Kretschmer[22] tried to establish the relationships between morphology and the psyche; between corporal structure, character and temperament. For him, the constitution was the ensemble of all individual qualities that pertain to heredity: "the notion of constitution is psycho-physical, biological, and it applies to the whole body and psyche."[23] He constructed three human bio-types, largely accepted in the European inter-war practice. The three types, Kretschmer claims, are: 1. asthenic, 2. athletic, 3. picnic.[24] As a result of the research, certain associations were identified between bio-type (the constitutional type) and the type of criminal acts committed were reached.

On the other hand, there is one more discipline that emerged in Germany in the interwar years, namely the 'criminal biology.'[25] The 'criminogen inclination' (analogous to the 'state of danger' postulated by the Italian positivists) represents those inherited or acquired dispositions that under the influence of the environment may exteriorise "criminally, or as penal deviations, or under the form of a danger to social laws."[26] The study of the criminal proved to be of major importance in the fight against criminality. The Lombrosian anthropology, based on the science of stigmata, led then to the practice of an 'integral anthropology,' practiced by anthropologists, doctors, penal specialists, psychologists, and philosophers.[27]

The new tendencies in penal codification, centred on the doer and not on the deed, allowed the performance of 'individual treatments for each delinquent.' The work of the Italian positivist school of criminology allowed the configuration of the institutional framework in which a clinical type of knowledge could be practiced. The corpus of medical knowledge regarding criminality was then elaborated through the constant activity of the Italian constitutionalist school of medicine and the German criminal biology.

The Romanian case promises to be a challenging one, as I plan to follow the Foucaultian paradigm genealogically, by establishing some structural and ideatic filiations with what Foucault found to be the Western model of constitution of social spaces. These filiations were all the more probable since they were consciously desired and adopted by some of those who envisioned and put into practice the modernisation of Romania. The choice of depicting the (in the main, European) sources of the medical model of violence by using the interpretations given to them by the interwar Romanian specialists was a part of this challenge.

Besides, there are other aspects that make the case of inter-war Romania an interesting one. In the penal field, the political union of 1918 was followed by ample discussions regarding legislative unification,

including the elaboration of a new Penal and Civil Code. The juridical debates that ensued around the elaboration of the new codes from this period are prolific, and constitute a noteworthy source for one who is interested in the valences that 'modernity' has in the legislative field. They are discussions of high intellectual standing between penal specialists who are educated to a large extent in Western European schools, and who try continuously in their discussions to relate themselves to, and keep up to date with, the contemporary debates within the international scientific milieu. The foundation in 1921 of the Legislative Council of the Penal Studies' Institute and of its publication, *The Penal Law and Penitentiary Science Magazine*, shaped the institutional framework within which these debates took place.

There were two 'channels' that allowed for the imposition of a medical vision of violence, both of them influenced by the positivist school. First, the individualisation of punishment, which was codified - from a juridical and penitentiary point of view - in the Penitentiary Law of 1929, and second, the safety measures, as they appear in the 1936 Penal Code. Due to the limitations of scale of the present paper I shall present only the law for organising penitentiaries and prevention institutes from July 1929, focusing on the elements that suggest the functioning of this medical model of violence in Romania, namely, on the principle of individualisation of punishment.

3.   The Romanian Law for Organising Penitentiaries and Prevention Institutes, July 1929

Designed to remedy the serious lacks existing in the organisation of the Romanian penitentiary system, the Law for the organisation of penitentiaries and institutes of prevention, promulgated in July 1929, proposed their reorganisation in the modern spirit of the new scientific settlements, as they were formulated in the field of international penal science.[28] In order to be efficient, the alignment to the new international standards and practices took into account the particular Romanian reality: the social and institutional developments existent in Romania. In the conditions in which the law on penitentiaries emerged in the absence of a new penal code (a code that would be promulgated only seven years later), the confidence that Romanian law-makers had towards the rhythm of development of contemporary science should be underlined.

From the Exposition of motives to the 1929 Law it is evident that

> all modern law-making departs […] from the principle of the individualization of punishment, that is by the adaptation to the individual of the regime and treatment in the penitentiary and prevention establishments.[29]

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The punishment no longer sought the 'expiation of the offender,' but his re-adjustment, this being seen in a similar way to medical treatment: "*In the case of the treatment of the disease, a treatment must be applied to the patient.*"[30] [my emphasis]. The modern principles that guided the elaboration of this law were of positivist inspiration, maintaining that

> crime is no longer an abstract notion. And what should interest jurists and penal specialists first of all *is the criminal.* We are interested first and foremost in the research of the social causes of the infraction, of the psycho-physical causes." [my emphasis][31]

In creating the 1929 Law, the Romanian legislators envisioned the following scientific principles: the individualisation of punishment, individual separation, penitentiary diagnostic and penitentiary treatment.[32]

From the point of view of the inquiry pursued by the present research, I believe that the 1929 Law contributed to the conceptualisation and the putting into practice of criminality as disease through two main accomplishments: the individualisation of both punishment and penitentiary treatment, on one hand, and the activity of prevention of probable criminal actions that posed threats to society, on the other.

The first reform was put into practice by creating more types of penitentiaries and institutes of prevention, and by putting the detainees into categories, on the basis of fluxes of knowledge intersecting in: the individual card, the anthropological record - accomplished through the activity of penitentiary anthropology laboratories - and the penitentiary diagnostic.

The prevention activity was realised with the help of prevention institutes and the identification of offenders with a criminal potential, which again, involved the same elements of fluxes of knowledge: the individual card, the anthropological record, the penitentiary diagnostic.

The 1929 Law was followed by specific decisions for putting into practice the different measures that contributed to the modernisation of the penitentiary system. The constitution, in 1935, of an Anthropological Inspectorate,[33] to put into practice and supervise the implementation of the provisions of the 1929 Law, demonstrates the importance held by anthropological research in the reform of the penitentiary system in Romania. The importance that the activities of penitentiary anthropology have from the perspective of the present research should be noted, because

> penitentiary anthropology does not have the pretension that was sometimes attributed to it *of transforming the penitentiary into a hospital*; but, if it really aims to *treat and even cure,* in some cases, the criminals, it may

> collaborate with the administration in the work of preparing
> reclassification […] or for the elimination [from society] of
> the *inadaptable*. [my emphases][34]

The explanation of 'criminality' thus resides in the adaptation deficiencies, which are caused either by 'hereditary' or 'social' anomalies.

The General Directorate of Penitentiaries, through the Anthropological Inspectorate, decided to put the recommendations of the bio-social investigation into practice. Then, details were made available regarding the realisation, the application, and the utility of the anthropological record,[35] and of the individual card of the detainee.

On April 18, 1935, the Superior Council of the Penitentiaries made the decision to apply the system of the individual identity card,[36] "to the purpose of facilitating the knowledge of the personality of the detainees and of the individualization of penitentiary treatment."[37] In the individual card was collected

> all the scientific observations made on the nature of the
> offender, as well as the indications of treatment resulting
> from them, both for the time of detainment and for later.[38]

In conformity with article 64 of the 1929 Law, the individual card was complemented with the anthropological record. In this way one could find gathered together "all that interests the detainee, giving at the same time ease to the necessary notifications and consultations, in all circumstances."[39] In this form were "brought together the anthropological record and the individual card."[40] The page dedicated to observations regarding the psycho-physical state of the detainee is of direct interest for the present paper. It should be kept in mind at this point the importance accorded to psycho-physical heredity and to the temperamental features of the detainee in both the criminological diagnosis, and in the recommendation of the treatment to be followed. The bio-social investigation[41] represented a complementary instrument used in the realisation of the specific activity "of getting to know the personality of the detainee,"[42] proper to anthropological laboratories from penitentiaries and institutes of prevention. In the realisation of the "investigations on the previous life of the detainees" the use of "questionnaires with questions adapted to the situation in our country, without the hiring of special personnel"[43] was decided upon. A number of questions - considered to be the minimum necessary for knowing the personality of the detainee - were established. The completed questionnaire was to be attached to the record of the detainee, and its summary written down in the section regarding social observations from the individual card.

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The formation of the network of surveillance may be reconstructed as: the gathering of data in the bio-social investigation is made directly from the detainee, but also from those authorities capable of providing the necessary data: the judge of peace, the priest, the teacher. The completion of the questionnaires of the social investigation will be done in the order: minors, teenagers, first time offenders, and then all the other categories of detainees.[44] The order will be the one dictated by the chances of success of the treatment.

In conclusion, the transformations that occurred in the Romanian penitentiary system explain the replacement of the term 'prison' with 'penitentiary' in the 1929 Law. The former term was replaced because "the old meaning of the prison from the past, considered only as a place of expiation of punishment"[45] no longer expressed the actual conception of penitentiary science. That is why the term 'penitentiary' became established, a term designating *"a social sanatorium, meant to redress the detainees morally and physically."* [my emphasis][46]

A diffuse network of a clinical type of knowledge of delinquents, which reunites different specialists 'in matters of the human being,' was gradually insinuated into interwar Romania, starting with the anthropology laboratories set up to gather and order information about the delinquent, collected and provided by penitentiaries and institutes of prevention. A network of knowledge articulated around the family-school-psychological clinic was prefigured.

The influence of medical language may be observed in the frequency of terms such as 'aetiology,' 'diagnostic,' 'treatment,' 'prophylaxis.' On the other hand, individual deviance may be identified through permanent reference to a type of deviance that is statistically constructed; in other words, individual 'disease' may be diagnosed at the intersection of international fluxes of knowledge with statistical information that is provided at local and national levels.

Notes

[1] For more details about 'medicalization of crime' see P Darmon, *Médecins et assassins à la Belle Époque. La médicalisation du crime*, Éditions du Seuil, Paris, 1989, *passim.*

[2] M Foucault, *Trebuie să apărăm societatea* (Society Must be Defended), Bucureşti, Ed. Univers, 2000, pp.178-200.

[3] M Foucault, *Naşterea clinicii* (The Birth of the Clinic), Ed. Ştiinţifică, Bucureşti, 1998, p. 25.

[4] Cercul de studii penale, penitenciare, şi al direcţiunii generale a penitenciarelor, *Revista de Drept penal şi ştiinţă penitenciară*, Organ al

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Cercului de studii Penale (The Circle for Penal and Penitentiary Studies and by the General Direction of the Penitentiaries, *The Penal Law and Penitentiary Science Magazine)*, 1921-1947.

[5] J Rădulescu, 'Influenţa pozitivismului italian asupra codificării penale actuale (The influence of Italian positivism on contemporary penal laws)'. *The Penal Law and Penitentiary Science Magazine*, Vol. 14, 1935, pp. 121-138.

[6] J Moruzi, 'Originile criminalităţii (The Origins of Criminality)'. *The Penal Law and Penitentiary Science Magazine*, Vol. 7, 1928, pp. 67-85.

[7] The fundamental work of Cesare Lombroso (1835-1909), *L'uomo delinquente studiato in rapporto all'antropologia, alla medicina legale e alle discipline carcerarie*. (A study of the delinquent in relationship to the anthropology, to the legal medicine and all the penitentiary sciences, was published in 1876. Raffaele Garofalo (1851-1934), whose main work, *Criminologia: studio sul delitto, sulle sue cause e sui mezzi di repressione* (Criminology: The Study of the Delicts of its Causes and of Methods of its Repression) appeared in 1885, proposed a bio-sociological conception of crime. The 'most pre-eminent representative of the positivist school of law' is Enrico Ferri (1856-1929), author of the work *Sociologia Criminale* (Criminal Sociology), published in 1884.

[8] Rădulescu, op. cit., p. 125.

[9] Moruzi, op. cit., p. 71.

[10] ibid., p. 73.

[11] ibid., p. 81.

[12] E Ferri, *Criminal Sociology*, D. Appleton, New York, 1987, pp. 1-50, viewed 23 May 2007, <http://www.questia.com/library/book/criminal-sociology-by-enrico-ferri.*jsp*>.

[13] Rădulescu, op. cit., p. 128.

[14] ibid., p. 136.

[15] ibid., p. 126.

[16] C Rădulescu-Motru, 'Responsabilitatea penală (The penal responsability)'. *The Penal Law and Penitentiary Science Magazine*, Vol. 19, 1940, p. 95.

[17] V V Stanciu, 'Regimul penitenciar al anormalilor în lumina noului cod (The deviants' penitentiary regime in the new Penal Code)'. *The Penal Law and Penitentiary Science Magazine*, Vol. 17, 1938, p. 108.

[18] M Kernbach, 'Constituţia şi personalitatea omului delincvent la lumina noilor cercetări (The Delinquent's Constitution and Personality in the Light of the New Scientific Findings)'. *The Penal Law and Penitentiary Science Magazine*, Vol. 12, 1933, p. 372.

[19] This school's most important representatives are De Giovanni (1830-1916), Giacinto Viola (1870-1943) and Nicola Pende (1880-1970).

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[20] ibid., p. 373.

[21] ibid., p. 374.

[22] The most important work of Dr. Ernst Kretschmer (1888-1964) *Körperbau und Charakter: Untersuchungen zum Konstitutions-Problem und zur Lehre von den Temperamenten* (Physique and Character: An Investigation of the Nature of Constitution and of the Theory of Temperament) was published in 1921.

[23] ibid., p. 374.

[24] F Ştefănescu-Goangă, A Roşca, and S Cupcea, *Adaptarea socială* (The Social Adaptation), Editura Institutului de psihologie al Universităţii din Cluj, Cluj, 1938, pp. 40-41.

[25] In 1927, the German Society of Criminal Biology was constituted. This society was composed of penal specialists and German and Austrian criminologists, and its president was Professor Adolf Lenz, author of the work *Grundriss der Kriminalbiologie* (Treaty of Criminal Biology).

[26] Kernbach, op.cit., p. 387.

[27] ibid., p. 392.

[28] Parlamentul Romaniei (The Romanian Parlament), Lege pentru organizarea penitenciarelor şi institutelor de prevenţiune, M.O. Nr. 166/30 iulie 1929 şi Expunerea de motive, (The Law of Organizing Penitentiaries and Prevention Institutes, issued in The Official Journal No.166 , July 1929, together with its Exposure of Reasons), Imprimeriile Statului, Bucureşti, 1929.

[29] ibid., p. 384.

[30] Direcţiunea Generală a Penitenciarelor, 'Raport prezentat Consiliului superior al Penitenciarelor cu privire „la organizarea penitenciarelor şi institutelor de prevenţie" (The General Direction of the Penitentiaries, Report Presented to the Superior Council of Penitentiaries on the "Organization of Penitentiaries and Crime Prevention Institutes")'. *The Penal Law and Penitentiary Science Magazine*, Vol. 9, 1930, p. 109.

[31] ibid., p. 109.

[32] ibid.

[33] Direcţiunea Generală a Penitenciarelor, 'Fişierul antropologic la penitenciare (The General Direction of the Penitentiaries, The antropological File in Penitentiaries)'. *The Penal Law and Penitentiary Science Magazine*, Vol. 14, 1935, p. 392.

[34] Direcţiunea Generală a Penitenciarelor, 'Punerea în aplicare a carnetului individual, la penitenciare (The General Direction of the Pentiaries, Using the Individual Notebook in Penitentiaries)'. *The Penal Law and Penitentiary Science Magazine*, Vol. 14, 1935, pp. 239-249.

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[35] Direcțiunea Generală a Penitenciarelor, 'Ordin Circular 18393/13.VIII 1935 (The General Direction of the Penitentiaries, Circular Order No. 18393/13.VIII 1935)'. *The Penal Law and Penitentiary Science Magazine*, Vol. 14, 1935, p. 231.

[36] The General Direction of the Penitentiaries, 'Using the Individual Notebook in Penitentiaries', op. cit., p. 239.

[37] ibid.

[38] ibid.

[39] ibid.

[40] ibid., pp. 240-241.

[41] Direcțiunea Generală a Penitenciarelor, 'Ancheta biosocială asupra deținuților pusă în aplicare la Penitenciare (The General Direction of the Penitentiaries, The Biosocial Investigation of the Prisoners, Applied in Penitentiaries)'. *The Penal Law and Penitentiary Science Magazine*, Vol. 14, 1935, p. 331.

[42] ibid.

[43] ibid.

[44] The General Direction of the Penitentiaries, 'The Antropological File in Penitentiaries', op. cit., pp. 391-392.

[45] E Gr Constantinescu, 'Problema penitenciară în Proiectul de Cod Penal Român (The Penitentiary Problem in the Project of the New Romanian Penal Code)'. *The Penal Law and Penitentiary Science Magazine*, Vol. 14, 1935, p. 275.

[46] ibid., p. 275.

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'Resurrecting' the Self:
Atomising the Individual via Solitary Confinement

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Abstract
In 1992, a former Iranian political prisoner killed himself in Ontario, Canada, where he was living as a refugee. During his imprisonment he was subjected to an extremely inhumane torture method referred to as 'coffin' or 'resurrection,' the central aspect of which is absolute isolation combined with extreme physical and mental abuse. The approach that describes his suicide based on the 'victim's confrontation with the monstrousness of human kind' fails to explain this act fully, since it reproduces what was aimed for by 'resurrection,' namely, atomisation of the individual; such an approach asserts a false dichotomy between the individual and the society. The 'success' of resurrection signifies the social makeup of the self. If the self were a solipsistic entity, as individual-subjectivist theories suggest, solitary confinement and isolation techniques would not function. Isolation aims to break down the resistance of the individual and dehumanise him/her through atomisation. The social construction of the self yields to the transcription of this personal breakdown into a social retreat, i.e., since consciousness is a social construct, the penal system succeeds in terrorising the society through punishing the individual, traumatising both the individual and the society. Furthermore, the destruction of the self via atomisation results in social misconceiving of this trauma as an isolated problem peculiar to certain individuals due to their personalities. Society tends to view the trauma that is caused by torture and isolation as the personal problem of the immediate victims of these cruelties, victimising them by intrinsically labelling them as 'others.' Such a misconception, in turn, makes this trauma insurmountable; in this way, the atomisation of the self continues on a social scale and the tragedy of the immediate victim is prolonged even after his/her release. Unless the social construction of consciousness is admitted, the trauma and its social extent cannot be confronted and thus, cannot be surmounted.

Key Words: Atomisation, consciousness, individual, personality, self, social, torture.

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Punishment is largely for the purpose of deterring the potential criminal. Thus, since punishment is for others than the punished, it must be publicized. It must even be dramatized.

Colonel Lanser[1]

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In the 1980s, tens of thousands of political activists and members of opposition groups were arrested, tortured, and killed by the Islamic regime in Iran. Besides 'traditional' forms of torture, such as electrification and sexual abuse, the Islamic regime tried other techniques of interrogation. These included a form of solitary confinement, which is called 'resurrection' or 'coffin,' that aimed to crush the prisoners, deprive them of their sense of personality and humanity, and reduce them to insensate, isolated atoms. In 'resurrection' the prisoners are kept in box-like, rectangular cells that resemble coffins; the space is so small that once a person of normal height lies down s/he occupies it all. The Iranian prisoners who were kept in the coffin were blindfolded for more than 23 hours a day; the blindfold would be removed once a day, for about ten minutes, when the prisoners were taken to the washroom. The prisoners couldn't remove the blindfolds while eating or even while sleeping. They had to sit with their knees bent for 15 to 18 hours a day. They should not show any sign that they were alive, no coughs, no sighs, and no sounds while eating. Making any sound or removing the blindfold would result in physical attacks and torture by the guards. In the meantime, propaganda material or verses from the *Koran* were continuously broadcast through loud speakers.[2]

What was the goal of 'resurrection'? In order to answer this question, 'resurrection' should be analysed and understood within the broader context it belongs to. First and foremost, 'resurrection' is a form of solitary confinement; it functions as a particular form of confinement. Therefore, the primary question to be answered in this context is: 'why confinement?'

Prison is an oppressive apparatus for structuring the subject in the image of the atomic, individualised self. Foucault has proffered the view that as a particular form of confinement, prison functions toward distribution, classification and fixation of individuals in order to maximise the application of power upon them. Its function is to domesticate the individual and render him/her useful by applying a particular form of work upon his/her body.[3]

The rise of prison confinement corresponds to the emergence of modern capitalist society. At an ideological level, the bourgeois society is defined as the amalgamation of individuals; society is defined not as transcendent but as a 'fictitious entity.'[4] This ideological picture, on the other hand, intends to constitute the philosophical ground upon which atomisation of the self, in the image of the bourgeois subject, is justified. The bourgeois idea of individuality might be beneficial to the bourgeois, but once applied to the worker it produces and intensifies the atomisation which has already been forced upon the self within the capitalist mode of production.

Since, in principle, imprisonment does not discriminate between people, it can assume an 'egalitarian' appearance. Yet this very egalitarianism itself functions as an aspect of atomic individuation of persons due to the abstract nature of the idea of equality in modern bourgeois society.

In a society in which liberty is attached to every individual life, prison is the public, egalitarian form of penalty, regardless of the class or social position of the incarcerated individual. Imprisonment is also quantifiable and thus satisfies the utilitarian demand for an objective measure in order to calculate the effectiveness and 'economic' worth of confinement: "There is a wages-form of imprisonment that constitutes, in industrial societies, its economic 'self-evidence' - and enables it to appear as reparation."[5] Prison is related to the system of exchange for paying one's debt or 'compensating' the harm or offence. It uses time to re-assess the exchange value of confinement and accordingly appeals to the 'natural' measure of capitalist society.[6]

Confinement emerges as the apparatus of the institutionalisation of the work force to the extent that such institutionalisation amounts to the emergence of the atomised self. Although, in particular historical epochs, it has had immediate economic functions (such as managing the work force in the mercantilist era, when there was a shortage of qualified labour),[7] this institutionalising aspect is not simply economic (in the narrow sense of the word). Otherwise, the continuation of confinement beyond the mercantilist period cannot be explained.

Rusche and Kirchheimer draw a direct line between the economic management of the work force and certain penal practices. Thus, they infer: "only a specific development of the productive forces permits the introduction or rejection of corresponding penalties."[8] If so, then it remains an enigma, how, after the disappearance of the mercantilist period, confinement is continued as almost the sole form of punishment in modern societies. The goals sought by imprisonment, therefore, might be considered as transcending these immediate economic managerial ends.

The institutionalisation effect of confinement is not solely complementary to the atomising effect of the work process under capitalism. Rather, it is the disciplinary process that imposes atomic individuality upon the self. In this sense it *rehabilitates* the subject that fails to fit into the form of the self that is provided by bourgeois ideology and the capitalist mode of production. With imprisonment the 'instinctively' and intrinsically social self disappears so that the modern individual subject emerges. Prison is also an apparatus to change the individual's behaviour. By retraining and rendering the individual docile, it reproduces what is already there to be found in the social body. Thus, it not only deprives the individual from his/her liberty, but also functions toward transforming him/her.[9] Confinement, in general, has a 'resurrecting' effect; more precisely, 'resurrecting' the self is the centre of gravity of any form of imprisonment: "The techniques of correction immediately form part of the institutional framework of penal detention."[10] Consequently, different forms of practices, theories, experiments and projects have always been performed and investigated in prison system. These

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activities are realised in order to achieve the apparent goal of rehabilitating the criminal.

Therefore, although imprisonment may be losing its function of providing immediate economic benefits (supply of qualified labour), it is not given up by the state and bourgeois society. However, the disciplinary effect of confinement should not be understood in terms of an abstract confrontation between powers or forces; confinement is an ideological, social, and political project. Similar to other ideological, oppressive, and disciplinary machinery, prison is an apparatus in the service of politics and movements of a class. Prison is the physical mediation through which political and ideological sanctions representative of a particular class movement are materially exercised upon selves. Moreover, the disciplinary or the repressive function of imprisonment has always been the essential aspect of confinement. Prison has never been a productive unit similar to a factory that produces particular material entities. Even in the mercantilist era the distinctive aspect of prison is not the management of the workforce in order to maximise the productivity of labour that is confined *within* prison. Rather, it has been used as an apparatus to *forcefully* decrease the price of the labour and to *discipline* the workforce that had greater ability to manoeuvre due to certain economic factors.[11] Imprisonment has always been a form of oppression and determent, its scope transcending the limits of the prison walls, realised in the form of a social project. If prison was ever essentially a productive unit, then its unprofitability should have resulted in its abolition. Thus, it is more plausible to think of profitable prison labour as an accidental element. Work in prison must be considered a form of punishment.

What makes work a desirable part of prison confinement is the atomising effect of the capitalist mode of production due to commodification of the workforce and the alienating effect of production processes. Moreover, what confinement aims at is not structuring a microcosm; rather, rehabilitating the convict aims toward reforming the society in the image of the prison model. Thus, confinement does not simply aim at rehabilitating the criminal as a social individual; rather, the model individual and the model society that is desired by a political order are produced and imposed onto society via the body of the prisoner. It is not only the convict who is isolated, rather, every member of society is subjected to the isolation process, which is produced and exercised in prison. The effectiveness of this process, ironically, is based on the social-communal makeup of the human self. Thus, what is aimed at is not 'socialising the individual' as if the individual and the society are in opposition; rather, prison, as a particular apparatus of structuring the individual and society, aims at impressing a new form upon society via reforming the individual self.

Asserting that crime and criminality are the products of isolation and of prison confinement in general, Foucault reverses the relation between

prison and the social order, which was formerly set by Rusche and Kirchheimer.[12] Prison is not simply determined by the larger social order; rather, it aims at actively remodelling society. Moreover, confinement, and in particular, solitude and isolation, aim at providing the conditions of total submission of the convict.[13] However, there are two problematic sides of such an approach. First, prison, in this account, is also presented as a 'productive unit,' regardless of the texture of this product. Foucault's formulation seems to be a mere reversal of Rusche and Kirchheimer's. Second, the 'raw material' of such production is the prisoner and the product is the convict. Therefore, both before and after the act of production, the convict is represented as an ultimately passive atom.[14] However, such a situation renders prison useless, since the raw material and the end product are identical. It also nullifies the revolutionary form of conceiving the relation between society and confinement that is achievable through a Foucauldian approach. For instance, when discussing penal labour, Foucault considers the work that is imposed on inmates as intending to constitute a power relation or "empty economic form, a schema of individual submission and of adjustment to productions apparatus."[15]

Foucault ignores the fact that the disciplinary aspect of prison work is an immediate consequence of the existing mode of production: it has the same effect as the introduction of watermills had on determining the speed and rhythm of the work in the textile industry. Additionally, the alienated essence of work in capitalist society yields to work in general as an atomising activity; this aspect, which is realised in the form of compulsory work, is used to increase the isolating and atomising impact of prison.

Prison is not a simple deprivation of liberty. It has a modulating function with regard to the penalty.[16] This aspect of imprisonment further explains practicing 'resurrection' upon inmates. This runs parallel to the duration of both imprisonment and of the modulated penalties and practices such as solitary confinement and 'resurrection'. The rehabilitated inmate, the resurrected self as an atom, graduates from prison. Solitude also functions in the form of silencing the inmates. Silencing is a particular form of depriving the inmates from meaningful sensual data. It aims at forcing the prisoners to reflect about the goodness of man, which in turn will amount to moral reformation rather than a mere change of attitude. Solitude is directed towards the resurrection of the inmate, but in harmony with social order.

The introduction and practice of solitary confinement has been delayed in certain eras due to a lack of financing for the required structural and architectural changes. However, there were efforts to acquire the advantages of solitary confinement through other methods. For instance, in the mid-19th century, silence was used to isolate the prisoners who were still living together. Inmates were supposed to sit or stand silently during their free time.[17] This practice by itself is sufficient evidence for the claim that

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isolation and atomisation of the convict through full submission was the primary goal that was sought by prison confinement.[18]

When the destructive effects of solitary confinement are considered, the particular ideological and political nature of prison confinement and its goals become clearer.[19] Isolation is used against the 'most dangerous' elements; it is supposed to control and rehabilitate 'the most troubling ones.' It is not only the most terrible penalty - short of death - that could be inflicted on the convict,[20] but is the realisation of the Sadist dream of repeating death a hundred times.[21] Contrary to the 'good' intentions of its proponents, isolation causes serious behavioural problems and mental and emotional breakdowns, notwithstanding the dehumanising effects it has. Imprisonment and solitary confinement aim at producing a form of 'cellular individualism.'[22]

Isolation has also been used against political prisoners from the very early days of its introduction.[23] It aimed at isolating the political prisoners from other prisoners and strengthening the control over them. In the meantime, political radicals who were confined made the greatest reaction to isolation practice. The use of isolation techniques in the form of 'resurrection' by the Iranian Islamic Republic regime, or the introduction of solitary units under the pretext of 'prison reform' that aims at isolation of political activists in present-day Turkey, are further evidence of the political nature of isolation projects. On the other hand, this political aspect of isolating techniques hints toward the political content of the 'power relations' at play inside and out of prison.[24] For instance, the major goal of 'resurrection' was to deprive the prisoners from their sense of human identity, which is social through and through, by imposing upon them the belief in the essential solitude of human beings, by depriving them from activity,[25] and by prohibiting them from collective and communal interaction.[26]

The atomisation of the self assumes a twofold form both within and outside prison. Inside prison, the atomisation is imposed on the prisoner in the form of physical isolation that is strengthened by continuous surveillance. Foucault rightly maintains that prison is where the punished individual is also observed, and where data about him are acquired. "The theme of the Panopticon - at once surveillance and observation, security and knowledge, individualization and totalization and transparency - found in prison its privileged locus of realization."[27] Although isolated, the prisoner is the subject of a permanent gaze that 'witnesses' this isolation and thus confirms this solitude as the individual's essential mode of being. The only 'human' contact that the isolated convict has is the very gaze that intends to dehumanise him. 'Resurrection' can be considered an extreme form of panopticon exercised on inmates:

its task was to constitute a prison-machine with a cell of visibility in which the inmate will find himself caught as 'in the glass house of the Greek philosopher' and a central point from which a permanent gaze may control prisoners and staff.[28]

This visibility, however, yields to a radical form of invisibility: the convict both inside and out of prison is invisible as a person.[29] As a prisoner in maximum security put it; "prisoners are human waste. The more forbidding the penitentiaries, the more like garbage they define us."[30] Once released, the convict still carries this mark; he has disappeared as a human individual; he has emerged as the material 'other,' the delinquent, or even the 'hero'. Foucault rightly maintains that the first principle of prison is the isolation of the convict. It not only isolates the prisoner from society by depriving him/her of liberty, but also it isolates the inmates from one another. Prison uses solitude as an apparatus of reforming the inmate by providing him/her with the opportunity to reflect. However, this reflection that allegedly amounts to a reformation of the self does not have a merely corrective sense. Rather, it replaces the self of the convict, first with non-self or the non-existent of the self and then by providing a new transcendence that fills this absence.[31]

Prison confinement and solitude in particular, produces converts. The resurrected self is an atom that is invisible beyond the limits of confinement. Yet resurrection and atomisation are not limited to the immediate victim. The invisible, when he or she enters society, learns to ignore others: all become invisible.[32] The delinquent, as the product of prison confinement, is not only the author of his acts but he is related to his offence through a complex web of events. Through this web, the power exercised on the inmate, in order to reform him and make a convert out of him, is also exercised upon the whole of society. Thus, society is also reformed through the penitentiary system. Through the criminological construction of offence causality, the convict is introduced as a criminal offender before he actualises the offence. This can be shown both contextually and biographically and, thus, can be, and is, extended so that it covers every member of society. The delinquent, as a biographical unity that is produced by a penitentiary system, represents the 'other' as a kernel of anomaly. The convict disappears so that the delinquent emerges as the other. 'Delinquent as the other' is the permanent offender that exists in a mode of permanent invisibility.

Are prison confinement and isolation 'successful'? To the extent that they succeed in atomising the self, in producing the 'other,' they should be considered as fulfilling their task. The function of prison, and of solitary confinement in particular, contrary to the claims of the proponents of this technique, is not to rehabilitate or reform the convict; rather, it is to produce

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an 'other' by atomising the self. However, this 'success' is not total, since it depends on an aspect of the makeup of the human self, which confinement intends to negate. Prison carries an insurmountable contradiction at its core: prison has access to society and can impose itself as a microcosmic model of the social order, where people are related within a vertical hierarchy, due to the social formation of subjectivity that transfers the power exerted by the institution onto the members of the community. This dependency on the social yields an internal tension within the prison institution, which emerges in the form of 'surplus of power' at a point 'where the full force of institutional domination meets the oblique resistance of the prisoner.'[33]   It supplies a minimal space of action for the prisoner.[34] Moreover, it points toward the possibility of resisting the atomising effect of oppressive and disciplinary apparatus and of a possible dissipation of the destructive effects it has carved upon the body of the immediate victims of institutionalisation.

Notes

[1] J Steinbeck, *The Moon is Down*, The library of America, USA, 2001, p. 42.

[2] See F Arghavan, 'Resurrection', *Khavaran*, Vol. 2, No. 6, 2000, p. 5; M Raouf, *The Tree That Remembers*, Canadian Film Institute, Montreal, 2002, p. 5. "It can be said that 'resurrection' was the synthesis made by the Islamic Republic intelligence services, based on the latest experiences of foreign intelligence organizations. Haj Davood Rahmani, who was the mastermind behind these mental and physical tortures, would repeat, within the day, through the loudspeakers of the prison: 'This is your resurrection. You have to convert, otherwise, you stay here until you disappear.' Or he would say, 'There is no way out of here. You should convert. Otherwise, you'll stay here and then will be put by the wall' [meaning that you either give up your beliefs or you'll be executed - S. A.]" Arghavan, op. cit., p. 6.

[3] M Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*, Vintage Books, New York, 1977, p. 231.

[4] "The community is a fictitious body, composed of the individual persons who are considered as constituting as it were its *members*. The interest of community then is, what? - the sum of the interests of the several members who compose it." J Bentham, *An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation*, in S M Cahn and P Markie (eds), *Ethics: History, Theory, and Contemporary Issues*, 3rd ed (New York, Oxford University Press, 2006), p. 309.

[5] Foucault, op. cit., p. 232.

[6] ibid., p. 232.

[7] G Rusche and O Kirchheimer, *Punishment and Social Structure*, Russell & Russell, New York, 1968, p. 76.

[8] ibid., p. 6.

[9] Foucault, op. cit., p. 233.

[10] ibid., p. 234.

[11] "Now that it no longer paid to employ prisoners, however, they were frequently left with nothing to do. This raised the whole problem of the purpose of imprisonment, and brought its repressive, deterrent side to the fore." Rusche and Kirchheimer, op. cit., p. 112.

[12] E C Casella, *The Archeology of Institutional Confinement*, University of Florida Press, Miami, 2007, pp. 66-8.

[13] Foucault, op. cit., p. 237.

[14] "In Foucault's discourse the prisoner is less an institutionally dominated being than a cog in sociocarceral machine." Casella, op. cit., p. 69.

[15] Foucault, op. cit., p. 243. Foucault's conceiving of prison and the type of production he attributes to prison appears as the mirror image of the reductivist approach of Rusche and Kirchheimer. In both approaches the socio-economic determination is reduced to the emergence of prison as an economic entity. Neither Foucault nor Rusche and Kirchheimer see how prison, as an oppressive, disciplinary apparatus is also linked with a wider web of disciplinary institutions and economic enterprises through the industry that rises around prison system. For a short yet comprehensive account of 'prison industry' see L A Rhodes, *Total Confinement: Madness and Reason in the Maximum Security Prison*, University of California Press, Los Angeles, 2004, pp. 9-10, and Chapter 1.

[16] Foucault, op. cit., p. 244.

[17] Rusche and Kirchheimer, op. cit., p. 135.

[18] "In defence of solitary confinement, the reformers argued that intemperance and thoughtlessness are causes of the crime, and that the prisons are full of people who have never seriously thought about things. Now all is changed. Alone in his cell, the criminal is assailed with recollections, his conscience troubles him, a revulsion of feelings sets in, a struggle ensues between depraved habits and the stirrings of his better nature (which unfortunately brings some prisoners to the lunatic asylum), often followed by insight, remorse, and a change of attitude", ibid., p. 134.

[19] For some scientific studies that have been made regarding the effects of isolation, solitary confinement, and sensual deprivation see J E Rasmussen (ed), *Man in Isolation and Confinement*, Aldine Publishing Co., Chicago, 1973. This book is a first in its field and collects a number of articles presented at "Symposium on Man in Isolation and/or Enclosed Space, sponsored by NATO Science Committee Advisory Group on Human Factors" in 1969. For further and more recent discussion and bibliographic

information see Rhodes, op. cit., and M Jackson, *Prisoners of Isolation: Solitary Confinement in Canada*, University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 1983.

[20] Jackson, op. cit., p. 13.

[21] Commenting on the differences and affinities between Auburn and Pennsylvania systems Foucault states, "Auburn was society itself reduced to its bare essentials. Cherry Hill was life annihilated and begun again", op. cit., p. 239.

[22] Rhodes, op. cit., p. 36. Analysing the special kind of solitary confinement in the US, which is known as 'special unit,' Rhodes states, "A control unit does produce a 'tame' prisoner, in the sense that it is difficult for him to affect the world beyond his cell no matter what he does inside it. The plan put forward by Bentham and the architects of the silent prisons was intended to make this taming effect reach all the way into the prisoner's mind and soul - to change him - though as Lynds admitted, the strategy did not necessarily work", p. 43.

[23] "While political radicals were confined in prisons of all types, particular use was made in the late eighteenth century of the new penitentiaries. They had the facilities for isolating the political prisoners from ordinary prisoners, and their better perimeter security could more effectively deter the 'jail delivery riots' to free political prisoners which had become an integral part of eighteenth-century British political tradition", Jackson, op. cit., p. 15.

[24] Calling the struggle between the prison system and the inmate 'power struggle,' as many commentators do, is misleading, in that it reproduces the view from the perspective of the institution - and mirrors the image of the inmate that the institution intends to depict (as 'choosing to be bad'). This view simply dismisses the fact that the inmates and the institution do not confront each other on equal grounds. Moreover, the term 'power' has almost no reference, and abstracts this confrontation of all its political content. Quoting Scott, for instance, and in response to what she considers as mechanical deterministic binary Foucauldian model, Casella defines the 'resistance' of the inmates to the institutional repression 'as a form of subordinate power', op. cit., p. 70. She goes on with Morris to consider this resistance as 'imposing limits on the authority of prison institution' and accentuates it with Hobsbawm as making the system work for the inmate's own least disadvantage, ibid., p. 70. Although she accuses Foucault of completely ignoring human volition in his analysis of penal systems, the 'social actor' that she, following Giddens, proposes as the agent behind the 'power relation,' is a pure formality; it is a human that is abstracted from all its particular socio-historical positions. For a vivid criticism of such formality see Dorothy Smith, *Writing the Social: Critique, Theory, and Investigation*, University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 1999, chapter 7.

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[25] On action as a social category and its central role in the formation of personal identity and the idea of the self see A A Leont'ev, 'Sign and Activity', and A N Leont'ev, 'The Problem of activity in Psychology', both in *The Concept of Activity in Soviet Psychology*, J V Wertsch (ed), M E Sharp Inc., New York, 1981, pp. 241-254 & 37-71; A N Leont'ev, 'On Vygotsky's Creative Development', in *The Collected Works of L. S. Vygotsky*, Vol. 3, R W Reiber & J Wollock (eds), Plenum Press, New York, 1997, pp. 9-32; L Vygotsky, *Tool and Sign in the Development of the Child*, in *The Collected works of L. S. Vygotsky*, Vol. 6, R Reiber (ed), M Hall (tr), Plenum Press, New York & London, 1987, pp. 1-68; L Vygotsky, 'Memory and Its Development in Childhood', in *The Collected Works of L. S. Vygotsky,* Vol. 1, R Reiber & A Carton (eds), Plenum Press, New York & London, 1987, pp. 301-310.

[26] Forough Arghavan, in a personal interview with me, stated that the isolation started while prisoners were in the provisional Section 8 waiting to be taken to the 'coffin'. She spoke of a 'Prison Code' prohibiting prisoners from speaking to each other, sharing their belongings and prohibiting them from "any form of collective and *communal* activity." It meant that prisoners could not share anything they had. If your friend was cold and you happened to have an extra pullover, you were prohibited from passing that extra to her. If you had an orange, you were not supposed to share it with your comrades. Breaking the code was punished by severe physical torture up to seventy-two hours. Yet, she recalled that prisoners would break the code despite the threat of torture in order not to lose what she calls their sense of human dignity.
Another former ex-political prisoner, speaking of a similar experience emphasised the importance of actively resisting the isolation in the coffin as the only way to keep her integrity: "when I was sitting in the coffin for the first couple of months, I tried to deny the routine, what was happening to me. I tried to not to listen to the propaganda, just block it. Not listen, deny it. I'm sitting here, nothing gonna' happen to me. But reality was harsher. After a couple of months I thought I can't go like that. There's two ways. Either I fall down and die in one way or another, or I resist it consciously … I felt that, if I want to resist, I have to fight it actively. I have to hear them and challenge them. And I have to restate my state of being. *All of those rules is, was to make you to be alone*", Raouf, op. cit., p. 5 (emphasis added). G Wakefield, also, calls solitary confinement "annihilation from active life," "an ingenious mode of intellectual torture", quoted in Jackson, op. cit., p. 16.

[27] Foucault, op. cit., p. 249.

[28] ibid., p. 249-50.

[29] Another former Iranian ex-political prisoner formulates this state of invisibility when outraged against the international 'indifference' and

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'ignorance' concerning the mass murdering of political activists in the 1980s in Iran: "You can hear a lot of times about human rights, about peace and also about business, technology and the other side in the airs, *not very far, half a day*, you can go there and see a lot of mother[s] or father[s] that they lost their children just because they want to make a society with peace, nothing else. *It's not fair*", Raouf, op. cit., p. 4 (emphasis added).

[30] R L Levasseur, 'Trouble Coming Everyday', quoted in Jackson, op. cit., p. 45.

[31] "Contemporary prisons are indeed haunted in this sense, holding as they do a history of disappearances. And they are pervaded by past efforts and failures, often taking up when some long-forgotten plan left off", Rhodes, op. cit., p. 15.

[32] Another Iranian ex-political prisoner states, "I see that in the society I'm living [that is Canada - S.A.], we're already, without anybody punishing us, we are living in that isolated glass jail and I am 'I' and you are 'I', another 'I'. And we are not sharing. Nobody cares. That was one of the terms that I learned here, that, 'who cares.' I can go and sit in my class beside the same person for the whole year, not saying hello to each other. Here I can sit in front of somebody and open my orange and eat it without offering, *without even thinking that there is another person here* might like it", Raouf, op. cit., p. 11.

[33] Rhodes, op. cit., p. 23.

[34] The fact that this form of action and resistance do not have to necessarily assume a violent form that reproduces the power exerted by the institution points to the fact that the possibility of the exertion of this very power relies on something other than itself. One of the Iranian ex-political prisoners that was quoted in note 18 above gives some examples of the 'active resistance' she practiced while in the coffin: "I tried to imagine, to picture my son's face and ah, I'm sorry. I couldn't see more than two pictures. I didn't have any other images. I felt that I'm losing. I got scared and tried to remember my, to remember my cousins' names, to remember names I couldn't remember. And I was listening to everything, every simple, every little thing coming from outside world. I was, I was catching it … Finding life and seeing that, it's not finished. And ah, and trying to challenge what they were trying to do with us, to say that it's, to say that there's no life. [I] Was trying to find it. I made friend with mosquitoes, with flies, it's ah, I could watch, I wouldn't push away the mosquito sitting in my hand, on my hand, sucking my blood, no … Even hearing the guards were outside playing something and laughing, this is, this is people even if they are guards and that's [sign of] life", Raouf, op. cit., p. 5.

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Section 4

Victims of Violence

Rape as a Weapon of War:
The Long-Term Effects on Victims and Society

Cassandra Clifford

Abstract
The following paper studies the use of rape as a tool of war, including the short and long-term effects it has on the individual, as well as the societal and political future of a country. The paper will look at the following key questions: Does rape as a tool of war leave a country with less chance of a solid and stable political future? What are the long-term effects on the society as a whole? What are the ongoing effects of stigmatising victims, including the effects on: marriages, children, families and communities? This entails inequality and gender discrimination faced by women in times of war, including social exclusion, and how this symbolic form of violence affects that marginalisation, in the future and in times of peace. What promotes an individual to use rape as a tool of war, and what are key motivating factors?
What function does rape have in modern warfare, and how does it compare in a historical perspective? The paper concludes with recommendations for more in-depth analysis and studies on both primary and secondary victims, and on rapists. These recommendations lead into suggestions towards a sustainable end to the use of rape as a weapon of war.

Key Words: Combat strategy, forced impregnation, Gender-Based Violence (GBV), genital mutilation, genocidal rape, infanticide, post-conflict, rape, rapists, war orphans.

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Countries where rape has been used as a weapon of war:
Afghanistan, Algeria, Argentina, Bangladesh, Brazil, Burma, Cambodia, Chechnya, Congo, Cyprus, East Timor, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, India, Indonesia, Kuwait, Liberia, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Peru, Pakistan, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Turkey, Uganda, Vietnam, The Former Yugoslavia (Bosnia, Croatia, Kosovo and Serbia), Zimbabwe.

Countries currently utilising rape as a weapon of war include:
The Sudan, Chechnya, the Central African Republic (CAR,) Congo, and Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).

Abbreviations and Definitions:
- ASD: Acute Stress Disorder - a psychiatric syndrome whose

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symptoms include feeling numb and detached (like being in a daze or a dream, or feeling that the world is strange and unreal); difficulty remembering important parts of the assault; reliving the assault through repeated thoughts, memories, or nightmares; avoidance of things (places, thoughts, feelings) that remind the victim of the assault; anxiety or increased arousal (difficulty sleeping, concentrating, etc.).

- DDR - Demobilisation and Reintegration
- DID - Dissociative Identity Disorder - a psychiatric diagnosis that describes a condition in which a single person displays multiple distinct identities or personalities, each with its own pattern of perceiving and interacting with the environment.
- Fistulas - an abnormal connection or passageway between two epithelium-lined organs or vessels that normally do not connect. In cases of rape, fistulas are vesicovaginal and rectovaginal.
- HPV - Genital Human Papilloma Virus
- OCD - Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder: an anxiety disorder characterised by recurrent, unwanted thoughts (obsessions) and/or repetitive behaviors (compulsions), such as: hand washing, counting, checking, or cleaning, often performed with the hope of preventing obsessive thoughts or making them go away. Compulsions, (these however, only provide temporary relief, and not performing them markedly increases anxiety).
- PTSD - Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder: an anxiety disorder that can develop after exposure to a terrifying event or ordeal in which grave physical harm occurred or was threatened. Traumatic events that may trigger PTSD include violent personal assaults, natural or human-caused disasters, accidents, or military combat.
- RTS - Rape Trauma Syndrome: symptoms are similar to PTSD
- STI - Sexually Transmitted Infections

1.   Introduction

The use of rape as a weapon of war is undoubtedly effective, as it is not an attack on an individual, but an attack utilising social and gender stigmas to advance a societal break-down. As rape as a weapon of war demoralises and destabilises entire communities, it weakens ethnic communities/ties, and affects populations with the exploitation of the reproductive rights and abilities of its victims. When rape is employed instead of a bullet, the weapon continues to wield its power beyond the primary victim; while the battlefield may be the body, the target is civil society.

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A. Why is rape such a useful weapon**?**

       In war there are many weapons that may be employed, and while the Kalashnikov or IED may be favoured arms in modern warfare, there is one weapon all men carry, and more often, use. Men are choosing to use their bodies - in fact their manhood - as weapons to attack. The victim is raped in an effort to dehumanise and defeat the enemy, leaving an entire society with long-term suffering as victims cascade across generational divides. The scourge of rape as a weapon affects not only the individual lives of the victims, but the entire family and community in which they live. Such instances of rape leave lasting marks on the entire country's civil society, which in turn affects our globalised world.

       The use of rape as a weapon is one of the most violent and humiliating offences inflicted on the enemy The brutalisation of rape permanently scars the victim's mind, soul and, often, body. Rape is often used as a precursor to murder, while other victims survive, only to serve as daily reminders to those around them of the tragedies of war. Victims are shunned by their families and communities. Rape can leave a permanent reminder of war and of the enemy through the birth of a child, which places both the mother and child in continual victimisation and isolation. While rape as a weapon of war continues today, many of the psychological effects have yet to be felt in many communities around the globe.

B. Historical and Modern Context of Rape as a Weapon of War

       The idea that rape is a normal by-product of war, due to its continual use historically, and currently, only perpetuates its use. Its normalisation, combined with its continual impunity, increases its use as a weapon. Perpetrators are less likely to be tried for rape than for murder.

       Historically, there are many illustrations in art and literature which exemplify the perception of rape as normality in war, such as Homer's *Iliad* and Giambologna's sculpture, *The Rape of the Sabine Women* (1574-82), in Florence's Loggia dei Lanzi. The use of rape is also noted on multiple occasions in the Old Testament of the Bible, including: *"For I [God] will gather all the nations against Jerusalem to battle, and the city shall be taken and the houses looted and the women raped…"*[1]

       In modern history, rape was used in World War II by the Nazis, Soviets, and by the Japanese (as was the case with 'Comfort Women' and the infamous Rape of Nanking); it was also used in Vietnam. The last decade has seen a growing number of civil conflicts around the world that directly target women and girls. The numbers of rapes and other forms of sexual abuse have reached alarming levels, thus constituting an epidemic of sexual violence as a form of warfare. Countries such as: Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Guatemala, India, Liberia, Pakistan, Sierra Leone, Uganda, Sudan and the Congo, to name only a few, have used, or currently use rape as a weapon in conflict. In

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both a modern and historical context it is clear that all armies use rape as a weapon.

C. Who Are the Victims?

The disparity of the age of the victims of rape and sexual violence only solidifies the use of the weapon to destroy victims, as they range from infancy to the elderly. Due to the extensive acceptance of gender-based violence, women and girls have been primarily targeted, so much so that being

> ... violated in a conflict situation it is in-scripted within their everyday life and violation gets normalised. These include virginity testing, pulling of the labia, female genital mutilation (FGM), child marriages, forced pregnancies and marrying the girl to the person who raped and impregnated her even if it is not her will.[2]

Females - especially in patriarchal societies - are targeted due to their standing and value in the community. While they constitute the majority, they are not the only victims. Men have been known to have their genital areas repeatedly beaten in attempts to render them infertile, and to humiliate and demoralise them by taking away their perceived manhood and masculinity. Men have also been known to be directly raped, as in Croatia, where it is estimated that approximately 4,000 males were sexually assaulted, of which 11% were castrated and 20% forced to perform oral sex.[3]

2.   Effects on the Victim

Victims are often raped multiple times and gang raped, which can cause a much higher degree of physical and physiological injury, often leading to death. Many women have abortions through non-sterile procedures, and non-medical methods, and thus risk death, infection, scarring or sterilisation. Physical injuries may include gynaecologic, rectal, and internal haemorrhaging. The long-term physical effects of rape can include pregnancy and sexual transmitted diseases, including HIV/AIDS. Rapes are often carried out with guns, branches, bottles and other objects, which are intentionally used to inflict additional pain on the victim. The violent nature of rapes and the frequent use of objects increase long-term and permanent physical damage such as fistulas, in which an abnormal opening is produced between the vagina, the bladder and/or rectum. Women who are pregnant often miscarry, while others are rendered infertile due to the extent of damage inflicted on their bodies through rape.

A 2003 study, aimed at examining the long-term systematic effects of civil wars on public health, showed an increase in suicide (especially among women of child-bearing years), which may be related to unwanted

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pregnancies due to rape, cervical cancer (which is directly linked to the STI HPV), AIDS (which showed the highest level of impact) and unintentional injuries (which were suggested to include unreported suicides).[4] Sexually transmitted infection (STI) rates of soldiers are 2 to 5 times higher than in civilians in peacetime, and can be more than 50 times higher in times of conflict.[5] The dramatic increase of the HIV virus after combat is alarming, as in Rwanda, where a study of 1125 female victims showed 66.7% with HIV.[6] Thus rape and disease combine into a deadly cocktail that only serves to radically increase the number of casualties of war. The combination of rape as a weapon and the spreading of the HIV virus now distorts the distinctions between on the one hand, rape and deliberate killing, and on the other, civilians and combatants.[7] The increased relevance of HIV/AIDS also contributes to social exclusion and destabilises economies, as many with the disease are abandoned, stigmatised and children are left as orphans. The sudden creation of high levels of health issues placed on a nation recovering from conflict will significantly strain the healthcare system. Many victims cannot afford the care they need, or do not have physical access to appropriate care, as the following victim's testimony in Liberia illustrates:

> I was very afraid. He forced me to go far into the bush and he undressed me. Then he raped me … My stomach is very painful, but I don't have any money to go for treatment.[8]

This sudden burden on state resources strains not only the financial stability of the nation, but also that of the victims and their family's financial stability, due to the cost of healthcare.

Victims have also been forced to rape other victims or family members, thus adding the perceived stigmas of incest and homosexuality to the physiological scars left behind. Psychological effects include: social difficulties or dysfunction, disassociated blame, isolation, fear of intimacy and sexual dysfunction. The long-term psychological effects of rape can include PTSD and RTS, OCD, DID, eating disorders, self-injury, self-blame, panic attacks, flashbacks, and sleeping disorders. These effects can be lifelong if the victim does not get immediate support and care. Victims' symptoms can be exhibited as either expressive or subdued, and can immediately cause ASD. Some of the physiological effects may manifest into physical effects, such as increased vulnerability to other sexual and physical abuses. Victims are also at an increased risk of suicide, due to the physiological effects, as even "hiding their stress can also result in … increased risk of suicide."[9]

3.   Children Born of Rape
        A significant lasting effect of rape as a weapon of war is the number

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of children it bears and the ripple effects this has. Children are consequences of rape in conflict that are borne by both the victims and society. According to a three-part report, *War Children of the World*, tens of thousands of children have been born due to rape in conflict.[10] There are no true statistics on the number of children born as a result of rape as weapon in each conflict. Many women may be forced to endure multiple pregnancies by rape, as in a testimony out of East Timor, where a woman had four children, all born of rape.[11]

The mother faces a lifetime of turmoil over her conception through rape, regardless of her decision to raise the child, give the child up for adoption or terminate the pregnancy. A mother who keeps a child is often tormented and pulled between feelings of love and hate. These feelings of hate or shame only torment a mother more as she then feels guilt for having such thoughts about her own child. An adviser for the International Rescue Committee in Rwanda made the following statement:

> Did you ever see the look in a woman's eyes when she sees
> a child of rape? It's a depth of sadness you cannot imagine.
> Mass rape forces the victims to live with the consequences,
> the damage, the children.[12]

A mother who gives a child up for adoption lives with the trauma of carrying and giving birth to her attacker's child; she also lives with the grief of separation and loss. Women who terminate pregnancies struggle with the feeling of hate and shame regarding the conception and may also face guilt and mental anguish for the loss of a child, or due to a conflict of moral or religious beliefs. A program assistant, working with victims of rape as a weapon of war in Zagreb, stated, "The foetus growing inside the women is a living reminder of the horror she has suffered, like a wound that keeps on growing."[13] The effects of all scenarios last a lifetime for both mother and child, as well as for her family and community. A study of children born of rape in East Timor stated that,

> evidence suggests that such children are both at risk of
> abandonment to orphanages, and, if kept by their mothers
> likely to experience ostracisation and impoverishment, due
> to the mother's low social status ...[14]

The direct correlation between a mother's well being and the well being of a child, physically and mentally, are well established.

Orphanages in conflict zones are often flooded with 'rape babies,' as a conflict or post-conflict scenario leaves many who would be willing to adopt unable to, due to instability and/or poverty. The burden is then placed

on the state. Children who spend their lives in orphanages or foster homes are more susceptible to sexual and mental abuse. Many are turned away once they reach 16 or 18, with little education, money or support and are, thus, not only prone to abuse, but poverty and homelessness. Those who adopt children are faced with the decision of whether to tell their child the truth behind their birth, which can then lead to trauma and a sense of guilt for the adoptive parent.

The response to children born of rape as a weapon of war has left children to face endless struggles of identity and social hurdles, both internally and externally. In many communities, such as in Rwanda, children are labelled with names such as *Enfants non-desires* - unwanted children, or *Enfants mauvais souvenir* - children of bad memories. Children carry the burden of their traumatic conception and their mother's pain with them. This can manifest into guilt, viewing their self as a source of misery, a mistake, tainted, and often as evil, as they see themselves as genetically connected to their rapist father and thus often feel they are predisposed to violence. Hate of what the man who fathered them did to their mother can also manifest into anger. The social stigma placed on both the mothers and children only "exemplifies the problem that international law fails to recognise the offence of forced maternity on behalf of the mother, or any offence with respect to the child."[15]

4.   Long-Term Societal Consequences of Rape as a Weapon of War
Rape as a weapon of war places all females living in a conflict zone in fear of sexual violence. This continual fear leaves victims in constant torment and mental anguish, causing increased long-term psychological stress and damage. Many physiologists believe that fear alone can cause PTSD. A victim traumatised by the lingering threat of rape is often too afraid to leave the home to work. This changes not only the internal dynamics of their family, but the economic and social well-being. Children afraid to walk to school affect their countries' literacy levels. Women too afraid to collect water, animal fodder and firewood contribute to the malnutrition and poverty levels of both the family and community. These effects are dramatic when compounded by tens of thousands of people across a nation, where they leave communities crippled under the burden. Ripple effects reach even those communities untouched by the use of rape as a weapon of war, as a village's trade may decrease.

The violence and brutality of the use of rape as a weapon of war does not begin or end with the rape itself. Victims are most often beaten, and in many cases physically mutilated. Mutilations include: cutting off of lips and ears, blinding victims so they cannot identify their attackers, amputations of limbs, and mutilations of genitalia. Victims often beg for death over rape, and reports tell stories of atrocious suffering before the victim is murdered,

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such as the torture and mutilation one mother witnessed:

> My daughter refused to obey the order to get undressed. So
> they ordered her to choose between rape and death. She
> chose death. So they started to torture her, cutting off her
> breasts one at a time with a knife, then her ears and then
> they completely cut open her belly … I wasn't able to
> protect her. Since then I haven't been able to do anything.[16]

The effects of rape as a weapon of war also include secondary
victimisation, which is the re-traumatising of the victim of sexual assault,
abuse, or rape, through the responses of individuals and institutions.
Secondary victimisation includes victim-blaming and inappropriate post-
assault behaviour or language by medical personnel or other organisations
with which the victim has contact.[17] Those forced to watch the brutalisation
of another are psychologically traumatised and scared, as they feel helpless
and in many ways, responsible for the attacks. There have also been many
instances of rape among those who are pregnant. Most often, these brutal
rapes end in miscarriages; in such cases it could be charged that infanticide
was also committed due to the use of rape as a weapon.

Human Rights Watch collected drawings from children in Sudan.
The grave nature of what those children had witnessed was played out on
paper, through graphic images. One child coloured the images of rape,
illustrating the dramatic physiological effects on children who subsequently
witness such violent and heinous acts.[18] International Alert's report,
Women's Bodies as a Battlefield noted that witnessing sexual violence often
led to, or contributed to, dysfunctional family lives.[19]

> A U.N. survey of Rwandan children of war concluded that
> 31% witnessed a rape or sexual assault, and 70% witnessed
> murder. They will grow up beside children born of rape, all
> of them together forced to navigate different but
> commingling resentments.[20]

5.   Consequences of Rape as a Weapon on the Victim's Community

Rape is especially stigmatising in cultures with strong customs and
taboos regarding virginity, sex and sexuality. Thus, a victim may be viewed
by society as being: unfaithful, dirty/unclean, a traitor, damaged. Often
victims suffer isolation, disownment, or are prohibited from marrying; many
are divorced, abandoned, abused, neglected and even killed. Accounts such
as this victim's story are not unfamiliar:

My husband insults me everyday, calling me the wife of the militiamen who raped me … when I ask my husband to give me some food he replies to me, why don't you go and ask for food to your husband in the forest?[21]

In the Congo, for example, researchers state that rape as a weapon of war has now "metastasised into a wider social phenomenon" which now reaches further than the conflict itself, and domestic abuse and killings are increasing, seeming "almost normal."[22] Women are re-victimised and abused, left to feel even more shame and guilt for their attacks, and thus their suffering is only magnified. Many women are left to support children alone, whilst living in fear of rape or ostracisation, and dealing with the traumatic recovery, which is often too much to bear. These consequences have a long-term effect on both the individual and society, as it leads to the destabilisation of the community and family structure.

6. Effects of Rape as a Weapon of War on the Rapist

In Bosnia-Herzegovina, stories emerged from soldiers who were threatened with death if they did not rape. One soldier told how he was forced to prove his manhood by raping 12 women: "…they stripped a girl naked … she looked scared and lost … three of them held her down. The soldiers told me I should rape her and the others too…"[23] Studies have yet to look at long-term effects on perpetrators of rape as a weapon of war. What are the physiological effects of the use of rape in warfare on the rapist, and how does this affect the social structure and community thereafter? Rapists often come back to their communities after having committed such atrocities.

The ripple effect that rape as a weapon of war has on the entire community and country is potentially enormous. US soldiers who used torture as a strategy in conflict have been found to use these same practices in their jobs when they return. Torture techniques from combat have shown up in prison systems, police forces and immigration services, where instances of rape are numerous. The highly publicised case of Chicago police commander, Jon Burge brings to light how the effects of torture can affect countries where combat has not taken place. After serving in Korea and Vietnam, Burge went on to the police force; he used torture techniques to coerce confessions for some 20 years, ending with 192 accusations. The case put considerable financial strain on the state (allegedly costing some $17 million and 4 years to investigate), while also causing the rule of law to be tainted. The effects and blowback can result in more than just torture, but a lack of clear justice, economic instability, continued fear and physiological trauma. While DDR programs have been criticised for not including specifics for survivors, consideration must also be given to the mental health of the perpetrators of such violent acts, in order to better understand how to control and prevent

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their use in future conflicts.

Additionally, such analysis and treatment should provide assistance in preventing gender-based violence in post conflict situations. How does a perpetrator's physiological well-being affect the future in countries prone to repeated conflicts? If perpetrators were treated, would we see a lower level of rape in follow-on conflicts? Left untreated, or under-treated, PTSD can lead to suicide, accidents, violence, irrational and impulsive choices. In 2002, in just over a month, four soldiers at Fort Bragg, Army headquarters for Special Forces and Special Operations units, killed their wives. Three had just returned from Afghanistan; two then killed themselves. The case illustrates the results of untreated PTSD, thus it is inevitable that some combatants who used rape will have PTSD, and similar instances could occur.

These issues illustrate the need to include substantial consideration for victims in demobilisation and reintegration plans (DDR), as successful DDR is one of the main keys to prevention. In addition, there is a need to include programs that focus on the physiological effects that carrying out such acts have on combatants. Studies need to explore how soldiers who continually rape in conflict adjust to civilian life. In a post-conflict society, do they continue to use rape as a strategy? In the Democratic Republic of Congo many Rwandan combatants leave with no guarantees to return home safely; they have little to lose and "feel they can benefit only by continuing the violence and forestalling an uncertain but likely ominous end for themselves."[24] The incidence of post-conflict rape is high for this reason, and DDR programs currently place little emphasis on it. Many rapists and victims know each other, and it is known that it taunts victims to see the perpetrator again; but what does seeing their victims do to perpetrators? Does the guilt and shame they feel eat at them and cause them other issues besides being prone to violence? Do they commit suicide in higher numbers? Do they become less productive and destabilise the economic recovery of their family and community? These are questions that we need to ask - and answer - if we are to end the use of such a vicious weapon of war.

7.   Conclusions and Recommendations

The tolerance and standardisation of rape as a weapon of war has lead to its impunity, and thus increased the silence surrounding the practice. Impunity for the increasingly brutalised use of rape as a weapon of war, combined with its effectiveness, only provokes its use. The perpetrators are less likely to be tried and punished for the use of this weapon, and if convictions do follow, the punishment is disproportionate to the crime. As Nelson Mandela stated:

> Safety and security don't just happen: they are the result of
> collective consensus and public investment … we must

become tireless in our efforts not only to attain peace, justice and prosperity for countries but also for communities and members of the same family. We must address the roots of violence. Only then will we transform the past century's legacy from a crushing burden into a cautionary lesson.[25]

Mandela's words illustrate the urgent need to form collective and cohesive programs which address the persecution of rape as a weapon of war. In addition, Mandela illustrates the need to not only focus on prevention and prosecution, but the need to address why we continue to use rape in modern combat. Thus, there is a need to focus on gender equality on a global scale.

Reliable statistics are impossible to obtain; available statistics are often only calculated from victims seeking medical assistance for pregnancy, STI's or abortions, thus leaving a void in substantial statistical data. Those who receive treatment rarely receive adequate physiological care and little follow-up is done with survivors. Therefore, this lack of resources for survivors, their families and the communities affected not only exacerbates the long-term effects of rape as a weapon of war, but also fails to show the depth and enormity of its long-term effects on individuals and civil society. Many survivors do not seek treatment for medical or physiological effects, as they feel there is no one who can or will help them, and thus, the lack of adequate aid and support programs only fuels their fear of reporting such crimes and seeking treatment. When international organisations are present to witness the violations and deliver medical and physiological help with more immediacy, it will undoubtedly aid in offering survivors more security in which to report and seek treatment. Nonetheless, such interventions are not foolproof and will not lead to accurate statistics, as shame and fear will always play a factor. In other regards, the presence of the international aid community does not guarantee safety against the use of rape, nor does one find security in the refugee camps, as levels of rape in the camps remain high (it must be noted that all types of combatants rape, including peacekeepers).

There have been historical cases for the prosecution of rape as a weapon of war; in 1474, military officer Peter van Hagenbach was the first to be sent to an international tribunal for the use of warfare rape committed in Briesbach, Austria, under his command. He was convicted and beheaded for his crimes.[26] However, most developments with regard to rape have taken place during the twentieth century: the first United Nations conviction exclusively focused on rape as a war crime in 1998; the International Criminal Court for the former Yugoslavia made the first conviction of the use of rape as a crime against humanity in 2001; Article 7 of The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court explicitly mentions sexual violence as a war crime. However groundbreaking these developments may be, they in no

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way compare to the scale of rapes committed; nor in many instances do the punishments received truly fit the crime. Continued silence on rape as a weapon of war places women as items of conquest and as spoils of war. This silence weakens societies and places generations at risk. While the damage of rape can never be undone, placing adequate punishment on these crimes will help end their longstanding impunity. Steps towards ending the impunity over the use of rape as a weapon of war, however considerable, must be taken at the national level. Additionally, gender barriers must be torn down and victim support must be properly established to see substantial advances in the number of prosecutions and see that they are befitting the severity of the crime committed.

There is no doubt that the effects of the use of rape as a weapon of war are far-reaching, regardless of time, place or culture. Short and long-term support and treatment for victims is substantially lacking, which will only serve to exacerbate the use of rape as a weapon of war. Thus, an end to the perception that rape is a common and unavoidable tactic of war must occur, making it unequivocally unacceptable. In order to do this there are three main areas of focus: first, the issue of gender inequality and bias must be removed in all countries. When such programs are in place at peace time it will significantly reduce the stigma and use of rape and gender-based violence in times of conflict. Second, there must be a unified international response to ban the use of rape as a weapon of war once and for all, and thus, strategies of prevention and awareness must be put into place, including in internally displaced persons and refugee camps and in times of post conflict. Third, impunity must come to an end, or victims will continue to remain silent and not seek medical, psychological and legal attention if they feel there is no retribution or care which they are safe to receive. If one is listening, victims will talk, thus if aid and government agencies step forward and ask victims to speak out, then they must be willing to not only listen, but to provide them with both short and long-term care and support, including providing physical and financial access to services.

The effects of rape as a weapon of war are not contained to the victim, nor do they end once the rape is over, or once the physical wounds have healed. The wounds of rape do not heal; they leave lasting scars on individuals, families, communities, nations…the world. The effects and enormity of mass rape as a weapon of war are yet to be felt, as only the beginning of the long-term effects that impact all of society and shape our future world are beginning to emerge.

It is evident that there is a significant need for in-depth and qualitative studies on the scope and depth of the long-term effects of rape as a weapon of war on all its victims, both primary and secondary, as well as on the perpetrators themselves. Very little attention has been focused on those who have been forced to witness such crimes, but were not physically

victimised themselves. Currently, data and studies on the effects of rape as a weapon on the rapist, either short or long-term, are difficult to find. It is clear that this data would prove substantial in the prevention of its use, as well as in understanding the long-term effects on civil society. The beginning of the end of the use of rape as a weapon of war is to combat gender inequalities and stereotypes in cultures while in peace time, as a method to prevent and curb the use of rape as a weapon of war. Removing the stigma of rape is the first crucial step to see that the ripple effects do not continue to haunt our global society in future generations and centuries.

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Mental Health and Substance Use Problems:
The 'Invisible' Scars of
Intimate Partner Violence Victimisation

Marika Guggisberg

Abstract
Mental health consequences resulting from exposure to intimate partner violence (IPV) have been confirmed in multiple studies. It is generally accepted that victimised individuals are at a significantly increased risk of suffering from high rates of psychological symptomatology compared to persons with no history of IPV. In addition, the link between substance use and IPV, particularly alcohol use, is acknowledged in the international literature. More recently, an association has been found not only with the perpetration of IPV but also with its experience. This relationship between exposure to IPV and increased rates of mental health problems along with harmful substance use has been found to increase the risk of further victimisation. This paper presents preliminary findings of research that investigated the prevalence, nature and the scope of IPV victimisation, mental health and substance use problems in a cohort of adult female service users in the metropolitan area of Perth, Western Australia. It presents quantitative and qualitative data elaborating on two case studies that have analysed contexts, dynamics, and motivations for substance use. Homotypic and heterotypic forms and patterns of mental health and substance use problems will be discussed along with particular exacerbating factors for IPV victimisation shedding light on the complex lives of female victims of IPV. Raising awareness of these issues will increase professional understanding, which may lead to improved inter-disciplinary treatment-intervention and prevention efforts for women already in contact with support services. The information gained from this study will be useful for government and non-government agencies that assist IPV perpetrators and victims, public health and criminal justice professionals, and policy makers. It will contribute to increased understanding of the different dynamics and consequences of IPV victimisation.

Key Words: Interpersonal violence, mental health, offender, self-defence, substance use, victim, victim precipitation, women.

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1.   Introduction

Each day women are subjected to Intimate Partner Violence (IPV) all over the world.[1] They are mentally and or physically harmed, or even

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killed as a result of a violent attack by a current or former partner. Why is it that IPV appears to be an inevitable part of many women's lives? This paper argues that IPV victimisation is not inevitable and should be prevented as there are far-reaching mental, physical, and behavioural consequences for the abused.

IPV victimisation constitutes a global social, public health and criminal justice problem,[2] which affects younger women disproportionately much more than older women.[3] Recent research evidence suggests women also engage in IPV. However, investigations into the nature and the consequences of violence between both partners demonstrate that IPV victimisation perpetrated by women cannot be compared to that of men, as motives, and the effects, are incomparable.

This paper outlines the 'invisible' scars of women subjected to the often hidden violence in their homes. Abused women's scars, namely, co-occurring mental health and substance use problems, can become exacerbating factors and thus increase the risk of further IPV. The background for this paper is a study that commenced early in 2007. It reports on preliminary findings of this violence research among women attending support services in the metropolitan area of Perth, Western Australia. The study investigated the prevalence, nature, and scope of co-occurring mental health and substance use problems associated with IPV victimisation. It is anticipated that applications of research results can be used to reduce and prevent IPV victimisation of women by developing prevention and intervention programs that cut across social, health, and criminal justice areas.

2.   Private - Public Domain

The problem of violence in the home, specifically intimate partner violence, is not a new phenomenon. While in the past forty years it has been on the agenda as a social, criminal and health issue, it is a universal global problem with prevalence estimates ranging from ten percent of physical and sexual assaults in Australia (with approximately one quarter of victims requiring medical attention)[4] to fifty-three percent in the Middle East.[5] However, it is important to note that comparing prevalence data is difficult due to varying definitions and methodologies.

Intimate partner violence is difficult to combat because of the separation of the private and public domains. Very often, the problem is regarded as a private matter and no-one else's business. Sometimes, friends and neighbours are aware of violence taking place in the home, but it is regarded as a very private issue. Studies consistently indicate that only a fraction of violent incidents, when committed by a current or former intimate partner, are reported to the police. For example, Mouzos and Makkai noted:

> Few women reported the most recent incident of physical and/or sexual violence to police. Incidents perpetrated by strangers were more likely than incidents by known males to be reported to the police (27% compared to 10%).[6]

Therefore, it is fair to argue that the home is one of the most dangerous places. In fact, the issue of IPV has become a concern of many governments and a topic of public awareness internationally. It has been recognised that IPV victimisation is a fundamental violation of human rights. Moreover, certain forms have become a criminal offence in many countries. This criminalisation clearly stigmatises violence in the context of an intimate relationship as a public rather than a private matter and as unacceptable behaviour in contemporary society.

3.   Health Consequences

The seriousness of IPV victimisation can be observed by examining health consequences arising from these actions. Women subjected to IPV are at risk of physical injury due to kicking, pushing, slapping, and strangulation[7] and even to being murdered, particularly at times of relationship changes.

Homicide is recognised as the most serious criminal offence[8] and women are at a far higher risk of becoming a victim of intimate partner homicide compared to men;[9] IPV appears to be a significant factor in these deaths. However, only a small proportion of IPV incidents result in death. Non-lethal injuries are the most commonly observable health consequences for abused women.

While the most obvious consequences of IPV are physical injuries, there is also a non-physical element that needs to be considered, namely psychological and health risk behaviours. The author termed mental health and substance use problems associated with IPV victimisation the 'invisible' scars, in order to counter the focus on physical injury resulting from IPV victimisation. Some effects of relationship violence are visible and obviously related to the exposure of actions by a current or former partner - others are not. The effects of IPV vary greatly, not only depending on the type and the nature of IPV victimisation, but also because of the specific context in which the violence has taken place. Sometimes injuries sustained from the violence require hospitalisation of victimised individuals. In addition to physical health consequences, exposure to IPV often has a significant negative impact on victimised women's mental health.[10]

The development of severe mental health problems can be explained by the nature of IPV, which is in the context of an ongoing intimate relationship.

Intimate partner violence, unlike for example, violence perpetrated by a stranger, is committed by a known and usually trusted person. As a

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result, the effects appear to be much more damaging compared to violence by an unknown person, which can be explained by the setting and the victim-offender relationship. Many researchers argue that IPV victimisation, compared to other forms of violence, such as community violence, is acknowledged to have more dramatic effects because of the abuse of power, which has the potential to produce deep levels of fear and anxiety.[11] A recent Australian study found that 30% of women exposed to IPV by a former or current partner feared for their lives.[12] It can be argued that the effects of IPV may be exacerbated due to the fact that the perpetrator and the victim are in a current or former intimate relationship. Consequently, it is not surprising that IPV victimisation has been associated with a battery of negative mental health consequences. In addition to mental health problems resulting from IPV victimisation, negative health behaviours by victims have been found to be associated with the exposure to IPV.

4.   Health Risk Behaviours

Certain health risk behaviours have been associated with IPV victimisation. Recent studies, conducted predominantly in the US and Canada, found that women with a history of IPV victimisation were at a particular risk to engage in health risk behaviour such as using legal/illegal psychoactive substances in a harmful and hazardous way.[13] This observation, while known from anecdotal evidence, is less well documented in the Australian literature.

One of the associations of IPV victimisation with health risk behaviour observed by professionals in government and non-government services is increased alcohol, tobacco and other drug (ATOD) use. This phenomenon, in addition to adverse physical, reproductive, and mental health consequences among victims of IPV has not been well understood. In the following, preliminary findings of a study investigating the relationship between IPV victimisation, mental health and substance use problems will be presented.

5.   The Present Study

This ongoing study set out to examine the relationship between mental health and substance use problems associated with IPV victimisation. Participants were female users of a government support service at eight district offices in the metropolitan area of Perth, Western Australia. It commenced early in 2007 and utilises a mixed method research design in order to capture the complexity of the subject matter. The recruitment strategy does not specifically target women with a history of IPV. The quantitative component of the study consists of a 90-item anonymous self-administered questionnaire incorporating a number of validated and standardised sub-scales measuring IPV victimisation, mental health

symptomatology, and recent ATOD use. One question asks participants to self-assess whether they believe themselves to be currently experiencing mental health and substance use problems along with IPV victimisation, in which case they are able to indicate their interest in participating in the qualitative follow-up study, a semi-structured confidential in-depth interview.

The findings presented here are from a preliminary analysis of the first fifty-eight participants in the quantitative component of the study. The data indicated that thirty-eight (sixty-six percent) of women experienced at least one incident of physical violence in the previous six months. The majority of these incidents were reported to have been severe and frequent. Sixty-one percent of participants reported to have experienced at least one incident of physical abuse occurring five times or more within the past six months. Twenty-six percent of women indicated to have been sexually abused. Of these, all but one also experienced physical violence. Of the women reporting physical and or sexual abuse, eighty-four percent reported diagnosable mental health problems. The vast majority of these women, seventy-six percent, experienced several mental health issues. In fact, anxiety and depression in addition to symptoms of posttraumatic stress were the most common forms reported by sixty-one percent of participants. Two out of five women were at risk of an alcohol use disorder. Eighty-three percent of them reported to have experienced physical violence in the six months prior to the study. Nearly eighty percent of women with hazardous and harmful alcohol consumption patterns also smoked either tobacco and or marijuana. Mental health and ATOD use was found among approximately one third of the cohort, all of whom reported to have been subjected to physical violence by a current or former intimate partner in the past six months.

The qualitative component of the study provided the opportunity to explore the issue from the perspective of abused women, and to go beyond 'objectively' measuring the consequences and associations of IPV victimisation. From the twelve interviews conducted so far, two case studies have been selected to illustrate the impact of ongoing IPV in terms of mental health and substance use behaviour associations. They also demonstrate the differences and similarities of experiences and behaviours. In order to protect the identity of the participants, names and other identifying features have been changed.

Sarah is a young woman of approximately thirty years. Nothing in her appearance indicates her ongoing exposure to IPV and severe mental health and risk behaviours. Sarah has been married for nine years and has two young daughters. She reported having been subjected to IPV at the hands of her husband for the whole duration of her marriage. However, she also reported an increase in the severity of episodes over the years. Three years ago, Sarah was diagnosed with depression and an anxiety disorder. She also indicated that she was suffering from sleep difficulties and frequent panic

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attacks. Sarah admitted to using a number of legal psychoactive drugs for non-medical purposes, in addition to her prescription medication. According to her, these substances are necessary as they have a calming effect. Sarah believes that her feelings of immediate danger and constant hyper-vigilance are the consequences of IPV victimisation. She has reported suffering from severe physical violence at the hands of her husband, particularly at times when he is intoxicated with alcohol. At those times, she noted, "his violence is incontrollable and often leads to an escalation where I fear for my life." She tried to seek help from the police twice, which, according to her, was not an effective strategy. Sara admitted to suffering from feelings of entrapment and helplessness, having attempted suicide previously. Despite her subjection to severe IPV, she feels unable to leave the relationship due to her lack of financial resources and a perceived emotional dependence on her husband. She still expresses hope that he will eventually change his abusive behaviour.

This case study demonstrates the complexity of the issues many of the abused women in this study faced. The next case study highlights a different issue - women's participation in the violent behaviour. Interestingly, the majority of the twelve women interviewed reported that they sometimes retaliate in response to the violence they are subjected to.

Ashley is a middle-aged mother of four teenage children. She admitted to sometimes becoming frustrated and angry at her partner for having been subjected to frequent and sometimes severe violence over the past 13 years. Ashley stressed that her use of violence towards Andrew (her partner) was always in self-defence. The violence used by both partners, Ashley reported, was particularly severe at times when she and Andrew had consumed alcohol and other, illegal, drugs. A few years ago, she threw a knife at Andrew. Ashley admitted to having been intoxicated at the time, but emphasised that Andrew had been the primary aggressor. She said:

> I have endured 13 years of verbal abuse, threats, and violence. This time I simply had enough. I exercised my right to hit back. I did not think at that time, I just grabbed what was nearest to me and threw the knife, which missed his head only by a few inches and stuck in the wall. Fortunately, the knife missed him and stuck in the wall beside his head.[14]

The police were called and as a result Ashley was incarcerated for seven months. Andrew's violent behaviour towards her, according to Ashley, was never mentioned during the court proceedings.

This second case study illustrates how boundaries can become blurred between the victim and the offender. In such circumstances police and courts are left to make a judgement based on the facts. This can result in

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a woman (who may have been subjected to IPV victimisation for several years without anyone noticing) being charged for perpetrating IPV. Consequently, it can be argued that if a victimised woman retaliates by using violence herself, she is in serious danger of being regarded as a criminal offender, despite having been a victim of crime in the first instance. Research evidence suggests self-defence to be the single most commonly reported reason for women to use violence against their male partners.[15]

6.   Conclusion

        This paper outlined associations between substance use and mental health problems against the background of IPV victimisation. It has been argued that violence in the context of an intimate relationship may produce more severe psychological symptoms compared to forms of interpersonal violence perpetrated by a stranger. These more dramatic effects can be explained with the particular relationship of the victim and the offender. It can be concluded that the home is a particularly dangerous place for many women, affecting their physical and mental health, as well as their behavioural coping responses.

        This paper also presented preliminary findings from an ongoing Australian study investigating the co-occurrence of mental health and substance use problems in association with IPV victimisation. Previous research, predominantly from the US, appears to be corroborated, suggesting a clear association between IPV victimisation, mental health problems and ATOD use. These preliminary results suggest that victimisations experiences are complex and behavioural consequences are not easily understood. It is the author's hope that findings of this study, upon completion, will contribute to innovative efforts in collaboration across social, health, and criminal justice areas with the aim of combating IPV and its devastating effects for direct and indirect victims.

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How Does Mothers' Sexual Abuse Trauma Beget Trauma in Daughters? The Constellation of Mother Complex

Neringa Grigutytė

Abstract

Sexual abuse trauma causes immediate as well as long-term consequences. Not all the victims experience the same outcomes, or they differ in duration and intensity. Though previous research has settled a range of psychological and behavioural consequences of sexual abuse trauma, there is still a lack of understanding of aetiology and theoretical background. From all aspects of sexual abuse, which are vaguely explained by scientists, we take interest in the repetition of experiences of sexual abuse over generations. Research findings continuously suggest that mothers of sexually abused children often have been sexually assaulted themselves. Relations with the mother are very important in order for girls to disclose and survive sexual abuse trauma. Mothers' reactions to children's disclosures are influenced by their own trauma. This article is based on the grounds of C. G. Jung's psychoanalytic theory and on the assumptions that (1) sexual abuse experience has a deep predisposition and (2) the repetition of trauma is related to unstable inner relations. Jung brought into use the term 'Mother Complex,' which is one of the deep structures a person develops through interaction with the mother, representing basic affective attitudes and domains in life, developmental needs and difficulties. Transmission of sexual abuse trauma to the next generation in a sense of a Mother Complex constellation is discussed in relation to classical psychoanalysis, contemporary analytical works and the results of contemporary research.

Key Words: Intergenerational transmission of trauma, mother complex, RIGs, sexual abuse.

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1.   **Ground Works**
        The prevalence of child sexual abuse in women varies from 7% to 62% depending on the research characteristics (e.g. the broadness of definition, methodology, and analyses).[1,2] A major proportion of these women become mothers themselves. Maternal trauma of childhood sexual abuse has been identified as a risk factor for intergenerational abuse.[3,4,5] Although mothers who have been abused do not necessarily abuse their children, the risk of intergenerational abuse is estimated at 30%.[6] While

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working with abused children, it has been noted that mothers of sexually abused children frequently have a history of sexual abuse; for example, they are significantly more likely to have been the victims of sexual abuse themselves (from 22% to 42%),[7,8] and the rates are significantly higher than in control groups of mothers (12%).[9] Recent research has suggested that child sexual abuse trauma is a strong predictor of sexual abuse in the next generation, with daughters' risks of abuse being 3.6 times greater when their mothers reported a history of sexual abuse.[10]

Despite the 'cycle of victimisation' over generations that has been documented in the empirical literature, the processes underlying this cycle are not well understood. Leifer and his colleagues described two main theoretical perspectives for understanding the circle of abuse across generations - Belsky's ecological theory and Bowlby's attachment theory.[11] An ecological perspective draws attention to the fact that the lives of parents and children are intertwined, and that an understanding of factors that influence parents is important for understanding the experiences of children. The attachment theory postulates that the working models of the self, others, and self-other relationships which derive from care-giving relationships are transmitted across generations and account for continuity in abuse. DiLillo and Damashek refer to the research of Maker and Buttenheim, who hypothesised that identification with the abuser could lead sexually abused mothers to re-enact the trauma of their own abuse through sexual victimisation of their own children.[12] Others proposed that victims' perceptions of risky behaviours and their expectations regarding their likely involvement in risky behaviours may result in a vulnerability to their own re-victimisation and abuse of their children as well.[13] This may happen when mothers with sexual abuse trauma subliminally expose their children to high-risk situations, perhaps by allowing contact with male offending partners or other perpetrators outside the home. These are some speculations about the mechanisms by which sexual abuse trauma may be transmitted from one generation to the next.

The question is whether, and how, victimisation per se may increase the circle of abuse. It is obvious that there are not only factors of family or surroundings, but also some deep intrinsic factors or mechanisms, which, up to a point, may be responsible for the intergenerational transmission of abuse trauma. The point of view of the article is based on the grounds of C. G. Jung's psychoanalytic theory. Jung proposed a model of the internal world in which external reality played a vital part in determining the nature of psychological reality.[14] Two assumptions are made: victims of sexual abuse have a deep predisposition for such an experience, and the repetition of trauma is related to unstable inner relations.

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2.   Mother Complex

        In his theory, Jung brought into use the term *Mother Complex*, which is one of the deep personality structures which develops from interaction with the mother, representing basic affective attitudes and domains in life, developmental needs and difficulties. It diverts our expectations, determines our interests and influences the relations with ourselves, others and the world. The mother complex is described as a group of feeling-toned ideas associated with the experience and image of the mother. The mother complex is a potentially active component of everyone's psyche, informed by experience of the personal mother and by collective assumptions.[15] At the core of any mother complex is the mother archetype, which means that behind emotional associations with the personal mother there is a collective image of nourishment and security on the one hand (the positive mother), and devouring possessiveness on the other (the negative mother).[16]

        The *positive mother complex* constellates if the child - from infancy - feels that he or she is desirable, beloved, safe and his or her needs are met. Such persons feel that life is good and right, as they themselves feel to be; they open themselves up to a world which they trust; they expect things to go well and these expectations are often fulfilled.[17] The person is in relation to his or her body, to others, to the outer as well as the inner world and vice versa. As Kast notes, people with a *negative mother complex* have the feeling that both they and the world are bad. They have no sense of an unquestioned right to existence, and they are the ones to be blamed for everything, even their existence.[18] As a result, they feel hopelessness and primal distrust. Such people may not easily feel a sense of belonging to others, though they strive for it. Inherent in their complex is a belief and expectation that they will always be rejected and treated badly. And these negative expectations are often fulfilled.

        The constellation of a mother complex has differing effects depending on whether it appears in a son or in a daughter. The focus of the article is only on the mother complex in women, raising the question of whether mothers transfer sexual abuse trauma to their daughters across generations. The notion of formation of the complex in enriched by Daniel Stern's concept of the 'Representations of Interactions that have been Generalised' (RIGs).[19] Though RIGs are formed around actual events and experiences, from everyday events to important emotional events, the experiences are internalised and stored in a generalised schematic form, which appears as our inner schema and patterns our expectations of relationships. According to Verena Kast:

                In episode memory, actions, emotions, perceptions, etc are
                remembered as an inseparable unity, although we can of

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course focus on one particular aspect, such as the emotions
involved.[20]

One particular RIG does not reflect one particular episode of
experience with a mother, but rather contains a variety of specific memories
and results from repeated and similar interactions, as an individual's
experiences are reflected in many RIGs, or generalised representations.[21]
Reacting experience is being structured by episodic memory into a complex
in the form of generalised representations. In Stern's words "how we
experience ourselves in relation to others provide a basic organising
perspective for all interpersonal events."[22]

A mother complex does not directly reflect our own mother's
behaviour, although the personal mother is very important for the
constellation of mother complex. It seems to be a 'complicated melting pot'
of actual experience and fantasy, frustrated expectations, etc. Though
complexes settle mainly in childhood, they can alter and influence the whole
life. It is important to emphasise that not only mothers, but the whole
'mother-realm,' in which motherly qualities are experienced, influence the
formation of positive or negative mother complex.

3.   **Mother Complex Constellation and Consequences of Child
       Sexual Abuse Trauma**

A pPositive mother complex in women may have a negative impact
on sexual abuse trauma coping; however, a negative mother complex is more
liable to sustain and reinforce the outcomes of sexual abuse and disturb the
recovery process after trauma. The long-term outcomes of child sexual abuse
have been well documented in clinical reports and empirical reviews and
include an increased risk of depression, post-traumatic stress disorder and
other clinical symptoms, as well as lower self-esteem, greater health risk
behaviours - especially harmful and hazardous substance use, and risky
sexual behaviours.[23,24,25] Research also suggests that child sexual abuse
trauma may negatively impact later relationships with significant others,
including partners and children.[26]

The stress on the correspondence of a negative mother complex to
outcomes of sexual abuse trauma is new, though obvious. For example, when
a negative mother complex dominates, the sense of distrust in others prevails.
Sexual abuse trauma reinforces this sense, especially when abuse is
experienced from a close family member. The deep expectations, such as not
to trust others in order not to be hurt, are confirmed. This is one of the most
severe sexual abuse trauma outcomes.

Sexual abuse trauma often produces feelings of worthlessness,
blame, guilt and helplessness, as well as an inability to control oneself and
one's situation. These are the core emotional predispositions of negative

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mother complex. Women with such complex constellations are not capable of having satisfactory and worthwhile relations with others and their sexual abuse experience merely confirm this incapability for them. Negative mother complex constellation strengthens even more through the formations of RIGs, when mothers do not believe their children, react negatively to their disclosure of sexual abuse and can not provide emotional support for them.

Research data show that a mother's own history of abuse may be associated with difficulty in functioning effectively as a parent, for example: difficulties in providing adequate care, troubles in sustaining a reasonable balance of affection and discipline, in greater use of physical punishment strategies and reduced ability to protect a child.[27,28] Diminished parenting abilities may be due to several factors, including a lack of positive parenting role models or depleted emotional resources needed for successful care giving. Also, mother-child role reversal is important.[29,30] For example, mothers who have been sexually abused may be fearful and overprotective or become overly dependent on children to meet their own emotional needs and may engage more in self-focused rather than child-focused communication. When mothers are more self-focused (usually utilising alcohol and other drugs in an attempt to avoid painful memories, depression, anxiety, and other difficulties associated with their own abuse trauma), they are less able to perceive their daughters' needs and have protective relations. Thus, the likelihood of the intergenerational cycle of sexual abuse trauma increases.[31]

4.   Intergenerational Circle of Abuse

As stated earlier, research suggests that having been sexually abused in one's own childhood may be a risk factor for sexual abuse occurring in the next generation. From the point of view of psychoanalytic theory, the intergenerational circle of abuse is based on unstable inner relations of victims. Relations with the mother are very important for girls to disclose and survive sexual abuse trauma, but mothers' reactions to children's disclosure are influenced by their own trauma. If there is no safe and supporting environment and no emotional contact with the mother, a girl must rely on her own inner structures and images, which may have been affected or not developed enough.

Carrying out the experiment of word association, Jung has noticed that mothers and daughters react very similarly. His results show that daughters generally have similar mechanisms of adaptation to the world as do their mothers.[32] Though they try to separate from the family with all their might, this ties them even more to the images of parents.[33]

It seems that the recovery after sexual abuse trauma is more beneficial in girls who have a positive mother complex. Such girls may feel guilt, fear, have depression or other sexual abuse trauma symptoms, but they have a potency to find inner resources to recover.[34] In Jung's words, such

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girls are able to assimilate negative experiences to a certain extent and to offset these negative experiences with positive ones.[35] Thus, they may be protected from long-term consequences of trauma.

Contrarily, negative mother complex may reinforce the consequences of experienced trauma. These are long-lasting, and not only strengthen a woman's negative mother complex, but also often produce preconditions for the appearance of a negative mother complex in daughters, which, in turn, may lead to a higher risk of trauma experience. If there are no external influences, the cycle of abuse may continue through the generations. Patient and sensitive intervention of professionals is needed to rebuild the contacts with the inner mother as well as with the external one. In other words, it is necessary to free oneself from dominance of the negative mother complex and to cope with sexual abuse trauma if one is to stop the vicious circle of transmission of abuse to the next generation.

This article is one of the attempts to understand and explain the intergenerational transmission of trauma in terms of analytical psychology. The assumptions of mother complex constellation and its influence on sexual abuse trauma still need scientific proof. Thus, according to psychoanalytic theory, complexes (the negative mother complex in particular) derive from the person's care-giving relationships as well as the whole of his or her experience. They are transmitted across generations and may account for continuity in abuse.

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Powerful, Educated and Immune from Justice: Contemporary Cambodian *Vitrioleuses*

Jane Welsh

Abstract
This paper discusses the issue of acid attack violence in Cambodia: a brutal and cruel form of violence that involves the intentional throwing of corrosive acid onto another person with the intention of disfiguration. In this country, attacks are predominantly perpetrated by women as a result of sexual jealously and crimes of passion. Much of the current discourses and interventions in Cambodia are focused on the victims of these crimes by often labeling victims as *Sangsars* - mistresses to older, married men - who are blamed for their own attacks. Thus, perpetrators are largely ignored and remain free from prosecution. With particular reference to the high-profile acid attack of Tat Marina by Khoun Sophal - the wife of a senior government official - this paper will also explore other factors that contribute to the impunity and disregard for Cambodian *vitrioleuses*. Some of these structural, human and contextual factors include power, gender imbalance, inequality, corruption and traditional beliefs that find women incapable of perpetrating vicious, intentional violence. This paper will be of particular interest to advocates and academics working on gender, human rights and disability issues.

Key Words: Acid attack violence, Cambodia, impunity, justice, violence against women, vitriol, women criminals.

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Vitriol throwing or acid attack violence is a brutal and cruel form of violence. Acid attacks involve the premeditated throwing of sulphuric, nitric, or hydrochloric acid onto another person, leaving them scarred physically, mentally and emotionally for life.[1] Acid attack violence is culturally, politically, legally, economically-sanctioned and often homicidal violence directed at girls, women and men, and perpetrated by both women and men who kill or seriously injure family and community members with impunity. This violent method of retribution "melts human flesh and even bones, causing excruciating pain and terror, and leaves the victims mutilated and scarred for the rest of their lives."[2] Consequently, acid attack violence is an insidious human rights issue, and "throwing acid is one of the worst crimes that a person can commit."[3]

Acid attack violence in Cambodia is a multi-causal problem, with risk factors such as poverty contributing to the incidence and severity of acid attack violence. However, the predominant underlying and interrelated components impinging on and inhibiting the development of responses to acid attack violence are cultural and societal processes.

It is difficult to ascertain accurate data on the number of acid attacks; however, the incidence of acid attacks suggests that it is increasing in Cambodia, with approximately 60 known cases of acid attacks taking place between 2004 and 2005.[4] In the early to mid 1990s, acid attacks were reported intermittently in the Cambodian media; however, a very public and high profile acid attack in late 1999 has provoked a lasting media interest in this issue. Both women and men are attacked for a number of reasons, including: sexual jealousy and extramarital affairs, land or business disputes, domestic violence, personal or family disputes, robbery, or hate or revenge.[5] In many cases reasons are unclear, and the attackers unidentified. There is, however, an identifiable pattern of motivations for acid attacks in Cambodia: women tend to attack other women over sexual jealousy or 'crimes of passion.'[6]

Throwing acid as a 'crime of passion' is not a new phenomenon. There are many reports that suggest vitriol attacks were in vogue during the late nineteenth century in the United Kingdom and Europe. A 'wave of *vitriolage*' occurred, particularly in France, where in 1879, 16 cases of vitriol attacks went before the assize court; from 1888 to 1890 there were 83 reported cases.[7] [8] The rhetorical and theatrical term *La Vitrioleuse* was coined, and their violent acts were widely reported in the popular press as 'crimes of passion,' perpetrated predominantly by women against other women, and "fuelled by jealousy, vengeance or madness and provoked by betrayal or disappointment."[9] *La Vitrioleuse's* intentions were to disfigure the individual facial features of their disloyal mate or female rival, therefore robbing him or her of the possibility of further amorous or sexual activity.[10] The crime of *vitriolage* produced widespread cultural myths about these women's based crimes and the "responses to it (which) presumed that the victim had participated in creating the conditions that inevitably spilled over into violence."[11] During the late 19th century several Art Nouveau artists also popularised the image of *Vitrioleuses* and Grasset's 1893 disturbing, yet beguiling '*La Vitrioleuse'* print is considered an Art Nouveau masterpiece.

Whereas sulphuric acid was used in industrial machinery factories, Shapiro explains that vitriol was a popular household cleaner, and many *Vitrioleuses* procured it cheaply and easily from grocers, dispensaries and hardware dealers. According to 19th century criminal writer Paul Aubry, the majority of *Vitrioleuses* were poor women who chose this weapon when they believed themselves to be economically vulnerable, with no leverage or resources.[12] However, the widespread hysteria and publicity about the use of

vitriol in 'crimes of passion,' which for a short time made such crimes even more prevalent, promoted an increase in cases where middle-class and bourgeois women also threw acid.[13] Commentators have also suggested that in many cases juries often excused women's premeditated, violent acts as they had 'honourable motives' in avenging their loss of love, loyalty and social position.[14] The 1885 case of Marie Couffin is testimony to this, when, in front of nearly five hundred people, she attacked her husband and his mistress. This 'crime of passion' was deemed less revolting than her husband's errant ways, and she was acquitted of the crime.

Whilst there is a plethora of information on case studies outlining the motivations and perpetrators, little literature exists on why vitriol attacks ceased in the United Kingdom and Europe. Possible explanations are that acid became scarce during World War II, or that reporting of such attacks changed in light of increased coverage of the war.[15] Chowdhury suggests that the decline in attacks was attributed to the strengthening of police and judicial systems.[16] The transformation of gender roles with women joining the war effort and intimate relationships between men and women could also be contributing factors to the decrease of attacks during this time. Further research needs to be conducted to understand the history and the demise of vitriol attacks, which will assist in understanding why attacks continue to occur, and may suggest ways to develop interventions for the present and future.

Today, acid attacks are also widely reported in South East Asia, South Asia, the Middle East, and Central and Northern Africa. Attacks also occur, to a lesser extent, in North America and Europe. These attacks seldom kill but result in serious disfigurement and suffering, which confine women to their homes, thereby leading to social isolation and depression.[17] Today, perpetrators of this act usually use sulphuric acid, nitric acid or hydrochloric acid - all of which are cheaply and readily available. Sulphuric acid is also used in the production or process of: cotton looming; weaving; microphone repair; amphetamine drugs; vinegar; traditional medicine; and radio and television repair. In many instances, acid throwers can purchase acid at motorbike mechanic shops for approximately 40 cents per litre. Alternatively, goldsmiths, jewellers, brass makers, and informal gold polishers use nitric acid to purify gold and metals, and perpetrators can easily purchase this from many of the gold and jewellery shops for about $1.50 per litre. Hydrochloric acid is also used in acid attacks; this is (also) used to polish jewellery and make soy sauce, cosmetics, and traditional medicine and amphetamine-type drugs.[18]

It is difficult to ascertain the exact historical trajectory of acid attack violence in Cambodia. In the 1960s in neighbouring Vietnam, a high profile case occurred which involved the sister-in-law of Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diem.[19] However, it is the case of 16-year old Karaoke star Tat Marina

that has created the greatest impact upon the increase in acid attack violence in Cambodia. On 5 December 1999, the wife of a high-ranking government official viciously attacked Tat Marina in public with more than a litre of nitric acid. This case of acid attack violence points out aspects of traditional Cambodian culture that influence the cultural myths, attitudes and beliefs of families, community members and leaders, law makers, development workers and other stakeholders towards acid attack survivors. Tat Marina was attacked because of her lower status and wealth, and the fact that she dared to dishonour a person higher in the social hierarchy, an act which provoked retribution.

At the time there was immense media coverage of the attack, with some less flattering stories in the local press that portrayed Tat Marina as an opportunist *Srey Ta-Ta* (a woman who lives with a much older, married man who economically supports her), who contributed to her own downfall. Nine years later, the perpetrator has never been brought to justice. This sent a very clear message out to Cambodian society, implying that mistresses or broken/bad women (*Srey Khoich*) deserve to be destroyed by acid, and there is no punishment for the crime. Reports from the NGO community and media have suggested the incidences of acid attacks in Cambodia have increased since Tat Marina's attack.[20] According to newspaper clippings collected by a local NGO: LICADHO, eight attacks occurred during the weeks after Tat Marina's attack. Similarly, Smith and Kimsong also suggest that, according to officials at one Phnom Penh hospital, there were eight acid attack victims during mid-December 1999, as opposed to one or two every few months, which had, hitherto, been the norm.

It is at this point that it is important to acknowledge significant factors in the Cambodian way of life, including: marriage, sexuality, gender relations, religious beliefs, face and honour, and hierarchy - all of which underpin and contribute to such horrific violence.[21] An adapted 'ecological violence model' by Heise is useful in understanding this interplay of cultural, societal, personal and situational imperatives that combine to proliferate and reinforce the subjugation of acid attack survivors in Cambodia. This approach argues that no one process is the sole causative or underpinning factor and it is an intricate network of processes together in combination, rather than in segregation, that are the indicators responsible. For example, in this model, cultural imperatives such as Karma, along with other processes, combine with personal level imperatives such as a survivor's individual financial resources, to determine the likelihood of acid attack violence.[22]

Based on this model, marriage is one institution that influences the cultural tapestry of Cambodia. Cambodia is a male-dominated society in which females are expected to conform to cultural norms, traditions and socially assigned gender roles by being 'a good woman' (*Srey La-Or*), marrying 'a suitable man' (*Bdei La-Or)*, providing children, and being a

loving and loyal homemaker (*Srey Grap Lakkhana*/*May P'Teah La-Or*).[23] The *Chbap Srey* is a traditional moral code of conduct for Cambodian women that outlines these expected and acceptable moral, religious and social behaviours, and also 'one's position in society.'[24] Many explains that marriage is a very important tradition for Cambodians, and that arranged marriage - which has been the practice in Cambodia for centuries - remains the conventional norm. One consequence of arranged marriages in Cambodia is that people who may not be intellectually, sexually or physically compatible with each other can be paired. The culturally prescribed role for men in Cambodia is not as rigid as it is for women, and it is socially acceptable for men to engage in pre-marital and extra-marital sex, although the modern constitution forbids polygyny and polygamy.[25] From 1970 through to 1998, significantly more men were killed or disappeared, and the only available options for many women were either to be a next wife (*Proh Pun Kroay*) or to remain unmarried (*Srey Ot Toan Gaa Te*). Surtees states that, given the dominance of the family institution and "women's role within it in the Cambodian social order, some researchers argue that many women prefer to be second and third wives, rather than to remain unmarried."[26] These factors, along with the increase in disposable incomes for some sectors of Cambodian society, have contributed to a dramatic increase in the buying and selling of sex in Cambodia.

Despite a plethora of information in Cambodia pertaining to the sex industry, very few reports focus on the cultural aspect of sexual behaviour and sexual practices in Khmer society. The silence shrouding this issue could be attributed to the private nature of sexuality in Cambodia, the cultural practice of protecting 'face,' and the logistical difficulties in collating statistics on the frequency and habits of pre-marital and extra-marital sex. For example, in some cases a husband will seek a mistress (*Sangsar*/*Srey Ta-Ta*) for a love affair.

As mentioned above there are also more women than men in Cambodia, a factor which, in addition to cultural acceptance of polygamy, has contributed to the availability and increased demand of women for pre-marital or extra-marital affairs. A 'good woman,' or loyal wife does not deviate from traditional norms, and will adhere to the *Chbap Srey* 'serve and respect their husbands at all times' and rarely leave her husband and home. Zimmerman states that "shame is one of the most influential emotions in the lives of Cambodian women,"[27] and the fear of losing status as a divorcee, or being abandoned and learning to live independently is a risk many women are afraid of. Therefore, a woman will instead take drastic steps to ensure she is not dishonoured by abandonment or placed in greater economic vulnerability by a young and attractive rival and will blame other women, rather than the men who are involved. An angry wife is also far more likely

to throw acid at her husband's mistress (*Sangsar / Srey Ta-Ta*) than at her unfaithful husband.[28]

In cases of acid attack violence where women attack other women, men sometimes absolve themselves of responsibility and accountability by deceptively suggesting that women were the only ones culpable, as they were the token torturers. As Daly illustrates, the token torturers (women) maintained and perpetrated the status quo as they mercilessly inflicted (acid) upon other women.[29] That is, wives often throw acid "against their husbands' mistresses (*Sangsar*): to take revenge and destroy the appearance of the victims so the husbands will not stay with them," and as Mydans poignantly states "… these are battles among the oppressed, the harsh intersection of mutual tragedies - woman against woman." However, these statistics on female perpetrators need to be viewed with caution, as they do not infer or "include accomplices of the perpetrator." The case of Tat Marina is testimony to this: although the instigator of the acid attack was a woman, a group of five or six men surrounded Tat Marina before the acid attack with "one of them kneeing her repeatedly in her chest until she passed out … [t]wo men went to a car parked nearby and brought back a container of nitric acid."[30] Furthermore, the husband of perpetator - and Tat Marina's lover - was aware of the impending acid attack, yet did not do anything to prevent it. Tat Marina now lives abroad, she has received over 20 operations, and it is doubtful that she will ever return to Cambodia. She has had numerous threats to her life. Several of her family members were forced to leave Cambodia and now live in exile. The attacker/s have never been arrested and it is believed that they still live in Phnom Penh, Cambodia.

Most information accrued for this research was from interviews, NGO reports and Masters and PhD papers. It is challenging to find theoretical and academic information and discourses on the issue of women perpetrating violent crimes such as acid attack violence.

Catherine McKinnon's conjecture on women perpetrators as abused victims themselves is not salient in this context. Theories posed by Burfoot and Lord in 'Killing Women' are also not useful in fully explaining this violence. The concepts of sadist/masochist - voyeur/victim, as developed by Belinda Morrissey, also do not directly translate into the context of female *vitrioleuses* in modern day Cambodia.

However, one possible concept that could be pertinent is that of Shapiro in 'Breaking the Codes - Female Criminality in the Fin de Siecle Paris.' In this we are able to locate a discourse akin to that of contemporary Cambodia. She discusses the private, domestic struggles played out in public spaces, whereby the *vitrioleuses* 'suffered' and were not punished for their crimes. They too were often more powerful and in a position of higher status than the victim. Thus, they were also powerful, educated and immune from justice.

As a final note, an Anti Mistress Law has recently been enacted in the Cambodian National Assembly. Instigated by Princess Marie Ranarid, this law aims to fine or imprison men who are caught violating conjugal relations. Whilst it is a new initiative, it will be interesting to see whether the introduction of this law will affect the motivations of crimes of passion involving the use of acid in Cambodia.

Notes

[1] Cambodian League for the Promotion and Defense of Human Rights (LICADHO), *Living in the Shadows: Acid Attacks in Cambodia*, Author, Phnom Penh, 2003, p. 1.

[2] ibid.

[3] ibid.

[4] J Morrison, *Fact-finding Visit to Cambodia 3rd to 9th November 2005*, Author, York, 2005, p. 2.

[5] LICADO, *Categories of Motives and Reasons for Events 1999 – 2005*, Author Phnom Penh, 2005, p. 1.

[6] ibid.

[7] M S Hartman, *Victorian Murderesses*, Paperback edition, Robson Books Ltd, London, 1977, p. 240.

[8] J Guillais, *Crimes of Passion: Dramas of Private Life in Nineteenth-Century France*, Trans. J Dunnett, Routledge, New York, 1991, p. 149.

[9] A L Shapiro, *Breaking the Codes: Female Criminality in Fin-de-Siècle Paris*, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1996, p. 139.

[10] R Harris, *Murders and Madness: Medicine, Law, and Society in the Fin-de-Siècle*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1989, p. 238.

[11] Shapiro, op. cit., p. 139.

[12] Hartman, op. cit., p. 240.

[13] ibid.

[14] Harris, op. cit., p. 238.

[15] K Watson, 'Loss of Face: Vitriol Throwing in Nineteenth-Century Britain', *Social History Society Annual Conference*, Dublin, January 2005.

[16] E H Chowdhury, 'Feminist Negotiations: Contesting Narratives of the Campaign Against Acid Violence in Bangladesh', *Meridians: Feminism, Race, Transnationalism* 6.1 (Summer 2005), p. 163.

[17] Human Rights Watch (HRW), 'Stop Violence Against Women: Forms of Violence Against Women in Pakistan', viewed 14 January 2006, <http://hrw.org/campaigns/pakistan/forms.htm>.

[18] LICADHO, 2003, op. cit., p. 3.

[19] C Sovirak and Adam Piore, "High-Profile Case Brings Rise in Acid Attacks," *The Cambodia Daily* December 24 1999, Vol. 17 Issue 7 ed.

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[20] J Smith and K Kimsong, 'Acid-Laced Vengeance', *The Cambodia Daily*, February 5-6 2000.

[21] M O'Leary and M Nee, *Learning for Transformation: A Study of the Relationship between Culture, Values, Experience and Development Practice in Cambodia,* CCC, Phnom Penh, 2001, p. 47.

[22] L Heise, 'Violence Against Women: An Integrated, Ecological Framework', *Violence Against Women*, 4.3 June 1998, p. 262.

[23] K Mony, 'Marriage', viewed 12 April 2006, <http://ethnomed.org/cultures/cambodian/camb_marriage.html>.

[24] E Bit, *The Warrior Heritage*, Seanglim Bit, California, 1979, p. 100.

[25] Mony, op. cit., p. 3.

[26] Ledgerwood and Baldwin, Benjamin and Kumar, quoted in R Surtees, 'Cambodian Women and Violence: Considering NGO Interventions in Cultural Context', Masters Diss., Macquarie University, 2000, p. 76.

[27] Zimmerman, quoted in G Vogin, 'An Analysis of Domestic Violence in the Catholic Rural Communities of Kompong Cham Cambodia: An Exploratory Study', PhD Diss., Institute of Spirituality and Counselling Psychology, 2004, p. 9.

[28] LICADHO, 2003, op. cit., p. 2.

[29] M Daly, *Gyn/Ecology: The Metaethics of Radical Feminism,* Beacon Press, Boston, 1978, pp. 137-139.

[30] Smith and Kimsong, op. cit.

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The Land of Oz:
Youth Gangs and Child Soldiers

Melissa F. Zisler

Abstract
Hundreds of thousands of children around the globe are involved in violent armed conflict. Children are often targeted for recruitment into gangs and paramilitary groups. These dangerous collectives have been liberated from the polarities that once existed. Their organisation and means of expansion, irrespective of national or social boundaries, the universal possession of arms, and lack of adherence to legal norms transcend social and national contexts. This paper examines the recruitment and abduction of children to serve in gangs and paramilitary operations around the world. Children of gangs and child soldiers witness and participate in extreme forms of violence. Though these groups may emanate from different regions around the world, encompassing diverse cultures and backgrounds, they share many similar characteristics. An understanding of the commonalities between gangs and child soldiers may help us comprehend how and why children join or are abducted to serve in these dangerous collectives. In this study, I will examine gangs and paramilitary operations that employ children, including membership, operational structure, and objectives. Next, I present commonalities in the social structures that may be contributing factors to the participation of children in these violent collectives. Finally, I examine the environmental factors and persuasive instruments that encourage recruitment or abduction practices to develop. This childhood epidemic exposes the fissures that exist within societies where youth violence is prevalent. A discovery of the similarities of 'at risk' children around the world will aid in the prevention of child exploitation and indoctrination.

Key Words: Armed groups, children, child soldiers, gangs, violence, youth.

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1.   **Introduction**

> *Worldwide, government armies, warlords, rebel groups, paramilitaries, and other militarized groups include an estimated three hundred thousand children... If these children stood side by side, locked their hands, and spread their arms, they would form a human chain 250 miles long.* [1]

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The manipulation of young populations to serve as vehicles of violence is a global problem. A contradictory relationship exists within the context of child soldiers, or children in armed conflict. Currently, hundreds of thousands of children around the world, ranging in age from five to eighteen years old, are involved in violent armed conflict.[2] Two of the main genres associated with this phenomenon are gangs and paramilitary organisations. Although these groups may emanate from diverse environments, cultures and backgrounds, they share many similar characteristics.

As the numbers of children recruited into gangs and violent military organisations escalates, this phenomenon is transcending borders. It is clear that the changes or strides that have taken place thus far are not sufficient. There have been countless laws passed and treaties signed and ratified both globally and in specific regions, that enforce the age of children in armed forces; yet, the vast majority of affected children remain in terrorist factions and paramilitary groups as well as street gangs.[3] An understanding of the shared characteristics or intersections of gangs and child soldiers may reveal how and why children join or are abducted to serve in these dangerous collectives. In this paper, I will define gangs and paramilitary operations that employ children; second, I present similarities and visible patterns in the roles that children play in these violent collectives; and finally, I examine the tools and mechanisms by which children are recruited or abducted to join gangs and paramilitary operations.

2.   Definitions of Children in Armed Conflict

Children of gangs and child soldiers are referred to in the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) proclamation as "children living in difficult circumstances."[4] There are two definitions associated with gangs and child soldiers. The child soldier definition indicates that a state of war exists, whereas in most instances gangs are not associated with war. Therefore, Dowdney presents a working definition encompassing all Children and Youth in Organized Armed Violence (COAV):[5] "Children and youth employed or otherwise participating in Organized Armed Violence where there are elements of a command structure and power over territory, local population or resources."[6] Children in armed groups, with an average age of thirteen years, are found in Afghanistan, Iraq, Liberia, Myanmar, Sudan, South Africa, Nigeria, Kenya, Europe, Australia, Mexico, Peru, Hong Kong, South Korea, Taiwan, Philippines, Colombia, Ecuador, El Salvador, the United States, Jamaica, Brazil, and the People's Republic of China.[7, 8]

According to the U.N. Convention on the Rights of a Child (CRC), a person is defined a child if he or she is under eighteen years old, although this definition is not accepted in all countries.[9] Some traditional or rural societies in Africa welcome a child into adulthood after they have completed a rite of passage. This normally occurs at the age of fourteen years. Circumcision is

often associated with this ritual.[10] In addition, many communities recognise adulthood in terms of labour. Therefore, these societies refer to children who join an armed force as "minor soldiers or underage soldiers."[11] The formal definition of a child soldier as stated by UNICEF is,

> Any person under eighteen years of age who is part of any kind of … armed force in any capacity, including … cooks, porters, messengers, and those accompanying such groups. Girls recruited for sexual purposes and forced marriages are included in this definition. It does not, therefore, only refer to a child who is carrying or has carried arms.[12]

As this definition does not include contexts of war, youth gang members could be included.

The definition of a gang changes often within a historical timeline. Originally, a gang was "an adolescent group perceived both by themselves and others as involved in delinquencies, but not of a serious or lethal nature."[13] However, the definition has been altered as gangs are noted as participants in extensive illegal and violent crime. Constant amendments to this definition have hindered statistical data.

There are two different structures of gangs: vertical and horizontal. A vertical gang is comprised of people living in the same neighbourhood. They are often members of the same family with a history in the area. The collective is often broken up into subgangs by age group. A horizontal gang is the most prominent gang structure. It is comprised of youth of similar ages who come from different areas. These gangs spread across cities, states and countries. When a gang grows this large, it morphs into a "supergang."[14] With areas of control so large, these gangs can be extremely dangerous to youth.

3.   Children in Armed Conflict

Child soldiers are assigned roles such as porters, sentries, sex slaves, spies, cooks, minesweepers, bodyguards, and combatants. Roles vary by age and gender.[15] Children in gangs participate at the bottom of a hierarchy, engaging in drug deals, serving as runners and lookouts, and eventually moving up through the ranks.[16]

Initiation rituals are commonplace in gangs and paramilitary groups. These tactics are a way to alienate the subject from the outside world. Initiations also serve to desensitise the victims to violence. Child soldiers are often ordered to kill or rape a family member or member of the community for initiation. This erases any morality that a child may have, enabling them to carry out further atrocities without reservation. This has long lasting effects on communities highly populated with former child soldiers; they do

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not know right from wrong, and killing and torture becomes the norm.[17] Whether a child joins, is recruited, or is abducted into a gang or paramilitary organisation, the collective serves a larger purpose for the individual. Within these structures, a child is fulfilling basic needs. Burton posits several needs that must be met to avoid conflict.[18] Burton's perspective of needs fulfilment stems from Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs. Maslow's hierarchy of needs consists of a pyramid of five categories of needs in ascending order: physiological, safety, belonging/love, esteem, and self-actualisation.[19]

The first need is *recognition*.[20] Children who are susceptible to recruitment or abduction into a gang or terrorist group may be lacking recognition.[21] When they enter a group such as this, they are given a role, which comes with responsibility and status. In addition, they are often recognised through monetary rewards for service. This responsibility, along with the reputation, is a main reason for children to join gangs.[22]

The next need is *identity*.[23] The children are lacking a sense of identity when they enter armed groups.[24] Any identity they did possess is stripped from them during initiation. The groups instil a new sense of identity, usually that of a killer. An 'us versus them' mentality cultivates the children's minds. The more they disassociate with the 'other,' the more they relate with their perspective groups. Children often go from futile existences to an identity with grave importance, fighting for a cause.

The third human need is *security*.[25] Areas of corruption and political unrest foster environments that exhibit vulnerability for children. From 2002 through 2004, the LRA (Lord's Resistance Army) in Uganda abducted twelve thousand children. They were most vulnerable at night when the group would conduct their raids. Due to this threat, many children now leave their villages at night and escape to other nearby cities, where they sleep on park benches, at bus stops, verandas, and in local factories. They are labelled 'night commuters.'[26] Oftentimes to insure their own safety, children will unite with the group they fear. This enables the children to remain in control. Capitalising upon this tactic is a common recruitment strategy among gang members.[27]

At times, girls join armed struggles to escape domestic exploitation and abuse. The group provides them with security.[28] However, if they leave, they face death.[29] The RUF, rebels of Sierra Leone, consisting mainly of abductees, brands each member of their group with the initials RUF. This insures that if a member escapes the force, they are recognised by comrades, opposing forces, or members of society, all of which will kill or greatly harm the child.[30]

The last human need that Burton proposes is *participation*.[31] Child soldiers often follow a political agenda, whether right or wrong. For gang members, establishing a sense of territory and defending that territory may serve as participation in their world.[32]

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4.   Recruitment of Children in Armed Conflict

Brett and Specht propose three levels that lead to involvement of children in gangs or paramilitary organisations: 1) environmental factors, encompassing seven categories; 2) personal history, and; 3) a triggering event.[33]

The first environmental factor affecting child involvement is *war*. The regions in which war exists, often civil war, have high numbers of children fighting in the conflict. This environment creates a dynamic for self-protection.[34]

The second factor is *poverty*.[35] According to numerous scholars, poverty is the leading factor, present in the vast majority of cases, that creates susceptibility to recruitment or abduction.[36] Impoverished areas, corrupt regimes and leaders take advantage of children. Child soldiers are recruited due to "convenience, low cost and impunity."[37] Gang leaders prefer using underage youth "to do their dirty work"[38] as their prison sentences are shorter or non existent.

The third factor is *education and employment*.[39] Children who are in school, or employed, possess a sense of self that can deter them from joining dangerous collectives. Schools can serve an essential role in communities, especially when parental roles are absent. However, if the education system is corrupt, youth may be steered in the wrong direction. It is not unusual for schools to become breeding grounds for recruitment.[40] Press ganging is a popular tactic used by rebel forces. Press ganging is a form of abduction where soldiers forage marketplaces, schools, or orphanages to round up children. A notorious case from the LRA involved 139 girls captured from Aboke school at one time.[41]

The fourth factor affecting membership of armed groups is *family and friends*.[42] A child's parents, siblings, extended family, teachers, and friends make up their social network. This core group is responsible for emotional development and acclimation to surroundings. Research shows that "inadequate parental supervision is one of the strongest predictors of youth delinquency and violence."[43] When there is trouble at home or the lack of a home, children will spend most of their time on the streets.[44]

A child with role models involved in violent lifestyles is at risk for involvement.[45] In Columbia, guerilla groups deploy attractive and articulate youth as recruiters to glamorise a life of violence, and to act as role models to increase recruitment. In the Philippines, armed groups deploy child soldiers to recruit other children through propaganda and peer pressure.[46] Gang awareness programs at schools can be detrimental if presented improperly; highlighting such things as graffiti, language, gestures and colors in anti-gang seminars may indicate exoticism and produce adverse effects.[47]

The fifth environmental factor is *politics and ideology*.[48] The political context of one's childhood greatly influences one's outlook on life.

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A political leader who focuses on the differences between people of one region, differences in ethnicity or religion for example, can influence the attitudes of the people.[49] This methodology can be used to propogate ethnocentrism and xenophobia. "Youth gangs have often been linked to urban political systems in times of rapid change and social turmoil."[50]

As the logistics of war have changed, government militaries - facing new battlegrounds - are coming in contact with a type of enemy they are not prepared to fight: children. This raises two issues: 1) Children are not seen as harmful enemies. When military professionals encounter child soldiers, it can greatly affect morale and emotional stability. Troops have been affected by Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder and clinical depression after engagements with rival youth. A whole new strategy is being developed for encounters with child soldiers. These methods stress non-confrontational approaches and focus on accentuating 'normal' child-like ideology. 2) Combating child soldiers is not highly favourable in the public eye. The media has a tendency to portray fallen child soldiers as martyrs and brave fighters for their cause, while conversely criticising the military for defending themselves.[51]

The sixth element explores specific *features of adolescence* that create susceptibility for recruitment.[52] Adolescents want to fit in and gain approval from their peers, promoting a positive self image. The glamorisation of gangs or armed groups can become an intricate factor in their appeal to young people.[53]

The last environmental factor is *culture and tradition*.[54] Together, these social constructs help a young person understand the world. A culture of disease has plagued areas of great poverty and strife. Specifically, HIV/AIDS has spread through these regions. Innocent women, abducted by child soldiers and held as sex slaves and/or raped, are becoming infected with HIV/AIDS. To put this social issue in perspective, statistics show that "more than two million children under age fifteen live with HIV, and each day approximately seventeen hundred additional children contract HIV."[55] The proper resources are currently lacking to combat this epidemic.

A cultural revolution that is enabling children to take a prominent role in armed groups and endangered zones is the proliferation of small arms.[56] The trafficking of light weight, small arms is spreading around the globe. This culture of weaponry allows the world's youth to participate in, and hold active roles in armed conflict.

A child's personal history contributes to involvement in violent collectives. These external influences will affect children similarly; however, children will choose to deal with these influences differently based on personal context. A triggering event, the third level of Brett and Specht's model, can be different for each child.[57] Stressors affect each individual adversely. Children can deal with stressors; however, when a child's 'stress absorption capacity' becomes overwhelming they become unable to deal with

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stress constructively.[58] This response can act as a trigger and result in membership of a violent group.

5.   Conclusion

To conclude, it is essential to rid children of blame for being a part of violent armed groups. Structural violence produces harmful effects for youth worldwide. In addition, the "commodification of children,"[59] which we are witnessing in this modern age of armed conflict, has the potential to result in 'social death' in particular societies. Social death of victims has three aspects, us-them thinking, dehumanisation of the victims, and blaming the victim(s). Humanitarian groups, civil societies, media, and most prominently, malevolent leaders of these armed groups, collectively have the potential to contribute to the social death of children at large.

Worldwide efforts, both by governments and advocates, have been put in place against this epidemic. However, these constructive endeavours, thus far, have not prevailed. There *are* several key strengths of this activism that have been identified, such as: establishing international standards on child employment, codifying legal norms, and setting minimum age requirements.[60] However, this 'progression' is naïve at best. These steps do not address the problem; they signify band-aid solutions. Most of the children at risk will not be affected by these changes. The only true strength of this movement thus far is increasing public awareness.

Hurdles remain and the much needed funding is not yet available. Throughout this examination of child soldiers and children of gangs, the substantial parallels that exist under the surface are revealed. As time goes on, we are witnessing the evolution of the phenomenon of children in armed groups. It is essential to use these parallels to facilitate innovative and successful measures to eradicate these practices on a global scale.

Notes

[1] M Wessells, *Child Soldiers,* Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 2006, p. 2.

[2] ibid.

[3] P W Singer, 'Talk is Cheap: Getting Serious about Preventing Child Soldiers,' *Cornell International Law Journal*, Vol. 37, 2004, pp. 1-22.

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[8] Singer, 2004, p. 2.

[9] Convention on the Rights of a Child. Office of the United Nations High Commissioner on Human Rights, Geneva, 1997-2003, viewed 29 October 2007, <http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/k2crc.htm>.

[10] Wessells, 2006, p. 5.

[11] ibid.

[12] ibid., p. 7.

[13] Spergel, op. cit., p. 179.

[14] ibid., p. 199.

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[19] ibid.

[20] ibid.

[21] Spergel, op. cit., p. 223.

[22] ibid.

[23] Fisher, op. cit..

[24] Spergel, op. cit. , p. 223.

[25] Fisher, op. cit.

[26] P Akhavan, 'The Lord's Resistance Army Case: Uganda's Submission of the First State Referral to the International Criminal Court'. *The American Journal of International Law,* Vol. 99, no. 2, 2005, pp. 403-421.

[27] Dowdney, op. cit., 2005.

[28] R Brett and I Specht, *Young Soldiers: Why They Chose to Fight,* Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder, 2004.

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[30] I Beah, *A Long Way Gone: Memoirs of a Boy Soldier*, Sarah Crichton Books, New York, 2007, p. 24.

[31] Fisher, op. cit.

[32] Spergel, op. cit.

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[33] Brett and Specht, op. cit.

[34] ibid.

[35] Brett and Specht, op. cit.

[36] Brett and Specht, op. cit.; Dowdney, op. cit.; Errante, op. cit.; Spergel, op. cit.; Wessells, op. cit.

[37] Wessells, op. cit., p. 33.

[38] J Glusing, 'Child Soldiers in Drug Wars', *Spiegel Online International.* March 2, 2007, viewed 29 October 2007, <http://www.spiegel.de/international/spiegel/0,1518,469510,00.html>.

[39] Brett and Specht, op. cit.

[40] ibid.

[41] Wessells, op. cit.

[42] Brett and Specht, op. cit.

[43] Errante, op. cit., p. 361.

[44] Brett and Specht, op. cit.; Dowdney, op. cit.

[45] Dowdney, op. cit.

[46] Wessells, op. cit.

[47] Errante, op. cit.

[48] Brett and Spect, op. cit.

[49] ibid.

[50] Spergel, op. cit., p. 240.

[51] P Singer, 'Fighting Child Soldiers'. *Military Review* 83, no. 3, 2003, pp. 26-34.

[52] Brett and Specht, op. cit.

[53] Ibid.

[54] ibid.

[55] Wessells, op. cit., p. 118.

[56] Singer, op. cit., ; Spergel, op. cit., ; D M Rosen, *Armies of the young: Child soldiers in war and terrorism,* Rutgers University Press, New Brunswick, 2005; Wessells, 2006.

[57] Brett and Specht, op. cit.

[58] Errante, op. cit.

[59] Rosen, op. cit.

[60] Singer, op. cit.

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Section 5

Attempts at Countering Violence

Mashing Power: Musical Imaginings of the Unimaginable

David Weir

Abstract
Since the 9/11/2001 attacks on the U.S., a mushrooming personal computer industry has converged with a protracted media-hyped war and increasing availability of high speed Internet to give rise to a new form of musical political activism. 'Political mashup' utilises digital audio technologies to set recontextualised sampled political speech to composed or appropriated musical backings. Digitally captured, manipulated and underscored speech forms new narratives that reflect the political views of their creators. Generally self-produced (often by non-professional musicians), political mashup tends to be distributed via the Internet, where it can be downloaded free of charge from many websites. U.S. President George W. Bush's role as the most visible and audible architect of the 'war on terror' has made his speech particularly vulnerable to capture by a multitude of mashup artists eager to express their opposition to the war. In all but a handful of examples currently circulating online, the latitude for constructing meaning enjoyed by mashup practitioners is deployed in acrimonious, indeed, often abusive ways that speak more of personal catharsis than envisioned peace. My work problematises this tendency, proposing an alternative approach to political mashup that is guided by ideals of non-violence. Prominent power-wielders in the 'war on terror' are 'corrected' by their own words, verbalising confessional narratives that imagine their redemption. The 'unimaginability' of such repentant speech from powerful leaders bespeaks the brutal logic of power, seen here as transcending the sovereign power of nation states and their leaders to encompass what Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri have called 'Empire.' Presenting audio examples of my works, I explicate their multi-faceted nature as expressions of resistance; first against perpetual war, but finally, against the hegemonic decrees of Empire. I explore the potentialities of the Myspace site as a global network that facilitates communication between the singularities who comprise a resistant 'multitude': its aim being the rupturing of acquiescence to hegemonic messages that legitimate violence.

Key Words: Activism, mashup, media, music, non-violence, politics, technology.

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1.   Introducing Political Mashup

This paper focuses upon a post-9/11 form of musical political activism. Certain points throughout the paper shall be illustrated by audio examples **[**audio clip 1 **-** excerpt from *Imagine This*].[1]

Unfortunately, I cannot claim authorship of that timely merging of the sampled speech of U.S. 'War President' George W. Bush with John Lennon's iconic ode to peace. The track in its entirety constitutes an atypically hopeful example of 'political mashup' by one of the recently emerged genre's exemplars, Tom Compagnoni - aka *Wax Audio*. Political mashup is a postmodern form of musical protest based upon the incorporation of political speech samples into composed or appropriated musical settings.

President Bush was, of course, an unwitting participant in this digital 'tour de force.' The broadening reach of contemporary global telecommunications networks renders the images and soundbites of major political leaders ever more vulnerable to capture. Political speech is generally an audiovisual event - a carefully crafted conflation of text and images designed to convey governmental messages. Political mashup artists unearth their raw materials by stripping the aurality from these events. From its internment as digitised data on the hard drives of increasingly affordable computers, the speech may then be subjected to a prodigious array of manipulations using software that can be found as open source freeware on the Internet. Digital artists cut, copy, paste, stretch and repitch captured audio, recontextualising the speech of political leaders to change its meaning. New, oppositional narratives, formulated through the reordering of words and phrases – and the occasional construction of words from syllables – are imbued with further meaning by the addition of music, which can be used for dramatic, humorous and ironic effect [audio clip 2 - Bush: "I was led into the darkness…"].[2] To find an audience, artists need only to [audio clip 3 - Bush: "post the results on the internet?"].[3]

More than merely the novel product of a generation's enthralment with technology, political mashup is a dissident practice that arises from the convergence of these technologies with the mass-mediated 'war on terror.' Although inextricably bound to that conflict through its co-option of media soundbites from the war's chief protagonists, political mashup's genealogy has roots in both the longstanding tradition of protest music and in 20th century cultural activism. In the spirit of the latter, its practitioners comprise a multitude of musicians and digital artists seeking agency in opposing not only the war, but the networked structure of globalised capitalism for which war is really just a biopolitical instrument. This hegemonic structure, which Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri have called 'Empire,' has evolved hand in hand with our western liberal democracies along the global pathways their technologies have forged.[4]

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2.   A Brief Genealogy of Political Mashup

The violence visited upon the U.S. on 9/11 evoked a proliferation of media images. Unremittingly looped playbacks of the passenger jet careering into the South Tower of the World Trade Center transfixed television viewers in the West. Those not engulfed by the surge of flag-waving U.S. nationalism that followed the attacks waited nervously for the responses the events would be called upon to justify.[5] The rumblings of war exposed cracks in democracy even then, only days after the events, when Slavoj Žižek remarked: "decisions are being made that will affect the fate of all of us, and all of us just wait, aware that we are utterly powerless."[6] For, it was possible to empathise with the reeling nation while concurrently meditating on what could have led to acts of such focused hatred. Judith Butler has suggested that America's sense of woundedness after the attacks offered an opportunity for it to take pause; to "start to imagine a world in which the violence might be minimised"[7] [audio clip 4 - Bush: "How I dream of peace in our world"].[8] However, in that climate of shock and injured national pride, *The New York Times* pilloried those who cautioned against violent knee-jerk responses, branding them as 'excuseniks,' an appellation echoing that of 'peaceniks' from the Vietnam war era.[9] Whatever remained of the corporate-owned media's role as a watch dog over government policy was jettisoned as the media became, instead, the platform from which the ideologues within the Bush administration could launch their war of ideas.[10] [audio clip 5 - Bush: "the unfurling of flags"][11] Initially, there was widespread support of the Afghanistan invasion.[12] The figure of Osama Bin Laden constituted a tangible enemy at which the grievously injured nation could direct its vengeful wrath. The global communications networks supplied the conduit through which epochal ideas could be disseminated, a fact discerned by Derrida:

> Between the two supposed war leaders, the two metonymies, 'Bin Laden' and 'Bush,' the war of images and of discourses proceeds at an ever quickening pace over the airwaves, dissimulating and reflecting more and more quickly the truth that it reveals.[13]

President Bush issued warnings [audio clip 6 - Bush: "Iraq is a grave and gathering threat"],[14] while the perils of anthrax and chemical/biological weapons haunted evening news broadcasts. Reportage became progressively infused with a lexicon centred around the term 'terrorism,' a word, according to Saul Newman, that has come to

> function(s) as an ideological tool of the modern western state, serving to legitimise a series of measures which, prior

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to September 11, would have been unthinkable, but which
are now accepted as necessary and normal.[15]

This propogandist function of terror-centred rhetoric became more
evident after the 2003 U.S. decision to invade Iraq. The unprovoked,
unilateral invasion was lent implicit support by the western mass media, who
portrayed it as the liberation of Iraqis from the "evil dictator,"[16] while
downplaying civilian casualties and avoiding references to increasingly
dubious pretexts for invasion [audio clip 7 - Bush: "Those weapons of mass
destruction gotta be somewhere!"].[17] The extraordinary measures referred to
by Newman included the tightening of anti-sedition laws, the withholding of
normal juridical process for terror suspects and the covert surveillance of
citizens. It was within this socio-political climate that political mashup was
conceived. In the spirit of 'culture jamming,' technologically adroit
musicians and digital artists began capturing media content, then deploying
their digital cut and paste skills to reconfigure it. Reconstructed narratives
were posted on a mushrooming array of activist websites and blogs. The
currency exchanged for their freely downloadable creations was a sense of
agency in an otherwise one-way discourse. Here are some edited examples:
[audio clip 8 - Other mashups].[18]

3.   Empire and Spaces of Resistance
The vein of derisiveness that threads these examples is characteristic
of the genre. Notwithstanding the acrimony directed at Bush and his hawkish
administration, the pieces express an emphatic opposition to something
beyond merely war. They embody an importunity to listeners to recognise
threats to their own democracies - directed not from outside by the terrorists,
but from within by their elected leaders. Of course, cyberspace is awash with
conspiracy theories avowing U.S. government orchestration of the September
11 attacks, but the suspicions of the political mashers in relation to
governmental corrosion of democracy need not be dismissed as mere
paranoia. Since 9/11 we have witnessed the muzzling of the press, the erosion
of civil liberties and the flouting of international juridical law by the U.S.
government and its allies - all in the name of fighting terrorism. According to
Hardt and Negri these suspensions of normal democratic observances are
justified by the sovereign states that implement them by recourse to the
ancient notion of 'state of exception,' a response to times of crisis during
which the sovereign entity temporarily adopts extraordinary powers of
intervention and control. However, the war on terror, Hardt and Negri argue,
is a war that cannot be won.[19]
The extraordinary measures referred to above may, therefore, be
seen as regulatory police actions that operate in a *perpetual* state of
exception. Moreover, it is within such an unending crisis that the

supranational entity of 'Empire' finds the necessary conditions for its project, which is the formation and preservation of social order.[20] The United States, as a central node of Empire, justifies its violence outside of discourses of legality, resorting instead to rationales based upon morality. Violence, therefore, is legitimised by claims of "justness."[21] That the war on terror is sold to us as a 'just war' is indicative of the biopolitical nature of Empire's en-globing power, applied not only through perpetual police action to maintain social order, but also through the dissemination of universal values that aid in regulating societies, through institutions such as the mass media.[22]

One key value among these is the normalisation of violence. What is problematic in most of the political mashup artists' oppositional responses to Empire is their failure to escape the universalised frames of reference *installed* by Empire. Saul Newman has revisited Foucault's philosophical conundrum concerning the difficulty of countering power from within its own field of influence, which, claimed the latter, encompasses everything. Newman, through a compellingly constructed argument beyond the scope of this paper, suggests that resistance to power can only be mounted from a space that remains untainted by power's inculcated axioms.[23] If Empire is sustained by the violence it normalises, then one can only conceive a counter paradigm from a place within oneself that remains resistant to this inculcation. To this end I have created an imaginary projection of the character of U.S. President George W. Bush through which non-violent tenets may be expressed [audio clip 9 - *The Redemption of George W.*].[24]

4.   The Multitude's Destabilisation of the Global Capitalist Hegemony

The piece I just played is intended as an invitation to imagine the 'unimaginable.' It is an attempt at dislocating a reality - the reality that accepts power's modus operandi as normality. The piece is available - along with others - for listening and free download on a number of Internet sites, most prominently, on the social networking website *Myspace*.[25] Inverting the mass media's traditional model, based upon the provision of mildly interesting content to a widespread audience, the Internet is a platform that facilitates "dense clusters of users"[26] who share intense interests. The inbuilt architectures of social networking sites such as *Myspace* and *Facebook* are expressly designed to facilitate the formation of connectivities based upon common interests. A glance through the online 'friends' of any activist *Myspace* profile will inevitably reveal a whole host of profiles similarly aligned along axes of political engagement, non-violence, anti-globalisation, environmentalism and human rights. Representing both musician and non-musician activists, the profiles utilise their online connectivity to share resources and information in a realm largely unpoliced by hegemonic regulatory mechanisms.[27] In fact, these globally linked online activists find a

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pronounced resonance with Hardt and Negri's concept of the 'multitude'; they constitute a fluid array of singularities whose attentions and creative energies coalesce around political and social perspectives held in common.[28]

The online multitude of activist musicians can be seen as a culture in the making. In their departure from traditional resistant strategies that aim for revolution, they represent a celebration of means rather than ends, an orientation illustrated by the slogan of Web-based independent media centre, Indymedia: "Don't hate the media, become the media."[29] Their goal is not the overthrowing of the existing hegemonic structure, but rather, the engagement with a mode of cultural production that negates this structure - and disturbs its hegemony by their very processes of production.[30] These processes are disruptive in that they function largely outside of the field of influence of global capital. They operate at each stage of the life cycle of a typical political mashup piece: from the sharing of mass mediated speech samples, the distribution of information unavailable through mainstream souces, the sharing of digital audio production software via peer-to-peer networks or through open source platforms, the self publishing of creative products via the Internet, and the non-pecuniary distribution of the creative works.

To conclude, the non-violent form of musical 'protest' I have espoused escapes Empire's field of influence on three counts: by its rejection of the normalised violence instilled by Empire, by its transgressive appropriation of the technologies of Empire, and by its production and dissemination outside of the revenue streams of Empire. Such oppositional, transgressive practices may therefore be seen as examples of agency within the complex milieu of global capitalism, made possible by that system's own infrastructure. These instances hold the possibility of producing new cultures whose identities are determined not by the system they oppose, but by the world they envision. In imagining the 'unimaginable,' they may gradually call forth a culture that prioritises values such as peace, equality and compassion above the amassing of wealth.

Notes

[1] T Compagnoni, *Imagine This*, Wax Audio, 2003, viewed 12 June 2007, <http://www.waxaudio.com.au/downloads/mediacracy>.
[2] D Weir, *The Redemption of George W.*, self produced audio recording, 2006.
[3] G Bush online audio archive, viewed 12 June 2006,<http://www.thebots.net>.

[4] M Hardt and A Negri, *Empire*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 2000, p. 298.

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[5] S Žižek, 'Reflections on WTC, 7/10/01' (an earlier version of the book, *Welcome to the Desert of the Real*), available online at lacan.com, 1997/2001, viewed 5 February 2008, <http://lacan.com/reflections.htm>.

[6] ibid.

[7] J Butler, *Precarious Life: The Powers of Mourning and Violence*, Verso, New York, 2004, p. xiii.

[8] Bush, op. cit.

[9] Butler, op. cit., p. xiii.

[10] S Marshall, 'An Introduction to *S-11 Redux*', summary outline of a short film directed by Stephen Marshall, October 2004, viewed 23 March 2008, <http://gnn.tv/videos/9/S_11_Redux>.

[11] Weir, op. cit.

[12] Zizek, op. cit.

[13] J Derrida, quoted in G Borradori, *Philosophy in a Time of Terror: Dialogues With Jürgen Habermas and Jacques Derrida*, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 2003, p. 21.

[14] Bush, op. cit.

[15] S Newman, *Power and Politics in Poststructuralist Thought: New theories of the political*, Routledge, London, 2004, p. 101.

[16] R Hil and P Wilson, *Dead Bodies Don't Count: Civilian Casualties and the Forgotten Costs of the Iraq Conflict,* Zeus Publications, Burleigh, Queensland, 2007, p. 22.

[17] D Weir, *Mass Distraction,* self produced audio recording, 2004.

[18] Musical excerpts from: *Fudge the Numbers* by Lthrboots, viewed 5 January 2008:
<http://www.acidplanet.com/artist.asp?pid=407513&T=7962>;
Bushwack 2 by Tone Def and the Bots, viewed 7 February 2008,
<http://www.diymedia.net/audio/mp3/tdntb-bushwack2.mp3>;
Bush Comes Clean by Frenz, viewed 23 March 2008,
<http://frenz.dmusic.com>;
Fuzzy Math by The Bots, viewed 3 June 2006,
<http://www.thebots.net/FuzzyMath.mp3>.

[19] M Hardt and A Negri, *Multitude: War and Democracy in the Age of Empire*, The Penguin Press, New York, 2004, p. 14.

[20] ibid., p. 21.

[21] ibid., p. 27.

[22] ibid., p. 15.

[23] Newman, op. cit.

[24] Weir, *The Redemption of George W.*, op. cit.

[25] <http://www.myspace.com/davidjweir>.

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[26] Y Benkler, *The Wealth of Networks: How Social Production Transforms Markets and Freedom*, Yale University Press, New Haven, 2006, p. 177.
[27] ibid.
[28] Hardt and Negri, *Multitude*, op. cit., p. 198.
[29] ibid., p. 305.
[30] A Haupt, 'The Technology of Subversion: From Digital Sampling in Hip-Hop to the MP3 Revolution', in *Cybersounds: Essays on Virtual Music Culture*, M Ayers (ed), Peter Lang, New York, 2006, pp. 107-125, p. 108.

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Günter Grass - His Commitment against Violence

Cornelia Caseau

Abstract
In a speech delivered before the parliamentary group of the SPD on 11 January 2008, Günter Grass, winner of the Nobel Prize for literature in 1999, summarised a number of points that make up his social and political commitments spanning his entire literary career. The speech revealed that the majority of these themes reflect a lasting commitment against violence. These will constitute the subject of this paper. Grass evokes the current problem of violence among young immigrants in German cities, which the leader of the regional government of Hessen, Roland Koch, wanted to fight using racist measures proposed during his election campaign in 2007/08. Grass is equally worried about the growing number of regions in crisis and at war in the world today, particularly in the Middle East and Africa. At the same time he accuses Western democracies for their hesitations when confronted with these troubles. We should not forget his commitment towards the Kurds in Turkey and the right of asylum to the politically persecuted. Grass suggests rereading the report on the North-South dialogue composed by his spiritual father, the social democrat Willy Brandt, for the UN in the mid '70s to combat the roots of violence, which constitute poverty, hunger and humiliation. In effect, for Brandt, world hunger is only another form of war. Grass similarly shows his commitment against the exclusion of the most disadvantaged, a commitment which he carries on in his fight for minorities in Germany and throughout Europe, and for the integration of the Roma and Sinti peoples who were systematically exterminated during World War II. Consequently, the subject of this paper will be to study to what degree the commitment of Grass was and still is able to join in the struggle against violence and exclusion in all of its contemporary forms.

Key Words: Brandt, Eskildsen, Grass, Kemal, Pankok, Roma.

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1. Introduction

Günter Grass, German Nobel Prize winner for literature in 1999, who celebrated his 80th birthday in October 2007, is known for his vast literary and creative output, his political activities, but equally for his commitment against social injustice, poverty, hunger, exclusion and violence in the world. Even if his recent confession of belonging to the Waffen SS

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threw a shadow over his integrity and tarnished his fame, nevertheless it is important not to forget that especially since the 1960s Grass has looked into each of these questions.

And recently, in a speech delivered before the parliamentary group of the SPD, the German social democratic party, on 11 January 2008,[1] the writer summarised a large number of points that have made up his social and political commitment throughout his literary career. It turns out that most of these themes reflect a long-lasting fight against violence and hostility. The recollection of some of these will constitute the framework of my paper.

First of all: where does this commitment come from? There are two people in this field who seem to have particularly influenced Grass: they are Otto Pankok, one of his professors at the Academy of Fine Arts in Düsseldorf just after the war (Grass started his artistic career in painting and sculpture), and the social democrat German Chancellor and winner of the Nobel Prize for Peace, Willy Brandt. These two men devoted their lives to fighting for peace and justice and it is their ideas with whom Grass identified himself. He asks for the right of a writer to express his or her opinion on political issues, taking an active role as a citizen. He also claims that intellectuals, and in particular, writers, should leave their 'ivory towers' to commit themselves to public life.[2] "Wer den Beruf des Schriftstellers wählt, muss zu Wort kommen …"[3] (he who chooses the career of a writer should speak out); he wrote in an open letter addressed to fellow writers at the time of the construction of the Berlin Wall in 1961: 'He who stays silent becomes guilty.'

Throughout his career Grass was considered as a committed writer, the terror of the bourgeois.[4] From the publication of his first great novel, *The Tin Drum* in 1959, which was a worldwide success, he was designated as such.

Moreover, the writer's publications and statements are practically always accompanied with strong reactions, even controversy. Let me quote as an example the reaction provoked by the publication of the novel *Too Far Afield* in 1995 which deals with the subject of how the reunification was handled.[5] On the first page of the magazine *Der Spiegel* one sees the godfather of German literature, Marcel Reich-Ranicki, tearing up this book. In an open letter addressed to the writer, he alludes to what he considers to be Grass' great failure.[6]

The most ferocious criticisms would be surely those provoked by the publication of the book, *Peeling the Onion* in the summer of 2006 where Grass admits his membership as a young man in the Waffen SS.[7] Labelled as a man who belonged to the Waffen SS, he would probably have reached the peak of what the critics identify with brutality, because this term tends to mean 'the incarnation of evil,' or 'son of the devil.'[8]

Second, let's examine the degree to which Grass succeeded in fighting against violence and working for peace - a commitment that his experiences, as well as those of his generation who lived under National Socialism - aroused in him.[9] In effect, Grass always considered his writing as an act against forgetting.

2. Violence of Young Immigrants and Rhetorical Violence in Politics

The months of December 2007 and January 2008 were marked by an election campaign in two German states: Hessen and Lower Saxony. In particular, it was the campaign in Hessen which provoked the anger of Grass. The Minister-President of the conservative CDU party of this region, Roland Koch, who had already won the last regional election due to his populist language and a campaign against dual nationality, tried once again to play the same hand, without this time convincing the majority.

Let us recall the facts: in December 2007 a German pensioner was attacked by two young immigrants in a Munich subway station, an event hugely publicised in the media which would be followed by a similar assault shortly after in Frankfurt.

These brutal attacks would thereafter provide Koch with the facts necessary to justify and strengthen his arguments against immigrants. The violence of the youths, especially that of young immigrants, that he wanted to combat with exemplary sanctions fed, in this manner, a violent rhetoric.[10] In effect, he proposed to send these juvenile delinquents to so-called education camps, a name that is certainly full of meaning and that cannot help recalling the term 'Jugendschutzlager' used during the Second World War.[11] Certainly, statistics prove that juvenile delinquents more often come from an immigrant environment rather than a purely German one. But the statistics also illustrate that the danger coming from this part of the population is largely exaggerated by certain politicians. For instance, in Hessen 90% of serious crimes are committed by Germans.[12]

Invited on 11 January 2008 for the first time in 34 years by the parliamentary group of the SPD, Grass spoke precisely on this subject. He was noticeably repelled by this kind of manipulation and warned the politicians against using terminology associated with the NPD,[13] the extreme right party. His speech thus provided an opportunity, on the one hand to express his worry and his reaction against this xenophobic campaign, and on the other hand, to confirm, once again, his support for the SPD and social democracy.[14]

The question of immigrants and asylum seekers has preoccupied Grass for a long time. In 1997, Grass denounced the politics of the conservative Kohl government towards foreigners. Grass delivered a speech

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praising the Kurdish writer Yasar Kemal on his acceptance of the most important German Peace Prize entitled *Friedenspreis des deutschen Buchhandels* at the Paulskirche in Frankfurt. In this speech Grass condemned the hypocrisy of Germany, which, on the one hand, supplied arms and tanks to the Turkish government, but on the other hand refused the right of asylum to the Kurdish minority persecuted in its own country. Moreover, Yasar Kemal received this prize for his commitment to the poor, the exploited and the persecuted.

3.   "Hunger is Another Form of War"[15]

These words were delivered by the socialist German Chancellor Willy Brandt at his speech before the UN in 1973 in New York. Grass does not tire of repeating this famous sentence - to the degree that he included it in his own acceptance speech when he received the Nobel Prize in 1999. Grass met Brandt at the end of the summer of 1961, the summer when the Berlin wall was constructed and when Brandt was mayor of Berlin and first time candidate to become Chancellor. Grass offered his services to write Brandt's speeches and afterwards he participated wholeheartedly in his election campaign. He also supported Brandt's Ostpolitik. Since then, they remained close and the perceptions of the politician, who died in 1992, stays with him even today.

Not only as Chancellor, but while president of the North-South Commission at the beginning of the 1980s, Brandt revealed the cause and effect relation between the arms race of military alliances in the east and west and the poverty of countries on the path to development. On the one hand, Grass tried to attract the world's attention towards the injustice between rich and poor countries, the abundance here and the hunger there. On the other hand he also tried to point out the anger of the poor nations of Asia, Africa and Latin America, faced with the arrogance of rich countries in the north who were not ready to renounce their overabundance and their economic power.[16] According to Grass, the events which took place in New York and Washington in September 2001 would have justified a new reading of the North-South report of Willy Brandt[17] and his book *Organized Lunacy*.[18]

One action, which perfectly illustrates the desire of Grass to act, is his involvement in 1968 against the hunger of the children of Biafra, an enclave of Nigeria. After he could not find support either from student organisations or international organisations for the defence of human rights (the USSR was among others involved in this genocide), it was Grass who led the group of demonstrators on 4 October 1968 in Hamburg. An article appeared several days later in the weekly paper *Die Zeit*, signed by Grass, among others, provoking the government and citizens to act.[19]

Grass also carried out another action to help the poorest in India. Following a trip to Calcutta in 1986-1987, he discovered the life of the untouchables in the shanty towns of this megacity and decided to intervene to ameliorate the condition of the children's lives. Through providing funding to the Calcutta Social Project, he was able to contribute financially to the construction of a school.[20]

Despite the humanitarian actions carried out throughout the world, Grass has a sombre outlook on the prospect of world relations. In his speech of 11 January 2008 he predicted that the future will probably be made up of relentless struggles for the redistribution of food and wealth as well as unleashed violence.[21] Grass believes, in effect, that a growing number of regions in crisis or at war in the Middle East and Africa find themselves face to face with western democracies with weak behaviour who lose their credibility when confronted with terrorism.[22]

Grass made several noteworthy comments about war in general. For him, military offensives, like those carried out by the Bush government against Afghanistan and Iraq are unacceptable.[23] He considers the war in Iraq as a threat to peace in the world.[24] In 1995 however, he supported the intervention of German soldiers in the Balkans, a position he regrets today because he deplores the Europeans' failure at Kosovo and the participation of the Americans called in to help.[25] He would never have supported the bombardment of Serbia with arms operated by remote control which killed thousands of civilians.[26]

Although he does not declare himself a pacifist, he is always looking to maintain or re-establish peace.[27] His involvement in the foundation of the Willy Brandt Circle in 1997 at Hamburg, along with some politicians, illustrates once again Grass commitment to peace.[28] It is by demonstrations, publications and public declarations to support peace that the Circle seeks to act. Also, in 2006 he called on parliament and the German government to be on guard against the danger of armed conflict in Iran.[29] And, in 2007 he fought against the construction of a very controversial centre for Germans expelled in 1945 from former German territory in Eastern Europe, declaring himself instead in favour of a centre against war in general.[30] It is a more just solution, because those who want to prevent expulsion should prevent war.[31]

4.   From Pankok to Eskildsen - or the Commitment of a Writer against Discrimination

The commitment of Grass towards minorities, in particular for the Sinti and the Roma in Germany, has been another of his long-standing and significant objectives. This interest goes back to the period 1948-52 when he was a student at the Academy of Fine Arts in Düsseldorf. During this period

it was his professor Otto Pankok (1893-1966) who drew the attention of his students towards minorities, and in particular, those known as 'gypsies.' And Grass perpetuates the work of his master, thanks to the Foundation Otto Pankok set up in 1997 in Lübeck. This foundation still offers today an endowment of €10,000 to those who distinguish themselves through special efforts in favour of these minorities.

Let us not forget that Otto Pankok was one of the most famous German painters during the first half of the 20th century. His work is rated at the end of the expressionist period. In the `30s he became famous, especially due to his drawings on the life of the gypsies who were living in Düsseldorf. Under the Third Reich he was not allowed to work, which did not prevent him from underlining the fate of Jews in captivating images. As a humanist, he transmitted his ideals to his students; and his 1950 wood carving, entitled *Christ Breaking the Gun*, became the icon for the pacifist and anti-nuclear movement.[32] An exhibition shown at the Günter Grass House in Lübeck in 2007 entitled *The Good God Otto Pankok. A Teacher of Günter Grass*[33] saw the rediscovery of his work and recalls at the same time the artistic beginnings of Grass.

But let us return to the terrible reality of the 'gypsies' during the Second World War. In effect, the majority in Germany were imprisoned in work camps. The first camps were, moreover, built at the time of the Olympic Games in Berlin in 1936 to present visitors a city without gypsies.[34] In 1942 Himmler signed the Auschwitz decree to send these ethnic groups to their deaths. In 1943 the Sinti and the Roma were then deported by the thousands to Auschwitz-Birkenau, where most died of starvation, disease, ill treatment and as a result of medical experiments.[35]

In what way does Grass contribute to the integration of these discriminated minorities? On 11 October 2000 he gave a speech before the Council of Europe to recall the violence and injustices committed against the Sinti and the Roma during World War II and maintained that these minorities are even today threatened.[36] They suffer from discrimination, exclusion, expulsion, persecution and, indeed, homicide.[37] Even today, they find few protectors and defenders of their rights. Grass quotes in particular the example of the Roma of Kosovo, who in the 1990s suffered, at the same time, the hatred of the Serbs and the Albanians, to finally be forced to flee the fires and murder attempts committed against them.[38]

For a better integration does Grass not ask for the teaching of their language at school? Equally, he calls for a representative of the Roma at the European Parliament. And, as a model he quotes the example of the young Macedonian Republic where Roma deputies sit at the Parliament of Skopje.

His most recent intervention on their behalf is the editing of the preface of a book which appeared in December 2007 entitled *The Roma Journeys*.[39] It deals with a photo-reportage of the young Danish photographer Joakim Eskildsen and the writer Cia Rinne. Once again, Grass commits himself in favour of this minority because the Roma represent for him a "black mark on the conscience of Europe."[40] Therefore, he claims for them - who he considers true Europeans - a passport which would guarantee the right to move about and live in any country in the EU, from Romania to Portugal.

5.   Conclusion

        If we wanted to make a short summary, by way of conclusion, we could state that Grass, in his role of concerned citizen, fought all of his life against violence in all its forms, and for peace and the integration of the excluded. The three examples given, that is to say violence of the young and rhetorical violence in politics first of all, the violence of injustice and poverty second, and the criminal exclusion of minorities finally, make up his commitment. For his actions, Grass often came under fire, but despite all the accusations and deceptions he never abandoned these causes.

Notes

[1] G Grass, 'Werdet laut und deutlich!'. *Die Zeit*, No. 4, 17 January 2008, p. 41.

[2] F Capellan, 'Raus aus dem Elfenbeinturm: Schriftsteller fordert mehr politisches Engagement von Intellektuellen', Interview with Günter Grass, *Deutschlandfunk*, 20 January 2008, viewed 28 June 2008, <http://www.dradio.de/dlf/sendungen/idw=dlf>.

[3] G Grass, "… dem Anspruch des Schriftstellers, als Bürger politisch ein Wort mitzureden", in *Ohne Stimme, Reden zugunsten des Volkes der Roma und Sinti*, Steidl, Göttingen, 2000, p. 12.

[4] F Schongauer, 'Günter Grass. Ein literarischer Bürgerschreck von gestern?', in *Zeitkritische Romane des 20. Jahrhunderts*, H Wagener (ed), Stuttgart 1975, pp. 342 - 343.

[5] G Grass, *Ein weites Feld*, Steidl, Göttingen, 1995.

[6] M Reich-Ranicki, "Mein lieber Günter Grass..." in *Der Spiegel* 34, 21 August 1995.

[7] G Grass, *Beim Häuten der Zwiebel*, Steidl, Göttingen, 2006.

[8] S Chwin, 'Grass und das Geheimnis'. *FAZ* No. 197, 25 August 2006, viewed 29 June 2008, <http://www.faz.net/s/html>.

[9] C Mayer-Iswandy, *Günter Grass* (portrait), Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, München, 2002, p. 116.

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[10] A Zielcke, 'Jugendgewalt und Sprache*.' Jetzt kommt die Panik' in *Südddeutsche Zeitung*, 16 January 2008, viewed 28 June 2008, <http://www.sueddeutsche.de/kultur/artikel/117.html>.
Die Jugendgewalt, derer man durch drakonische Strafen Herr werden will, treibt analog eine rhetorische Gewalttätigkeit hervor'.

[11] The term 'Jugendschutzlager' was known as a protection camp for/against the young in the 1940s, in Anonymous, *Schattenblick, Politische Berichte*, Vol. 104: Zeitschrift für Sozialistische Politik, 17 January 2008, viewed 28 June 2008,
<http://www.schattenblick.de/infopool/medien/altern/pb-103.html>.

[12] A Zielcke, op. cit., in 'Hessen etwa werden 90 Prozent der schweren Gewaltdelikte von Deutschen verübt'.

[13] NPD = Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands (the German National Democratic Party).

[14] G Grass, 'Conseils aux socialistes', a shortened French translation of his speech by Pierre Deshusses was published in *Le Monde* 01 February 2008. The longer, German version of the speech was published in *Die Zeit* No. 4, 17 January 2008, under the title 'Werdet laut und deutlich'.

[15] "Auch Hunger ist Krieg!", First speech of Willy Brandt given before the UN in New York on 26 September 1973, viewed 28 June 2008, <http://www.einestages.spiegelde/static/document/160/willy_brandt_vor_der _uno.html >.

[16] Speech given by Günter Grass on 7 October 2002 at Lübeck on the eve of the 10th anniversary of Willy Brandt's death, viewed 28 June 2008, <http://www.bwbs.de/Beitraege/138.html>.

[17] Published in February 1980, viewed 28 June 2008, <http://www.nachhaltigkeit.info/artikel/nord-sued-kommission_562htm>.

[18] W Brandt, *Der organisierte Wahnsinn- Wettrüsten und Welthunger*, Bertelsmann, Gütersloh, 1985.

[19] M Dönhoff, 'Der Völkermord in Biafra, Ein Appell in letzter Stunde' Als Deutsche sollten wir wissen, was wir sagen, wenn wir das Wort Völkermord aussprechen, …denn Schweigen wird zur Mitschuld'. *Die Zeit* No. 34, 04 October 1968, p. 3.

[20] Ch Siemes, 'Bis die Augen überlaufen'. *Die Zeit*, No. 6, 03 February 2005, p. 37.

[21] '… es wird ein Jahrhundert erbitterter Verteilungskämpfe und entfesselter Gewalt sein.', Speech given before the parliamentary group of the SPD, Berlin, 11 January 2008, in *Die Zeit*, No. 04, 17 January 2008.

[22] ibid.

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[23] H Kuligk, 'Amerikanische Politik muss Gegenstand der Kritik bleiben'. Interview with Günter Grass, in *Spiegel online,* 10 October 2001, viewed 28 June 2008, <http://www.spiegel.de/kultur/gesellschaft.html>.

[24] H Zimmermann, *Günter Grass unter den Deutschen. Chronik eines Verhältnisses*. Steidl, Göttingen, 2006, p. 620.

[25] ibid.

[26] M Bissinger (ed), *Die Springer Kontroverse. Grass/Döpfner. Ein Streitgespräch über Deutschland*, Steidl, Göttingen, 2006, p. 26.

[27] ibid., p. 26, 'ich bin kein Pazifist' ('I am not a pacifist').

[28] 'Frieden, Demokratie und die Einheit Deutschlands in Europa', found on the website of the Willy Brandt Kreis, viewed 28 June 2008, <http://www.brandt-kreis.de>.

[29] 'Den Konflikt mit dem Iran friedlich lösen!', Erklärung des Willy-Brandt-Kreises, Berlin 05 May 2006, viewed 28 June 2008, <http://www.uni-kassel.de/fb5/frieden/regionen/Iran/stimmen/willy-brandt-kreis.html>.

[30] G Grass, 'Aufruf zur Errichtung eines Zentrums gegen den Krieg', *Neues Deutschland,* 28 December 2007, viewed 28 June 2008, <http://www.uni-kassel.de/fb5/frieden/science/zentrum.html>.

[31] G Grass, 'Wer Vertreibungen verhindern will, muss Kriege verhindern', ibid.

[32] G Grass, 'Christus zerbricht das Gewehr', ibid.

[33] *Der 'Liebe Gott' Otto Pankok. Der 'Lehrer' von Günter Grass*, Exhibition shown from 21 January to 24 June 2007 at the Grass House in Lübeck.

[34] H Holzbach, '… wie Juden zu behandeln'. *Die Zeit*, 34/2000, p. 64.

[35] P H Carstensen, 'Völkermord an Sinti und Roma darf nie vergessen werden', Speech of the President of the Upper Parliament, in *Das Parlament*, with the supplement "Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte", Deutscher Bundestag und Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung 2006, viewed 28 June 2008, <http://www.das-parlament.de/2006/01-02/Bundesrat/002.html>.

[36] G Grass, *Europa hat eine Verantwortung*, speech given before the Council of Europe in Strasburg, on 11 October 2000, viewed 28 June 2008, <http://www.netzwerk-regenbogen.de/GrassEuropa.html>.

[37] 'Diskriminierung Ausgrenzung, Vertreibung, Verfolgung, Totschlag', in G Grass, *Ohne Stimme. Reden zugunsten des Volkes der Roma und Sinti*. Steidl, Göttingen, 2000, p. 37.

[38] ibid., p. 76.

[39] J Eskilden andC Rinne, *Die Romareisen*, Mit einem Vorwort von Günter Grass, Steidl, Göttingen, 2007.

[40] 'Sie sind der blinde Fleck im Bewusstsein Europas', in G Grass, *Ohne Stimme*, op. cit., p. 71.

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The Rhetoric of Violence in African Literature

Oumar Chérif Diop

Abstract

Foucault argues that the socio-political arena is a field of forces, practices, and discourses that involve relations of power that in turn depend on the multiplicity of points of resistance. Therefore, the power network is an interplay of power and resistance, a field of constant confrontation between individuals, groups, and classes. Foucault's notion of the rhetoric of violence stems from his analysis of the socio-cultural function of an order of language that is tantamount to that socio-political arena that constructs the objects and subjects of violence. For Teresa de Lauretis, "the rhetoric of violence presupposes that some order of language is at work not only in the concept of violence, but in the social practices of violence as well."[1] Using Foucault's and Lauretis' concepts of rhetoric of violence I will show how the writings of Alex Laguma and Sony Labou Tansi are counter-discourse to violence as a set of political, ideological, cultural, and discursive strategies.

Key Words: Apartheid, discourse, legitimacy, oppression, power, resistance, rhetoric, sarcasm satire, violence.

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According to Teresa de Lauretis, "The very notion of rhetoric of violence presupposes that some order of language, some kind of discursive representation is at work not only in the concept of violence, but in the social practices of violence as well."[2] That order of language is indicative of the relations of power, the socio-political tensions, and the agendas of different forces interlocked in the fight for the preservation or the subversion of the power structure. Foucault's notion of the rhetoric of violence stems from his analysis of the socio-cultural function of an order of language that is tantamount to that socio-political arena that he defines as a field of forces, practices, and discourses that involve relations of power that in turn depend on the multiplicity of points of resistance.[3] The power network, it can be argued, is therefore an interplay of power and resistance, a field of constant confrontation between individuals, groups, and classes. Consequently, the rhetoric of violence not only constructs objects and subjects of violence, but legitimises acts of violence. Inherent to language is semiotic violence, the process of self-legitimation that excludes the 'other' and denies their legitimacy. According to Foucault, the forms of violence akin to the power network use a number of discursive strategies to legitimise their practices.

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They weave through the social body a network of discourses that generate forms of subjectivity or social subjects/objects.[4]

Rhetorical violence is ultimately geared toward marking internal boundaries. Therefore, it entails creating otherness that concomitantly denies it legitimacy and urges for its annihilation.[5] In this paper, I will focus on how the victims of violence design strategies that subvert the dominant discourse in Alex Laguma's *Time of the Butcherbird* and Sony Labu Tansi's *La Vie et Demie*.

Alex Laguma's *Time of the Butcherbird* is a good example of such a strategy of defining the other to legitimise its annihilation. The drought that has affected the area is blamed on the kaffirs, which gives the Whites a moral justification to cleanse the land of any black presence. Dominee Visser's sermon to his congregation is a clear racist construction of the other. Once defined, the other becomes the scapegoat whose sacrifice re-establishes order in a community that has sinned by allowing racial promiscuity. Visser declares,

> In the purity of our blood also lies the guarantee of our honorable mission. It is the duty of all of us to unshakably keep to our aim, spiritual and earthly, which is to secure for our children their God-given land and soil on this earth. Holding to this aim is the only means of acquiring forgiveness of sins of the past, of purifying the blood again, in the name of God and our nation.[6]

Thus, the kaffir is the perfect figure of other to the Afrikaaner, whose obliteration becomes a divine mission of the latter. As a prerequisite to their constitution as a hegemonic economic and political power, the Afrikaaners weave history and religion to justify their violent acts of appropriation of the black people's land. As an intertext of abominable cultural and ideological representations, the Black is the incarnation of evil. As such, the fight to rid the land of his presence was justified in the past and will be forever. The legitimation here, rather than being political, is perniciously ethical and symbolic. Aiming at a subconscious adherence to an agenda of political violence, it interpolates interpretations of history and scriptures. The novelistic discourse, by juxtaposing history and religious propaganda, unveils the real motives of the Apartheid system. In the following passage, the reader learns more about the Meulens:

> The father loved the land: to him country was not only a geographical entity, an anthem, celebrations of Dingane's Day, the day of Blood River. For him country was who own the flat, dreary red and yellow plains and the low,

undulating hills, the grass and the water. This was a
heritage which had been gained through the sacred blood of
their ancestors and the prophetic work of God.[7]

Here then, the word, whether secular or religious, succeeds the intrusion of
white colonisers in South Africa. The musket paved the way to the Bible, and
the Bible is another element of the violent strategy that names the land to
appropriate it.[8] The heritage they acquire through violence, and are ready to
keep through violence, is the land. That is what is at the core of the religious
discourse of legitimation.

Mmau Tau, an activist and a beacon of political consciousness in the
black community, sees past the white rhetoric of justification and unveils the
true nature of the racist oppressors, who, by striving to obliterate the other,
lose their humanity and irremediably regress into bestiality:

> […] It is said that the white man's laws and his weapons
> and his money make his heart bad, that for these things he
> has exchanged brotherhood, that with these things he can
> destroy manhood. But it is his own manhood, his own
> brotherhood which he has killed. So be it, but he has not
> killed ours. We are still a people. With laws and guns and
> money he knows nothing of people, does not sense the
> dignity of people.[9]

For Mmau Tau, the Whites are corrupted by materialism and are, therefore,
unfit to lead a community. Having lost their soul to the evils of power and
wealth, they have lost true humanity, and their illusion of power cannot resist
the determination and will of true humanity and genuine brotherhood.
Perceived in this light, the white man is self-defeated and his demonisation -
that is a result of his monstrous acts - calls for his eradication. Therefore, it is
a moral imperative to confront the Whites, to unmask them, and to fight
them.

In her political crusade, Mmau Tau overturns the Whites' semiotics
of violence into a semiotics of black resistance when she declares that

> the evil is the law and the guns who ransack our homes,
> frighten our children, mistreat our women, humiliate our
> elders, arrest and jail our breadwinners and protectors. Must
> we obey the evil or must we obey the blood which is life?[10]

The abhorrent abuse of power to bully and victimise is underscored
by the specification of the targets of racist violence. Guns rob innocent
children of their lives, submit women to brutal force, and assault defenceless

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elders. An opposition to such abuse of force becomes a moral imperative and a redemptive course of action. To the life in indignity that is being imposed by people who have traded their humanity and morality to evil, blacks ought to oppose real life - based on dignity and brotherhood. The indictment strips the Afrikaaners of any form of legitimacy in South Africa and by the same token, morally justifies the anti-Apartheid struggle of the blacks.

The rhetoric of violence in *Time of the Butcherbird* appears as an ideological confrontation between white supremacists and the anti-Apartheid movement. Both sides need to delineate their camps and claim legitimacy by defining the other. The discourse on both sides is therefore a discourse of political intent that primarily aims at rallying the troops around a political agenda.

In Sony Labou Tansi's *La Vie et Demie*, the oppressors' historical perspective is essentially a self-legitimating myth that is informed by distortions and propaganda.[11] Well aware of such manipulation, the fiction-writer of violence confronts the oppressors to reveal the ethical and ideological foundation of their outlook.

Using a burlesque style of writing, Sony Labou Tansi creates in his novels spaces where the autocrats are unmasked and their rhetoric of violence demystified and deconstructed by a relentless and uncontrollable opposition. As a case in point, I will consider the way authoritarian rule and its hegemonic discourse are assailed and eventually defeated by the emergence and expansion of an anti-hegemonic movement that articulates a discourse of liberation in Sony Labou Tansi's *La Vie et Demie*.

After the independence of Katamalanasia, a vast country in Africa, the new Head of State, the 'Providential Leader' installs a ruthless dictatorship soon challenged by Martial, a staunch opponent to the regime. The 'Providential Leader,' in an unprecedented man-hunt finally captures Martial and decides to liquidate him himself. Slaughtered and cut into pieces, Martial still talks, protesting that he does not want to die this way. Reduced into meat-pie and eaten by his family members under the gaze of the 'Providential Leader,' Martial still continues to talk and to torment the dictator and his successors. On the one hand, Martial's resilience and pugnacity allows him to outlive his death as he becomes the spectre that drives the Providential Guide to his suicide. On the other hand, Martial's daughter, Chaidana joins the trenches at the age of fifteen, and becomes extremely lethal within the power circle of Katamalanasia. The methods that Chaïdana uses to avenge her father's cruel death and to subvert the dictatorship are not always approved by Martial's ghost. Chaïdana's prostitution in the *La Vie Demie* hotel is one such stratagem that allows her to kill several dignitaries of the despotic regime. The burlesque adventures of generations of dictatorial regimes are at the centre of Labou Tansi's biting

satire that targets all sorts of enormities, especially the despots' rhetoric of violence.

That barbaric treatment of Martial's body results in a superhuman resistance that defies the despot, who eventually beseeches his victim to tell him how he wants to die. Whereas the victim is referred to as a nameless object, ready for consumption when he is pushed into the despot's dining room, towards the end of the episode, the despot has to address him by his name, thus conceding that Martial still exists. As a matter of fact, he survives and outlives the tyrant in various processes of metamorphosis, transference, dissemination, contagion, combination, condensation, and expansion. The superhuman tenacity in the proclamation of a will to live supersedes the horror of torture. Moudileno argues that for Martial, the triumph of the human means to refuse to be silenced and to keep on speaking. In doing so, he asserts himself as a living body refusing to be muted.[12] The tyrannical determination to silence the object of torture is met with an indomitable subject of speech who articulates a discourse of defiance amidst meatloaves.

After the horrible scene of slicing, chopping, and tearing of the rebellious Martial, the tenacious scattered morsels of his flesh keep on repeating: "I do not want to die this death."[13] Such a martial and majestic compounding of the word and the wound is another instance of subversive discourse that refuses the closure of torture and constitutes the perennial indomitable defiance of the mass-body. Consequently, Martial becomes immortal through the imagination, the myths and legends of the masses whose ideal he embodies. His blood becomes 'le noir de Martial,' which inscribes everywhere the indelible will of the people not to surrender to oppression. Martial becomes the pervasive and evasive resistance that no terror can subdue. Hence the emergence of a mythology that plunges it roots into the depths of the people's aspiration to live and their bold and persistent defiance against the system. As a martyr and a mythic hero, Martial becomes a much more subversive catalyst empowered by two confluent but divergent sources: the fears of the autocrats and the aspirations of the masses. These two sources interpolate and set in motion enemies that are entangled in deadly psychological and physical fights. In the following episode, when the "Guide Providentiel" indulged in a demagogic speech about the "hard times," "general dehumanization of humans" and "the necessary revolution for people's survival,"[14] the crowd saw Martial's ghost pushing the despot off the podium and went wild.

Martial systematically controls the space of the political discourse. The despot's speech becomes a parody of "Martialese" that galvanises the rebellious masses. Subsequent to the evocation of Martial is the mayhem caused by his apparition on the podium that unleashed the rebellious powers of repressed speech.

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Martial's apparition and the galvanisation of the people constitute an integral part of the socio-political processes that contribute to the raising of the masses' level of political consciousness. As a result, the social body regains its capacity to stand against its destruction by the tyrant.[15] Through language, the people resist political annihilation. Using the body as the locus of violent despotic discourse, Labou Tansi shows that a refusal to succumb to despair and barbarism is the prerequisite to the emergence of a discourse of emancipation. The nature metaphors underscore the power of the multitude and its unbound natural freedom.

By breaking the silence that tyrannical rule attempts to impose on society to pursue its violent practices, the forces of change unleash the destructive powers of the word that defines and exposes the oppressive system. The word, therefore, breaks the spell under which the innocent victims of the abusive power fell. In other words, the act of naming triggers the therapeutic process that leads to exorcising the demons of oppression. In the same vein, the writer becomes a threat to the dictator insofar as the literary text exposes the rule of tyranny and violence.[16] This counter discourse unveils the strategies that are used to impose the monological discourse of power, the sole purpose of which is to indoctrinate and to subjugate the masses and to reduce them to passive listeners.[17]

This polyphonic nature of social discourse is well fictionalised in Labou Tansi's *La Vie et Demie*, where it astutely and constantly defies and deconstructs the discourse of hegemony and repression.[18] It is an integral part of the rhetoric of violence that functions on the basis of two premises: on one hand, the opposition of the ideal of living to physical violence and on the other hand, the confrontation of tyrannical rule with the fusion of Martial's epic resistance with the people's aspiration and ideals. The reason why the resistance is not suppressible is because the Katamalanasian people, with their extreme diversity of voices and forms of resistance, are the true hero. Their popular rhetoric always finds the right form and medium to attack and subvert the discourse of the hierarchy. The voice of Katmalanasia supersedes any form of containment and can submit dictators to destructive forms of mockery. Labou Tansi dramatises the impossibility to control the voices of the people by showing the lunacy of the attempt to monopolise discourse and to silence all other voices. Such an undertaking is in vain, for the masses, under the direst repressive circumstances, find an outlet for their opinions. As a case in point, the narrator in *La Vie et Demie,*[19] recounts the episode when the people of Katamalanasia changed the name of the country to Hell.

> When the guide, Jean Oscar, learned about the shameful nickname given to the country, his pocket, his dear pocket, he became cruelly angry, and ordered that any owner of a tongue and lips that would utter the word "hell" be shot

without trial. The first one to be shot was Kha Dominique Roshimanito, a bishop who never listened to the radio. Then, another four hundred and seventy priests and pastors […] While in a fit of extreme rage, Jean Oscar's father's heart ransacked the country, Martial's folks dumped in his bed fourteen kilos of pamphlet with a single word: "HELL." He ordered that all books, documents, and papers containing the world "hell" be burnt at Bastards Square.[20]

The episode suggests that this infernal chase is unproductive. Here, as in numerous other instances in *La vie et Demie*, the dictator is entangled in the depressingly high number of absurdities that grows exponentially. As a matter of fact, he is aggravated because he cannot win the senseless rhetorical war he has declared. His limited resources are no match to the limitless resources of the people and the realisation that his war campaign is a lost cause leads to his suicide. His suicide is an expression of the loss of initiative in the face of an incompressible popular determination to exist as a voice in the socio-political arena. In *La Vie et Demie*, popular language is not an appendix to or a duplicate of the language of power. Instead it emerges from the masses' determination to deconstruct the monologic discourse of power by letting the dead and the streets talk. This dynamics of Labou Tansi's novelistic discourse shows that the plurality of discourse strategies is intrinsically resistant to any form of monologic control.[21] As such, the rhetoric of violence strikes a note of hope and optimism in the midst of bloody repression. Labou Tansi's style is rather asymmetric to the reality he describes because it derides that reality and lays bare its absurdity. In his attempt to re-present realities that defy logic, sanity, and the imagination, Labou Tansi opts for a style that juggles caricature, sarcasm, exaggeration, mythology and the fantastic. His burlesque style and seditious laughter subverts and deconstructs the rhetoric of tyrannical violence and is an integral part of the process of recreation of a new order in Katamalanasia.

The fact that the Katamalanasian regime is dysfunctional is obvious in the way the country is run. Random, reactive policies have precedence over planning; emotions override rational decisions. For instance, the dictator's bottomless greed leads to a taxation/extortion system that, twice a year, collects body tax, loyalty tax, land tax, the effort to boost the economy tax, travel tax, patriotism tax, militant tax, the fight against ignorance tax, soil conservation tax, and hunting tax. And the narrator concludes: "Those who did not have enough money took loans from their neighbors."[22]

Beside the accumulation and repetition that underscore the magnitude of the absurdity of the measures the despotic regime takes, the list is riddled with nonsensical taxes that defy the norms. The citizens pay taxes for their bodies, for their work, for their submission to the autocrat, for his

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travels, and other extravaganza. The lame excuses to subject people to this system point at the moral hollowness and the ridicule of a regime that fails to earn our respect in spite of its power to impose its will.

Labou Tansi's jeering tone is again at work when he draws the reader's attention to the number of costly official holidays: Names Day, Leaders' Day, Special Forces Day, the Leader's Son Day, Immortals Day, the Leader's Chameleons Day, Meditation Day, Spermatozoid Day, Ox Day …[23]

The absurdity of the practice is not only underscored by the length of the list, but mostly by the incongruity of a mix that juxtaposes the celebration of oxen, meditation, spermatozoids, and names. The fact that everything revolves around the autocrat leads to the countless drift into follies. As a case in point, because he dreamed that blue is a divine color, all houses, tree-trunks, gates, people's heads, and faces were painted blue. Every citizen was supposed to wear blue, and all machines, cars and objects were to be painted blue. While rumours about the production of a blue race were circulating, only eleven of the eighteen blue rats created in the labs survived. This level of self-indulgence that starts with a dream is a sign of madness that culminates with the shocking fantastic stretch of lab experiments.

Labou Tansi's burlesque crusade[24] is at its best in his characterisation techniques. By creating types, he limits the description of his characters to one physical and/or moral trait. Thus, he freezes them, so to speak, in one attitude or one utterance/discourse and turns them into circus-like clowns. The reader's laughter is cathartic because it frees him/her and allows him/her to take revenge on the dictator. More importantly, the recovery of freedom through laughter becomes a form of reconciliation with our humanity and a victory over death and destruction. Labou Tansi opts for cathartic laughter that redeems and resuscitates life. With his burlesque style, he turns laughter into a lethal weapon to fight against fear and to ridicule the cult of personality of Africa's "providential guides." Thus, laughter becomes the prelude to, and an integral part of, the liberation process that heralds a new moral order.

Violence is one of the means used in a social setting to impose a hegemonic discourse. However, such an attempt is quite often met with a form of resistance in order to derail the oppressors' plan to prevail over their victims. Such a clash is dramatised in different ways in Laguma's *Time of the Butcherbird* and in Labou Tansi's *La vie et Demie*. What these works have in common is the representation of violence as a process of fragmentation that results in the disintegration of the self, the individual, the community or the society and the ways those entities deal with such a process. They also show the victims' attitudes and strategies to counter the oppressive methods used to subdue them.

Notes

[1] T de Lauretis, 'The Violence of Rhetoric: Considerations on Representation and Gender', in *The Violence of Representation*, N. Armstrong & L. Tennehouse (eds), Routledge, London, 1989, pp. 239-258, p. 240.

[2] ibid.

[3] M Foucault, *The History of Sexuality*, *Vol. 1*, Vintage Books, London, 1979, p. 96.

[4] de Lauretis, op. cit., p. 240.

[5] L Folena, 'Figures of Violence: Philologists, Witches, and Stalinistas', in *The Violence of Representation*, op. cit., p. 220. Lucia Folena argues that "a culture depends on its ideology to exist; and since ideology as self-representation always and necessarily creates otherness, it can be argued that ideology as such is intrinsically violent."

[6] A Laguma, *Time of the Butcherbird*, Heinemann, London, 1987, p. 106.

[7] ibid., pp. 57-58.

[8] Ngugi Wa Thiong'O, *Homecoming: Essays on Africa and Carribean Literature, Culture and Politics*, Lawrence Hill and Company, New York, 1972, pp. 31-36. See also J L Comaroff and J Comaroff, *Of Revelation and Revolution, Volume 1: Christianity, Colonialism, and Consciousness in South Africa*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1991, p. 261; B Davidson, 'The Story of a Continent: Program 5', in *The Bible and the Gun*, J Percival, C Ralling, A Harries and M Csaky, (Dirs), R M Arts, Boston, MA, 1984; V Y Mudimbe, *The Invention of Africa: Gnosis, Philosophy, and the Order of Knowledge*, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1988, pp. 44-98.

[9] Laguma, op. cit., p. 46.

[10] ibid., p. 47.

[11] "Mais ici les mots ne disaient plus ce que disent le mots, juste ce que voulaient les hommes qui les prononçaient. "
"But here the words no longer said what the words mean, just what the men who uttered them wanted." (My trans.), S Labou Tansi, *La Vie et Demie*, Editions du Seuil, Paris, 1979, p. 83.

[12] L Moudileno, 'Labou Tansi's 'La vie et demie,' or the Tortuous Path of the Fable', translated by Francis Higginson, *Research in African Literatures*,
Vol. 29, no. 3 (Autumn, 1998), pp. 21-33; See also: N Martin-Granel, 'Sony in Progress', in *Sony Labou Tansi ou la Quête Permanente du Sens*, M. Kadima-Njuzi et al. (eds), L'Harmattan, Paris, 1977, pp. 211-28.

[13] Labou Tansi, op. cit., p. 13.

[14] ibid., p. 40.

[15] Regarding the political 'involvement and the process of politicisation of the masses,' see F Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth*, Trans. R Philcox, Grove

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Press, New York, 2004, p. 63; W Rodney, *The Making of an African Intellectual*, Africa World Press, Trenton, NJ, 1990.

[16] According to Eric Faye, "Because he plays with his subjects the way one uses a pawn, because he invents imaginary plots, rewrites History, and makes it himself, because he is a creator of fiction and has no equal in the manipu-lation of lies, the tyrant is invading the turf of the writer. He makes his people live a story that is half-real, half-imagined, and spiced with propaganda the way that an author invites one to live a possi-bility that doesn't occur." Quoted by Moudileno, op. cit., p. 23.

[17] S Decalo, *Psychoses of Power: African Personal Dictatorships*, Florida Academic Press, Gainsville, 1998, p. 4.

[18] M Holquist (ed), *The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays*, The University of Texas Press, Austin, 1988, p. 263.

[19] Labou Tansi, op. cit., p. 263.

[20] ibid., p. 133 (my translation).

[21] Holquist, op. cit., p. 263.

[22] Labou Tansi, op. cit., p. 122.

[23] ibid., p. 129.

[24] S Dabla, *Nouvelles Ecritures Africaines*: *Romanciers de la Seconde Genération*, L'Harmattan, Paris, 1986, p. 223. Following on Dabla's analysis, it appears that the new rhetoric of violence is characterised by a novelistic discourse that favours satire and the burlesque, allegories, fables, parodies, and ironies.

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The Role Of NGOs in Promoting Childrens' Participation in Domestic Violence Prevention

Monica Denomy

Abstract
Children in Latin America are particularly vulnerable to violence: of the 185 million children and youth in the region, over six million are victims of severe aggression, and another 80,000 are killed every year in the 'safety' of their own homes. The Pan American Health Organisation identified that more than 36% of girls and 29% of boys have suffered sexual abuse. In addressing the problem of domestic violence in the region, government institutions and community organisations typically focus on adults: either women, who are perceived as the victims, or men, who are seen as the primary aggressors. Little attention has been focused on children, however, either as victims or as partners in domestic violence prevention. As a child-centred community development organisation, Plan International has been working since 2004 to develop models for domestic violence prevention and awareness-raising, with a focus on children and youth. By the close of the project in 2010, the project will strengthen the capacity of 15,000 children and youth and 16,000 adults in Brazil, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Honduras, El Salvador and Peru. Training sessions have covered a variety of topics, including family violence, gender equity, children's and women's rights, violence prevention, and case recognition and referral. A number of important conclusions and recommendations have emerged from the project to date. One primary discovery was that the protagonist role of children and youth in conducting community training activities for adults has not only helped to build awareness about the problem of domestic violence, but has also supported increased communication and respect between adults and children. In addition, the youth involvement in activities served to draw additional attention to the effect of domestic violence on children. Youth facilitators have built considerable skills and self-confidence through the process, which have enabled them to take an active role in other community development processes.

Key Words: Children, domestic violence, Latin America, NGO.

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The global problem of domestic violence is increasingly recognised as not only a critical public health problem, but also a serious violation of human rights.[1] Children in Latin America are particularly vulnerable to

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violence: of the 185 million children and youth in the region, over six million are victims of severe aggression, and another 80,000 are killed every year in the supposed 'safety' of their own homes.[2] The Pan American Health Organisation has identified that more than 36% of girls and 29% of boys have suffered sexual abuse, in most cases by family members.[3]

As many cases of domestic violence are never reported to authorities, it must be assumed that the available data greatly underestimate the true magnitude of the issue. The problem caused by this lack of information is far reaching; without reliable data, the extent of the abuses is not appreciated by community and government institutions, and laws remain insufficient to confront the issue.

In addressing the serious problem of domestic violence in the region, government institutions and community organisations typically focus on adults: either women, who are perceived as the victims, or men, who are seen as the primary aggressors. Little attention has been focused on children, however, either as victims or as actors in domestic violence prevention.

Plan International, or Plan, is one of the largest child-centred community development organisations in the world. Plan works in more than 65 countries on programs and initiatives that address the causes of poverty and its consequences for children's rights and their lives; since 2004, supported by the Canadian International Development Agency, Plan has been working to develop models for domestic violence prevention and awareness-raising, with a focus on children and youth.

By the close of the project in 2010, activities will have strengthened the capacity of over 15,000 children and youth and 16,000 adults in Brazil, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Honduras, El Salvador and Peru. Training sessions work with children, youth, parents, teachers, community leaders, police officers, health professionals and community service organisations, and cover a variety of topics, including family violence, gender equity, children's and women's rights, violence prevention, support and treatment for victims and case recognition and referral.

Though domestic violence is an unconventional area for an international development organisation to work in, there is an important role for NGOs to play in violence prevention. Through interventions, NGOs can support the creation of an environment where people have the awareness and tools to demand rights from the government, while also increasing the government capacity to effectively respond to these human rights abuses. For a development organisation specifically, the importance of working in violence prevention was recognised by the President of the Inter-American Development Bank, Enrique V. Iglesias, who stated that:

> Development is an issue that goes beyond economic
> growth. It includes social justice, the consolidation of

democracy, human rights and all that affects the quality of
life. We will not have high quality economic and social
development, nor will we really have respect and peaceful
co-existence, if we are not capable of eliminating the roots
of violence.[4]

The focus on children is significant with violence prevention work,
as work has shown their attitudes to be more open to change, and therefore
awareness raising activities are likely to show greater impact.

There are a number of significant challenges to working in the
prevention of domestic violence in the region. Primary among these
challenges is the widespread social acceptance of violence against children as
a means of disciplinary action, to the extent that victims are often blamed for
the violent behaviour of the aggressors; this acceptance contributes to the
social stigma that often prevents victims of abuse from coming forward. In
Colombia, a national study in 2002 revealed that 47% of women used
physical punishment to discipline their children,[5] and 32% felt that this was
necessary for their children's upbringing. In Peru, an NGO-conducted poll in
2005 revealed that only 30% of children and youth questioned had never
been physically punished by their parents.[6]

In addition, gender-based violence accounts for a significant
percentage of cases of domestic violence; the prevailing Latin American
culture of 'machismo' (male dominance or superiority to women) is an
important contributing factor to these instances of abuse.[7]

The lack of government support is a crucial barrier in dealing with
the issue. Existing policies are often antiquated; in Peru and Brazil, for
example, law requires de facto obligatory conciliation sessions between
children or women and their abusers. Many countries that do have laws
against domestic violence do not have a comprehensive definition of what
this entails, and cases of neglect or sexual abuse are not covered by laws.
More progressive laws often exist on paper only, and there is little
commitment by police officers to prosecute cases of domestic violence, or by
health professionals to file reports. This is justified through a number of
reasons, ranging from a reluctance to interfere with family affairs, to the
already-present problem of overcrowded jails.[8] When cases do reach courts,
domestic violence is often considered to be a misdemeanour, rather than a
felony offence, and penalties are light.[9]

Although participation of adults is essential for project success,
children and youth have been identified as key players in addressing both the
problem and the changing cycle of domestic violence. The youth have
eagerly embraced this responsibility.

A unique feature of this project is the different roles that children
and youth are assuming. Children are an important beneficiary group, and

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specialised workshops have been designed using dynamic, child-friendly methodologies such as puppetry, role playing, theatre and painting to raise children's awareness about their rights. Special versions of all project materials have been produced to make the information accessible to different age groups.

However, the role of children goes far beyond that of a beneficiary group. In developing a new set of programs for future development work, community consultations were organised in each country where Plan works, including separate consultations with children, to ensure that they had an open space to voice their concerns. When asked about the main problems in their communities, the overwhelming answer from children and youth was that of violence; it was from these consultations that violence prevention emerged as a regional priority for Plan's work and the planning for this project began. From the initial stages of the project, children and youth have been involved in the conception and design, which has promoted a sense of ownership and connection to activities.

After receiving training, children and youth in El Salvador and Honduras become the trainers themselves. Activities for parents, teachers, health professionals, community leaders and police officers are all facilitated by the children and youth, with support from area specialists.

In Peru in particular, children and youth leaders from school governments and from child worker groups are leading the national campaign entitled "Goodbye to Physical Punishment." These youth helped to outline training that they would need for this role, and used this knowledge to plan the campaign. All official spokespeople for the campaign are youth. Activities include developing posters and flyers, marches, public speaking events and a National Day of Art against Violence, consisting of art competitions, exhibitions and concerts, which will produce a CD of music to spread the message on non-violence.

In all countries, youth-led media projects are also helping to spread project lessons beyond the direct workshop participants. Primarily using radio as a means of communication, youth have developed their own priorities to share through informative talk shows and commercial-style announcements. This format was so successful in reaching the communities and conveying the messages that the police force in Honduras requested that the youth media specialists work with them to develop a series of radio programs to present the police role in violence prevention work and improve their relations with the communities, where police are often regarded with apprehension. Through this methodology, project reach is increased and has resulted in greater recognition by adults of the contribution of youth.

Finally, children and youth are also playing an important role as multipliers, and carrying out replicas to their peers of the training that they receive. Through this technique, the project is reaching a greater than

anticipated number of beneficiaries. In El Salvador alone, youth conducted replica trainings with over 1,800 of their peers in a single year. These activities were supported by Plan staff, but completely coordinated and run by youth. This is an important step towards project sustainability, as the participants are taking responsibility for the continuation of activities.

A number of important results and recommendations have emerged from the project to date. I am going to discuss the outcomes at two levels: those directly relating to the children and youth, and those with a wider impact on communities.

One primary discovery was that the protagonist role of children and youth in conducting community training activities for adults has not only helped to build awareness about the problem of domestic violence, but has also supported increased communication and respect between adults and children. This can be seen in Honduras, where youth identified alcohol as being a primary cause for the high levels of child abuse; these youth successfully lobbied community leaders to have the cantinas in town shut down. To this day, there is no alcohol available in that township, and both children and adults have expressed their satisfaction with the resulting changes. It was through project activities that youth received support in expressing themselves and adults were encouraged to listen to, and respect youth opinions.

Youth roles in communities have changed and increased, and adults are gradually providing spaces for them to participate and be heard. In El Salvador, Community Development Associations, known as ADESCOs, invited project facilitators to join the organisation. The youths receive training in administration of funds and project management and are now in leadership roles in community-run programs.

In addition, the youth involvement in activities served to draw additional attention to the effect on children of domestic violence. Adults are increasingly aware of the problem, and towns are starting to include child protection in community development plans, including allocating resources to this issue.

Youth facilitators have built considerable skills and self-confidence through the process, which has enabled them to take an active role in other community activities. Youth have reported that they are joining networks, are more active in school, and are increasingly making plans for the future.

The focus on working in cooperation with children in domestic violence prevention has produced a number of important results at the community level:

1. Gender

The project works constantly to promote gender equality, and the design, content and implementation of training methodologies promote a

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gender perspective in communities. Participants in the evaluations commented on greater awareness of gender equality and increased recognition of women's and girls' rights. Youth, in particular, expressed new realisations of the importance of gender equality in promoting harmony inside the home.

The importance of equitable access to resources and opportunities was deeply ingrained in this project, and steps were taken throughout to ensure that males and females were integrated equally. Participation in project activities provided new opportunities for women and girls for community involvement, which was uncommon prior to the commencement of the project.

2. In-Kind Project Contributions

Through awareness-raising activities and advocacy efforts, local organisations and, in particular, local governments began to make in-kind contributions to domestic violence prevention and promotion of children's rights, showing an important increase in community commitment to combating domestic violence. In some cases, there were funds raised by community leaders, which were used to provide follow up of domestic violence cases in the communities. All of these instances are important achievements towards project sustainability.

3. Changes in behaviour and attitude

Changes in behaviour were observed among a number of different beneficiary groups. Teachers are not applying physical punishment in schools, and reported that they are now using reprimands, counseling, conversation, and temporary suspension as disciplinary tools. Likewise, parents reported that prior to training activities, they would hit children with belts or other objects; now, punishments typically comprise the giving of more chores, making the child stand still and explaining why they are being punished.

4. Increased rate of domestic violence reporting

One of the greatest challenges in working in domestic violence prevention is the low reporting levels. Therefore, increases in reported cases of domestic violence is actually an important result of project activities, indicating the development of an environment where people feel comfortable coming forward with cases of abuse, and feel a degree of confidence that authorities will respond to the report. Over recent years, the Colombian Institute of Family Wellbeing reports a 25% increase in use of their services for cases of abuse, and an increase of 34% for sexual abuse support.

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In Honduras, there were 568 cases of abuse, rape and attempted rape against children and youth reported to the Public Ministry in 2001. The number of cases has nearly tripled, reaching over 1,500 cases.[10]

Project evaluations have developed a number of recommendations for work in domestic violence prevention in the region:

1. Expand the geographic coverage of the projects to benefit a greater population within the country.
2. Support the creation of new community networks to provide better services to victims.
3. Continue focus on children and youth, as activities show a more immediate impact.
4. Incorporate the theme of existing laws into workshops, as children and youth have very superficial understanding of the topic
5. Continue to work on increasing equal gender representation in activities, with a particular focus on men.

I would like to close with the commentary from one project participant, a 14-year-old girl from El Salvador who, though shy, was recognised by the school director as a potential leader and selected to participate in the workshops. This quote illustrates some of the important changes that have been promoted through project activities:

> I didn't want to participate in the program because it was held on Saturdays and Sundays, and I wanted a break from school, but the director told me that I had been selected, along with one other student, from the 400 youth in my school, so I felt lucky and accepted. Even though I didn't want to go at first, the first day I had fun and learned about public speaking and about rights, what violence against children and women is...In my community, children are beaten with belts and sticks, and now we aren't going to allow this any more. This doesn't mean that I will put myself in the middle to stop it, because I could be hit as well, but we have to speak to parents and to police [so that they understand and stop]…Now I feel like superman, except that I'm a girl.[11]

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Notes

[1] In keeping with Plan International's Child Protection Policy, pseudonyms have been assigned to child participants referenced.

[2] United Nations, '80,000 Young Die Every Year in Latin America, Caribbean due to Family Violence - UN', in UN News Centre, 17 November 2006, viewed 20 May 2008, <http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?>.

[3] The Pan American Health Organization (PAHO), 'Gender Based Violence and HIV/AIDS', in *Fact Sheet: Gender, Ethnicity and Health Unit*, Regional Office of the World Health Organisation, Washington DC, viewed 26 May 2008, <http://www.paho.org/English/AD/GE/Viol-HIV_FS0705.pdf>.

[4] Inter-American Development Bank IDB, 'Domestic Violence: It Hurts Latin American Development - Four Hundred Experts Analyze Costs and Prevention Strategies', 22 October 1997, IDB, Washington DC, viewed 3 May 2008, <http://www.iadb.org/exr/PRENSA/1997/cp24597e.htm.>.

[5] World Health Organization, WHO, 'Encuesta Nacional de Demografía y Salud ENDESA' WHO, Geneva, 2000, viewed 5 October 2006, <http://www.who.int/infobase/report.aspx?rid=115&dm=8&iso=COL>.

[6] G Alexandrecu, Y G Bhavani, A Derlb, R Habasch, P Horno, M Nilsson, et al., 'UN Study on Violence against Children: Ending Physical and Humiliating Punishment of Children, Making it Happen', International Save the Children Alliance, Stockholm, Sweden, 2005.

[7] M B Lykes, M B Brabeck, T Ferns and A Radan, 'Human Rights and Mental Health among Latin American Women in Situations of State-sponsored Violence', *Psychology of Women Quarterly*, 1993, Vol. 17, pp. 525-544.

[8] L Cordova, 'Rights-Women: Latin American Laws on Domestic Violence', *Inter Press Service*, November 1997, viewed 1 October 2007, <http://www.ips.fi/koulut/199750/8.htm.>.

[9] Human Rights Watch Organization, 'Women's Rights in Latin America and the Caribbean', viewed 4 March 2008, <http://www.hrw.org/women/overview-lac.html>.

[10] R Braverman, K Andino and U Herrero, *Niños, Niñas y Adolescentes de Honduras nos hablan sobre la violencia: Escuchemos lo que tienen que decirnos!* , International Save the Children Alliance, Tegucigalpa, 2006, p. 12.

[11] J Orellana, Personal interview, Ilobasco, El Salvador, 12 March 2008.

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